
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HAN YÜ AND THE BUDDHA'S RELIC: AN EPISODE IN MEDIEVAL CHINESE RELIGION

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IN FEBRUARY, A.D. 819, Han Yü presented to the Imperial Throne what later became the best known attack upon Buddhism ever produced by a Chinese writer—his "Memorial Concerning the Relic of the Buddha." This short document is intrinsically interesting because of its literary character; its directness, its clarity, and its apt choice of words shine through even an English translation. Han Yü has rightly been called "the most venerated of all those ever associated with Chinese literature."[1] This memorial is even more interesting because of the circumstances under which it was written and the boldness of its conception and execution.

The Tang period constitutes perhaps the high point of religious superstition in China. There has always been and still is a very large amount of superstition in China among all classes, but it never was so influential, even among the highest class, as during this period. In the third century B.C., Sün-dz, the third of the great Confucian founders, taught that there are no spirits whatever, completely rejecting all superstition and magic,[2] but Han Confucianism, during the next four centuries, did not follow him in this respect. The notion of spirits and demons is embedded in the ancient Classics, and these writings were then still too close in point of time for the conception of spirits to be successfully eliminated by reinterpretation, as was done in Sung times. Between the third and seventh centuries, intellectual China was floundering in a sea of doubt, despondency, and confusion. Confucianism with its high moral ideals and intellectual guidance ceased to be the directing principle for intelligent people. Its place was taken by Daoist antinomianism, alchemy, and thaumaturgy, together with Buddhist rejection of family life, idol worship, and reliance upon

1. H. A. Giles, *History of Chinese Literature*, p. 160. For translations from Han Yü's poetry and prose, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 160-63, 196-203. Bruno Hermann Luebeck, in his *Han Yü, the Champion of Confucianism* (1938), a Ph.D. thesis at Hartford Seminary Foundation (unpublished), has, perhaps, translated more of Han Yü's writings than anyone else.

2. Cf. H. H. Dubs, *Hsüntze's Works*, Book XVII.

elaborate ritual performances. These two positive religions continued to grow in influence in the Tang period, in spite of temporary checks caused by persecutions. Their popularity among the ignorant masses inevitably accentuated their superstitious aspects. This feature in turn brought them into disfavor with intelligent persons, so that the very success of superstitious Buddhism and Daoism brought about a revival of Confucian scepticism and attacks upon these religions.

Buddhism and Daoism both entrenched themselves firmly in the first two centuries of Tang rule, which began A.D. 618. The Daoists declared that the Tang emperors were descended from the greatest Daoist philosopher, the Lao-dz, who had the same surname as did this dynasty, Li. The Daoists accordingly provided the imperial house with a pedigree going back to Juan-sü, one of the mythical "Five Lords" *(Wu-di)*, in the third millinnium B.C., through Li Er, the Lao-dz, in the sixth century B.C., on down to their own time.[3] The two centuries 550-750 were the age in which the creative force of Chinese Buddhism was most vigorous and when the greatest teachers flourished. The Buddhists built monasteries and temples throughout the country, acquired endowments of lands and slaves, so that they became quite wealthy. They secured the favor of all classes by their promises of supernatural favor and salvation.

At Feng-siang, a city 150 kilometers west of the imperial capital at Chang-an, there was, in the ninth century, in the Monastery of the Gate to the Dharma, a finger bone of the Buddha. According to the written regulations of this monastery, once in thirty years this relic was to be taken from its shrine and exhibited publicly, which event supposedly produced an abundant harvest. At the time for this exhibition, the Emperor, who was later posthumously entitled the Model Exemplar *(Hsien-dzung)* of the Tang dynasty, on February 6th, 819,[4] ordered a courtier to bring this relic into the imperial palace, where it was to remain until the third day, and thereafter was to be sent about to various monasteries to receive their worship and adoration.

The arrival of this relic in the capital caused a great furor. Crowds gathered to see it as it was carried through the streets. The highest nobles and the lowest commoners all thronged to watch it pass. To the

3. Cf. *Sin-Tang-shu* 70 A: 1a, b (Bo-na ed.); also H. H. Dubs, "The Identification of the Lao-dz," *Jour. Amer. Orient. Soc.*, 62, (1942) 302, n. 17.

4. *Jiu-Tang-shu*, 15: 16a (Bo-na ed.).

Buddhists, this event must have appeared as the height of their glory and influence; to the Confucians, however, this procession appeared as an imperial encouragement to superstition, entirely unworthy of an enlightened nation, something that must be stopped at all costs.

Han Yü was then fifty-one years of age. He had achieved fame as the greatest literary artist of his time. In accordance with the Confucian tradition that every outstanding person should serve the nation in its government, in 802, seventeen years before, he had been summoned to the imperial court and had been made a Supervising Inspector. In the performance of his duties he boldly criticized the fiscal policy of the government. But the Emperor (the Virtuous Exemplar, *De-dzung*) wanted no criticism, so he punished this forward man by sending him out of the court to the extreme south of China, where he was made the magistrate of a county in the present Guangdung (a name usually written Kwangtung, but pronounced as here written). Frankness combined with uprightness were not wanted in a sycophantic court, even though Confucian principles required these qualities to be honored. In the third year thereafter, Han Yü was recalled to the court by the new Emperor, the Model Exemplar. Now, however, the jealousy of the ministers caused him to be shifted to Lo-yang, the eastern capital, away from contact with the Emperor. In 817 a policy which he had recommended and which had at first been rejected, was successful in quickly ending a rebellion. He thus secured the confidence of the Model Exemplar and was made an Attendant Gentleman of the Board of Punishments, an imperial advisor of almost ministerial rank.

Han Yü felt even more strongly than other Confucians the national disgrace of giving imperial honor to a superstitious relic. He knew the danger to himself that would result from another criticism of the Throne, for the prime minister, Huang-fu Bo, was jealous of him,[5] and the Emperor would inevitably be angry at any criticism, so that it might even cost him his life. But Han Yü had devoted himself to championing Confucianism and had always followed his conscience in rebuking error. He did not hesitate. When he heard of the proposed procession, he quickly prepared a memorial to the Throne. It is cleverly fashioned, avoiding any direct criticism of the Emperor, but its meaning is clear and unmistakable. As an example of Chinese

5. *Sin-Tang-shu* 176: 5b.

literary style at its best and of incisive direct expression even in the face of danger, it is unequalled:[6]

A MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE RELIC OF BUDDHA

Your subject [Han] Yü says humbly:

[1. *Buddhism does not lengthen human life or benefit a government.*]

Buddhism is merely one of the barbarian *dharmas*. It first came into China during the Later Han period and did not exist in China in ancient times.

Anciently, the Yellow Lord *(Huang-di)* occupied the throne to the hundredth year and attained the one hundred and tenth year of his life. Shao-hao occupied the throne to the eightieth year and attained his hundredth year. Juan-sü occupied the throne to the seventy-ninth year and attained his ninety-eighth year. The Lord [named] Ku occupied the throne to the seventieth year and attained his one hundred and fifth year. The Lord [named] Yao occupied the throne to the ninetieth year and attained his one hundred and eighteenth year. The Lords [named] Shun and Yü both attained their hundredth year.[7] At this time the country was completely tranquil, and the people were peaceful, happy, and [lived to] an advanced age. Nevertheless, China did not yet have any Buddhism. Later, Tang, [the founder of] the Yin

6. This memorial has been translated in part by various persons, but no complete translation has been published. H. A. Giles (*op. cit.*, pp. 200-3) translates an extract. J. J. M. de Groot (*Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, pp. 54-59) translates the incomplete version found in the *Jiu* and *Sin-Tang-shu*. Only Luebeck (*op. cit.*, pp. 168-75) translates the complete version of this memorial found in Han Yü's *Works*, but his translation remains unpublished. The present translation was made before Luebeck's became known to me. I have attempted to present as *exact* a translation as good English allows. For the Chinese original I have used the Commercial Press's anastatic reproduction of a 1227 printing from Ju Hsi's edition of Han Yü's *Works*, *Ju Wen-gung Hsiao Chang-li Sien-sheng Dzi*, in the *Sz-bu Tsung-kan* series, ch. 39, pp. 2b-4a.

7. Mr. Fang (a glossator of the twelfth century) notes that the preceding lengths of reigns and lives are mostly taken from the *Di-wang Shzh-ji*, by Huang-fu Mi (lived 215-282). He is a quite unreliable authority. These ancient rulers are actually all legendary personages, hence their long reigns. But Han Yü did not know of their purely legendary character. They are supposed to have reigned in the third millennium B.C.

In the first part of this memorial, Han Yü is merely repeating a common Confucian argument against Buddhism, which had previously been urged in the last testament of Yao Chung (died 721); cf. de Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 46. But how much more forcefully than Yao Chung does Han Yü state the argument!

[dynasty], also attained his hundredth year.[8] Of Tang's descendants, Tai-mou occupied the throne to the seventy-fifth year, and Wu-ding occupied the throne to the fifty-ninth year. The *Book of History* and the histories do not state to what age they attained. When, however, we infer their age, they both probably attained to not less than their hundredth year. King Wen of the Jou dynasty attained his ninety-seventh year, King Wu attained his ninety-third year, and King Mu occupied the throne to the hundredth year.

At this time also, the Buddhas' *dharma* had not yet entered China, so that this longevity was not because they worshipped the Buddhas.

In the time of Emperor Ming of the [Later] Han [dynasty, China] first possessed the Buddhas' *dharma*.[9] [But] Emperor Ming only occupied the throne to the eighteenth year. Later, rebellions and collapses of dynasties occurred one after another in succession, so that the lives [of rulers] were not long. During the [Liu] Sung, the Tsi, the Liang, the Chen, the Northern Wei [dynasties], and later, the service of the Buddhas became gradually more respectful, but the lengths of reigns became even shorter. Only Emperor Wu of the Liang [dynasty][10] occupied the throne to his forty-ninth year. Altogether [this emperor] thrice left the world and became a [Buddhist] monk, abandoning himself to Buddhism. At the sacrifices in his ancestral temples he did not employ bloody sacrifices. He ate only one meal a day, and restricted himself to vegetables and fruits. Yet, in the end, he was pursued by Hou Jing and died of starvation in his fortified palace, so that his dynasty was destroyed. He served the Buddhas and sought for their blessings, but instead obtained calamity. Looking at it in this way, one can see that the Buddhas are not worth being served.

[2. *The dynastic policy has been to repress Buddhism.*]

After the Eminent Founder *(Tai-dzu)* [of the Tang dynasty, Emperor Shen-yao, named Li Yüan], had first received the abdication of

8. The *Historical Memoirs* (*Shzh-ji*), written by Sz-ma Tsien (lived 145-ca. 85 B.C.), which is our best source for such matters, do not state the age of Tang; this length of his life is also given by Huang-fu Mi; cf. E. Chavannes, *Les Mémoirs Historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien*, I, 187, n. 5.

9. Buddhism was popularly believed to have been brought to China as a result of Emperor Ming's dream of a Buddha during A.D. 64-67; Yao Chung makes that statement. But Chinese records testify to its arrival in 2 B.C. This dream is a later invention; cf. J. R. Ware, *T'oung Pao*, 30 (1933) 110, n. 7 and the literature listed there.

10. Reigned A.D. 505-550.

the Sui [dynasty], he discussed doing away with Buddhism.[11] But at that time, the ability and knowledge of his courtiers was not great, and they did not profoundly understand the Way of the ancient [Confucian sage]-kings nor what was appropriate to both ancient and present times. They obscured his sage intelligence in order to save this fraudulent [doctrine], so that this proposal was thereupon dropped, which event your humble subject has constantly regretted deeply.

Humbly I have considered that Emperor Rui-sheng-wen-wu,[12] and your Majesty's godlike sageness and heroic bravery, which for several thousands or hundreds of years have not been equalled, at the beginning of your reigns immediately prohibited people from leaving the world to become Buddhist or Daoist monks or nuns, and also prohibited the establishment of new Buddhist or Daoist monasteries.[13]

11. In 624 a minister, Fu Yi, submitted a memorial advocating the abolition of Buddhism and Daoism. The Emperor's advisors opposed it. After his abdication in 627 this matter was dropped. Cf. de Groot, *op. cit.*, 36-43.

12. This title uses the first word in the posthumous name of the Dynastic Exemplar, Dai-dzung (reign 762-779), which is Rui-wen Hsiao-wu *(Jiu-Tang-shu* 11: 28b), with the last three words in the honorary name given this same ruler by his courtiers in 763: "Emperor Sheng-wen-wu of the Bao-ying year-period" *(ibid.,* 11: 4a).

I can, however, find no account in the imperial annals that the Dynastic Exemplar prohibited the consecration of monks and nuns at the beginning of his reign; de Groot *(op. cit.)* lists none. In September and October, 765, when the Tibetans and other invaders were threatening even the capital, the *Ren-wang Sutra,* which was believed to protect a country from all kinds of calamities and induce prosperity, was publicly chanted at two Buddhist monasteries at the imperial capital, before Buddhist idols, which performances were attended by court officials *(Jiu-Tang-shu* 11: 8b, 9a; *Sin-Tang-shu* 6: 9b, 10a). After this danger had passed, however, on March 14th, 766 and on February 25th, 767, this same Emperor issued edicts markedly Confucian in tone, the latter of which ordered the burning of all private prophecies and supernaturalistic Confucian interpretations of the Classics (the *wei-shu*); cf. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 11: 9b, 10a, 11b, 12a. If at this time there was issued a prohibition against the consecration of Buddhist monks and nuns, it would almost surely have been recorded in the *Jiu-Tang-shu.*

In July or August, 779, the Virtuous Exemplar *(De-dzung),* Emperor Sheng-wu-hsiao-wen, in the same year that he ascended the throne, decreed: "From this time henceforth, it is not permitted that petitions may be offered for permission to erect Buddhist or Daoist monasteries or to enter the monastic life." Han Yü was almost certainly thinking of this latter ordinance and made a mistake in the name of the emperor enacting it; cf. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 12: 2b; de Groot, *op. cit.*, 53. This error may indicate the haste with which Han Yü prepared his memorial.

13. On March 15th, 807, the Model Exemplar decreed that thereafter the officials of the Board of Sacrifices *(Sz-bu)* should issue certificates for all Buddhist and

Your subject has constantly considered that the purpose of the Eminent Founder ought to be carried out at the hands of Your Majesty. Even though [this purpose] may not yet be now immediately put into effect, how could it be that [this religion] should be given free license and, contrary to [that purpose], be caused to become more flourishing?

[3. *The dangerous social consequences of this imperial order.*]

Now it has been heard that Your Majesty has ordered a crowd of monks to bring a bone of the Buddha from the storied building in Feng-siang-[shou]-yü,[14] in order that it may be seen and may be carried into the inner apartments of the imperial palace, and it has also been ordered that various monasteries should forward it and should make offerings to it.

Although your subject is extremely stupid, I yet know that Your Majesty is not misled by such Buddhist performances, and that this respectful treatment is in order to pray for blessings and is just to secure a prosperous harvest, to make the people joyful, to accord with popular ideas, and merely to provide the means for an extraordinary and strange spectacle and amusement for the gentlemen and commoners of the imperial capital. How could it be that your sage intelligence is such that you would be willing to believe in this sort of a thing?

Yet the people are stupid creatures, are easily misled, and it is difficult for them to be perspicacious. If they see that Your Majesty does such things, they will say that in your heart of hearts you serve the Buddhas. They will all say that the Son of Heaven is a great sage who, moreover, with his whole heart respects and believes [this religion]. Then how could it be that any person among the people would thereupon regret the ruin of his own person or his life? By hundreds or tens they will set fire to [incense] on the tops of their heads [in becoming monks] and will burn off their fingers in sacrifice. By hundreds or tens they will doff their clothes, scatter their money, and from morning to

Daoist monks and nuns and street preachers (*Jiu-Tang-shu* 14: 10b). This was probably the ordinance limiting the number of monasteries, nunneries, monks, and nuns in the empire and limiting ordinations to once every three years, which is recorded in *Jiu-Tang-shu* 43: 11a, *Sin-Tang-shu* 48: 9a, b, and discussed in de Groot, *op. cit.*, 52. (These authorities do not indicate at what time this limitation was made).

14. Feng-siang-shou-yü was a ward in the present Feng-siang, Shensi; cf. ***Shina Rekidai Chimei Yoran,*** by Sadao Aoyama, p. 599b.

night they will turn to imitating such acts. Verily, I fear that thereafter old and young will run to discard their occupations and habitations [to become monks and nuns]. Unless there is immediately imposed a prohibition, to check and control the various monasteries, there will inevitably be those who will cut off their members or slice up their bodies in making offerings, which will injure the customs and destroy the usages [of the people] and make the land a laughing-stock to the world. This would be no small matter.

[4. *Buddhism is un-Chinese and immoral.*]

Verily, the Buddha was by origin a barbarian. He did not understand the Chinese language. His garments were of a different fashion [from those of the Chinese]. He did not talk about the models set by the ancient [Chinese sage]-kings. In his speech and his person he did not conform to the models or the mourning practices of the ancient sage-kings. He did not understand the proper loyalty between prince and subject nor the proper affection between father and son. If he were still living and should come to your court and capital as an envoy at the command of his country, Your Majesty would tolerate and receive him. But there would be only one audience for him in the Hall for Disseminating Good Government,[15] one feast for him in the Hall for Courtesy to Guests, and one suit of clothes would be granted to him. Then he would be put under guard and sent beyond the frontiers, in order not to permit him to mislead the crowd of common people. How much more [should he be treated thus, now] that he has been dead for so long a time!

[5. *The un-classical nature of allowing such a baneful thing to approach the imperial person.*]

This dry bone is left over from his baneful funerary remains. How could it be proper that it should be caused to enter the forbidden apartments of the imperial palace? Confucius said, "Reverence the spirits while maintaining the proper distance in relations with them."[16] Anciently, when the feudal nobles went to pay their respects to a deceased person at his state, they moreover ordered shamans and invokers previously to use peach wood and broom straw to exorcise

15. The Hall for Disseminating Good Government *(Süan-jeng)* was the reception hall at the imperial palace.

16. *Analects* VI, XX.

and drive away any evil, and then only did they pay their respects.[17] Now, without urgent reason for doing so, you are to approach in person and view this rotten and baneful thing. Shamans and invokers are not to go first. Peach wood and broom straw are not to be applied. If your courtiers have not declared its wrongness, if the censors have not brought forward its error, your subject is really ashamed of them. I beg that this bone may be delivered to the high officials to be thrown into water or fire, in order forever to annihilate the root [of this evil], to cut short the doubts of the country, to end the delusions of later generations, and to cause the people of the world to know that the deeds of a great sage surpass by tens of thousands of degrees those of ordinary beings. Would that not be grand! Could it not be delightful!

[6. *He takes upon himself any untoward results of his proposal.*]

If, however, the Buddha does possess supernatural power and should produce any calamity or evil effect,[18] all such calamities and blame

17. Peach wood was believed in ancient China to drive away evil spirits. Broom straw was believed to sweep away such spirits. Han Yü is referring to the classical *Dzo-juan*, Duke Siang, year XXIX, 1; J. Legge's translation in *Chinese Classics*, pp. 544[3], 547b. This passage recounts an incident in 554 B.C., when Duke Siang of Lu, then a vassal of the state of Chu, was ordered to go in person to Chu in order to present shrouds for the deceased King Kang of Chu. He feared to do so and was advised to have the corpse first exorcised. Shamans accordingly used peach wood and broom straw to drive away evil influences from the corpse and the shrouds, whereupon the shrouds were spread out for presentation.

This practice is elevated into a principle in a chapter of the *Li-ji* dating from the third century B.C. (J. Legge, *Li Ki*, II, II, ü 42; *Sacred Books of the East*, XXVII, p. 172): "When a prince attends the mourning ceremonies for a subject, he takes along shamans and invokers with peach wood and broom straw, along with halberd-bearers, to avert [evil influences]. Thereby he [merely] treats [the deceased] differently from in his lifetime." The last sentence is the anti-superstitious Confucian author's attempt to harmonize this practice with his philosophy. But Jeng Hsüan (A.D. 127-200), in a note to this passage, reports the belief of his age: "The nature of peach wood is to drive away evil [influences]. The spirits and divinities fear it." This practice was thus interpreted either as actually efficacious to avert evil or as a mere ceremony useful only to distinguish the proprieties for the dead from those for the living, depending upon the philosophical belief of the performer. Han Yü himself had few such superstitious fears. He instances this event as the proper classical method of treating a corpse and also, perhaps, used it to terrify the superstitious Emperor.

18. For *chung* (H. A. Giles, *Chinese-English Dictionary*, character no. 2930) "lofty, to worship," which does not make sense, the edition of Han Yü's words with annotations by five hundred persons *(Wu-bo-jia Ju-yin-bien Chang-li Sien-sheng Wen-dzi)* reads *fu* (Giles, no. 3707), "happiness," which is obviously an emendation. But

should be visited upon the person of your subject. If Heaven should look down and visit such things upon me, your subject will hold no resentment or regrets, nor fail to meet whatever may come with the greatest firmness and sincerity.

Respectfully your subject Yü presents this memorial with sincere agitation of mind and sincere respectful fear, in order that it may be reported to the Throne.

The consequences of this memorial were all that Han Yü might have feared. The Emperor was very angry, and the next day took the memorial to the prime minister, telling him to order Han Yü's execution. When two of Han Yü's influential friends interceded with the Emperor, the latter replied:

Yü says that I serve the Buddhas, which goes very much too far. How could I still be lenient with him? He even says that after the Later Han dynasty served the Buddhas all the emperors and kings suffered from an early death. How could he utter such an unreasonable criticism? In his capacity as a courtier Yü is presumptious and arrogant. He certainly cannot be pardoned.[19]

Evidently someone, possibly the prime minister, had misinterpreted Han Yü's memorial to the Emperor. His friends were obliged to induce some imperial relatives to intercede with the Emperor and point out to him that a death sentence was too severe a punishment for a faithful admonishment. So, on February 12th, just six days after the relic had been ordered to be brought to the palace, Han Yü was exiled from the court by being sent as governor to Chao-jou, the present Chao-an, on the seacoast of eastern Guangdung.[20] He left the next day and arrived on March 23rd.[21]

After his arrival he sent to the Throne a memorial, thanking the

the character *fu* does not in any way resemble *chung*, so that only with difficulty is it admissible as an emendation. I have read *chung* as *sui* (Giles no. 10,424) "an evil spirit, an evil influence," which character differs only very slightly from *chung* and, being uncommon, would easily be copied as *chung*.

19. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 160: 4a, b. Clerks attended imperial audiences to record imperial deliverances (Cf. H. H. Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, III, ch. 99 A: 27a), so that these imperial and other statements were very likely taken from stenographic records.

20. *Shina Rekidai Chimei Yoran*, 455b.

21. From his life by Hung Hsing-dzu, printed in the edition of Han Yü's *Works* with annotations by 500 persons, appendix, 7: 1b.

Emperor for having spared his life and for giving him an opportunity to continue serving the state. He spoke of his declining health and expressed his regret that he was not permitted to serve at the court, where he might extol the Emperor in his verses. When the Emperor received this note, he said to his ministers:

> Yesterday I received a memorial from Han Yü after he had reached Chao-jou. He thinks that his remonstrance concerning the Buddha's bone was a great matter and that this was an expression of love for me, and asks how I could fail to recognize it. But in his capacity as a courtier Yü ought not to have said that the Lord of Men serves the Buddhas or that my life would be shortened thereby. Because of that I disliked it. Let him be pardoned and transferred [to the capital].[22]

But the prime minister, Huang-fu Bo, feared Han Yü's straightforwardness and replied,

> Yü is really quite arrogant and disrespectful. He might be tried out for a time by being transferred to another commandery.[23]

So, on November 12th, Han Yü was appointed governor of Yüan-jou, the present Yi-chun, in western Jiangsi (Kiangsi).[24]

Then, as if to confirm the superstitious interpretation of Han Yü's memorial, the Emperor died on February 14th of the next year. Two days previously, the superstitious Emperor had taken a draught of medicine given him by a eunuch.[25] This medicine was almost surely represented to the Emperor as the elixir of immortality. Since an important constituent of that elixir was cinnabar, a poisonous mercury compound, the usual dose of the alchemical gold in that elixir was as much as could be placed upon the point of a jade knife. This amount was supposed to cure sickness and restore youth. Wang Shou-cheng, another eunuch in the imperial palace at that very time, asserted that he had previously prepared such draughts frequently for an earlier patron.[26] The Emperor was evidently given an overdose, for he immediately fell ill, suffered for two days, and died. On November 20th, 820, after Huang-fu Bo had been dismissed by the new Emperor, Han Yü was recalled to court and made the Libationer (or president) of

22. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 160: 5a.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Shina Rekidai Chimei Yoran*, 718b.
25. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 15: 20a.
26. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 184: 10b.

the Imperial Academy.[27] He died on December 25th, 824,[28] in the fifty-seventh year of his age, loaded with honors.

For those inclined to superstition, there is also the following historical event. On April 6th, 873, another Emperor, the Beautiful Exemplar *(Yi-dzung)*, likewise ordered the same finger-bone of Buddha to be brought to the capital and palace. On the same day that this order was given it rained yellow mud. The Emperor's advisors were aghast, and pointed out to him that when the Model Exemplar had brought this relic to his palace, he had died within a year. But the Beautiful Exemplar would not be frightened, and is said to have declared that if he could only view the relic, death would hold no terrors for him. It was duly brought into the city on May 8th, where the streets had been decorated in its honor. The Emperor welcomed and reverenced it in person. But he died that same year, on August 15th, at only forty years of age. Make out of this incident what you can!

Han Yü was not himself absolutely free from superstition. In one essay he discusses the nature of spirits:

> Spirits [ordinarily] make no sounds, have no shape, and possess no aura *(chi)*. . . . If people disobey Heaven, do wrong to other people, are cruel to living creatures, or go contrary to moral obligations, they affect the aura. Thereupon spirits take shapes. By their shapes they produce sounds in response [to these evil aura]. So they send down chastisements and calamities—all of which are caused by human beings. When that has been done, they return to their ordinary condition.[29]

This simple belief in the automatic response of spirits to punish human sins is almost his only concession to superstition. It is derived from the teaching of Mo-dz (fourth century B.C.). If one cavils at this, he should remember that even Epicurus and Lucretius believed in gods.

Han Yü's memorial concerning the Buddha's relic was merely one shot in the long war of medieval Confucianism against superstition. This essay had few immediate effects, except upon Han Yü himself. Its importance lies in its own intrinsic interest and in its effects upon his successors. It shows the risks a Confucian had to run, if he was to

27. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 16: 5a.

28. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 160: 6a.

29. From Han Yü's essay, "The Origin of Spirits *(Yüan-guei)*," ch. 11, p. 7a, b of his *Works*.

be true to his faith. It also indicates the temper of educated men at that time. Such men were then few, as they have been elsewhere, but they were the intellectual leaders of the country.

After Han Yü's death, more progress was made against Buddhism. On August 11th, 853, the Elegant Exemplar *(Wen-dzung)* enacted a law that no more Buddhist monks or nuns should be consecrated.[30] On September 30th, 845, the Military Exemplar *(Wu-dzung)*, under the influence of certain Daoists, issued the edict that broke the power of Buddhism. Almost all the Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, and shrines were ordered destroyed, leaving only one in each larger department. More than 260,000 monks and nuns were ordered to return to civil life and to marry. The entire wealth and lands of these monasteries were confiscated.[31] While certain of these temples were soon rebuilt, and while even emperors at times encouraged Buddhism, yet this religion never recovered its earlier strength. Its economic foundation, which had been built up during many centuries, had been taken away and could not be replaced. Daoism, in its turn, suffered a worse blow in 1258 and 1281 at the hands of Kublai Khan.

Still more important is the fact that Han Yü inaugurated a new school of Confucianism, which came to its flower in the Sung period. This Confucianism left no place for even Han Yü's attenuated belief in spirits. Sung Confucianism is free from such superstition. The universe arises from the operation of impersonal powers. Unfortunately, however, this philosophy does not remove the possibility that there are occult forces. Hence geomancy, divination, and all the practices embodied in *feng-shui*, are quite in harmony with Sung Confucianism. Although some Confucians attacked these beliefs too, their attacks could not be effective. Yet Han Yü's essay has remained a beacon light to intelligent persons and has been read, because of its impeccable style, by every Chinese schoolboy.

30. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 17 B: 15b.

31. *Jiu-Tang-shu* 18 A: 14a, b; de Groot, *op. cit.*, 61-67. I assume that the day on which the first edict is dated, which does not fit the seventh month, in which it is dated, was really in the eighth month, and that both edicts were of the same date.

"THE CHRISTIAN PARTY IN POLITICS"

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DURING THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS of American national existence, indifference to institutional religion was widespread, particularly among the cultured group which produced national leaders. Deism and Unitarianism claimed many adherents, among them the first six presidents of the United States. The constitutional provision against a religious test for office-holding was not, it is true, immediately duplicated in every state; in those states, however, where there was an established church, liberal religionists and members of non-conforming religious organizations united to break the grip of the establishment. The campaign for disestablishment in Virginia produced masterly statements of the principle of religious liberty from the pens of Jefferson and Madison, and was supported by Baptists and, probably, by Presbyterians, as well as by such "Wheelhorses of revolution" as Archibald Cary of Ampthill, who was presiding officer of the Virginia Senate at the time.[1]

While disestablishment was welcomed by all save members and clergymen of the established churches, that indifference to religious organization which helped to bring about disestablishment was far less welcome. Loud were the protests evoked by Jefferson's expression of the essentially private character of religious belief: "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg."[2] Most of those who protested most vociferously conveniently forgot to cite the first sentence of this statement and thereby falsified Jefferson's position by eliminating his frame of reference.[3] At the time of Jefferson's election to the presidency,

1. Cf. C. E. Merriam, *A History of American Political Theories* (New York, 1924) pp. 86-88; A. Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1943); H. W. Schneider, "The Enlightenment in Thomas Jefferson," *Ethics*, 53 (1942-43), 246-54; R. K. Brock, *Archibald Cary of Ampthill, Wheelhorse of the Revolution* (Richmond, Va., 1937).

2. Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia*, in A. Koch, and W. Peden, *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Modern Library, New York, 1944) p. 275.

3. See, for example, T. Dwight, *An Oration Delivered at New-Haven on the 7th*

such statements as these were widely used against his candidacy, and, in fact, an attempt was made to defeat him by injecting the issue of his "irreligious" attitude into the campaign.[4] The loss of clerical prestige and influence which was one of the incidental outcomes of disestablishment disturbed some, especially in Congregational New England, where the clergy had been in a central position.

> The minister with two or three principal characters were supreme in each town.—Hence the body of the clergy, with a few families of distinction, between whom there was ever a most intimate connection, in effect, ruled the whole state. The loss of this happy influence of the clergy, in this country, is deeply to be regretted, and is to be ascribed to two causes—the increase of knowledge, and growing opposition to religion.—Knowledge has induced the laity to think and act for themselves, and an opposition to religion has curtailed the power of its supporters.[5]

Others labored to defend the thesis that democracy is the true political expression of Christianity, and that, therefore, Christianity is the necessary religious background for democracy; that only the truly Christian can create a good government.

> Religion (I speak of it only as the spring of popular government, and as it is politically beneficial. . . .) religion,—a principle inborn and instinctive, in the human heart, so effective of good, so productive of felicity:—that principle, which restrains while it consoles the poor, which abases the pride, while it declares the duties of the rich, powerfully impressing as it does, the lesson of christian equality,—that, the father of the universe, looks with an eye, of equal beneficence, on the whole family of mankind. . . . This Religion, the philosophists, the fabricators of recent revolutions, ridicule, afflict and persecute, and have confederated their exertions to banish it from the earth.[6]

of July, A.D. 1801 before the Society of the Cincinnati, for the State of Connecticut, assembled to celebrate the anniversary of American Independence. (Hartford, 1801). p. 10. ". . . the laws of another State, by which, in that State, all restraint is removed, and men are left entirely free to worship, at their pleasure, 'twenty Gods, or no God.' "

4. See, for example, the superficially reasonable argument in the anonymous pamphlet, *The Claims of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency, Examined at the Bar of Christianity.* By a Layman, (Philadelphia, 1800).

5. David Daggett, Esq., Attorney at Law, *An Oration pronounced in the Brick Meeting-House in the City of New Haven, on the Fourth of July, A.D. 1787. It being the eleventh anniversary of the Independence of the United States of America.* (New Haven, Conn., [1787]), p. 6. See also Dwight, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

6. W. Hunter, Esq., *An Oration delivered in Trinity-Church in Newport, on the fourth of July, 1801.* (Newport, R. I., 1801), pp. 21-22. See also Dwight, *op. cit.*, p. 18;

At the time of the death of Jefferson and John Adams on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, there was, on the surface, an era of good feeling in matters of religion, as in matters of politics. Maryland had just abolished its test act after a struggle lasting thirty years.[7] Liberal religionists were politically dominant throughout the entire country. "Anti-Christian elements were by no means aggressive except perhaps in remote regions where 'Freethinkers' dwelt in small communities."[8] Under the surface, however, there was a gathering of forces for an assault on the principles of religious freedom. These isolated citations, from those who felt that tolerance in matters of belief was tantamount to indifference, suggest the nature of this attack. Other straws in the wind were the formation of national organizations by five Christian denominations, the establishment in 1810 of the American Board of Foreign Missions under Congregationalist auspices, and the foundation of the American Bible Society in 1816 and of the American Sunday School Union in 1817. In Kentucky, as a matter of fact, the issue between liberalism and the organized religions became open warfare as early as 1812.[9]

All was fair on the surface, but reaction had set in. Abner Kneeland, pastor of the First Universalist Church in New York City, discussed the dangers of restriction of liberty of thought in his address on the "semicentural" Fourth of July. Our ancestors, he said, had come to this country to avoid persecution for conscience' sake, and,

> Of all the despotisms which have ever infested the human race, there is none more cruel, none more unrelenting, than that which masks itself under the

Eliphalet Nott, *The Providence of God Towards American Israel, A Discourse, delivered in the Presbyterian Church, in Albany The Fourth of July, 1801. At the Celebration of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of American Independence.* (n.p.,n.d.), pp. 30-31; R. Puffer, *A Discourse delivered at Berlin, July 4, 1810, on the Anniversary of American Independence,* (Leominster, Mass., 1810), p. 9. For the briefest possible summary of this theme, see J. Evarts, *An Oration delivered at Charleston, (Mass.) on the Fourth of July, 1812, in commemoration of American Independence.* (Charlestown, 1812), p. 10: "There never was a republic worthy of the name, unless among a people who were in a considerable degree under the influence of Christianity."

7. Joseph L. Blau, "The Maryland 'Jew Bill,'" *Review of Religion,* VIII (1943-44), 227-39.

8. Martha Edwards, "Religious Forces in the United States, 1815-1830," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* V (1918-19), 436.

9. See Niels Henry Sonne, *Liberal Kentucky, 1780-1828* (New York, 1939), especially chapters IV and V.

hypocritical garb of superstition, falsely called religion. . . . With its more convenient, but less convincing arguments, *fire and fagots*, it was this hydra-headed monster that drove our forefathers into this, then, waste howling wilderness.[10]

The liberty our ancestors sought was liberty of the mind as well as liberty of the body, Kneeland continued. While liberty of the body was being denied to some, to the slaves of the South, "there is a species of slavery more to be dreaded than that of the body! We mean that of the mind—and this pervades, in a greater or less degree, in the Northern as well as the Southern states."[11] He admitted that his auditors might be astonished to hear, and "perhaps unwilling to admit" the mental slavery of their fellow citizens. He urged, however, that they should ask themselves

how many can there be found who dare express their opinions freely on all subjects, particularly on religious subjects, unless their opinions should happen to accord with what they know to be popular in the eyes of the religious part of the community? But why should one man, or one set or class of men, have any more right or privilege in this respect than another? . . . Why should any man suffer in his person, reputation, or estate, because (forsooth) he cannot think with his neighbor on all subjects.[12]

Despite his reference to a "set or class of men," Kneeland did not mean to indict the clergy as a group, although they "may have the vanity to think, that they are set as guardians of the consciences of their fellow-beings." Some clergymen, he stated, were "rational, as well as liberal men. They are men who never try to convince by coercion." To men of this sort, his remarks did not apply.

Still, and we feel it our imperious duty to declare it, we perceive, or think we perceive, a spirit of intolerance, of *"spiritual intolerance* and *oppression,"* growing in our country; which, if not checked by firm and manly resistance, will one day, sooner or later, sap the very foundation, not only of our religious, but also of our civil institutions! . . . Let it not . . . be supposed that it requires the edicts of popes, councils, or synods, to take away the right of private judgment in matters of religion. The moment that civil privileges are

10. Abner Kneeland, *An Oration delivered July 4, 1826, being the semicentural anniversary of the independence of the United States of America,* (New York, 1826), p. 11.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 24.

12. *Ibid.,* pp. 24-25.

granted to one man, and withheld from another, on account of his religious faith, that moment seeds of "*spiritual intolerance* and *oppression*" are sown.[13]

Kneeland's forebodings were not without justification. Exactly one year later, in a Fourth of July sermon delivered in the Seventh Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia, Ezra Stiles Ely, pastor of the Third Presterian Church of that city founded in the spirit of liberty and brotherhood by William Penn, gave utterance to one of the boldest expressions of "spiritual intolerance and oppression" that have been heard in the United States.[14] The immediate occasion of the publication of this discourse was the refusal of the Pennsylvania legislature, in February, 1828, to grant an act of incorporation to the American Sunday School Union. It must not be forgotten, however, that the delivery of the discourse, and, in fact, its first publication in the columns of *The Philadelphian,* a Presbyterian magazine edited by Dr. Ely, antedated this act of the legislature by several months. Dr. Ely's proposal was an ingenious one. He did not advocate an establishment or a religious test; he was not in favor of a union of church and state.[15] What, then, was his proposal?

Very simply put, it was that the "Christians" of the United States form themselves into a pressure group, transcending sectarian lines, to prevent the election of "opponents of Christianity," such as "Pagans, Socinians, Mussulmen, Deists." Pagans and Mohammedans are few in the United States today; in 1827 their number was certainly far less. It was, then, to prevent the election of Deists and Socinians, or Unitarians, that Ely urged union. *But every president of the United States up to 1827 was either a Unitarian or a Deist.* They had been chosen in the constitutionally prescribed manner by their fellow citizens, who judged them fitter than all others to lead the country. Ely's proposal involved a revolutionary change in the criteria by which fitness for public office should be measured:

13. *Ibid.,* pp. 26-27.

14. Ezra Stiles Ely, D.D., *The Duty of Christian Freemen to Elect Christian Rulers . . .* with an appendix designed to vindicate the liberty of Christians, and of the American Sunday School Union (Philadelphia, 1828). The excellent discussion of Ely and his speech in A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945), pp. 136-40, had not appeared when this article was written. The interpretation in that book is even more political than mine. Ely's speech is reprinted in full in Joseph L. Blau, *American Philosophic Addresses, 1700-1900* (New York, 1946).

15. *Ibid.,* p. 5.

Let it then be distinctly stated and fearlessly maintained IN THE FIRST PLACE, that every member of this Christian nation, from the highest to the lowest, ought to serve the Lord with fear, and yield his sincere homage to the Son of God. Every ruler *should be* an avowed and a sincere friend of Christianity. He should know and believe the doctrines of our holy religion, and act in conformity with its precepts. . . . Our civil rulers ought to act a religious part in all the relations which they sustain.[16]

The distinctive feature of Dr. Ely's plan was that, within limits, it transcended sectarianism. He admitted that he would himself prefer to vote for a Presbyterian, but, short of that, he would be willing to accept a member of any one of "the truly Christian sects" in preference "to any man destitute of religious principles and morality."[17] He proposed a union of "five classes of true Christians" to dominate elections:

If three or four of the most numerous denominations of Christians in the United States, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, the Methodists and Congregationalists for instance, should act upon this principle, our country would never be dishonoured with an *avowed infidel* in her national cabinet or capitol. The Presbyterians alone could bring *half a million of electors* into the field, in opposition to any known advocate of Deism, Socinianism, or any species of avowed hostility to the truth of Christianity. If to the denominations above named we add the members of the Protestant Episcopal church in our country, the electors of these five classes of true Christians, united in the sole requisition of apparent friendship to Christianity in every candidate for office whom they will support, could govern every public election in our country.[18]

To the five sects whose co-operation Ely advocated here, he added the Lutheran groups and the Dutch Reformed Church members.

This "new sort of union" he called "a Christian party in politics," and he expressed his great desire that "all good men in our country should join; not by *subscribing a constitution* and the formation of a new society; . . . but by adopting, avowing, and determining to act upon, truly religious principles in all civil matters."[19] While he emphasized constantly the point that it is moral fitness which is most important, his definition of moral fitness involved adherence to one of the more orthodox Christian sects. Thus he urged "that all who reverence the Lord's day, will abstain from supporting by their suffrages the open violaters of

16. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

the fourth commandment."[20] In colonial days, this was considered a religious matter, rather than a civil concern. Again, "All who profess to be Christians of any denomination ought to agree that they will support no man as candidate for any office, who is not professedly friendly to Christianity, and a believer in divine Revelation."[21] This, too, was one of Ely's criteria of moral fitness. "Why," he asked, "should we ever suffer an enemy, an open and known enemy of the true religion of Christ, to enact our laws or fill the executive chair?"[22]

And yet again, as if foreseeing the arguments which might be used against his plan, Ely insisted that

> It deprives no man of his right for me to prefer a Christian to an Infidel. If Infidels were the most numerous electors, they would doubtless elect men of their own sentiments; and unhappily such men not unfrequently get into power in this country, in which ninety-nine hundredths of the people are believers in the divine origin and authority of the Christian religion. . . . Have we not as much liberty to be supporters of the Christian cause by our votes, as others have to support anti-christian men and measures?[23]

Even the argument that the adoption of such a plan would breed hypocrisy did not trouble Ely. "There is," he said, "no natural tendency in the scheme to make men deceivers; and if real enemies of the Christian religion conceal their enmity, that concealment is for the public good." It would at the very least create the necessity for appearing religious; while it would be desirable "that public officers SHOULD BE good men, friends of God, followers of Jesus Christ," if this were not immediately possible, "it is a matter of thankfulness if they are constrained TO SEEM such persons."[24]

In sum, Ely urged his listeners to say, "Let a civil ruler . . . be a Christian *of some sort* . . . rather than not a Christian of any denomination."[25] He exhorted them to be "Christian politicians," "as conscientiously religious at the polls as in the pulpit or house of worship."

> Let us never support by our votes . . . any known contemner of the fundamental doctrines of Christ, for any office: and least of all for the Presidency of

20. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
25. *Ibid.*

these United States. . . . Let us elect men who dare to acknowledge the Lord Jesus Christ for their Lord in their public documents. Which of our Presidents has ever done this? It would pick no infidel's pocket, and break no Jew's neck, if our President should be so singular as to let it be known, that he is a *Christian* by his Messages, and an advocate for the Deity of Christ by his personal preference of a Christian temple to a Socinian conventicle. . . . We are a Christian nation: we have a right to demand that all our rulers in their conduct shall conform to Christian morality; and if they do not, it is the duty and privilege of Christian freemen to make a new and a better election.[26]

Dr. Ely's views were apparently referred to on the floor of the Pennsylvania legislature during the debate on the incorporation of the American Sunday School Union. The accusation against him, which was repeated in the newpapers, was that the author advocated "the union of church and state, and the establishment of a predominant religious sect by civil authority." This charge was, of course, baseless; Ely argued well against it in his "Appendix, designed to vindicate the liberty of Christians." His perfectly consistent argument, granting his fundamental belief in the necessary interrelationship of civil and religious life, not surprising in a leader of Presbyterian thought, was that as an infidel had the political liberty of being an infidel, so the Christian had the political liberty of being a Christian. "Are Christians the only men in the community who may not be guided by their judgment, conscience, and choice in electing their rulers?"[27]

The possibility that union of church and state might result from the course he urged may or may not have been present in Ely's mind. His real fault was the abuse of freedom of religion by advocating political action to gain religious ends.[28] He certainly did not desire an establishment; he was one of the first to realize the strength of a union of sectarian groups which would be at loggerheads in the event that one of them were to become the established church. What he was actually concerned with is clear from one sentence in the Appendix, quoted from a report of the Sunday School Union: "In ten years, or certainly in twenty, the political power of our country would be in the hands of men whose characters have been formed under the influence of Sabbath schools." What this

26. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

28. This is an instance of the type of abuse which I have called "freedom *for* religion." See Joseph L. Blau, "The Freeborn Mind," *Review of Religion*, IX (1944-45), 31-41.

character training would amount to is stated in another sentence quoted by Ely from the same report: "These institutions [Sabbath schools] may terminate in an *organized system of mutual co-operation* between ministers and private christians, so that every church shall be a disciplined army . . . in the grand onset against sin."[29]

This makes it clear that Ely did think of himself as one of the heads of a real political party. There is, in fact, a striking similarity between the expression used by Ely to define the results of Sabbath school influence and the words used by Jefferson in a letter to Madison concerning the choice of a law professor for the University of Virginia. In this letter, Jefferson argued that the law students of the country "no longer know what Whigism or republicanism means." He ascribed this to the popularity of Blackstone's Tory commentaries as a text-book. He continued:

> It is in our seminary that that vestal flame [of republicanism] is to be kept alive; it is thence it is to spread anew over our own and the sister States. *If we are true and vigilant in our trust, within a dozen or twenty years a majority of our own legislature will be from one school,* and many disciples will have carried its doctrine home with them to their several States, and will have leavened thus the whole mass.[30]

Ely must have been consciously thinking as a party leader, just as Jefferson was undoubtedly conscious of his obligation to build the future of the party he had led for so many years.

So radical a proposal as that of Ely naturally aroused considerable opposition. Some was direct and clear; it named names and argued issues. Other opposition was implied in indirect reproof of clerical usurpation and in positive restatement of the principles of separatism. Without attempting a complete survey of all the writings of those who were opposed to Ely's plan, it is my purpose briefly to examine three different expressions of the anti-Ely writers.

The first type of opposition to be considered here is that of the free thinkers. In the *Free Enquirer,* edited by Frances Wright and Robert Dale Owen, one article after another is devoted wholly or in part to direct attacks on Ely and his proposal. It is said that the decision reached by Fannie Wright to abandon her ladylike modesty (never more than skin deep!) and take to the lecture platform was induced by her fear that

29. Ely, p. 18. Italics in the original.
30. Koch and Peden, *Thomas Jefferson,* pp. 726-27. Italics mine.

Dr. Ely's "Christian party" would spread like wildfire in the mid-West, then inflamed by a period of revivalism.[31] Miss Wright and Owen recognized that the campaign for the stoppage of the mails on Sunday and other similar demands current in the decade of Ely's speech were aspects of the movement which Ely sponsored. Elyism was an attempt to "pronounce certain creeds and observances to be part of the law of the land"; it "betrayed the whole soul of priestcraft" which was visible before to observing eyes

> in pulpit orations, in clerical electioneering—thus were the designs of priestcraft visible—thus were they palpable—to the minds and pockets of the people, when lo! last and chief, awakes the cry of "union and supremacy!" and a standard is reared under which all the party-colored ranks of orthodoxy may rally into one phalanx, for the purpose of wedding church to state, and of incorporating priestcraft, under the name of Christianity, into the law of the nation.[32]

Fannie was by no means cautious in her accusations. She interpreted the bid of the clergy for control as an answer to the spread of free thought, which made inroads on the ecclesiastical income and threatened the economic security of the craft. Her picture of America dominated by the "Christian party" is vivid and telling. She must have thrilled her audience!

> Consider my friends! and you will perceive the very straitened position of the servants of the temple in the present unquiet season. If they do not resist the bold spirit which is abroad, the foundations of their craft will give way—their altar, so rich in first fruits and fat offerings, will be overthrown. If again they should undertake to quell that spirit, and the spirit should be stronger than they, their ruin would be accelerated. If, on the other hand, they should engage in the contest and carry the victory—ah! my friends, what an if! See the prospect it opens to ambition. "A christian party in politics;" Washington carried by storm; a Baptist senate; a Methodist house of representatives; an Episcopalian cabinet and a Presbyterian president! And to perfect the odor of sanctity of this New-Jerusalem upon earth, you must imagine a Supreme Court, compounded of Bishops, Presbyters, Elders, Deacons and high-seat Fathers of double-refined orthodoxy, propounding the soundest theology of all the sound churches, and trying every case, domestic and foreign, national, international, and individual, by the church catechism, the thirty-nine ar-

31. Albert Post, *Popular Free-Thought in America, 1825-1850,* (New York, 1943), p. 141.

32. Frances Wright, "Address delivered at the New York Hall of Science on Sunday the 18th October 1829," in the *Free Enquirer,* vol. II, no. 1. (Oct. 31, 1829), p. 3.

tieles, the Westminster confession of faith, the apostle's creed and the revelations of the apocalypse![33]

While his sister editor was thus hyperbolically painting the results of success for the "Christian party in politics," Robert Dale Owen was urbanely offering advice to the orthodox:

If they persist in the course they are at present pursuing, forcing on that most impolitic measure, the stopping of Sabbath mails, denouncing the immortal Jefferson as a scoffer, and aiming for highhanded supremacy and a Christian party in politics, they will make shipwreck—they may depend upon it—of the orthodox vessel altogether.[34]

Sometimes he patronized his opponent, Dr. Ely. Owen was somewhat heavy-handed, but he was capable of an occasional passage of irony, such as that in his editorial entitled "Exceeding Imprudence," which directs attention to a comment in Ely's paper, *The Philadelphian*, about the mercenary attitude of the Methodist circuit riders, "as if the Presbyterian clergy were never guilty of receiving a salary, or pocketing a contribution." Owen used this opportunity to insinuate that the plan for a "Christian party in politics" was really a plot, revealed too soon by Dr. Ely, who "committed that worst of orthodox blunders, the disclosure of the Church and State plan, before the prudent time."[35] In the same number of the paper, Owen adverted to his father's establishment of infant schools at New Lanark in Scotland, and the taking over of the infant school idea by the clergy for the better teaching of religion:

The clergy quickly saw the facilities such a plan afforded, and turned it with zeal and success to their own purposes. Thus that which was designed, by its founder, as the means of storing the young mind with facts, of directing the nascent curiosity upon useful objects, of forming the embryo habits, to order and industry, and moulding the docile disposition to kindness and benevolence, has become a tool in the hands of the Christian party in politics, to aid them in their unhallowed designs. They give infants sectarianism for knowledge, things unseen for the curious and interesting objects that every where surround their expanding senses, catechisms for practical instruction, and descriptions of unknown regions for knowledge of themselves and of the world in which they live.[36]

33. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
34. *Free Enquirer*, vol. II, no. 10, (January 2, 1830), p. 80.
35. *Ibid.*, no. 14 (January 30, 1830), p. 111.
36. "Infant Schools: their origin and present character," *Free Enquirer*, vol. II, no. 14 (January 30, 1830), p. 111.

These specimens must suffice here to indicate that to free thinkers Ely's proposal meant the overthrow of all the gains made by free thought in America. This outcome they used their talents both in lecturing and writing to avoid. They took advantage of every slip made by proponents of Christian political action, and sought opportunity to deprecate their antagonists by ridicule as well as by argument.

A second type of opponent of Elyism was created by Ely's definition of a true Christian. When Ely limited the epithet "true Christian" to the members of five or six orthodox, chiefly Calvinist groups, he antagonized all other Christian denominations. Of the excluded Christians, the Universalists were the most outspoken on this issue. So David Pickering, addressing the citizens of Providence, Rhode Island, on the fifty-second anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, asked

> See ye not that dark portentous cloud, gathering blackness as it emerges from the troubled waters of clerical and inquisitorial proscription? Have ye not heard the monster, bigotry, denouncing the chief magistrate of a free and independent people, as unworthy the honours that gather around him, because his understanding revolts at some mystical interpretations of the sublime revelations of the God-head?—Have you not been told by some master spirits, that a disciplined *corps* of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND is already trained for the political combat, and in readiness to enter the field?—Have you not been fearlessly apprized, that *ten* or *twenty years* will not be numbered in the march of future time, before every office, both of the state and nation, shall be filled with men of a peculiar religious stamp?[37]

Pickering urged his hearers to unite in opposition to such an "unhallowed attempt to effect a coalition of Church and State." He advised his audience to take the threat seriously, not to think that "these warnings are the dreams of enthusiastic extravagance, or the wild and untutored ravings of a bewildered fancy!" He felt that unless an organized resistance were to be opposed to "the disciplined forces of the enemy," "the unprecendented efforts which are now employed, will ultimately succeed in the utter subversion of all the principles of civil and religious liberty."[38]

In Nantucket, one year later, in his Fourth of July address, William

37. David Pickering, *Address delivered before the citizens of Providence, in the Universalist Chapel, on the Fifty-second Anniversary of American Independence.* Second edition, (Providence, 1828), pp. 14-15.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Morse, pastor of the First Universalist Church, called the birth of liberty in this country "an event, if we except the birth of the son of God, which for importance, stands unparalleled in the annals of the world"[39] He declared that any danger to liberty or to our republican institutions must be sought at home—"it is within, among ourselves—"[40] and announced his intention of calling attention to some of the elements of despotism which might at some time endanger liberty. Mental slavery, he said, was the worst of all tyrannies; "no tyrant is so tyrannical, no man so deservedly execrable in view of all benevolent beings in the Universe, as he whose object is to rivet upon his fellow-man the chains of mental slavery."[41]

Knowledge, he said, is the safeguard for liberty, a protection against political demagoguery, and against ecclesiastical tyranny as well. Such a bulwark is necessary, for

> a spirit exists in this country, not less unfriendly to the character of our republican institutions, than the efforts of party-politicians. I now allude to the influence of theological tyrants. It is possible we have less religious liberty in this country, than what some of us imagine. . . . The human mind never conceived a nobler thought, nor the heart of man a purer sentiment than the contents of that article embraced in our excellent constitution, which says that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."[42]

It was this very principle, however, which he thought to be endangered. He disclaimed a sectarian spirit; he avowed that he was standing before his audience "as a sentinel upon the watch-tower of liberty, prompted . . . purely by love for my country." From this high ground of principle he directed his attack against Dr. Ely and his coadjutors:

> Theological tyrants are always studying to extend their influence by seeking alliance with the civil power, and debasing the human mind, in order to accomplish their ends. In these days we hear of rallying "a Christian party in politics;" we also hear, in substance, that "no man is to be eligible to any civil office, who does not subscribe to the doctrines of the five prevailing sects."
>
> What would liberty be, or the right of suffrage, but a name to such as be-

39. William Morse, *An Oration delivered before the citizens of Nantucket, July 4, 1829, being the Fifty-third anniversary of the Declaration of the Independence of the United States of America,* (Boston, 1829), p. 8.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

longed not to the union, if five of the most popular religious sects in this country should unite, and succeed in getting the reins of government into their own hands?[43]

This question Morse answered by a brief survey of "papal usurpations" in Europe and South America.

He summarized his conclusions from the historical instances of clerical tyranny and religious despotism thus:

If hypocrisy, corruption and misery, have been the trophies, the memorials of a union of church and state in all ages and countries where such an unholy union has existed, we pray God in mercy to preserve the republic from the establishment of a national religion. Let that religious creed, which cannot stand, unaided by the civil arm, speedily fall to the ground. . . . Let the history of those ill-fated nations, where national religion has been established, be continually before our eyes, serving as an awful memento, a beacon light for the friends of liberty in this country, to avoid the rock on which they split.[44]

By far the best of the Universalist attacks on Elyism, worthy in some respects to be considered on a par with the statements of Jefferson and Madison on religious liberty, and fully as masterly a presentation of fundamental American beliefs on the subject as was the justly celebrated report of Col. Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky on the Sabbath mail question, was Zelotes Fuller's Washington's Birthday address of 1830. Fuller's theme was set in the brief preface, "To the Reader," where the author wrote:

If there ever was a time, when our civil and religious liberties were in danger—if there ever was a time, when the political sons of the illustrious Washington, should be inspired with fresh zeal, in behalf of the cause of freedom—if ever a time, when the united exertions of the friends of equal rights were called for, to suppress clerical intolerance, and to defeat priestly *finesse,* that time is the present.

The only apology we have to make to a certain "Christian party in politics," is, that we mean just what we say.[45]

Fuller's address proper began with a defense of the natural rights doc-

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

45. *The Tree of Liberty. An address in celebration of the birth of Washington, delivered at the Second Universalist Church in Philadelphia, February 28, 1830.* (Philadelphia, 1830.)

trine. The rights of conscience, freedom of opinion, and freedom of speech were guaranteed to men "by a certain code which existed before all civil governments . . . guaranteed by Almighty God."[46] After this defense, and a glorification of the wisdom of the founders in recognizing the inherent and unalienable character of these rights, Fuller proceeded to discuss Elyism in terms of its attack on natural rights. Here he distinguished between the ostensible and the actual motives of advocates of Elyism:

> We deem it a truth, too evident to admit of doubt, and too generally conceded to require proof on the present occasion, that it is the intention of a certain religious sect in our country, to bring about, if possible, a union of church and state. To effect this purpose, a deep and artful scheme has been laid, one which may ultimately be consummated, unless it is speedily and vigorously opposed. Yea, the declaration has gone forth, that in ten years, or certainly in twenty, the political power of our country, will be in the hands of those who shall have been educated to believe in, and probably pledged to support, a certain creed. . . . Be assured, whatever may be the *ostensive* objects of these measures [e.g., the Sabbath mail stoppage], if they should be generally adopted, they will tend to infuse the spirit of religious intolerance and persecution into the political institutions of our country, and in the end, completely to annihilate the political and religious liberty of the people.[47]

After stating the problem of the times in these words, Fuller continued with a resounding challenge to the people of the United States to preserve their liberties against the encroachments of those who desired union of church and state. Central to this challenge was the thought that, since sovereignty resides in the people, it is only necessary for the people to will freedom in order to remain free. It is evident here that he, too, like Fannie Wright, had extended the name of "Christian party in politics" beyond the fairly specific use made of it by Dr. Ely, and was using the name to cover all the attempts then being made "officiously and continually" to interfere "with the religious opinions of others, and . . . to effect by law and other means, equally exceptionable, a systematic course of measures, evidently calculated, to lead to a union of Church and State." If the people of America were not to choose wisely, then the fate of other countries subjugated by clerical tyranny would be theirs. "The past history of the Christian Church, should be a solemn

46. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

warning to us, never to permit an alliance to be formed, between the priesthood and the civil magistry."[48]

Somewhat less discussion is necessary to characterize the remaining type of opposition. It was the approach of a Unitarian layman with a profound concern for the American constitution. There is no specific reference to Dr. Ely or to the "Christian party in politics"; the application is, however, so obvious that mention of names was unnecessary. The author was true to the best ideals of religious liberty for which both Jefferson and Adams stood, those ideals which shaped the basic American thought on the relation between religion and the secular power.

Joseph Story, one of the most noted of our early conservative jurists and constitutional authorities, voiced this opinion in an address commemorative of the first settlement of Salem. In commenting on the charge which was frequently heard then as now that the settlers came to New England not to establish freedom of worship but for freedom to establish their mode of worship to the exclusion of all others, Story attacked *all* persecution on grounds of religion and declared that, in his view, religious liberty and civil liberty must stand together or fall together. While framed in reference to the first settlers, the statement is patently of contemporary application:

> I stand not up here the apologist for persecution, whether it be by Catholic or Protestant, by Puritan or Prelate, by Congregationalist or Covenanter, by Church or State, by the Monarch or the People. Wherever, and by whomsoever, it is promulgated or supported, under whatever disguises, for whatever purposes, at all times, and under all circumstances, it is a gross violation of the rights of conscience, and utterly inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. I care not, whether it goes to life, or property, or office, or reputation, or mere private comfort, it is equally an outrage upon religion and the unalienable rights of man. If there is any right, sacred beyond all others, because it imports everlasting consequences, it is the right to worship God according to the dictates of our own consciences. Whoever attempts to narrow it down in any degree, to limit it by the creed of any sect, to bound the exercise of private judgment, or free inquiry, by the standard of his own faith, be he priest or layman, ruler or subject, dishonors so far the profession of Christianity, and wounds it in its vital virtues. . . . There is not a truth to be gathered from history more certain, or more momentous, than this, that civil liberty cannot long be sepa-

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14. The entire passage is a magnificent example of the best in sincere American oratory.

rated from religious liberty without danger, and ultimately without destruction to both.[49]

Later, in discussing the introduction by Roger Williams of the idea of religious tolerance, Story declared the doctrine that a union between church and state was necessary to have been "the fundamental error of our ancestors, an error which began with the very settlement of the colony."[50] He warned his hearers against following the example of the Massachusetts colonists, and took advantage of the occasion to describe something very like Elyism:

> Is there any one, who would now for a moment justify the exclusion of every person from political rights and privileges, who is not a Congregationalist of the straitest sect in doctrine and discipline? Is there any one, who would exclude the Episcopalian, the Baptist, the Methodist, the Quaker, or the Universalist . . . ? If such there be, whatever badge they may wear, they are enemies to us and our institutions. They would sap the foundations of our civil as well as religious liberties.[51]

Strange, that Story did not mention the Presbyterians, most numerous of all the sects at that time.

So, through the efforts of men (and in deference to Fannie Wright, women, too) such as those whose answers to Elyism have been presented here, a threat to the finest and best ideal of American democracy was averted, for the time. Free thinkers, Universalists, and constitutionalists, from their different places, roused themselves to fight off an attempted aggression against freedom of conscience. Whether they believed in the natural right of man to free choice of his mode of worship, as did the Universalists who have been discussed, and as did Joseph Story, or whether they were motivated by a belief in the natural right of man to be free from religion, as were Fannie Wright and Robert Dale Owen, they were ardent secularists. Whether or no they believed in giving to God the things that were God's, they all believed in giving to Caesar the things that were Caesar's. They did not believe that the constitutional pledge of the American government not to interfere in matters of reli-

49. Joseph Story, *A discourse pronounced at the request of the Essex Historical Society, on the 18th of September, 1828, in commemoration of the first settlement of Salem, in the State of Massachusetts,* (Boston, 1828), pp. 45-46.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

gion was uni-directional; they all conceived it to involve as a necessary corollary an implicit pledge on the part of religious groups not to interfere in matters of government.

Elyism was defeated; Americans insisted that it was the duty of American freemen to elect American rulers. The spirit which informed Elyism was, however, not dead. From time to time, in our later history, other men and other movements arose whose objects were those of the "Christian party in politics." To the glory of American religion let it be said that every time the spirit of Elyism was resurrected, it was cast down again by true believers in the freedom of religion inside and outside of the churches.

ETERNITY—SHADOW OF TIME

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LIFE'S BREVITY seems to be the tragic limitation of man's works. His time is forever running short. He is forever striving in the face of death, which tomorrow or even today may put an end to his activities and thus leave his innermost desires unfulfilled and his ideals betrayed.

Awareness of change is the very beginning of thought. The phenomena of growth and decay are the cause of man's first wonder and the source of utmost apprehension, for a world of change seems to be a world of destruction, of wars, famine, and shipwreck. It is a world in which there is death—that inescapable finality on which all philosophy is orientated, as Socrates taught long ago.

Nevertheless, the realm of life and the realm of death are incommensurable. Even though *particular* careers must come to an end, life itself is continuous. From its perspective, death is only a transformation, not an end. Fear of death, therefore, whenever there is no immediate sensuous danger, is possible only in beings who can mentally anticipate the end of their own activities. But men whose characters and desires are congruous with their activities, are not likely to be much preoccupied with this fear. Dissatisfaction is the root of the concern with time.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the experience of death and the monstrous irrationality of politics which have characterized the last decade have moved men once more to reflect on the nature of time. One would like to welcome all who thus have found their way to an awareness of the most fundamental of man's problems which must be considered in all their implications before reason and order can again be established in society. But, unfortunately, much that has been said has only added to the confusion. Incipient reflection has been betrayed by a slave-like repetition of traditional formulas devoid of the very courage and imagination which the great thinkers of the past have shown in dealing with the problems of their own days. The past has accordingly been used as an aid to an irrational escape from responsibility, rather than as an instrument in fashioning the future. Thus a brief look at the history of the problem of eternity is necessary for clarification as well as for guidance.

While the observation of nature, with its cycles of births and deaths, suggested to man that his life would form no exception to this rule, myth and cult promised him that death was not the end, but only a point of transition to a beyond in which he would continue the games and joys of life in deathless permanence. The other life was a less disturbed continuation of this one.

But reflection soon came to see the fundamental fallacy involved in this belief which consisted precisely in conceiving the other life as essentially analogous to this one. The other life was inherently *temporal* in character. But mortality was of the essence of temporal life. The movements and processes of time could not be unless there was destruction, growth fed on decay. Hence, if there were to be an existence without death, it could not be in time. From such reflection the thought of *eternity* was born.

It was in eternity that the ceaseless flux of time came to a stop. But this eternal rest was only possible on the condition that the wants and deficiencies which things of time had so pregnantly exhibited were overcome. Unless they were overcome, eternity would not possess that equilibrium which is a necessary attribute of permanence. The beings comprised in eternity, if their wants were unfulfilled, would go on seeking replenishment, one encroaching upon the other, and thus again break into the cycle of time. It followed that eternity implied a reality complete in itself and its parts, that is, *perfection.*

It will be noted that, in its distinctive meaning, eternity is not at all identical with infinite duration in time, as it often is in a loose usage of the concept. Duration is a characteristic of things *within* time, while eternity is a reality *outside* time and comprehending all time. To further illustrate the traditional meaning of eternity the following passage from Boethius, the *locus classicus,* may be quoted (*The Consolation of Philosophy,* Book v, Cooper's translation:

> Eternity is the simultaneous and complete possession of infinite life. This will appear more clearly if we compare it with temporal things. All that lives under the conditions of time moves throught the present from the past to the future; there is nothing set in time which can at one moment grasp the whole space of its lifetime. It cannot yet comprehend tomorrow; yesterday it has already lost. And in this life of today your life is no more than a changing, passing moment. And as Aristotle said of the universe, so it is of all that is subject to time; though it never began to be, nor will ever cease, and its life is co-extensive with the infinity of time, yet it is not such as can be held to be eternal. For though it apprehends and grasps a space of infinite lifetime,

it does not embrace the whole simultaneously; it has not yet experienced the future. What we should rightly call eternal is that which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously the fulness of unending life, which lacks naught of the future, and has lost naught of the fleeting past; and such an existence must be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must keep present with itself the infinity of changing time.

The following passage, close to the one just quoted, is also relevant:

For the infinite changing of temporal things tries to imitate the simultaneous present of changeless life [*vitae immobilis praesentarium statum;* slight deviation from Cooper's translation]: it cannot succeed in imitating or equalling this, but sinks from immutability into change, and falls from the single directness of the present into an infinite space of future and past. And since this temporal state cannot possess its life completely and simultaneously, but it does in some manner exist for ever without ceasing, it therefore seems to try in some degree to rival that which it cannot fulfil or represent, for it binds itself to some sort of present time out of this small and fleeting moment; but inasmuch as this temporal present bears a certain appearance of that abiding present, it somehow makes those, to whom it comes, seem to be in truth what they imitate. But since this imitation could not be abiding, the unending march of time has swept it away, and thus we find that it has bound together, as it passes, a chain of life, which it could not by abiding embrace in its fulness.

The two fundamental conceptions of eternity and perfection, each of which was a necessary attribute of the other, seemed to define a reality which was free from the two perhaps most painful characteristics of temporal existence: death or destruction, and the tension, often unbridgeable, between desire and satisfaction. These conceptions now provided the measure by which to judge the reality of time and led to its rejection in varying degrees. At best it was considered a beautiful image of an eternity more beautiful still. But, in any event, man's supreme good was not temporal.

The *existence* of such an eternal reality as the ground of the temporal was *inferred* from the very strivings and impulses which characterize the world of time. Everywhere the temporal seemed to imply something beyond itself. The various degrees of perfection were conceived to point to an absolute eternal perfection from which the less perfect had descended, and to which it longed to return. It was a corollary of this conception that the ultimate fulfillment of temporal wants could not be found in time. Temporal desires, too, pointed to satisfactions beyond time.

Nevertheless, the conception of eternity was found to be full of *contradictions.* The immobility which was to characterize the eternal seemed to deprive perfection of any vital content and make it synonymous with undifferentiated monotony. Perfection, therefore, seemed to require, paradoxically enough, both absolute rest and the most complete activity. It thus became the task of logic, often ingeniously executed, to reconcile these two antagonistic notions in attempting to prove the activity of the immobile.

Similarly eternity was conceived as a sort of standing *now.* But a "now" could not possibly constitute such a reality (or any substantial reality). For, in any intelligible usage, "now" functions as a demonstrative or limiting term, or as an abstract device to indicate that any interval of time is composed of an infinite number of "nows," which is a metaphorical way of saying that any such interval could be infinitely subdivided (just as the "points" indicate the infinite divisibility of the line). Nevertheless, the *nunc stans* of eternity was conceived to comprehend the unrolling evolution of time in one single instant. The *simultaneity* which thus was taken to be the prime characteristic of eternity seemed to be, however, in mortal contradiction to any *succession,* the distinguishing characteristic of time. The two realities were incommensurable, and yet they were asserted to stand in the relation of prototype to image. Instantaneousness was succession in a more eminent way.

The same conflict arose from an opposition of eternity, necessarily one and unified, to time, diversified and plural. For eternity was assumed to be free from the finite particularisms, the destructive enmities of temporal plurality, and yet, far from constituting indistinct homogeneity, to be the realm where individualities would reach their ultimate perfection.

It is not necessary to multiply these instances—the list is long—to show that the conception of eternity is beset with inherent contradictions. But having realized this, one must ascertain the very roots of the contradictions and the reason for their acceptance. In this task one makes the perhaps surprising discovery that the contradictions which the concept of eternity was too narrow to hold without bursting its confines are well compatible with each other on a different level—the level of time. Temporal reality is characterized by rest as well as motion, stability as well as change, unity as well as variety. If one exam-

ines the concept of eternity in this light, it turns out, strikingly enough, to define, not a reality different from time, but only an aspect of *temporal* reality—primarily that aspect which is characterized by such attributes as rest, stability, and unity. Yet rest, stability, unity are polar concepts, that is, they have meaning only in that context in which their opposites can be found. Just as there is no illumination unless there is darkness, there is no unity unless of diversity, no rest unless of that which has moved (or in contrast to something moved), no stability unless there is change in which the stable can exhibit the greater permanence of its pattern.

But if the concept of eternity thus turns out to be an abstraction, an abstraction hypostatized, the question still remains how it could ever have commanded that profound allegiance which is an essential feature of its long history. As the conceptual basis of such allegiance is weak, it will perhaps appear that its root is moral. Indeed, the polarities, which we found to constitute the nature of temporal reality, define the very sphere of man's activities. It is between these opposites that he moves forever striving to achieve balance. If he is confined to a narrow routine, however secure, he will use the first opportunity which promises him a life of heightened activity. Conversely, if his life is devoid of peace and stability, it may appear to him that these are the supreme values, the very ends of his deepest desires. He thus creates the concept of an ideal reality in which there will be an abundance of what he now lacks.

Nevertheless, when he comes to reflect further on this ideal reality, he finds that it will not be complete unless it contain both of the vital opposites without which life would long ago have sunk into nothingness. But such awareness is indirect rather than clearly conscious. The ideal has already crystallized into a supreme good. Its conceptual framework is taken for granted. Hence, short of radical revision, the reconciliation of the irreconcilable becomes the task of thought. Some, indeed, have gloried in the contradiction. That the eternal was beyond human comprehension lent it plausibility. *Absurdity* was the mark of superhuman truth. Nevertheless, the incomprehensibility was of *man's* making in the first place. It was founded on his attempt to preserve the complex movements of reality within an ideal of which the abstractness constantly resisted such expansion.

Man had expected to find in eternity that fulfillment of his desires

which temporal reality seemed to deny to him and which, many thought, it would always deny to him. Yet, eternity was so defined that, in its context, the very needs and wants of time became meaningless. Reflection, accordingly, was led to a curious inversion. Bound by the inherent logic of its initial assumptions, it was brought to a rejection of those very temporal desires which had motivated its quest. Essentially, therefore, philosophy repeated in its intellectually much more complex ways the tendency of myth. It created its own ideal extension of time. But its conclusions were more absurd than those of myth, for it could avoid the naïveté of myth's assertion of the continuation of temporal life only by a quasi-denial of the values of time, and thus, as it ultimately could not betray its fundamental inspiration either, became imprisoned within its own contradictions.

From man's powerlessness to master the conditions of temporal life had sprung the golden image of an eternal existence of which time was but the fleeting reflection. But all the glory of that existence was temporal in disguise. It was but one way of expressing the deep longings generated in the creative process of time, one aspect of time's infinite fecundity, *a shadow of time.*

Further substantiation of the view that the concept of eternity constitutes but an indirect affirmation of the values of time is furnished by the moral postulates which flow from it and which represent a most important aspect of its history. Thus the transitoriness of things temporal always has been a potent argument in the hands of those who wished to assert the superiority of the eternal. Yet, when this argument is understood in its full implications, it is found to be so far from a rejection of temporal existence that it turns out to be an exhortation to its very activation. Because time is short, it must not be dissipated. There must be concentration on the essential. To look on things *sub specie aeternitatis* puts no premium on mere duration (also evil is eternal), but constitutes the search for the significant. The timely need not be identical with the superficial. On the contrary, only by investing his time with greatness and depth does man ever achieve the fullness of his being. Therein, for example, lies the "timelessness" of the Greeks.

But when we are told not to take the passing concerns of time too seriously, we can easily point out the fallacy of believing that they are, because their duration is not unlimited, less urgent and their resolution less imperative. In the extreme, even the pursuit of knowledge has

been held futile because death will bring us the possession of full wisdom. Yet the prospect of such miraculous knowledge makes not the slightest contribution towards solving the problems which motivate inquiry and a more natural knowledge. For the problems cannot be postponed without incurring a penalty which psychology has pointed out insistently enough, and which politics has illustrated only too well.

But, curiously enough, the immenseness of an eternal perspective has most frequently been found not at all incompatible with a very active concern for things temporal and readiness to interfere, by very temporal means indeed, in the affairs of time. This concern for a reality in which even the worst error and the greatest crime should have been regarded as of only fleeting significance (and was so regarded by some thinkers) constitutes a paradox which, whenever a rational justification was attempted, only led to further paradoxes. While this is a further contradiction, it is also further confirmation of the view that the values assumed to be eternal are temporal in disguise.

This view receives additional strength from the rather amazing discovery, yielded by an examination of particular instances, that the values alleged to be eternal quite frequently turn out to be the values of a rather immediate *past,* especially those that have to maintain themselves in opposition to values newly emerging in the present. This discovery, though perhaps novel, is rather plausible, considering the relentless impact of new forces demanding the modification of traditional convictions and habits. Inertia, in conjunction with a short memory, could find no better rationalization, no greater prestige for persistence in the old than the assumption of its eternity, and the more the old is endangered, the more violent will be protestations to this effect. (That the values thus persisting are very often those of a rather *immediate* past ought to receive emphasis in the face of frequent attempts to invest them with the authority, not only of eternity, but also of some more remote age or century.) The alleged clash between the eternal and the temporal is but a pretext, though rarely deliberate, for the grotesque and yet so familiar attempt to enslave the present to the past, to rule today from yesterday.

One final obstacle remains. There has been an increasing tendency to demand adherence to the traditional conception of eternity, not on account of any claims for its objective validity, but because it has been felt that only thus a powerful stimulus to morality can be maintained.

We need not concern ourselves here with doubts as to the chances of creating allegiance to a moral standard avowedly fictitious, or with scruples whether with intellectual sincerity the better part of morality has not already been sacrificed, for the misconception has a still deeper root. It rests on the perilous belief that truth can be disregarded at will, unaware that truth will reassert itself with a terrible vengeance. It rests on a moral cowardice to come to terms with the often irreducible and inescapable demands of reality and to remodel one's desires accordingly. It advocates illusions and, thereby, not only gives rise to vain expectations and ultimate despair, but also keeps man from achieving those objectives that lie within the range of his powers. Lastly, it is founded on a mistaken conception of reality itself.

It rests on a conception of the moral life characterized by the invidious antagonisms of work and play, virtue and pleasure, goodness and happiness. These antagonisms in turn are but derived from a fateful misconception of the relation between desire and satisfaction, a misconception which, perhaps, constitutes the basic error in the tradition here criticized. There seemed to be an abyss between desire and fulfillment and, consequently, there arose the belief that the unfulfilled desires themselves pointed to a satisfaction beyond time. It has been shown that this would *at best* constitute a postponement to an existence in which such satisfaction would be meaningless because the very needs which had prompted the desire would have become extinct. The more immediate result of this conception has been the frequent acceptance of the existence of unfulfilled needs, often of the most basic kind, as being founded in the nature of things. Conduct, thereby, was deprived of the most powerful motive for changing conditions in such a way that these wants could be supplied—not to speak of the ideal capacities inherent in man's nature.

But fundamentally there is nothing ultimate in the tension between desire and satisfaction. It constitutes the very dynamism by which life, in alternating between the one and the other, moves on. Desire, if it is intelligent and not chimerical wish, is inherently capable of satisfaction. It *demands* such satisfaction in one form or another, for intelligent desire springs from vital needs the disregard of which can only lead to stunted and crippled personalities. There inheres, for this reason, a basic immorality in the non-temporal conception of man, because it keeps him from realizing the activity proper to his being,

as is unwittingly acknowledged in the traditional conception of eternity itself when analysis reveals it as a temporal ideal in disguise. In a vicious circle become system, man finds himself denying his deepest desires for the sake of these desires themselves.

Truth seemed to endanger morality only because morality itself was not founded upon truth. One need not, therefore, fear that truth will lead to resignation or even loss of moral vitality. Quite the contrary, if allegiance to standards which blocked the free expression of man's nature was capable of such emotional force, there is no knowing what vast resources of strength will be tapped once man's ideals become more in accordance with his needs and possibilities.

The result of our analysis has been to demand the inversion of a conception with a long and powerful tradition behind it. It can only be suggested—elaboration would require another essay—that such reorientation is very much consistent with the deeper trends of the past itself. This word of caution is necessary, for it is only in continuity with the past and the values and memories it embodies that the reconstruction in thought and deed which has become the imperative task of our generation will be fruitful.

But it must finally be pointed out that whatever may be the *rational* force of the arguments here brought forward, their ultimate acceptance—as any intellectual insight in the moral sphere—depends on an emotional re-orientation as well. For there arises the illusion, after the emotions have been identified with certain objects towards which they were habitually directed, that the very strength of these emotions will be jeopardized with the discarding of these objects. Out of this fear grows that discrepancy of reason and emotion which is so particularly characteristic of our time, with the result that reason is misapplied to rationalize the preconceived, and emotion is enslaved to the irrational. In this distress one would willingly look for a less fallible instrument than reason to resolve the conflict. It is, therefore, a painful realization that reason, however precarious, is the only ultimate help. (Even the attitude of faith is one of trust which is to be preceded by reason; otherwise every assertion and every objective would have an equal claim to belief. Faith in reason, if such be required, must itself be reasonable.) But painful as may be the realization of such loneliness, it alone marks the road to recovery.

The need, therefore, is to educate reason. For once reason is

awakened, it will, though powerless in itself, provide the stimulus for the emotions which, though powerful, are blind and even inert without a guiding principle. The appeal to rationality is, therefore, also an appeal to more emotional force, because it is reason which will liberate emotion. It will then come true that more rational beings will also be beings more vital and deep. Then, also, that ancient vision of Greek art will be brought closer to realization, and form in its beauty and fullness will emerge triumphant over a matter which has become its ready matrix.

BOOK REVIEWS

Shinto: The Unconquered Enemy. By Robert O. Ballou. New York: The Viking Press, 1945. xi, 29 pp. $2.75.

The publisher's blurb announces that this is the first book written for the general reader about the national faith of Japan—"a religion which we must understand if we are to deal effectively with one of the most baffling problems we've yet faced as a nation." This is to overlook important publications like Basil Hall Chamberlain's, *The Invention of a New Religion,* and A. Morgan Young's, *The Rise of a Pagan State,* neither one of which is included in the author's bibliography, although the former is cited at least once in the discussion proper.

Mr. Ballou divides his study into three parts. Part I, comprising only eighty-eight pages—less than half the book—sets forth the author's own account of the history and meaning of Shinto. In spite of its brevity, this part well realizes the publisher's claims that it traces through the various mutations of Japanese history the account of the ideas and institutions within the framework of which the Japanese people have been taught that "they are superior to all other peoples, that their emperor is a god, and that his destiny is to rule the world."

Part II, in one hundred and seventeen pages, presents selections from English translations of Japanese texts, beginning with the *Kojiki* and continuing down to the days immediately following Japan's announcement of acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum on August 15, 1945. These selections are, for the most part, well chosen and calculated to bring due reward to anyone who really reads them. In large measure, however, they are far from being diet for the "general reader." They call for careful study, an undertaking which is complicated by the fact that all the explanatory notes of translators, frequently absolutely necessary to the understanding of difficult passages, have been omitted.

Part III, in a score or more of pages, sets forth the source references to the author's citations and adds a valuable annotated bibliography.

On nearly every page of Part I Mr. Ballou shows the benefit of much reading in the literary sources of Shinto, as well as in the accounts of interpreters who have gone before him. Even in the many places where his indebtedness to others is not specifically admitted by

him, it is not difficult to recognize the quarries from which his blocks are cut. To the arrangement of this material into an orderly and usable structure the author brings an enlightened perspective, brilliant powers of summation and interpretation, a style that shows the practiced master of good English, and above all a cosmopolitan spirit. The result is a book that can be recommended as a concise and authentic guide to the main highway. Along with this must go the caution that the presentation of minutiae frequently calls for correction. Indeed, one rarely comes across a book that combines reliability of overall picture with inadvertence to detail in the measure that this one does.

It is unfortunate that, prior to publication, the manuscript and proof could not have been gone over by an expert in Japanese culture and language. Proper nouns are frequently mutilated, sometimes almost beyond recognition—Tse for Ise, Oijui for Ojin, Juni for Kuni, Jui for Jin, Yiu for Yui, How-den for Hou-deu (Hou-deu is not the name of a man; it is the way Sir Ernest Satow wrote Hōjō), Tchijo for Ichijo, Kuammu Tenno for Kwammu Tenno, etc., etc.

Matsurigoto is a noun, not a verb. The probable date of the compilation of the *Kyujiki* is A.D. 620, not 720. Ninigi-no-Mikoto (p. 98) was not the first emperor; according to the ancient mythology he was the great-grandfather of the legendary first emperor, Jimmu Tenno. The principles of Ichijitsu Shinto were first worked out by the priests of Tendai Buddhism, not Shingon. Kobo Daishi did not found Ryobu Shinto; he enunciated principles which were later incorporated by the Ryobu School. The wife of General Nogi did not commit *harakiri*; she cut her throat. The *Genji Monogatari* is a romance from the early eleventh century, not the account of the adventures of the Minamoto clan. The statistics for Shinto shrines given on page 75 are misdated, etc., etc.

These are perhaps small nicks, but they mar the edge of an otherwise fine blade. For the sake of accuracy, and because of the influence that the book will probably have, they should be ground out as soon as possible.

There is one pitfall of a more serious nature into which the author now and then almost falls. It is the temptation to accept at their face value over-idealizations of their culture on the part of Japanese writers. Witness the reproduction of Nitobe's apologia that in the

characteristic Japanese philosophy of life there is no evil in nature—a direct misrepresentation of fact; also, the use made of idealizations of Bushido by Nitobe and others.

Nowhere does this danger appear in clearer form than in those Japanese interpretations of early Shinto which try to demonstrate that the true and original stream of the national faith is ancestor worship. In his chapter dealing with the beginnings of Shinto, Mr. Ballou says that some of the early gods, or *kami,* were the deified souls of the individual human dead. In close sequence he reproduces without refutation, Dr. Saeki's characteristic statement that in ancient Shinto, individual, historical personages, worshiped as *kami,* are more numerous than all other kinds of deities. This plays too easily into the hands of a State Shinto propaganda which has long tried to beguile the Japanese people and non-Japanese alike into accepting such absurdities as the dogma that Amaterasu-Omikami and other primitive nature deities of like sort are authentic, flesh-and-blood imperial ancestors. It cannot be too emphatically asserted that there is no legitimate ancestor worship in the *Kojiki* Shinto.

Mr. Ballou's presentation of so-called "popular" Shinto also calls for considerable reworking in the light of a more exact reference to facts. He divides Shinto into three phases or forces which he says are distinct from one another, although overlapping: State Shinto, sectarian Shinto, and "popular" Shinto. The last of these is declared to be without organization or unified church body, and is likened to a powerful folklore rather than to a religion.

There can be no legitimate objection to this classification providing the alleged distinguishing features can be identified with sufficient clearness to make the effort worth while. But note what is offered. We are told that popular Shinto includes the cult of Inari, the rice-spirit, and his messenger the fox; that it has black magic in it; that it makes use of a multitude of talismans against sickness, evil, and misfortune; and that it fosters phallicism and the worship of sun, mountains, trees, etc. "Every village has a local shrine which is an edifice of neither sectarian nor State Shinto, but merely the habitation of the local god who protects the village." The god-shelves of the homes are included within popular Shinto.

Consider the actual facts. There are more Inari shrines in State Shinto than there are sanctuaries of any other kind. The great Fushimi

Inari Shrine of Kyoto has the rank of Kampei Taisha—Grand Government Shrine—the highest that the state can bestow. While magic for evil effect ("black") has not been observed in State Shinto, there is much use of magical rites for socially approved ends—in the officially sponsored purification ceremonies, for example. The personal amulets and home-protecting talismans, used so extensively by the Japanese people, come mainly from Buddhist temples and the shrines of State Shinto, where they are sold as the source of considerable revenue. The greatest of the deities of State Shinto began her life in sun worship. Definite aspects of an ancient worship of trees, mountains, and waters still survive in the state cult. Within the past fifteen years the writer of this review has attended ceremonies at phallic shrines in the Tohoku that were included in State Shinto. The worship before the god-shelves of the homes, for the most part,venerates the deities of the official pantheon. The village shrine to the local tutelary deity is almost without exception included in the State Shinto registration. The statistics for State Shinto given in the *Jiji Nenkan* for 1940—the latest to hand—report 44,884 village shrines and 61,095 "ungraded" shrines, practically all of the latter being small village sanctuaries.

The chief claim to distinction which Mr. Ballou's book offers is in the hopeful and even expectant attitude which he entertains towards the possibilities of development in Shinto, particularly in its sectarian form, but not exclusively so. His final chapter is full of wisdom that should be taken especially to heart in these days when American zeal to re-educate and democratize Japan needs to be saved from the absurdity of our own provincialism. It is well for us to be reminded that Japan has a culture of her own, different from the American in many ways, but at its best as rich and worthy as ours. There is no softness towards the monstrosities of State Shinto. Here is an evil which must be approached as the enemy of civilization and exterminated. But after this purgation has been consummated, elements are left over which have their affinities with true universalism. Clarified by the research of scholars, East and West, Japanese religious culture should be provided with every opportunity to make its own contribution to the equality of man, peace, and international co-operation. Even the Hakko Ichi-u teaching, by which Japan rationalized her "Holy War" in the Pacific, has within it seeds which may blossom into genuine

world brotherhood. "It is folly," says the author, "to discredit the gods of a people whose co-operation is sought, and nowhere greater folly than in Japan."

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Jahwe als Krieger: Studien zum alttestamentlichen Gottesbild. By Henning Fredriksson. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1945. xii, 131 pp. Kr. 7:50.

This doctoral dissertation comes from the University of Lund. It was written under the general direction of Johannes Lindblom, to whom we owe many useful and often penetrating Old Testament studies. Many discussions have been devoted to YHWH as God of War, but none, according to the writer, to YHWH as himself a warrior. It is to this subject that Fredriksson addresses himself in this monograph. The bibliography contains the name of but one American scholar, Julian Morgenstern, and it is only his valuable monograph on Psalm 82 that is cited. English scholarship fares somewhat better, and, of course, the Norwegian work is adequately recognized. Even among the many German works there are some references missing, such as Otto Eissfeldt's constructive though somewhat popular discussion of *Krieg und Bibel* in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* series. Occasionally one is led to wonder whether all the books listed have been carefully examined. Otherwise it is hard to understand why Gressmann's stimulating discussion of YHWH as Leader *(Führergott)* receives no notice, nor Mowinckel's discussion of demonic elements in the Psalms. The work as a whole is well ordered and articulated. The theological significance of the results is excellently stated. This section is the most valuable part of the dissertation, but the detailed analysis of the body of the monograph is indispensably preliminary to it.

After a brief examination of some of the chief discussions in which this subject is treated (such as the well-known works of Gressmann, Baudissin, Lindblom, Buber, Caspari, and Hempel), Fredriksson turns to his central task. His discussion falls into two main divisions: YHWH as Leader of armies, and YHWH as individual Warrior or Protagonist. The Old Testament portrays three different types of *Führergott.* There is, first of all, the tribal God, who, as Leader of the army, ap-

pears at the head of his host, the people of Israel. In this representation, verbs which describe YHWH's relation to Israel are military *termini technici*. The Exodus from Egypt is understood as a military undertaking. But YHWH is also the God of Nature and, in this capacity, acts as Leader of the army. The God who reveals himself at Sinai is a God of Nature who comes forth as a war god to the *help* of his people Israel in their time of need, and participates in his people's conflicts. In these portraits of YHWH, the vivid associations with nature at Sinai constantly emerge and continue on in the tradition. The characterizations of the Chronicler and Deutero-Zechariah reflect this theologumenon. It is hard to understand why no mention is made of Second Isaiah, where this representation achieves its fullest and its most profound interpretation, especially since historical associations are remembered to describe the eschatological deliverance. Fredriksson recognizes that it is hard to draw a boundary between the God of Nature and the tribal God, since they are often merged. This is a constant problem in the Old Testament.

The third type of Divine Leader is seen in YHWH as God of the Land, who assumes the function of Commander-in-chief. The narratives in which this representation occurs (Josh., Judg., I Sam., Deut. 1:1-4, 44) are all fashioned according to a certain pattern, as Albrecht Alt has shown in his examination of the JE materials in Joshua 1-12. The portrait here is different from the portraits of the tribal God and the God of Nature. The tribal God is a personally present Leader. The God of Nature comes from Sinai and uses the forces of nature as his weapons. This God of the Land never strides at the head of Israel's armies. We never see him in conflict on the field of battle. He never comes from Sinai to the aid of his people. Influences from the God of Nature are present in the God of the Land. As Commander-in-chief of Israel, YHWH leads expeditions in times of trouble far from the battlefield, even in heaven, and gives his commands and counsels. He communicates with the leaders of the people only in the cult (oracles, vows, etc.). In this representation lies the possibility that YHWH can give land to other peoples than Israel, and in this, too, lies the demonstration that the God of the Land can become a God of the whole earth.

YHWH is the leader of the armies of foreign peoples. The same terms which are used of him in relation to the army of Israel are used

of him here. The foreign peoples are his mercenaries. He is portrayed by the prophets, who are responsible for this particular elaboration, as an armed warrior (Isa. 10:5; Jer. 51:20-23; Ezek. 30:24 f.; Isa. 48:14). He is also Leader of the army of the North, a term which has both historical (an actual enemy in the early chapters of Jeremiah) and mythological (Isa. 13:1 ff. and Joel 2:1 ff.) associations. Again, YHWH is Leader of the army of demons. This representation is naturally extremely limited, and where it does appear it is clearly assimilated to the YHWH religion. The references given are a strikingly varied group, and they are far from carrying the same degree of conviction. Some seem to be clearly figurative, others (like Jer. 22) seem to refer to actual military troops, while still others (like Job 15:21) admit of a demonic meaning. Finally, there are those (like II Sam. 24:16) which are indisputably demonic. Again, YHWH is Leader of the heavenly army. Note, e.g., such expressions as *the Camp of God* in Gen. 32:2-3 in the Mahanaim story, *the host of Yahweh,* or *the host of heaven.* Finally, YHWH is the Leader of the forces of Nature. As a God of war, he calls them into his service: *the storm,* which is so characteristic a feature of Old Testament theophanies (Ps. 18:8 ff.; II Sam. 22:8 ff.; Ps. 77:18 f.; Isa. 30:27 ff.; 66:15 f.; Nah. 1:3 ff.; Zech. 9:14 f.),[1] *cloudbursts of rain,* as in Judg. 5 and Ps. 68, passages which are worth comparing because of the intrusion of the Canaanite fertility influence in the psalm, *hail,* and *lightning.* The naturalistic thrust which the portrait of YHWH received from Sinai continued to exercise a powerful influence in all future representations of theophany and in later prophetic descriptions. The term *YHWH Zebaoth* appears relatively seldom in a strictly military context. The oldest passages suggest the meaning of YHWH as leader of Israel's armies, but the term is expanded and developed until it serves merely as an adjective to express YHWH's might and power.

The second main division of the monograph describes YHWH's activity as an individual warrior or combatant. The terms *gibbor* and *geburah* are examined, both in their purely secular usage and in their application to YHWH. The former can be applied to YHWH (Ps. 24:8; Judg. 5:23; Ex. 15:1), but with the introduction of mercenary troops it became secularized, so that the war is no longer considered YHWH's war in the ancient sense. With the great prophets of judg-

1. Fredriksson sees no reference to a storm in Judg. 5, Ps. 68, and Hab. 3.

ment criticism is launched against the politics of kings whose trust is in armies and external supports. This criticism was applied to faith in the heroes as well as to the heroes themselves. According to the prophets, Fredriksson says, the role of the *gibbor* had been played out, and so they directed their gaze to YHWH, the *gibbor* who alone would help. This view was possibly evoked by YHWH's destruction of Sennacherib's armies in 701 B.C. In the prophetic literature there is scant reference to the *might* of YHWH. Where it does occur, it designates his power in history and in judgment. In the Psalter it occurs much more frequently. YHWH as a man of war appears only twice in the O.T., but in crucial passages (Ex. 15:3 and Isa. 42:13).

More significant and interesting is YHWH's encounter with the chaos monster, especially as it is described in Second Isaiah, Job, and the Psalms. The struggle is described with very definite and realistic verbs, and with even more definite objects (Rahab, Leviathan, the *tehom*, the rivers, the Sea). In these passages, YHWH has taken the place of Marduk, and in this role he is distinctive. These characteristics remain the same wherever they recur in the Old Testament. The hymn, with its exaltation of YHWH's might, proved the most suitable vehicle for bearing these mythological portraits. In prophecy the myth is historicized in the form of a prophecy of judgment.

The war-song was originally a secular lyric, but it was peculiarly suited to describe YHWH as the protagonist of his people, or as the combatant in battle in general. The intense realism of the ancient lyric is preserved even when YHWH appears as the Warrior. Stirring war cries are shouted, like "arise," "go up," and "awake" (cf., e.g., Judg. 5:12, 8:21; Joel 4:9). The words which the warrior addresses to his opponent are repeated (Isa. 42:13). In a number of prophetic passages, as in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Nahum, the commission to go out to war is put into the mouth of YHWH. The purely secular song of victory (cf. I Sam. 18:7) naturally occurs but seldom, but Exodus 15, a cult song in its present form (Hans Schmidt's monograph does not seem to be known to the writer), is a song of victory with Yahweh as its hero.

The account of the great theophany at Sinai in Exodus 19:16 ff. (JE) is the literary model for all later accounts of theophany. Here YHWH is a heavenly God and above all a God of Nature. His purpose is to conclude a covenant with his people. But theophanies like

those in Psalm 18:7-15, II Sam. 22:7-15, and Isa. 30:27-31 can hardly be explained by their dependence upon the Sinaitic tradition alone. The holiness of God, which in Exodus evokes fear and terror, is described as anger in the psalm, and this theme of the angered God is further developed both here and in Isaiah 30. These reflect another tradition, of the *countenance* of YHWH, which appears elsewhere in the O.T., notably in Job, Psalm 18, and Isa. 30:27 ff. and gives a portrait of YHWH as warrior which diverges completely from all descriptions of battle in the O.T.

In the prophetic oracles of judgment, YHWH appears as the Leader of foreign armies and, hence, as a hostile conqueror. The fall of Jerusalem was a large factor in the production of such descriptions as we find in Lam. 2:2 ff. The Babylonians are the instrument of YHWH's judgment. But this view has its roots deep in "pre-exilic" prophecy (e.g., Amos 1-2). YHWH as a warrior naturally has his arms: his bow, his sword, his shield, his staff *(shevet* and *mateh),* his maul *(maffetz),* etc. YHWH's arm and hand appear conspicuously in all such descriptions and, not infrequently, appear as independently effective agents of his activity (cf. Pedersen's discussion in *Israel* and various essays of Wheeler Robinson, such as his chapter in *The People and the Book*).

The foregoing sketch of the O.T. portrait of YHWH as a warrior had its effects upon Israel's conception of YHWH's character. As a warrior, he is a living and active deity. Even when enthroned in heaven, he is never deistically conceived. In the annually recurring cultic festivals, the people were reminded of this energetic character of their God, YHWH, who participated in their battles on their side, who had marched through the desert to lead them on, who had selected their places of encampment, and communicated his counsels and commands. The pregnant line, "YHWH îsh milchāmāh" (YHWH is a man of war) expressed this faith admirably. The prophets utilized this language and ideology to portray their view of YHWH's judgment of his people.

YHWH as warrior also paved the way to monotheism, for it stressed his might and power. His deeds in history and, above all, his titanic struggle in the chaos dragon myth, showed how he was greater and mightier than all other gods. The theoretic question of monotheism did not emerge into their consciousness, but, on the other hand, it

was axiomatic for them that the sphere of YHWH's power was unlimited and nothing could oppose his will. This is a dynamic, though not a dogmatic, monotheism. In the words of Lindblom, YHWH is the strongest, and the realm of his power knows no limits. It is very strange that the extremely crucial passage, Exodus 18:10, is not cited anywhere. When Second Isaiah comes to formulate his monotheism he finds his demonstration in the deeds of YHWH both in creation and in history. They reveal his wisdom and his might. The figure of the warrior finds a great place here (Isa. 40:25 f.; 45:1-2; 46:9 ff.). Again, the representation of YHWH as a warrior has thrust into the foreground certain of YHWH's most central characteristics. His holiness is deeply rooted in Israel's *Kriegsfrömmigkeit*. Similarly, the idea of YHWH's might and power is emphasized by the representation of him as God of War. This is especially clear in the poetry of war. Again, YHWH's wisdom and shrewdness *(Klugheit)* is expressed when he emerges as counsellor in war, not least of all in passages which describe or are influenced by the chaos-dragon myth.

Finally, many of the emotions associated with YHWH in the O.T. are closely united with his character as warrior. This applies above all to his wrath, which is occasionally heightened to jealousy and vengeance (note the use of *nākām*). In view of all this, the piety of Israel was deeply influenced by the thought of YHWH as warrior and as leader in battle. Fredriksson seeks to give a historical sketch of the development of this piety in Israel. Each stage of Israel's history reflects its own response to YHWH's character in this respect. The influence of historical memory upon the life and faith of Israel was great, and it is only to be expected that the theological categories which emerge naturally from his activity in war should find their place in Israel's religion. The *help* of God in times of distress and darkness achieved a deepening and a vitality that was never lost, and this deepening and vitality derive their character in part from reflection upon YHWH's might and power in war. Here, also, the thought of YHWH's mercy and grace finds expression, and the piety of the faithful Israelite leans upon the protection and support of his victorious and powerful God.

The monograph is a careful and workmanlike performance, and this is not meant as faint praise. In a sense it is comprehensive and detailed, comprehensive, because it covers the entire area of the O.T., detailed, because innumerable points are raised in the course of the discussion.

On the other hand, one constantly wishes that the discussions might have been somewhat extended, and one misses, too, any reference to extra-biblical material. The absence is especially regrettable since the material is so rich and abundant. But such a criticism is hardly fair, for such a work, broad as it already is, has its limits. The monograph is so well articulated that the form obtrudes itself a good deal, but this has the advantage of seeing the subject in its dimensions and its implications. There are linguistic comments here and there upon which one might comment with profit (e.g., the demonological terminology, or the so-called *termini technici* of military combat).

One is inevitably let to ponder the date of this monograph (1945) and the years in which it was conceived and written. There are not wanting evidences that we have much other work to come from Europe in succeeding months. It is devoutly to be hoped that the tradition of research and publication represented by this monograph, a tradition to which we owe so much, above all as it is exemplified in Germany, may be speedily revived. Even more, it would be a great boon to biblical study in America if that tradition might be carried on here by our own Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, or by some academic institution.

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Zephanja: Textkritisch und literarisch Untersucht. By GILLIS GERLEMAN. Lund, 1942. Sweden: C. W. K. Gleerup, xi, 135 pp. Kr. 10.

A loose leaf inside the paper cover of the reviewer's copy of this monograph contains the additional information that it was submitted to the Faculty of Theology of the University of Lund (Sweden) on November 28, 1942, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the attainment of the degree of Doctor of Theology; he is pleased to state at the outset that, in his judgment, it is well up to the standard of doctoral dissertations. The author's strength lies in his industry and erudition, which includes an ability to use the Ethiopic and Coptic daughter versions of the Septuagint and such rabbinic texts as the Targum and Yalqut Shim'oni. His great weakness is a lack of feeling for Hebrew style and idiom, and for exegetical plausibility. Of course that is a

fault that may be remedied by prolonged, intensive occupation with the Hebrew Scriptures in the original and, we hope, early disenchantment with the young scholar's brilliant but erratic countryman, H. S. Nyberg. For the latter's *Studien zum Hoseabuche* (Uppsala, 1935) are still regarded in some quarters as something in the nature of a revelation (cf. Gerleman, p. 111), even though Begrich (*OLZ*, 1939, pp. 437 ff.) has shown that, broadly speaking, what is true in them is not new, and vice versa.

Apart from the foreword, bibliography, and key to abbreviations at the beginning, and the index of Bible passages cited and table of contents at the end, the work consists of: (1) a running commentary on the text of Zephaniah, which is valuable for the recording of all renderings —only time will reveal any omissions—in Septuagint, Vulgate, and Peshitta that apparently presuppose divergences from the Masoretic Text in their Hebrew originals, but often unconvincing in its conclusions as to the correct reading and its sense (followed by a complete translation based on the commentary, with the passages believed to be interpolated or redactional relegated to the foot of the page and 8-point type); (2) a sober appraisal of the character and technique of each of the three primary versions of the book of Zephaniah; and (3) an historico-theological appreciation of Zephaniah, against the background of political events and religious currents in Judah from the time of Isaiah to the Josianic reformation, which is stimulating though not always demonstrable.

In this last section, which interests readers of this Review most, Gerleman follows pretty closely, and with considerable justification, the view expounded by another Scandinavian scholar, the Norwegian Sigmund Mowinckel, in a work which is little known outside Scandinavia, namely his *Jesaja-disiplene, profetien fra Jesaja til Jeremia* (Oslo, 1926), to the effect that under the crushing weight of the Assyrian oppression even prophets of doom, like Zephaniah, were moved to shift more or less of the emphasis from the major to the minor thesis of Isaiah, i.e., from the impending (by their time largely realized) calamity to the remnant. Where, however, Mowinckel includes the author or authors of the Deuteronomic Code among the disciples of Isaiah, Gerleman forsakes his company for that of G. von Rad. According to von Rad, Deuteronomy (or at least Proto-Deuteronomy) urges a still intact community in Palestine so to conduct itself as to avert the

terrible judgment: it does not declare the doom to be already decreed and proceed to draw up a program for a reconstituted community (G. von Rad, *Das Gottesvolk im Deuteronomium*, p. 76). Furthermore, the Deuteronomic legislation on prophets (Deut. 18:22 ß) is actually directed against prophets of doom (*Idem, ZAW* [1933], pp. 109 ff.).

In the reviewer's opinion, the author would have done well to exercise even more caution with regard to Mowinckel: the latter's ultra-cultic concept of the Psalter is not the last word on the subject. But Gerleman surely also exaggerates the zeal of Deuteronomy for the cult: D, unlike P, does not stress the importance of maintaining a particular cult punctiliously for all time, but only that of limiting the practice of the cult to the central sanctuary—whose mystical sanctity, by the way, the Code does *not* dwell upon (cf. von Rad). The author also fails to make a necessary distinction between the nationalism of numerous Psalms and that of Deuteronomy. That of the former, as he points out, is bound up with a reverence for the house of David. But that of the latter is far from being pronouncedly legitimist, or even enthusiastically monarchist (Deut. 17:14-20). Gerleman, however, is so anxious to make out as strong a case as possible for the thesis that the Deuteronomic Code originated among levitical cult-prophets, that he actually fails to notice that Ps. 89:31-38 speaks of the divine election of the Davidic dynasty, not of that of "national Israel" (p. 112).

But, all in all, it is a book that needs to be read by those who work on the subjects it deals with. Owing to the state the world was in at the time of its publication, three years elapsed before it was offered to the undersigned for review. He can, therefore, extend only somewhat belated congratulations to Dr. Gerleman upon his maiden work.

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The Hebrew-Arabic Dictionary of the Bible, known as Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Alfāẓ (Agrōn) of David ben Abraham al-Fāsī the Karaite. Edited from Manuscripts in the State Public Library in Leningrad and in the Bodleian Library in Oxford by S. L. Skoss (Yale Oriental Series, Researches, Vols. xx and xxi.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936, 1945. 2 vols. cli, 600 and clx, 756 pp. $7.50 and $12.00.

These two sumptuous volumes are another debt we owe to the Alexander Kohut Memorial Fund, whose interest in Judaic and

Semitic Studies has already so greatly enriched our store of source material, and in this case one cannot praise too highly either the enterprise of the Yale Oriental Series, which undertook to see that these volumes appeared in a form worthy of them, or the vast patience of the editor in preparing and critically presenting a work of such proportions.

Dr. Skoss is Professor of Arabic at the Dropsie College in Philadelphia, and this work is one fruit of the little center of Judaeo-Arabic studies he has been instrumental in founding there, and from which we may expect in the coming years to see many more publications in this underdeveloped and yet extremely interesting field of study, which has very much to contribute both to the student of Semitic languages and to the student of biblical exegesis, as well as to the narrower circle of students interested in the religious development of the Jewish community.

This work, like a great deal of our Judeo-Arabic material, comes from the community of the Qaraites, and the Qaraites are still a considerable body in the lands of the Near East and in some sections of Eastern Europe. In recent years more and more of their manuscript treasures have been coming to the attention of Western scholars, and have been utilized in research in a number of fields where this curious community made significant contributions during the days of its prominence. In two fields in particular, however, the labors of the Qaraites have had special importance, viz., in jurisprudence and in exegesis. In consequence of their rejection of Rabbinism, these followers of Anan, however much they came to differ among themselves, and however far they later diverge from the original teaching of Anan, were inevitably thrown back upon the Bible, and in a sense forced to devote themselves to biblical studies. Also, since they rejected the Rabbinic law Codes, they had to develop their own by a fresh examination of the biblical sources, aided by some awakened sense of the intense interest in juristic problems among the Muslim communities in whose midst they lived. As they would not follow Rabbinic interpretations of Scripture, needs must they undertake a more minute study of the biblical text so as to establish on just foundations their own interpretations, and if Rabbinic Codes were inadequate in their eyes, more acceptable Codes could only be the result of a more meticulous attention to the working out of juristic principles.

Thus from the beginning of the Qaraite movement, there was a lively interest in these matters, and, particularly in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, there was considerable literary production among them in the fields of jurisprudence and exegesis. The attention given in recent years by modern scholars to some of the important Qaraite productions in these fields, has proved abundantly worth while, and shown that not only do they have intrinsic worth in themselves, but that their influence on later literature has been all too little recognized.

One important result of their attention to biblical studies was that these Qaraite scholars were led to pay particular attention to language. Their Scriptures were in Hebrew, with some little Aramaic, and some of the interpretative literature connected with these Scriptures was also in Aramaic. They themselves, however, for the most part lived in an Arabic speaking milieu and used Arabic as their normal language of expression. While it would be too much to say that they were the first to recognize the family likeness of these languages and so to become the founders of Semitic philology, it is nevertheless true that they were the first group to develop in any considerable fashion this early comparative study of the Semitic languages. Such famous philologians as Ibn Janāh, Ibn Bal'am, and the two Ibn Ezras freely admitted the eminence and importance of the Qaraite writers in this branch of study.

Such studies inevitably lead to lexicography, as we see them doing in Arabic among the Muslim savants, and one specially interesting aspect of this Qaraite involvement in linguistics is their lexicography, and perhaps the earliest of their great lexicons is this *Jāmiʿ al-Alfāz*, (Assembler of Locutions), of the tenth century David ben Abraham al-Fāsī. It is characteristically Qaraite in that it is in the form of a dictionary of the Bible, so that while it is a work of philology, it is planned as a service to biblical study and exegesis, much as the great Arabic lexicons are said to have been planned as a service to poets, and is written in Arabic so as to be more generally accessible to the people of their community who were more familiar with Arabic than with Hebrew. It aims to be complete, to discuss all the words occurring in the Old Testament, not only the Hebrew words but also those in Aramaic, and, throughout, Arabic is used for comparison. This was the tenth century, and of course to us some of these comparisons

seem naïve in the extreme, but, on the other hand, one is sometimes astonished at the insight of some of the author's observations. His discussion and arrangement of the words cannot be other than strange to us who have always used lexicons based on the triliteral root, for he was writing before the theory of Semitic triliteral roots had gained the wide acceptance it had after the works of Judah Hayyūj and Ibn Janāh had made their mark on the scholarly world of their day, and this very fact that he is unaffected by the triliteral theory makes him a very important witness to the state of philological learning among the Qaraites in the tenth century.

Al-Fāsī was not the only Qaraite to compile a biblical lexicon, but he was apparently the first in this field, and his work seems to have been much used by later writers, which makes it the more strange that there is so little reference to him in literature. His lexicon was abridged at least twice. One abridgment was by no less a personage than Abu Sa'īd Levi ben Yefeth Hallevi, called *al-Mu'allim* (the teacher), son of the celebrated Qaraite commentator, Yefeth ben 'Ali, himself an author of some note and a collector of the Masoretic differences between Ben Asher and ben Naphtali. This abridgment became in its turn the subject of two further abridgments, one by 'Ali ben Sulaiman, the Commentator, another Qaraite, and one by the Rabbanite 'Ali ben Israel Alluf, another famous Commentator, who, although an orthodox Rabbi of Jerusalem, held the Qaraite scholars in high repute. If Dr. Skoss's interpretation of the fact that we have fragments of a considerably augmented text of the lexicon is correct, it may well be that David b. Abraham himself made an abridgment of his work, and that what we have in the only complete MSS on which to base an edition is the shorter form of the work, just as we have the Muslim Arabic works of aṭ-Ṭabarī and al-Mas'ūdī only in abridgments made by the authors themselves.

The number of fragments of the work that have come to light shows that it was often copied, and thus must have had considerable popularity, and, now that the whole work is in our hands in printed form, it may be possible to trace the influence of al-Fāsī on later philological and exegetical works. It would not be at all surprising to discover that some of his interesting speculations on the interpretation of biblical expressions had a long history in the subsequent development of both Qaraite and orthodox Jewish exegesis.

Of the author himself curiously little is known. Ever since Pinsker, in 1860, and Neubauer, in 1861-1862, published extracts from this Lexicon from MSS they had discovered, there has been no little interest in it on the part of western scholars, but as late as 1902 Steinschneider, in his *Die arabische Literatur der Juden* (p. 86), had to write, "Von seiner Person ist Nichts bekannt." His Hebrew name is David ben Abraham, and his Arabic name, Abu Sulaimān Dāwūd ibn Ibrahīm al-Fāsī, and this *nisba* al-Fāsī suggests that he came from Fez in Morocco, which in the tenth century had a notable Jewish community, though we seem to have no evidence that there was a Qaraite group among them. That he belongs to the late tenth century is fairly clear. His lexicon was abridged, as we have seen, by Abu Sa'īd, the son of Yefeth b. 'Ali, and so must have been written at a somewhat earlier period than the work of Abu Sa'īd, who flourished at the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century. On the other hand, he refers to and even quotes Saadia as an authority, and so must have been writing later than Saadia, which would also point to a date in the late tenth century. Dr. Skoss points to a confirmation of this date in the fact that Ibn al-Faraj, in his grammatical treatise entitled *al-Mushtamil*, which he completed in 1026, refers to him as one already dead. All the indications point to his having lived and worked in Jerusalem, not in Morocco, and there is a good deal of evidence in the lexicon itself, as Dr. Skoss has shown, to indicate that the author must have been intimately acquainted with the topography of Jerusalem and of Palestine in general, and shows a curious familiarity with political and social conditions in Palestine. It is fairly safe, therefore, to include him among the savants of the great Qaraite centre at Jerusalem, and the name al-Fāsī may have come to be attached to him only because he was known to belong to a family that had come from Fez, so that al-Fāsī was a useful and convenient way of distinguishing him from some other David ben Abraham. It would be interesting to investigate whether the Arabic idiom and peculiar vocabulary he uses are those of tenth century Palestinian Arabic or show traces of the Maghribi dialect, but this can hardly be established until we know a great deal more of the dialectal history of those two areas.

Every dictionary, of course, is meant for the use of students, but the *Kittāb al-Alfāẓ* apparently had in mind the needs of less advanced stu-

dents, for the author not infrequently goes into somewhat detailed instructions, with the object, it would seem, of making quite sure that the student cannot possibly misunderstand. Perhaps Dr. Skoss is right in thinking that, in its abridged form at least, it was meant by its author for use in the class-room or study-room at the Qaraite Academy at Jerusalem. To a certain extent this is borne out by the somewhat polemic tone of the work, where Qaraite interpretations are defended at length and the views of others are refuted, often in quite vigorous language, and illustrative material used in a way that suggests indoctrination of students, and a care to warn them against views and interpretations that are not those of the School in question.

One of the most interesting things in the book is the long Introduction by al-Fāsī, in which he explains to the student how to use his dictionary, and goes into his own theories of the root-meanings of words, with particular reference as to how linguistic interpretations are to be used in dealing with biblical material, and finally pens an exhortation to the young student which one could wish would be taken to heart by every young student in our generation, insisting that the fundamental requisite for interpretation is sound philological training, which alone can assure proper understanding of all that a passage in an ancient writer should convey.

The misprints in the two volumes are rather more than one would expect, but otherwise the editing and publishing are excellent, and both editor and publisher are to be congratulated on the completion of an arduous task, which has made available to scholars a work that will prove extremely useful both to Semitic and to biblical studies. It is to be hoped that Dr. Skoss will be enabled to publish without too long a delay the Arabic Glossary which will discuss the material this work has to contribute to our understanding of the vocabulary of tenth century Arabic.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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A Short Account of the Copts. By WILLIAM H. WORRELL. Illustrated by WILFRED B. SHAW. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, xi, 55 pp. $2.00.

Coptic studies have never received their due in this country. H. Hyvernat, in his day at the Catholic University in Washington, made

notable contributions to this branch of Oriental learning, and for many years Dr. Worrell at the University of Michigan has been keeping alight the torch, but with his recent retirement one looks around in some anxiety to see who will carry on the tradition. It is a long, long time since any paper dealing with Coptic studies has been presented at the meetings of the American Oriental Society, nor does there seem much interest even in the narrower circle of the Society of Biblical Literature. And this is a pity. It is true that Coptic literature is, for the most part, dry and uninspired ecclesiastical production, and, in a goodly portion, is translation literature; and it is true that the modern Copts do all their writing in Arabic, so that some of the more attractive periods of the history of the Coptic Church have their source material in Christian Arabic and not in Coptic documents. Yet the Coptic language, the direct descendant of the ancient Egyptian, however heavily loaded with Greek it became in the Christian period, is a language that has a good deal of interest to the linguist, and the ecclesiastical literature of the Copts has much to contribute to the history of one of the Monophysite Churches, and to our study of the development of certain types of practical devotional religion which grew up in the East. It is a mistake to believe that the history of the Monophysites can be studied in the Greek sources alone, for Syriac, Coptic, and Armenian literature, and even Ethiopic literature, have no small contribution to make to our understanding of the various ramifications of this movement. Nor should it be forgotten how large a part Egypt had in the early development of monasticism, so that the queer Lives of the Saints in Coptic, in spite of all they have of the bizarre, throw a good deal of light on the life and thought of circles which contributed much to the monastic movement, and are circles which we rarely touch in the Greek literature. Moreover, Coptic art, which as a matter of fact has received more attention in this country than either the language or the literature, is a most significant chapter in the history of Oriental art.

Dr. Worrell, in this volume, is writing from the point of Coptic studies. He is not an Egyptologist writing on the last phase of Egyptian studies, nor a Church historian discussing a particular branch of Eastern Church history, nor an expert in Greco-Roman studies turning aside for a moment to look at a curious group on the borderland of those studies, nor is he a medievalist. He knows the Copts as a people and likes them, and attempts, in this expansion of his Henry Russel

Lecture, to present them as they appear through the rather sad story of almost continuous oppression which has made up their history, and to set forth sympathetically their achievements. The story of the Copts, however, is peculiarly a religious story, for their history as Copts begins with their conversion to Christianity, and the thing which has kept them together as a community under all their persecution and oppression is their religion. Dr. Worrell recognizes this, of course, and yet all through his account one has the uncomfortable feeling that it is written as though religion were a matter for contempt.

Students who are familiar with the author's earlier work will not be surprised at his discussion of the rise of the Coptic language, but others may well be astonished to see his opposition to generally held views. Coptic is written in Greek characters helped out by a few derived from Demotic to represent sounds that could not be expressed by any Greek letter. Dr. Worrell thinks that this "invention" of the Coptic script had nothing to do with the Christian movement, but was a necessity when Greek culture had made a new way of writing the vernacular language arise as a problem, and he thinks it was worked out by persons with no mean philological training. Also, he argues that the work was done in Alexandria, and that the Bohairic was the first dialect to be reduced to this conventional written form. The fact that all our earliest documents in Coptic are in the Sahidic dialect he explains as due merely to the fact that all the early material in Bohairic has perished, owing to the moister climate of the areas over which Bohairic was spoken. He gives a very clear statement of the five literary dialects of Coptic, and rightly insists that each of them was derived from the spoken language of its particular area.

Perhaps the most generally interesting section of the book is that which translates specimens of various types of Coptic literature. For the most part, the originals are not easily accessible, and these translations preserve admirably the flavor of the homely and somewhat clumsy style of the texts. The specimens chosen are for preference secular and nationalistic, in accordance with the author's main purpose. He has given some specimens of letters from humble folk, a few specimens of the "ascetic" texts, considerable extracts from the little-known Cambyses Romance, and as a verse specimen he translates a number of stanzas from the curious poem on Archellites and Synkletike, which, though it belongs to the cycle of the legends of the Saints,

is unique in its representation of the dramatic quality of human tragedy.

The illustrations of the book deserve a special word. They are not conventional pictures but pen and ink drawings based on photographs of Coptic material, and really illustrate much better than photographs. These are supplemented by a map of Coptic Egypt, and two reproductions, one of a Coptic ostracon, and one of a page of a Sahidic manuscript. One can only hope that, from the leisure of his retirement Dr. Worrell may have yet many things to add to this slender but interesting volume, which will serve to awaken interest among students in this undeservedly neglected area of Oriental studies.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

Armenia and the Byzantine Empire: A Brief Study of Armenian Art and Civilization. By SIRARPIE DER NERSESSIAN. Preface by HENRI GRÉGOIRE. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945. xxi, 148 pp. 32 plates. $3.00.

Although the churches of Armenia have attracted the attention of western scholars since the days of Choisy and Strzygowski, this is the first book in any language which presents a survey of Armenian Art as a whole. The author, a distinguished scholar of Armenian and Byzantine illumination, is well equipped for the task, but she has addressed her book to a popular audience as it grew out of five lectures delivered in 1942 for the Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves of the École Libre des Hautes Études in New York. She has, therefore, eliminated all footnotes and references but has given a useful bibliography at the end. The plates are small, and one wishes they were twice as numerous, especially since much of the material discussed is little known and poorly published.

Within these limits, however, Miss Der Nersessian has written a useful and interesting book. The first chapter presents a brief historical survey, describing the geographic and economic conditions and tracing the history of Greater Armenia and Cilicia until the end of the Byzantine Empire. In its mountain stronghold, Armenia was continually a battleground for Greeks and Byzantines on the one side, and, first,

Persians, then Arabs, or Moslems on the other, striving always to maintain a perilous independence and play one foe against the other. Although the history is long and complicated, enmity between Armenia and the Byzantine Empire never subsided, since the Greeks wished to conquer and assimilate the Armenians and were especially bitter in their persecution of the two strongholds of national life, the nobility and the clergy. Many Armenians, nevertheless, through either voluntary or forced exile played important parts in the Byzantine Empire; a number distinguished themselves as generals, and a few of Armenian descent even ascended the imperial throne. Relations with Armenia, however, do not seem to have been improved during these reigns. Greek influence on culture was more fruitful. From the invention of the Armenian alphabet in the fifth century, when Greek rather than Syriac texts of the Scriptures were translated, down to the twelfth century, when Gregory Magistros (1045) was praised as one who "wrote poetry like Homer and spoke like Plato," it was a determining force.

Armenia, where Christianity was made the official religion in 301 A.D., has the distinction of being the oldest Christian state. Its Church was also of apostolic origin, if one accepted the Armenian claim that the gospel was preached there by Thaddeus and Bartholomew. This the Byzantines denied, claiming St. Gregory the Illuminator as its founder, who had been sent by Leontius, Bishop of Caesarea. Thus they claimed that the Armenian See was a suffragan of Caesarea of Cappadocia and, thereby, dependent on the Greek Church. The controversy began in the fifth century with the consecration of the Catholicos by the bishops of Armenia instead of by the Archbishop of Caesarea, an act regarded as schism by the Greek Church. This dissension was never resolved but plagued the relationship of the two Churches throughout the centuries. Though appearing in many guises and even entering into the dispute as to the validity of the Council of Chalcedon and the teachings of St. Cyril, whom the Armenians followed together with the Church of Alexandria, about the definition of the person and natures of Christ, it was basically like the political controversies, a demand for autonomy on the part of the Armenians. Numerous attempts at reconciling the differences, including persecutions, therefore failed.

The Armenian Church also played an important part in preserving the national language and literature and, "with rare exceptions, all the Armenian writers including historians and poets, were churchmen."

An interesting though brief description is given of a few of the monastic schools.

Architecture is the best known branch of Armenian art. Here Miss Der Nersessian steers a sane middle course between the extravagant claims of Strzygowski, who says "Greek genius at St. Sophia and Italian genius at St. Peters only realized more fully what the Armenians had originated," and Choisy's conservative view that Armenian art is merely a provincial branch of Byzantine. Although extant monuments do not support Strzygowski's thesis that the Armenians of the fourth century were the first to use a square building with a single dome for church plans, this form of centralized plan in multiple variations became popular from the seventh century on. The author classifies and analyzes the various types, the niche-buttressed square, multifoil and trefoil plans, the domed hall-church, and the cruciform domed church, giving plans and occasional "envelope diagrams" which make the superstructure clear. She points out the wide variety of types in the relatively small number of monuments which have escaped destruction, how these travelled west to north Italy and France, and how, at Ani, Armenian architects of the tenth century were using pointed arches, cross-ribbed vaults, and clustered piers a century before their appearance in French Gothic architecture. The result is an impressive substantiation of her statement that "Armenian architects struck out along paths never explored by Byzantine art," that "the architecture appears as an original and vigorous art, and as one of the important factors in the development of East Christian art. In touch with the East and with the West, it drew its inspiration from both sources and served as a link between them" so that "new types, new structural methods elaborated by her architects spread to other countries and exercised an influence which is far from neglible."

To anyone familiar with the dearth of figure sculpture in the churches of Syria and Byzantium, the wealth of Armenian sculpture is amazing. Most of it, to be sure, is architectural, and done in low relief with flat, contrasting planes, and floral designs and geometric ornament predominate, but a sufficient number of figures and scenes have survived on the few monuments extant to indicate that from the sixth century figure sculpture was not a rarity on church facades. Here a lack of adequate illustration greatly handicaps the reader. Six pages are devoted to a description of the four extraordinarily rich facades of Aght'amar,

of which three small photographs give us a few details. (Its predecessors fare even worse.) It is peculiarly maddening, when one finds for the first time convincing identification and discussion of the iconography of these puzzling and important sculptures, to have to go to W. Bachmann's *Kirchen und Moscheen in Armenien und Kudistan,* (Leipzig, 1913) in order to see them. Although most of the scenes seem to derive iconographically from Egypt, Miss Der Nersessian follows earlier writers in comparing the style with Sassanian monuments. On the whole, with the exception of metal bookcovers and reliquaries, Armenian sculpture has little connection with Byzantine art and thus again demonstrates the main thesis of the book that Armenia is not merely a provincial branch of Byzantine art.

The final chapter, on Armenian painting, as one might expect, is the richest, and to this nearly half of the plates are devoted. The few mosaics and scanty remains of frescoes scarcely do more than substantiate the literary evidence that monumental painting at one time existed in Armenia. Many illuminated manuscripts, however, survive, dating from the ninth century on, and of these Miss Der Nersessian has given the best and clearest account yet to be written. Starting with manuscripts which show Byzantine influence, exemplified by the famous Queen Mlk'e Gospel, she demonstrates the modification of this style into a more Armenian form in Etchmiadzin Gospel 229, with the stiff frontality of its figures and its emphasis on decorative design rather than on plastic form. A second artistic trend came partly from Syria, partly from Persia, and its more oriental character may be seen in the Manuscript of 966 A.D. in the Walters' Art Gallery in Baltimore. Meantime, the Byzantine influence continued in other manuscripts, blending with and usually modified by Armenian strains. The two tendencies are traced down through the history of manuscript painting in Cilicia, which culminated in the powerful, realistic style of T'oros Roslin in the thirteenth century, then back again to Greater Armenia. The number of manuscripts touched upon in these few pages is amazing, and although the discussion goes too rapidly for easy reading, it forms a framework for further study of the subject. The chapter as a whole shows again how Armenia was a battleground between Oriental and Byzantine ideas, first swayed to the one, then to the other, but how she always expressed herself with originality and vitality, developing distinctive forms of her own, both in iconography and ornament. One

may well end with the latter, since it was in decoration that Armenian artists excelled in the rich profuseness of ornamental forms and sumptuous color, well exemplified in the beautiful manuscript no. 740 of the Morgan Library (pl. xxv, 2) with the peculiar fantasy of the dancing nude women and the delicate flamingo-like birds that flank the canon tables.

MARION LAWRENCE

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The Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of William Ockham. Edited by PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O.F.M. (Franciscan Institute Publications No. 2). St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1945. xi, 139 pp. $2.00.

The writings of William of Ockham probably possess more intrinsic interest for the philosophic enterprise of our own day than those of any other medieval thinker. For in Ockham we find the currently fashionable conception of logic as an instrument by which scientific discourse may be freed of ambiguities and of "metaphysical" fictions, and interpreted in function of empirically identifiable elements of observable natural processes. This conception was not, in Ockham's view, a revolutionary one; it was what he thought to be the fundamental principle of Aristotle's method. St. Thomas Aquinas, as critical of Plato's ideal entities as was Ockham, seems to have shared this general conception of the principles and method of human knowledge, and to have deemed it adequate not only for philosophical inquiry but for exhibiting the compatibility of Christian doctrine with natural knowledge.

What distinguished Ockham from Aquinas was neither his acceptance of the Aristotelian principles, nor his effort to utilize philosophic method in the explication of theological doctrine, but rather the rigor and persistence with which he carried out the program. This resulted in the development of powerful instruments of analysis, historically important in the genesis of both the mathematical and experimental methods of modern science; but it also resulted in the discovery of acute difficulties in the project of synthesizing an empirically grounded philosophy with the revealed doctrines of theology. The same basic principles which led St. Thomas to deny the validity of such Augustin-

ian "demonstrations" as those purporting to prove creation in time, or the doctrine of the Trinity, led Ockham to reject the few theological demonstrations which Aquinas had still considered valid. But where St. Thomas had been content to close these logical gaps by the use of analogies and metaphors, Ockham refused to fall back on pseudo-solutions of this type, and left the wounds of the "medieval synthesis" open and unhealed. It is one of the ironies of history that Ockham's fidelity to the principles of scientific method, principles which were fundamentally no different for him than for Thomas Aquinas, should have earned for him the reputation of scepticism.

The short treatise on divine foreknowledge of future contingents, of which Fr. Boehner has now provided an excellent critical edition, offers a pointed illustration of one of these unbridgeable gaps between philosophy and theology, and of Ockham's unwillingness to close the breach by the resort to dubious logic. The *Tractatus* is divided into five *Quaestiones*, dealing with diverse aspects of the problem of how God can have determinate knowledge, from all eternity, of human moral choices yet to be made, without entailing the consequent that such choices are predetermined as to their outcome. In short, how can there be determinate truth or falsity of a proposition asserting a future event, if the occurrence or non-occurrence of that event is assumed to be undetermined?

In the first section of the treatise, Ockham states nine postulates or *suppositiones* as basis for his discussion of the problem. Most of these serve to eliminate irrelevant or ambiguous modes of stating the problem, and to narrow it down to its essential difficulty. The fifth of these postulates gives a concise statement of Aristotle's analysis of future contingent propositions, according to which such propositions, if asserted of future events not predetermined by present conditions, are not determinately true or determinately false in the present time of their assertion; with the further consequence that determinate present knowledge of their truth or falsity is impossible, since *nihil scitur nisi verum*.

Against this conclusion is the explicit thesis of theology that God has infallible and determinate knowledge of all future events, including the free moral decisions of men. This thesis is asserted in the sixth postulate, as *indubitanter tenendum*. No proof of the thesis is attempted, and it is conceded on the sole authority of the Church –*prop-*

ter dicta Sanctorum. Significantly, Ockham states that "it is impossible to express clearly the way in which God knows future contingents."

The second *Quaestio* deals specifically with the problem of divine foreknowledge of future contingents. The arguments against such foreknowledge, grounded in Aristotle's analysis, are presented clearly and forcefully; in defense of the thesis of divine prescience Ockham offers no argument, but merely states that it is a doctrine of faith—*ad oppositum est fides.* His detailed discussion, in this and the remaining Questions of the treatise, gives logical clarification of the issue, but makes no pretense of resolving it. In this Ockham seems to show agreement with the dictum of St. Thomas, that pseudo-demonstrations of theological doctrines are as inimicable to the interests of theology as they are to the integrity of philosophy.

Fr. Boehner follows his edition of the text with a forty-five page discussion of problems connected with the *Tractatus.* After giving a very careful and accurate summary of the theses, terminology, and main arguments of the *Tractatus,* he takes up the question of whether Aristotle's denial of determinate present truth or falsity to future contingent propositions was held by Ockham to imply the possibility of a three-valued logic. Since the *Tractatus* offers very little material for investigation of this question, the discussion is based principally on Ockham's *Exposito super primum librum Perihermenias* (ch. 9), supplemented by relevant texts from his *Summa Logicae* and his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences.* These texts, edited by Fr. Boehner from manuscript sources as well as early editions, are printed in a series of Appendices, together with texts by Petrus Aureoli and Gregory of Rimini dealing with the problem of future contingents.

In discussing the relation of Ockham's analysis of future contingents to the question of a three-valued logic, Fr. Boehner makes no claim that Ockham developed such a logic, and indeed he asserts that Ockham regarded the three-value thesis as impossible. But in Ockham's commentary on the *Perihermenias,* he finds a short passage which takes up the question of the validity of conditional propositions by the criteria of material implication, such as contain an antecedent or consequent whose truth or falsity is indeterminate in the manner of future contingent propositions. In this text Ockham appears to consider the matrix of implicative relationships which would be generated by admission, in addition to the values T and F, of the "undetermined-T-or-F" value,

which we may symbolize by the letter N. Besides the usual four combinations of T and F, such a matrix will include five other implication functions involving the N-value. Four of these are quite clearly indicated by Ockham, through examples given in his text, and Fr. Boehner contends that the fifth function "N implies N" is implicitly admitted by Ockham as a consequence having formal validity or value T. This contention seems to me highly doubtful, since the apparent method used by Ockham for assigning the values of implications involving N-valued propositions is that of reducing them to sub-matrices of T and F elements. This procedure does not, however, yield the value T for the "N implies N" function, but the value N, since one of the possible T and F substitutions in "N implies N" is the explicitly false sequence "T implies F."

Does Ockham admit the validity of a three-valued logic? According to Fr. Boehner he does not. Does Aristotle's interpretation of future contingent propositions constitute a three-value thesis? On this point Fr. Boehner concedes that "it is hardly conceivable how in any Aristotelian logic, with its definite notion of truth as the correspondence of a proposition with reality, there is any place for a neutral value between correspondence and non-correspondence" (p. 65). Yet, in his subsequent discussion of the position of Ockham, and of other medieval writers, he refers to the Aristotelian view as "the three-value thesis," and draws the conclusion that Ockham, by denying the possibility of a third or neutral value, was placing himself in opposition to Aristotle on strictly philosophical or logical grounds. On this interpretation, Ockham is exhibited as having offered a *philosophical* solution to the difficulty involved in the theological doctrine of divine foreknowledge of future contingents. The solution would then be stated as follows: Future contingent propositions are determinately true or false; God knows whatever is true to be true, and whatever is false to be false; therefore God knows all future contingent propositions.

This interpretation, which seems to be favored by Fr. Boehner, does not seem to me to be justified by the texts. Ockham makes no internal criticism of Aristotle's analysis of future contingents, either as regards the truth of Aristotle's premises or the validity of his reasoning; his unique basis for rejecting Aristotle's analysis is stated in the four words *ad oppositum est fides.* In the selection from Ockham's *Ordinatio,* printed in the appendix of our edition, this fact is expressed even more

forcibly than in the *Tractatus: "Ideo dico ad questionem, quod indubitanter est tenendum, quod Deus certitudinaliter et evidenter scit omnia futura contingentia. Sed hoc evidenter declarare et modum, quo scit omnia futura contingentia, exprimere est impossibile omni intellectui pro statu isto"* (p. 98). Further on, he has this to say: *"Ista conclusio, quamvis per rationem naturalem nobis possibilem et a priori probari non possit, tamen per auctoritates Bibliae et Sanctorum, quae sunt satis notae, potest probari"* (p. 99). It seems unquestionable to me, on the basis of the texts, that Ockham could find no *philosophical* ground either for rejecting Aristotle's analysis of future contingents or for supporting the theological doctrine of divine prescience. It seems, indeed, as if he considered both positions to be true, while recognizing that he lacked the means of showing that the contradiction is verbal rather than real.[1]

Must we then conclude that Ockham here found an irreconcilable contradiction between philosophy and theology, or that he subscribed to the notion of "two truths?" To draw such a conclusion, it seems to me, would be to miss the point of Ockham's discussion in its relation to the fundamental empiricism of his philosophy. It would be to assume that the *meaning* of the theological statement, "God has infallible knowledge of future contingents," can be assigned through unequivocal definition of its terms in function of identifiable elements of experience. It is just this possibility which Ockham denies, when he asserts that it is impossible for any human intellect, in this life, to express the mode of God's knowledge of future contingents. In other words, the meaning which the word "knowledge" has for us, and the meaning which it could have as predicated of the actually infinite intellect of God, are equivocal—a thesis which Ockham upholds uncompromisingly in his *Quodlibeta.* But propositions containing a verbally identical term with equivocal meaning, such that one of these meanings cannot be defined at all, cannot be brought into *any* determinate logical relationship, either of compatibility or contradiction, with each

1. In support of this interpretation is the quotation from Adam Wodham, Ockham's pupil, which Fr. Boehner quotes (p. 83): "Quia videtur, quod ex eo ipso, quod aliqua sunt futura contingentia ad utrumlibet, non sunt determinate vera, nec per consequens possunt evidenter sciri vel praesciri esse vera. Et hoc tenet Okam, et probat hoc esse opinionem Philosophi, quamvis in hoc Philosopho veritas fidei contradicat."

other. The theological problem of divine prescience of future contingents, therefore, can only be a verbal problem for the human intellect in this life, in any form in which human beings can state it; and for God, presumably, there are no problems of any kind.

This interpretation of Ockham's position, which Fr. Boehner seems not to have considered, is at least consistent with the basic principles of his philosophy—principles derived from Aristotle and acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas. They may be indicated by the statement that propositions can be true or false only if their terms have definite meaning, while the ultimate basis of any meanings that we can assign to our symbols is our experience, direct or indirect, of their designata.

The philosophy of William of Ockham will remain a matter of controversy, even when his writings are accessible to all in dependable modern editions. But in the absence of such editions, the controversies will continue to be more passionate than profitable. Meanwhile Fr. Boehner has done an excellent job in his edition of this minor treatise, as in several other shorter Ockham texts which he has edited. We can only thank him for his labors, and hope that he will apply his diligent and intelligent scholarship to the task of editing some of Ockham's major philosophical works.

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Church Life in England in the Thirteenth Century. By J. R. H. MOORMAN. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. xxviii, 444 pp. $5.50.

The author of this work is a rising luminary among English historians of the Middle Ages. His competence in the interpretation of medieval documents was fully demonstrated in his admirable *Sources for the Life of St. Francis* (1940). The present work utilizes a vastly wider range, both of source materials and of modern studies, and constitutes a condensed exposition and critical appraisal of thirteenth century English church and monastic life and institutions. Of the two parts of the book, the first treats the secular clergy and diocesan and parish affairs; the second (chapters XVIII to XXVI) deals with monks and friars.

Mr. Moorman studies the church chiefly at the parish level. The varieties of patronage in parish appointments and the place and func-

tion of the chapels, chantries, collegiate churches, and incidentally of the "secular cathedrals," are the topics expounded in the first two chapters. Even here the sharp inequalities among different classes of clergy appear, and this impression is deepened through the chapters on rectors, vicars, assistant clergy, and clerical incomes. Service was evidently more often than not in inverse ratio to privilege and wealth. The good rectors came from the yeomanry, tradesmen, and peasantry; those from the landed nobility were likely to be greedy pluralists such as Bogo de Clare, who by favor of pope and king acquired more than a score of livings with incomes that totaled the equivalent of £150,000 in present currency, and earned Pecham's designation, "a robber rather than a rector." The chapter on vicars contains a luminous discussion of the monastic appropriations and parishes from which the vicarage system took its rise.

The author shows a marked interest in the moral aspects of the conduct of clergy and people. We are given an intimate account of the parsonage and its occupants. Evidence of clerical marriage, concubinage, and sheer immorality calls forth this comment:

> Celibacy is a vocation. To make the vow applicable to a small number of men, such as the members of a religious community, is reasonable enough; but to apply it to a class that numbered something like one in twelve of the adult male population is to create a tension which can scarcely be maintained.

A lively picture is presented of the services of worship and of the irreverence that accompanied them, and attention is called to the revival of preaching, which had been "spasmodic and incidental" before the coming of the friars. The chapter on "priest and people" indicates the difficulties of parish maintenance and the unclerical behavior as well as unclerical dress of negligent men in Holy Orders. With characteristic moderation, Mr. Moorman points out the difficulty of averaging up the score, since it is "extremists alone who get into the news." For the most part, he thinks, the clergy "gave the people what they needed."

Chapters XIII to XV are devoted to the episcopal order and diocesan affairs. While most priests were poor, most bishops had ample and even excessive incomes, which they used according to the measure of their sense of responsibility. We read with something like stupefaction the list of foods consumed at medieval banquets, and Mr. Moorman sup-

plies numerous examples of these. An Easter Day feast for the eighty persons of one bishop's household called for eight hundred pounds of meat, fourteen hundred eggs, and sixty-six gallons of wine, besides bread, cheese, and beer. Let us hope that some baskets of fragments were left for the needy! In a later chapter, however, the bishops are judged to have been as a whole "competent and conscientious."

On the monasteries the author assembles a large body of data most of which is on the debit side of the moral ledger. Monasteries had "ceased to attract the best type of man," because they had become prosperous and their life easy, while the universities and the friars made stiffer demands on mind and spirit. Abbots surrounded themselves with luxury and became alienated from their monks. Regulations to limit their autocratic powers left them still engrossed in the task of administration of their large estates. The estates of the monasteries were placed under the care of obedientiaries who were heads of departments, and in reality business men. Despite large incomes, many monasteries were financially embarrassed. Some were aided by neighbor houses; some sank into insolvency and were forced to disperse, but these, in general, were later able to recover their status. Nunneries unfortunately receive in this book only incidental notice.

No student of the history of monasticism can afford to overlook any section of Part II, but chapters XXII to XXIV are probably of greater interest and value than the others. These discuss life within the monasteries, the monks' standard of living, and the monastic contribution to society. Moorman is in some sense the continuator of Dom Knowles, whose admirable *Monastic Order In England* closes with the year 1216. But, while not, like Dr. Coulton, unsympathetic to the ideals of monasticism, he shows the monastic life of the century to have departed far from the principles of St. Benedict, and from the spirit of the tenth and eleventh century reformers, and, on the whole, lends corroboration to Coulton's view of its character in this period. Incidentally, Coulton is very rarely cited. Only two chapters are devoted to the friars (XXV and XXVI). The first of these enlists our admiration for the early labors of both Dominicans and Franciscans in England, and illustrates the "spirited resistance" which they met from the monks, once their rivalry was recognized. The second, indicates the "gradual falling away" from the early ideal—an ideal which Moorman would not have us forget.

The reader who wants his history in the form of broad and bold generalizations with indiscriminate applause and blame of persons and systems will resent our author's emotional detachment and conscientious attention to minutiae. But if the grace is given to read with attentiveness, there will emerge from each chapter a clear impression of church conditions that is certain to be substantially in accord with historical truth. No historian could be freer from prejudice than Mr. Moorman. He does not romanticize the thirteenth century, nor does he vilify the men of that age. Instead, he subjects its institutions and leaders to a rigorous, factual scrutiny, making cautious judgments and steering the reader away from exaggerated conclusions. He likens his book to a snapshot, which presents a stationary picture, rather than a film which tells a story. The work throughout exhibits this intention, but the comparison is inexact with regard to the impression it conveys. In Mr. Moorman's presentation of the data of that vigorous century, movement and trend become apparent, although he takes no pains to make them so. Generalizations that somewhat tentatively emerge are that the seculars were improving and that the religious were deteriorating.

The prospective reader should be aware that the book is about the life, and in no sense about the thought of the Church and of the religious orders. Intellectual achievement and educational effort are appreciated, but there is no examination of the content of the learned works of the time. Nor is the author much concerned with the traces of private devotion and piety which the sources afford. It is sufficient for one volume that we have a vivid account of the trying conditions amid which the towering intellect of Robert Grosseteste found expression, the learned and genial Adam Marsh was a beloved master, and competent leaders like John Pecham and Robert Kilwardby both thought and wrought worthily, while the brilliant Roger Bacon uttered unforgetable praise, blame and prophecy.

Save for a few clumsy sentences the book is stylistically admirable. A valuable table of statistics of monks, canons, and friars is appended (pp. 402-12), and there is an ample index.

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Skapelse och frälsning i Melanchthons teologi (Creation and Salvation in the Theology of Melanchthon). By HENNING LINDSTROM. Stockholm: Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, 1944. 415 pp. Kr. 9:50.

This is a thesis presented to the faculty of the University of Lund, Sweden, as one of its requirements for the Doctor of Theology degree. It is quite evident from the manner in which the book is written that the author was more concerned about fulfilling academic requirements than about writing a book that by reason of its lucidity would be easily read. In its present form this volume is far too verbose and repetitious to be interesting. In this connection, however, one should, perhaps, take cognizance of a custom that is rather common in Europe, namely that, of a meticulous presentation of details in all works of this kind.

The material in this book is divided into six chapters, and in these the following subjects are treated: Necessity and Freedom, Bondage and Freedom, Justification and Reconciliation, Faith and Works, The Word and the Spirit, the Church and the Ministry; and in each instance the author sets forth what Melanchthon taught on each particular topic. A comparison is also made between the theology of Melanchthon on the one hand and that of the Schoolmen and the other reformers on the other. In his introduction the author presents, as a part of his thesis, his observation that Melanchthon in reality constitutes the focal point for a great number of theological concepts which were in vogue at the time. Melanchthon must, therefore, be reckoned with in any attempt to investigate or to understand the kind of theology that is now known as Lutheran Orthodoxy. While it is almost impossible, by reason of the multiplicity of citations and the mass of arguments presented by the author, to follow the development or to summarize the content of this volume, we will, nevertheless, endeavor to call attention to some of the leading principles that are dealt with.

Melanchthon, so the author affirms, is indirectly to blame for the fact that the teaching regarding the work of God as Creator has found a relatively small place in Reformation theology. Creation and salvation were by Melanchthon thought of as two independent entities. The idea of creation, then, logically belonged to the sphere of the natural sciences, and it was inevitable that this should influence one's concept of creation. As a counterbalance to this, it was held by Melanchthon that man had been endowed with innate ethical ideas. This was all

well and good for the time being, but later developments were along lines that were not in keeping with the intentions of Melanchthon. Liberal theology, on the one hand, could be satisfied with a subjective experience of religion, while the "Crisis Type of Theology," denying the existence of any innate religious concepts, arrived at a position where it also had to deny that there was any point of contact between God and man. All of this runs counter to the position of Luther, who strongly affirmed that the activities of God in both creation and salvation stand in close relationship to one another, and find their goal and culmination in connection with man's salvation.

With respect to the freedom of the will, there is also a difference between Luther and Melanchthon. Reformation theology, as a whole, posited that God is not only omnipresent but that He, also, is active in all that happens, so that everything happens by reason of a higher necessity. Luther emphasized this concept of necessity in his denial of the complete freedom of the will. Melanchthon, while also believing in the omnipotence of God with its concommitent idea of a higher necessity, held that some room should be given to the freedom of man's will. In creation, so Melanchthon affirms, God is the *Causa Prima* who is constantly at work in and through the *Causae secundae,* creation, and that *causae secundae* in everything are "driven" by the power of God. In certain respects this is also true with reference to man, but here God does not "drive" anyone against his will. With free beings God co-operates according to their freedom, i.e., God does not affect the decisions that man might make. For this reason, even though God desires that all men should be saved, there are those who will reject the salvation offered and who will consequently be "lost," and that without any blame on the part of God as far as the ultimate outcome is concerned. God desires that all men be saved, but His saving grace is not irresistible, and no man is saved against his own will. Melanchthon would not admit that there was a "hidden will" in God in accordance with which some men would be saved and others lost. As the free will of man played its part in the fall of man, so it also is operative in connection with his salvation.

With respect to the Law, the author notices a divergence between Luther and Melanchthon. The former included the Law among the "enemies" of man, it was something that had to be overcome. Melanchthon, on the other hand, saw the Law as a gift from God. God

has revealed Himself to man through the Law, and through it He also desires to mediate His goodness and righteousness. The Law spans the bridge between time and eternity. It proclaims on earth that which finally shall be fully revealed in heaven, and it gives here and now that which shall find its completion in the world to come. Since the entire Law is the expression of God's will there can be no division of man's "works" so that they would represent a "higher" or a "lower" order of life or morality. What God demands in the first table of the Law should and must be realized by practicing that which is contained in the second table.

In the Old Covenant Melanchthon saw an example of the working of the *lex naturae* as this was expressed in the history and the government of Israel. Here he found a nation that, in all respects, was governed according to the will of God, and it was this divine will that formed and guided the history of Israel. The people of Israel saw its relationship to God expressed and realized through the objective ordinances of the Law.

The object of the Church, according to Melanchthon, is not only to proclaim the Word and teach men the true faith, but it is also, through the Sacraments, to mediate the grace of God. It is within the Church that men receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit is not given aside from the Church. Thus the Church stands far above everything mundane. She is the means whereby all good gifts are given both to the individual and society. Melanchthon lays great stress on the idea of the *pure doctrine*. No one can receive the Spirit who has not the correct intellectual apprehension of the teachings found in the Word and in the Church. In the visible, empirical Church, there is the invisible communion of the saints, and it is rather within this latter that the Spirit is active. Herein it seems that Melanchthon differs from Luther in that he places greater emphasis on the purity of doctrine. Luther affirmed that the Church was to be found wherever the Word was preached in truth and where the sacraments were administered according to the word and institution of the Lord. Melanchthon, on the other hand, would say that the Church is where the doctrine is correctly taught. This leaves room for the ever recurring question as to what constitutes the pure and correct doctrine. (And this may be one of the reasons why the Lutheran Church has been divided into its celebrated "fifty-seven varieties.") In fact, by this Melanchthonian ap-

proach to the concept of the Church the real Lutheran idea of the Church is vitiated.

The author has included a valuable bibliography in this volume, and throughout the book there is ample evidence of the fact that he is not only well familiar with the writings of Melanchthon but that he also knows what others have written on the subject. The value of the book would have been increased materially if the author had summarized his findings in a concluding chapter.

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A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents. By Earl Morse Wilbur. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945. xiii, 617 pp. $6.00.

The completion of the first volume of this magnificent history of Unitarianism evokes a tribute to a lifetime of persistent scholarship pursued amid the vicissitudes and distractions of educational administration. The author went about his task in long range terms, building up first one of the finest, if not the finest library on the history of Unitarianism to be found anywhere in the world. He travelled and, most fortunately, was able to transcribe many a precious document since lost in the conflagration. In order to acquire and utilize these varied resources, he mastered not only the usual run of European languages but, in addition, Polish and Hungarian. And now, *Deo gratias,* in his retirement he has been able to see through the press the first volume of this comprehensive survey. The work is even the more welcome because nothing of the sort previously existed in English, and the only comparable work in any tongue is now more than a century old.

The initial problem was to define the task. What is Unitarianism? Is it a movement or an idea? Plainly it is both. Sociniamism and English and American Unitarianism are movements with institutional forms. Their history is the history of churches. But there have been also many individual Unitarians, especially in the formative period, who espoused opinions without founding parties. And what were the opinions by reason of which they deserve a place? The reader would suppose that the leitmotif would be found in doctrinal Unitarianism. The author claims, however, that Unitarianism has been characterized

rather by an anti-doctrinal attitude than by opposition to a particular doctrine. The genius of the movement centers in three points: (1) complete mental freedom in religion, rather than bondage to creeds and confessions; (2) the unrestricted use of reason in religion, rather than reliance upon external authority or past tradition; (3) generous tolerance of differing religious views and usages, rather than insistence upon uniformity in doctrine, worship, and polity. If this be Unitarianism, then its history is the story of the rise of religious liberty and of rationalism within Christianity. The author recognizes that this would be too large an assignment and confines himself to tracing the emergence of these attitudes in a group whose ostensible raison d'être was the rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity. This, then, is a rewriting of Unitarian history from a non-theological point of view and with a very great wealth of detailed research.

The method has its merits. One learns thereby that Socinianism in Poland espoused the Anabaptist program of Sermon on the Mount Christianity. The historian of the sociology of religion will find the treatment of this section most illuminating. The method has also its drawbacks, which are most evident in the opening chapters on the precursors. The only thread which holds them in sequence is doctrinal, and if that thread is abandoned the result can only be a series of unrelated biographies, whose excellence lies chiefly in the accurate recording of the external events of their lives.

The treatment of Servetus is a case in point. On every count this is the best biography now available in any tongue. For precision of statement and balance of judgment it is unsurpassed. A sketch, most assuredly, is given of his thought, but the exposition is comparatively brief, and other aspects of his activity are described which derive their relevance chiefly from the point of view of religious liberty to show that a distinguished scientist was obliterated by an unwitting and unheeding religious intolerance. Servetus' mature theological work, the *Restitutio Christianismi,* is handled briefly with the statement that a full analysis is not called for, while space is devoted to his tract on syrups and to his discovery of the pulmonary circulation of the blood. This procedure is seriously open to question in a history of Unitarianism. Certainly Servetus was passionately interested in theology, and one would think that the *Syrups* might well have been dropped to provide more space for the *Restitutio.*

The precursors occupy only a small portion of the work. The bulk of the volume deals with the Antitrinitarian movement in Poland. No finer sketch of the Reformation in that country will be found than here. The previous works of Voelker and Wotschke are superseded by more exhaustive research and more succinct statement. If part of the story is the record of tiresome squabbling, the careers of Faustus Socinus and of his grandson, Andreas Wiszovaty, are among the finest in the annals of Christian heroism. The relationship of Socinus to the Antitrinitarian community in Poland is one of the most curious in the annals of sectarianism. He was the leader of a body which he was not permitted to join. The condition of admittance was adult baptism. Socinus was ready to submit to the rite as a gesture of brotherliness but not as a requisite for salvation. The congregation refused to accept him on such terms. Nevertheless, he affiliated himself with the group and came to be widely recognized as a spokesman of a society which, on its own premises, should have regarded him as a lost soul.

The story in Poland is carried up to the extermination of not only Socinianism but also the entire Protestant movement. The fortunes of the exiles in East Prussia and Transylvania are recounted, and the infiltration of their ideas is traced among various groups in Holland.

Let us hope that the sequel to this volume will not be long delayed.

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Civilization and Group Relations. Edited by R. M. MACIVER. New York: Published by Institute for Religious Studies. Distributed by Harper & Brothers, 1945. xi, 177 pp. $2.00.

Twelve men on a jury usually sift through to the ultimate truth. Twelve Apostles, seeing things unique and seeing them whole, bequeathed us dynamic standards of moral conduct that have changed the world. Twelve men, all learned and highminded, meditating on what is perhaps the most fundamental problem of our civilization, should give us new insights and new answers. This problem is the relationship between our society as a whole, and its various racial and religious minority groups.

In *Civilization and Group Relations* Professor MacIver and his

eleven collaborators are frequently judicial and sometimes apostolic. In sentences, usually perceptive and occasionally eloquent, they dissect the group hatreds that have fastened themselves upon America, and give some prescriptions.

The book is a publication of The Institute for Religious Studies, and as Professor MacIver, the editor, tells us in the preface—"The Institute . . . has been carrying forward in various ways its deep interest in the challenge to unity and brotherhood raised by the prejudice and discrimination that separate group from group." Here are gathered together the addresses delivered in the second annual course given by The Institute devoted to the subject, and they are presented in their original form. The contributions represent diverse fields, including, from several Columbia faculties, Professors Llewellyn, Lindeman, Brunner, Kandel, Lynd, Gifford, and MacIver; from Hofstra College, Professor Roucek; from The International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Mr. Mark Starr; from The University of Pennsylvania, Professor Young; and from the Church, Bishop H. St. George Tucker, D.D., and Father John La Farge, S. J.

In spite of the fact that we expect unevennesses in twelve essays by twelve different men, some of the inequalities in this book seem rather extreme. Though the genesis of the whole series of which this book is one, is religious in character, it appears to this reviewer that the contributions of the clerics fail to measure up to the standards of their lay collaborators. For example, Bishop Tucker's thesis somewhat surprisingly deplores that "frequently the loyalty developed among members of a group not only becomes an effort to serve the purposes for which the group was formed, but extends to all the varied interests of mankind." Elaborating on this theme, he notes, as an ex-missionary to Japan, and with evident approval, that "as long as the Christians had confined themselves to their own specific interests, that is, the Christian religion,—there was no great religious antagonism on the part of the educated classes in Japan. But the moment they went out of their specific field—they aroused a tremendous antagonism."

"I know," says Bishop Tucker, approving the restriction of Christian activity to purely Christian concerns, "I know that during the years I lived in Japan we were let alone by the government, because the government felt we were not a menace to the general policies of the government." One wonders whether this pronouncement of pas-

sivity was written before or after the "general policies" of the government of Japan were found to be inimical, not only to this country but to the dignity and decency of mankind everywhere, including Bishop Tucker's "own specific interests, that is, the Christian religion." May one ask how long representative spokesmen of the Church will continue to relegate it to the miserable role of playing safe in any application of Christianity and of confining themselves merely to preaching? Similarly, as a churchman of the South, he deplores political action by the Negroes there as a group, and his attempt to temper his disapproval with a funny story hardly improves the situation. Surely, if Christianity was to justify itself in Japan, it must have protested at many of the dominant trends in Japanese national thinking, even though this was outside the specifically "Christian interest"; surely the Negro, unless "Christianity" is forever to be divorced from democratic action, is justified in joining with other politically and economically disfranchised groups to protest that disfranchisement. It is re-assuring to find, later in this same book, an essay by Donald R. Young stating that "direct action (by minority groups) has been shown to be a powerful method of attack. Minorities can do much to improve their condition by exerting economic and political pressure," although he rightly cautions against carrying minority pressure to a point where inter-group tensions threaten to break out in conflicts which may cost more than their gains.

Father La Farge has a more realistic, even though distinctly a more localized, approach than his fellow clergyman. His varied New York City experience with racial tensions ranges from their temporary and local extinction by fiat of Charles F. Murphy, boss of Tammany Hall, to their more gradual and perhaps more lasting assuagement, through the formation of neighborhood consumers' co-operatives.

The more massive contributions to the book come from the group of Columbia professors, and from Dr. Roucek and Mr. Mark Starr. This group of essays is admirable in point of view and intent, but, however integrated they may have seemed as a series of lectures, there appears considerable overlapping when they are included in the covers of a single book. Moreover, when read at a sitting, they suffer together from the repetitive need that each essay has to orient, expound, and summarize a vastly complex problem all within the space of a score or so of pages. Many of the contributors would doubtless

appear to better advantage in individual books of their own, as some of them, including Professor Lynd, have already so amply demonstrated. Perhaps, however, there is an overriding value in gathering into a single volume evidence that the attack on prejudice is proceeding on many fronts, and is bringing to its support determined men from all over the country and from so many fields.

Two curious omissions in point of view remain when the volume is considered as a whole. First, it is pre-Freudian, in that it seems unaware of the possibility of wholly unconscious motives of race antagonisms. Secondly, it seems uninfluenced by Russia or any of the implications of her revolution.

That group hatreds are in part group fears, and that group fears have much source material in man's unconscious, is one of the truly illuminating concepts which depth psychology has offered as an additional tool for sociologists. Freud may not have given us the final charting of this new subterranean world, but the geographers of the social map can hardly ignore it. Nor can it be said in defense that Freud is either too theoretic or too schematic for this kind of book; for Professor Llewellyn goes back to Sumner's *Folkways* for his method of approach and emerges with a chapter both diagramatic and theoretical. Consider the following quotation:

> Man lives in an In-group; and to any In-group any and every other group is an Out-group. His In-group or We-group is indeed hard to conceive except by contrast to the Others who are not In, but are Out, not We, but They. This has four different aspects, all vital to our problem.

That is as schematic as the triangulated ego, id, and super-ego of Freud, and might perhaps be re-enforced as a method of research by some of the dynamism of the Freudian concepts.

Russia also has opened a new world, germane to every discussion of group and minority hatreds. It is, of course, obvious that no civilization of sweetness and light has yet been created, and that cruelties have continued unabated during the formation of a new type of society. Yet it is equally obvious that certain old patterns of group hatreds were abolished in the Soviet Union almost over night and have not re-appeared. What is the meaning of this? Does it mean that really determined action by the leaders of the state can actually eliminate racial and religious hatreds, or does it mean that this can be done sud-

denly only at the expense of creating new patterns of hatred, a substituted Out-group as Professor Llewellyn, drawing on Sumner, would say? This reviewer does not pretend to know the answer—but he would like the experts who have written this book to view the American scene with an awareness of the rest of the world, whether it be considered a brave new one or a craven old one.

In considering the group relationships within our civilization, we cannot forget that our groups and our civilization are a composite of individuals, and that, where "most men lead lives of quiet desperation," our civilization will be a desperate one though not necessarily quiet. It seems relevant, therefore, to close with the following quotation from Professor Gifford's contribution to the book:

> The (American) legislation of the past decade, was largely a process of catching up with Europe. There are those who still mourn the existence of the laws which seem to them utterly at variance with their picture of that lovely vague thing, the American way of life. On feels sad for these romantic persons who still believe that by industry, ability and brains the son of any workman can rise to the highest financial or political level. But such persons fail to distinguish between the possible (and it is still possible) and the probable. A healthy, dynamic society cannot live without a dream, but a society to be strong must also distinguish between a dream and a delusion. And the reality is that the great bulk of our population will not advance very far economically, although the total income of the country may increase tremendously.

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Religion in the Post-War World. Edited by Willard L. Sperry. Vol. I, *Religion and Our Divided Denominations.* ix, 115 pp. Vol. II, *Religion of Soldier and Sailor.* viii, 115 pp. Vol. III, *Religion and Our Racial Tensions.* ix, 106 pp. Vol. IV, *Religion and Education.* ix, 114 pp. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945. $1.50 per volume; $6.00 the set.

This series of four small volumes ventilates some of the more important issues in the relation of religion to contemporary American civilization. Of the twenty writers, five in each volume, who contribute to the series, about half are official representatives of religious insti-

tutions. The other half are not. The result is that the series as a whole has a relatively non-ecclesiastical atmosphere.

The first volume deals with diversity and unity within religious bodies in America. One is somewhat taken aback when Dean Sperry, at the end of his opening essay on "Our Present Disunity," seems to imply that the only "clear" solution to the problem of religious unity would be an established church. He seems to deplore the "privacy" of religious bodies decreed by the Constitution. But is "privacy" of religion decreed by the Constitution? Religious bodies are quite free, under the law, to unite with each other, and to influence public morality as well as personal choices. The only limitation is that they shall function by persuasion, not by direct or indirect legal coercion. "Publicity" of religion is prohibited only in this sense.

Father LaFarge's essay expounds the Roman Catholic conception of diversity in unity. In faith and church government there must be conformity. The organic unity of the church, however, presupposes and is enriched by differences of nationality, race, temperament, and language. Father LaFarge is distressed about the evil of disunity in religion: "Without religious unity we have no safeguard against that distortion of unity which we call totalitarianism" (p. 28). But totalitarianism is more obviously a denial of liberty than it is a "distortion of unity." It is simply a complete and enforced social unity. An enforced religious unity would likewise be a denial of liberty, against which safeguards are needed also.

John T. McNeill discusses the causes of Protestant divisions, and points out rightly that the ecumenical movement of the past century is the result of internal motives (belief in a universal Church) as well as of external pressures. Louis Finkelstein has an admirable discussion of diversity and unity in Judaism. The kind of unity he looks for, based on a free and uncoerced consensus of judgment, not only requires but also promotes spiritual maturity. An essay by Archibald MacLeish on humanism is included in the volume, though its theme is somewhat askew from those of the other essays. It is a deeply felt and moving reaffirmation of the dignity of man. The question whether humanism is actually or potentially a religious grouping comparable to the "denominations" is not raised. Perhaps it should be regarded as a movement of thought and feeling both within and without the organized religious bodies.

In the first essay of the volume on *Religion of Soldier and Sailor,* Paul D. Moody points out some lessons about religion in the armed forces which the first World War should have taught us. Lucien Price reflects on the spiritual quests of the American people between the two wars. Chaplain John E. Johnson has an excellent description of the religious background and interests (including deficiencies therein) of the "raw recruit," and of the religious program at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station. Chaplain W. D. Cleary gives a good account of the training and duties of Army and Navy chaplains in World War II. Lt. E. A. Atkins' essay, "A Soldier's Second Thoughts," is a thoughtful discussion of the impact of the war on the emotional life of the service man.

In the volume on *Religion and Our Racial Tensions,* Clyde Kluckhohn writes as an anthropologist of "The Myth of Race." Everett R. Clinchy urges the responsibility of churches and synagogues for combatting anti-Semitism by education. Edwin R. Embree has an excellent essay on "Color and Christianity." "Nowhere," he says, "has the gap between Christian ideals and the practice of the church been wider than in the treatment of Negroes." The essay is a plea, in historical perspective, against segregation by white churches. Margaret Mead's "How Religion Has Fared in the Melting Pot" is one of the liveliest and most penetrating essays in the whole series. Sometimes, she finds, religious affiliations reflect social divisiveness and retard assimilation, sometimes not. She throws new light on the identification of Americanism with a vague and diluted Protestantism, and says that the prevalent this-worldly affirmation of our present way of life has resulted in our having diffuse good intentions rather than profound convictions, in comfortable evasions of the fact and problem of death, and in an increasingly high evaluation of the natural goodness of children. She raises the very pertinent question whether the challenge of developing a new culture, of which the orchestra rather than the melting pot might be the symbol, may not give a new impetus to religion in America, so that it might have a creative rather than an acquiescent or reactionary function. Bradford S. Abernethy gives an interesting brief survey of agencies for interracial co-operation.

The first essay in the volume on *Religion and Education* is Alexander Meiklejohn's "From Church to State." I found this essay, drawn in part from the writer's recent book, *Education Between Two Worlds,*

very confusing. He asks whether the substitution of state control for church control of education can be justified. He seems to be talking about the "state" as a political entity: "Are our governments, national, provincial, and local, culturally fitted to do the work which we have assigned them?" (p. 7.) Consequently, when later on he says bluntly that the "state" is "the source of all morality" and even "the source of intelligence" (pp. 18 f.), one rubs one's eyes. Unable to believe that he means what he seems to say, one then supposes that by "state" he means "human community." On this supposition some sense can be made of his saying, ". . . each of us, in a well-organized society, yields to the state all that he is, all that he has" (p. 21), which would otherwise sound like nonsense. One might still suggest that the creative social rebels have not yielded to the existing social will as the final, most important reality. But the major consequence of this shift of meaning from "state" to "community" would be that most of what Meiklejohn says would immediately become irrelevant to the specific problem he began to discuss. The problem then remains, "How should the community educate its children? Should it give over the whole task of education to the state (e.g., the local school board) or not?" Which leaves us just where we started.

Payson Smith, in his discussion of the public schools and religious education, says that Americans have aimed to keep sectarianism out of the public schools, and to keep religion in them. Toward the first aim he believes we have made substantial progress, although he regards "released time" religious instruction as a dangerous tendency. He believes we have been likewise fairly successful with the second of our aims, since the schools teach and give opportunities for practicing "the virtues that are inherent and stressed in religion" (p. 56). He recognizes that public colleges and universities include much more specific, though non-sectarian, study of religion and religious activities than public secondary schools. He does not face the question whether we should have non-sectarian study of religion, in a more specific sense of the term, in public secondary schools.

Howard Mumford Jones seems mainly concerned with the pressure of churches on the state universities. From this starting point the study of religion and religious activities in state universities comes to look like a concession to external pressure, rather than an acknowledgment that religion is something with which any university, qua uni-

versity, should be concerned. Victor Butterfield has a better perspective, and faces the problem of religion in higher education more squarely in his essay on "Religion in the Liberal College." It is an essential function of liberal education, he says, to carry the student into all the important areas of human experience, including religion as well as science, art, and philosophy. Theodore Ferris, in the final essay, describes ways in which the church carries on its teaching function.

In spite of the number of essays included in this series of volumes, one cannot help thinking of other topics, no less important than some of these, which might have been aired. Religion in an industrial society, and religion and the arts, are examples. The most general single impression one gets from these volumes is that the writers think religion in America is becoming more and more secularized. "Secularization" seems to mean a tendency to vagueness in religious beliefs, dilution of religious feeling, and approximation to the mean in standards of conduct. My guess is that most of these writers underestimate the counter-currents flowing within Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism. Some of these counter-currents may prove to be reactionary, but others may set up a productive tension between religious devotion and social loyalties in American life. Relatively few of these writers see clearly the need and the possibility of the latter.

WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN

Smith College

Empirical Philosophies of Religion: Boodin, Brightman, Hocking, Macintosh and Wieman. By JAMES ALFRED MARTIN, JR. New York: King's Crown Press, 1945. xii, 146 pp. $2.00 (paper).

This volume is an accurate summary of the writings of five outstanding empiricists, with searching and penetrating criticisms of each, and a final chapter evaluating the results and purposes of empirical method in religion. The first three men are empiricists in the idealist tradition, whereas Macintosh is a realist and Wieman a naturalist. It is not at all clear what empiricism really means: it may become so broad as to include everything; it may be so narrow that it is simply sense experience; it may be objective or subjective, quantitative or

qualitative, Christian or non-Christian. The author classifies empiricism under three heads: (1) being "realistic" or "tough-minded," (2) the "appeal to experience" with many variations, or (3) the use of inductive methodology. Each of the five philosophers whose writings are examined in this essay use the term to some degree in all three meanings. The difficulties arise when a careful examination indicates that none of the five agree on the exact use of empiricism or on the results for philosophy of religion.

They are tough-minded enough to eliminate the older idealisms and the absolute certainty which they provided, but Hocking and Brightman are idealists still. All five are doubtful concerning the timeless absolute of the older theologies, but they differ in their concepts of God and solutions for the problem of evil. All of them make different appeals to experience, and their "verification" leads to strangely contradictory results. There are broad points of agreement, but nothing is clear-cut. In fact, "if the term be used inclusively, all philosophies and theologies are in some sense 'empirical.'" "Is the theory vindicated by the experience, or the experience by the theory?"

The author believes that with the help of Dewey and James we can point to a broader appeal to experience which will be more empirical. It must be primarily experimental, pluralistic, public, objective, and familiar. It must be frankly inductive and seek to avoid the basic assumptions of a particular religious system. Philosophy of religion must be freed from particular theologies, so that it can seek universal truths. It must face also the problems of linguistics, with the distinctions between emotive and descriptive terminologies. Finally, there must be an "empirical humility," which James had and which these modern empiricists lack.

It is not the purpose of this reviewer to defend the five empiricists against Martin's criticisms. The difficulty is to catch the perspective and discover where empiricism is going. American empiricism can trace its parentage to F. R. H. Frank, in Germany, and L. F. Stearns, of Bangor. The purposes of both men were primarily apologetic, and only with William James do we find a sound psychological and philosophical approach. It is Martin's view that it might be wise for the empiricists to return to James, and that the intrusions of the influence of Royce and other idealists is a mistake. The trouble with this suggestion is that the most public evidence of religious truth is pragmatic

rather than empirical, and that any broadening of empiricism in the direction of experimentalism may lead to the non-metaphysical instrumentalism of John Dewey. Macintosh long ago demonstrated that theology without metaphysics is barren, and any metaphysics takes one beyond empiricism in the opposite direction to pragmatism.

Perhaps Martin's conclusions could be rounded out by the following suggestions:

1. A rigorous empiricism, as illustrated in the writings of Wieman and Edwin R. Walker, might well be the starting point of any empirical philosophy of religion. To be adequately public and objective, the pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey would be involved in such a method. It would avoid the unwholesome privacy of individual religious experiences without denying their possible validity when tested pragmatically and in conjunction with the generally accepted truths of empirical philosophy. These findings would be more tentative than those of controlled scientific experiments, but would have a far richer content. As Martin suggests, in this field the appeal would be to the experiences of all religions and not to the Christian tradition as such.

2. An expanded empiricism, beginning with rigorous empiricism, would be necessary to round out the picture. Martin also seems to suggest this step. It would begin with sense experience, and then the meaning of experience would be expanded to include all of man's reactions to his environment, which means finding a place for appreciation, intuition, imaginative insight, and personal relations. Some of the basic assumptions of Christian history and doctrine and of metaphysics would be used in taking this second step.

3. The richness of experience which is part of an expanded empiricism needs supplementing. By the use of analogy, poetry, myth, and symbols, the concept of God can be given additional meanings, can be placed in proper metaphysical perspective, and can be interpreted as a specifically religious object within a particular tradition. By this step, empirical philosophy of religion becomes empirical theology within a particular religious tradition.

Provided these classifications are kept separate in the minds of those using them, such distinctions are invaluable in clarifying issues and testing concepts. Many of the criticisms leveled at the five empiricists by Martin are due to lack of clarity in distinguishing the levels of

empiricism. If the assumptions of stage three are smuggled into the methodology of stage one, or dictate the conclusions of stage one, we have the error of Thomism repeated in terms of idealism, liberal Protestantism, or of naturalistic theism. The linguistic problem might well be solved by the same distinctions, as was suggested by Bushnell a century ago.

Martin's essay is an admirable one, and it should be required reading for all who are interested in the five outstanding thinkers whom he has chosen to evaluate. Full documentation and a fine bibliography add to its value.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER
Church Divinity School of the Pacific

Mission of the University. By JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. Translated, with an Introduction, by HOWARD LEE NOSTRAND. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944. 103 pp. $2.00.

This brief but very illuminating essay was written in 1930, a year after the publication of *The Revolt of the Masses.* In scope and temper it reflects the author's manysided interests as teacher, essayist, publisher-editor, philosopher, and statesman. With an "exaggerated sharpness and simplicity" (p. 34), he has sketched what he conceives to be the crucial need of our time, the role which the university can and should play to meet this need, and the radical reforms which it must undergo if it is to perform its task.

The essay opens with a description of the spirit in which the problem should be approached—a spirit "both critical and creative" (p. 40), "prepared for anything, including calamity and defeat" (p. 36), yet courageous and hopeful. For "the moment is full of opportunity . . . many, many great things are going to be possible, among them a new state and a new university" (p. 38). Most to be combatted is complacency or "slovenliness"; most needed is the opposite, "to be in form." This involves, for the individual, "fire supported with the constancy of clear understanding and a calm will" (p. 41); for the group, compact organization on the basis of a cogent well-conceived purpose. All this is said with special reference to Spain, but its wider relevance is apparent.

The author then addresses himself to "the fundamental question," i.e., "What is a university for, and what must it consequently be?" (p. 47). Certain facts regarding all European universities today should be kept in mind. They provide nearly all the higher education which is provided; they cater, unjustifiably, only to the children of the well-to-do classes; and the instruction which they offer consists primarily of two things—the teaching of the learned professions, and scientific research. These two tasks, the author agrees, are both important, but they are very disparate. Society needs many men trained for the "practical professions," very few for scientific research. These two activities should therefore not be confused, as they are today, and the rarity of scientific genius and the difficulty of scientific research should be more fully recognized than it is.

The universities also offer some courses of a general character, in philosophy and history—"the last, miserable residue of something more imposing and more meaningful" (pp. 54 f.). These purport to give the student "general culture," but this "culture" has come to be thought of as merely "ornamental knowledge" which, in some vague way, is to educate his moral character or his intellect. "For so vague a purpose, one discipline is as good as another, among those that are more or less indefinite and not so technical—like philosophy, or history, or sociology!" (p. 55). This "relic" is "the humble remains of what [in the medieval epoch] constituted higher education, proper and entire, . . . not an ornament . . . but the system of ideas, concerning the world and humanity, which the man of that time possessed . . . the repertory of convictions which became the effective guide of his existence" (pp. 55 f.).

The great need of our time is culture in this vital sense, "precisely the opposite of external ornament. Culture is what saves human life from being a mere disaster; it is what enables man to live a life which is something above meaningless tragedy or inward disgrace" (p. 56). Not that we today should try to revive or live by the culture of other times—on the contrary, "culture is the *vital* system of ideas of a period. . . . Man lives, perforce, at *the level of his time,* and more particularly, at *the level of the ideas of his time*" (p. 57). It is culture in this dynamic sense that we have lost and most desperately need to reacquire. "Hence it is imperative to set up once more, in the university, the teaching of the culture, the system of vital ideas, which the age has

attained. This is the basic function of the university. This is what the university must be, above all else" (p. 59).

To perform this function the university must do two things. It must make the student, that is, "the ordinary man," "the unit of measure," and it must teach him only what he can really assimilate. This means that "we must turn the present university upside down. . . . Instead of teaching what *ought* to be taught, according to some Utopian desire, we must teach only what *can* be taught; this is, *what can be learned*" (p. 64). "The university of today . . . is a tropical underbrush of subject matters. . . . There is no remedy but to . . . use the principle of economy like a hatchet," and this pruning, this radical reorganization of higher education, "must be based upon the student, not upon the professor or upon knowledge" (p. 70). The torso or minimum of the curriculum must be determined by what is "strictly necessary for the life of the man who is now a student," and "what remains . . . must be further reduced to what the student can really learn with thoroughness and understanding" (p. 72). The absolutely necessary disciplines are, the author believes, physics, biology, history, sociology, and philosophy. These should constitute the central core of university instruction. To this core should then be *added,* for all students, what is necessary "to make the ordinary man a good professional," and, for the rarely gifted, training in scientific research. The author thus gives science a very important place in the university by assigning it a dual role. The important *results* of scientific inquiry should be taught to *all* students, and the potential scientific genius should be trained for scientific research and enabled to pursue this research. Thus science and culture are both distinguished and intimately related.

I have summarized the author's thesis largely in his own words in order to convey something of his pungent style. The rigor and penetration of his analysis puts the average contemporary treatise on education to shame. Few will disagree with his emphasis on the student, the need for pruning, and the prime importance of a central cultural orientation. Nor can we doubt that a culture, to be vital, must be relevant to the times. We can, however, challenge the author's sharp distinction between effective teaching and the continuing search for truth, and we can also challenge his assumption that the vital beliefs of the past, notably the powerful and time-tested religious beliefs

of our Hebraic-Christian tradition, are no longer vital or relevant today.

The translator's Introduction is ambulatory rather than incisive or systematic, but it contains useful and interesting information regarding the author's life and central beliefs.

THEODORE MEYER GREENE

Yale University

BOOK NOTES

Golgotha, Kranion and the Holy Sepulchre. (*Archaeological Papers.* VII). By GEORGE W. ELDERKIN. Springfield, Mass.: The Pond-Elsberg Co., 1945. 65 pp. $1.75.

In this monograph, which is as labyrinthine in its complexity of material and argument as was the palace of Minos with which it is incidentally concerned, Professor Elderkin attempts to show that there were symbols and architectural features common to the temple at Golgoi in Cyprus, the grove called Kranion outside Corinth, and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. His conclusion (p. 62) is:

> These close correspondences may be explained by the similar experiences of the two deities [Zagreus and Christ]. Both died and were resurrected. It was a logical consequence of the syncretism of the times [exactly what times?] that the devotees of the Christian god should seek to win converts from his pagan rival by adopting not only the plan of the mortuary temple of the rival but also rites of the rival's cult. It is very probable that the Philistines introduced into Palestine at an early date the Cretan communion. In John vi.53-54 one reads: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have not life in yourselves. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life and I will raise him up at the last day." These words taken in their literal meaning clash savagely with the gentleness of Christ. They are rather a relic of the ancient Cretan rite of omophagy in the cult of Zagreus which Christianity employed in a figurative sense to facilitate the conversion of the devotees of the Cretan god.

There are too many weaknesses in the details of the author's argument to justify a full acceptance of his thesis. The following list of questionable details represents a sampling taken from the first half of the monograph.

On page 4 Elderkin writes, "Since Zagreus was resurrected at Delphi and near if not at the *omphalos*, one may see an allusion to his cult in the words of the Psalmist [Ps.74:12], 'Yet God is my king of old working salvation at the middle of the earth.' The *omphalos* at Delphi marked the middle point of the earth." Unfortunately for this argument, the Hebrew text of the Psalm shows that there is absolutely no thought of an *omphalos; qereb ha-'areṣ* does not mean "the middle point of the earth," but simply "in the midst of (the peoples of) the earth" or, more simply, "on earth."

Equally doubtful in his conjecture (p. 6) that Hadrian found at Golgotha in Jerusalem a pagan Kraneion in a grove of Aphrodite and, nearby, a tomb of Zagreus. This sounds like one of Eisler's wild ideas. If there was a cult of Aphrodite or Zagreus in Jerusalem at any time before Hadrian, it must have been several centuries before Hadrian's time. Just as incredible is the author's supposition that the Jews were not irritated by the erection of a statue of Venus on Golgotha.

On pages 20-23 the author argues that the existence of underground passages and chambers in the "Marneion" at Gaza, and at other sites connected with Zeus, indicates the existence of a pre-Christian cult of a chthonic Zeus on the site

of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. This argument seems very odd to anyone who is aware of the existence of underground passages and chambers in the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. Or does Elderkin suppose that the Jews too were influenced by the cult of Zagreus?

In attempting to identify Asklepios as a royal priest of Zeus, the author etymologizes the Latin word *princeps* as *primus*, "holm-oak," plus *capio*, "understand." This is fantastic. How would he then explain the cognate *principium*? Obviously the first element is *primum* not *primus*.

These few but representative illustrations may suffice to show why the reviewer is highly skeptical of Elderkin's results. At the same time it is only fair to point out that the monograph contains an abundance of valuable material. Other students of ancient religion may draw conclusions different from the author's, but they should, nevertheless, be grateful to him for putting these materials at their disposal.

R. M.

The Attitude Towards Labor in Early Christianity and Ancient Culture. By Arthur T. Geoghegan. Washington: Catholic University of American Press, 1945. xxviii, 250 pp. Six plates. $3.00.

This is one of the Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity edited by Johannes Quasten, and was a doctoral dissertation. It surveys widely the two fields of (1) the attitude towards labor in ancient culture, and (2) the attitude towards labor in early Christianity. The author has gone to the sources and, while familiar with modern treatises, his quotations are from the ancient sources, both literary and non-literary. The reader interested in the subject—for example, one who would like to see what bearing Christianity has upon the modern labor question, or who merely wishes to understand the relation between Christianity and labor in the early centuries—will find here a great deal of information based upon and mediated by modern research.

There was, of course, an aristocratic tradition in the ancient world, which led many of the literati to look with scorn upon the manual laborers. You find this reflected in Celsus' attack upon Christianity, where Jesus is looked down upon as a carpenter, and where the Christians are viewed as "undesirable citizens." This aristocratic tradition was natural among the intelligentsia in a world in which slavery was common. On the other hand, in early Rome, before the days of fabulous wealth towards the end of the Republic and under the early Empire, there was a tradition of sturdy agrarian independence represented by the idealized figure of Cato. In the later classical period these two traditions got interwoven to some extent.

The Jewish factor is well described in Geoghegan's book. Ancient Judaism glorified labor—those were the days of relative independence, and before the ghetto and persecution had taught the Jew to live by his wits rather than by the work of his hands. There are no finer tributes to the value of manual labor than some which we find in the ancient Jewish literature.

It is recognized by the author that Jesus esteemed labor and consecrated it by his own example. The Apostles are described as reflecting the teaching of Jesus (p. 105). This, perhaps, explains the paucity of reference to labor in the New Testament. Some of the problems that arise are not dealt with and some are solved too readily by our author. It is a question whether the saying should read, "The laborer is worthy of his hire" or "The laborer is worthy of his keep"; "his wages" or "hire" sounds like a platitude; "his keep" or "sustenance" gives more point to the saying.

It is when the author gets into the second to fifth centuries that his real contribution appears. There is an excellent, if brief, treatment of the ancient Christian inscriptions, and the plates add materially to the value of the volume. The bibliography could be supplemented by several titles, even in English, and it is a pity that the proof reading was not better done. Perhaps this can be taken care of in another edition.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Alchemy as a Way of Salvation. By FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG. Stanford University, Calif., James Ladd Delkin, 1945. 46 pp. $4.50.

The first thing that must be said of this book is that it is exquisite in format—a joy to the eye! Each one of the 250 copies printed will surely become a "collector's item" in time. The decorations at the head of the chapters, taken from *The Book Raziel* (Amsterdam, 1701), add just the right cabalistic flavor of mystery. So much for the aesthetic.

The text begins with a passage from Hermes Trismegistos, the famous *Tabula Smaragdina,* of which Dr. Spiegelberg says: "We can hardly imagine the enormous importance of those few sentences for the thinking of many centuries. It may well be that throughout the history of mankind no other single text has ever caused so much speculation as these dark words have" (p. 2). Thus we are introduced at once into the world of the occult—the Hidden Wisdom. It was with this secret wisdom that true alchemy was concerned; it was only the "pseudo-alchemy of the cauldron-cooks" which concerned itself with the properties of matter and thus became the "mother of chemistry." But the search for the secrets of the universe lay through matter itself, and its transformation from coarser and denser into finer and more etherial forms. Before the soul could be purified and transformed, the magic Elixir must be discovered—or distilled out of the black, demonic earth itself. At least, in the West this was the method of procedure: in the East, the body itself was the alchemical vessel in which the transformation took place, and yoga the method of purification. "The inner fire of life was used as the impulse for the transformation of matter" (p. 21).

Into the brief compass of forty-six pages, Dr. Spiegelberg has compressed a goodly portion of his own wide knowledge and deep understanding of Oriental and Occidental mysticism, and for this we are profoundly in his debt.

M. B.

Preaching in the First Half Century of New England History. By Babette May Levy. Hartford, Conn.: The American Society of Church History, 1945. (Studies in Church History, Vol. VI). vii, 215 pp. $3.00.

This Columbia University dissertation is published by the American Society of Church History as the Brewer prize essay in its biennial competition. The concern of its author is to prove from the literary style and, to a lesser exent, from the content of the sermons preached and published by the English-trained first generation of colonial ministers, that the later Mathers and Willards differed in spirit from their predecessors. The author's emphasis on literary quality rather than content is an unfortunate one. It leads to a disproportionate effect. The "sermonic similitudes" of the early masters are catalogued in an interesting but not very edifying chapter to which twice as much space is given as to an unoriginal survey of "the doctrine as it was preached." Since Dr. Levy herself describes the similitudes as merely "a sidelight upon the Puritan mind," her emphasis is a distortion of the colonial pattern into forms which are more acceptable today.

In limiting herself to the pulpit literature, and failing to treat of the controversial pamphlets, "the innumerable eristic books of the period—the endless disputes about Arminianism, Antinomianism, Antipadedobaptism, Familism, and the many others schisms of the Puritan movement" (p. 30), Dr. Levy omits what is one of the most suggestive lines of interpretation of the religious literature of the Protestant reformation, the economic and social implications of doctrinal controversy. Ernest Sutherland Bates's *American Faith,* and the opening chapters of Dorfman's *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* might suggest to Dr. Levy that simplification of "our picture of the average seventeenth-century settler" must not be carried to the point where that picture becomes a falsification. The "question of separation," as Perry Miller has shown in his *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts* was by no means unimportant for those who were Puritan in their faith and English in their citizenship, and the "Presbyterian-Congregational controversy" is a vital part of the background of the American theory of independence of the eighteenth century. It is not going too far to say that the seventeenth century discussions of church government were an intellectual rehearsal for the eighteenth century discussions and achievements of self-government.

Fortunately, Dr. Levy does not live up to her own set limitations. Her fourth chapter, the most interesting of the book, deals with the practical teachings of the sermons on politics and war. There is, however, only one suggestion (on p. 67) of what particular political and social positions were being maintained by the groups which Dr. Levy chooses to omit from her account, which called forth these sermons. The narrow approach does not work for our better understanding even of the preachers to whom the book is devoted. On the whole, then, the author's self-imposed limitation of her theme limits sharply both the value and the interest of her work for most readers of this Review.

In fairness to the author, there are certain points that deserve to be men-

tioned. She does succeed in justifying her contention that there was a stylistic difference between the English-trained and the Harvard-trained preachers. The "plain style" was the aim of both; the later man introduced an ornamentation for its own sake which modified the original intention of the Puritan sermon. Her illustrative quotations from the sermon are apt, well-chosen, and diverse. Part I of her Bibliography, "The Sermons," is thorough, and gives information about both original editions and later reprints which will be of great help to users of her book. Part II, the "General Bibliography," is by no means complete, but it does list the most important secondary literature on the Puritans, as well as a number of the controversial works of which no discussion is given.

I remain puzzled, however, by a simplification which leads to such a glaring mistatement as this (from the very first page): "Puritanism in Massachusetts and Connecticut was at first practically unhampered in its development. True, only one type of Puritanism flourished and the whole colonization experiment was on a limited scale, but it had to waste its energy neither in resisting persecution and combatting prejudice, nor in contending with schism within its ranks." Shades of Thomas Morton, Anne Hutchinson, and Roger Williams—not to speak of the Separatists of Plymouth!

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Hymns and Hymnwriters of Denmark. By J. C. AABERG. Des Moines, Iowa: Committee on Publication of the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 1945. 170 pp. $2.00. Illustrated.

Danish hymnody, in this interesting survey, centers around the contributions of the three great writers, Thomas Kingo, Hans Adolph Brorson, and N. S. T. Grundtvig. Reverend Aaberg, as author and also translator of many of the hymns, tells the life story of each of the three and, simultaneously, succeeds in offering a vivid portrayal of the spiritual trend of the age in which he lived. Some introductory pages reveal that Denmark, rich in pagan folklore and balladry, became silenced during the seven centuries when the Church of Rome conducted services in Latin and forbade not only preaching but also congregational singing by the laity. Oldest and best known of pre-Reformation hymns in Danish is Hans Thomisson's "The Old Christian Day Song" (three copies are extant in Sweden in the Library at Uppsala), and it is described as reflecting "the true spirit of Evangelical hymnody."

Thomas Kingo is popularly called the Easter Singer of Denmark. Against a bleak background of a staid and uniform Lutheran orthodoxy of the early seventeenth century, his work "stands out as an amazing achievement. Leaping all the impediments of an undeveloped language and an equally undeveloped form, Danish poetry by one miraculous sweep attained a perfection which later ages have scarcely surpassed." He is staunchly Lutheran, but he looked upon orthodoxy only as a means to the end of a more vigorous Christian life. Many of his hymns are highly subjective in their traces of personal sorrow

and anguish. Just before his death in 1703, following an acute illness with intense suffering, some friends expressed profound sympathy, but courageously he answered, "It could not be expected that the two old friends, soul and body, should part from one another without pain." Some of that sentiment pervades the hymns reprinted here in translation.

Hans Adolph Brorson is definitely called the Singer of Pietism and also the Christmas Singer of Denmark. Translating freely from German hymnwriters, he never in his own work succumbed to their excesses of Pietist realism and familiarity, though he dwelt often and fervently on a glorification of the Savior's sufferings. His Christmas anthems ring out their note of triumph, and few hymns down the ages have enjoyed a popularity equal to his "Behold the mighty, white-robed band," or "The Great White Host," as it is entitled here in a new translation. His evangelicalism outlived the transient sway of Rationalism.

Grundtvig's contributions to hymnology became, in effect, a resistance to the emphasis on human enlightenment, and while he was calling himself the lonely defender of the Bible, the Rationalists in turn dubbed him a "dangerous fanatic." With what he called his discovery of the "living word," he turned to Irenaeus and other church Fathers, exalted the Apostolic Creed and the sacraments but also reemphasized that the Christian Church is not a product of theological speculations but a creation of God's own work in His Word and sacraments. As the Singer of Pentecost, he wrote hymns pervaded with light and life, such as the one that pays tribute to the noble voice of the hallowed church bell. Indirectly his hymnody was a vital factor in the rise of a religious and folk movement, of which the Danish folk high schools are only one outgrowth. He held that the life, Christian or national, of any country never rises above the real culture of its common people.

At the end of this volume, with its wealth of translations, the author devotes a few pages to Bernard S. Ingemann, whose vivid Pilgrim Song, beginning, "Dejlig er jorden" (Fair is the earth), touches sublimity as one hears it sung in Danish in lowly country church or city cathedral. Indeed, all who read Reverend Aaberg's survey of Danish hymnody will do well by themselves if they later make a pilgrimage to Denmark to absorb not only lyrical beauty through its hymns but spiritual and national trends in life as well. American church hymnals contain too few selections from this source.

ALMA LUISE OLSON

Eastern Catholic Worship. By DONALD ATTWATER. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1945. 224 pp. $2.50.

A Manual of Eastern Orthodox Prayers. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. xiv, 113 pp. $.90.

These two works, each in its own way, are valuable additions to the scanty amount of material available in English on the worship of Eastern Christianity.

The first, by perhaps the best English-speaking student of the Roman Catholics of the Eastern Rites, gives an adequate summary and guide to the various non-Roman liturgies, especially as they appear to the stranger who visits a Church in which they are being celebrated, together with an excellent popular introduction. The second, prepared by the Fellowship of Saint Alban and Saint Sergius, with an introduction by Nicolas Zernov, contains a large number of personal prayers for the Orthodox from varying sources, and a most useful ecclesiastical calendar with the various saints commemorated in the different Orthodox countries on each day of the year.

As both works are essentially popular, they cannot be compared with such a translation as that of the Service Book of the Greco-Russian Church by Miss Isabel Hapgood, which includes a complete translation of the entire service whether said aloud or secretly. Yet they fill a real need, and, for beginners in this field, whether for the purposes of study or devotion, they can be well recommended.

C. A. M.

The People's Anglican Missal in the American Edition. Mount Sinai, N. Y.: The Frank Gavin Liturgical Foundation, Inc., 1944. $5.00.

Occasionally we receive surprising and even disconcerting reminders of the various cross-relationships which exist between the broken fragments of our divided Christendom. We have one such reminder in this prayer-book published by the Frank Gavin Liturgical Foundation, Inc. This is a devotional manual for worshippers who desire to follow the text of the service of Holy Communion, as that is said or sung from the large-sized Missal or Mass-Book, published a short time ago by the same Foundation (1943). Both these volumes, the earlier Missal for the use of the celebrant of Holy Communion as he stands before the altar, and this people's edition of the same book, supplement the service of Holy Communion in the Book of Common Prayer of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.

The archetype, as it were, of this particular Book of Common Prayer, as of the similar books of the various "daughter" churches of the Church of England, is the First Prayer-Book of Edward the Sixth. This book was issued in A.D. 1549 to supersede the Latin service-books which had remained in use since the beginning of the Reformation in England nearly twenty years earlier. Thus, independently of the ecclesiastical authorities in Rome, there was introduced in England what, in technical language, is known as "a vernacular liturgy," for this "booke of the common prayer," contains *all* the official services of the Church, simplified, reformed, and in one English volume, in distinction to the five Latin books previously authorized. All successive editions of the Book of Common Prayer are, of course, revisions of this original one.

The documentary sources of the Book of Common Prayer are conveniently indicated in F. E. Brightman's *The English Rite* (London, 1921). The old

Latin service-books, in particular those of the Diocese of Sarum, constitute one of the major sources of the English Prayer-Book. The relationship between the *Supper of the Lorde* and *the Holy Communion, commonly called the Masse,* in the English Book, and the Mass in the Sarum Missal is made quite plain in Brightman's volume, and can, of course, be studied in other works. The reader is, perhaps, struck by the appearance of the three titles of the Eucharist which are associated with the three main divisions of Western Christendom. For is not the *Lord's Supper* the usual Protestant designation, while the *Holy Communion* is the familiar Anglican name, and does not the *Mass* emanate from the Church of Rome?

It is not, however, only in the retention of the word Mass as a rather obscure title for the service of the Sacrament that one detects that the Sarum Missal is one of the sources of the Book of Common Prayer. The selections from Holy Scripture to be used as epistles and gospels throughout the Christian year, for instance, are not taken directly from the Bible, but are the passages so appointed in the Sarum Missal. And no inconsiderable portion of the Prayer-Book is allotted to these lessons. Again, the structure of the Latin Mass remains intact. Furthermore, many of the old liturgical forms reappear in English, some of them, like the Kyrie, the Gloria, and the Credo, in complete translation, while in other instances, phrases reminiscent of the old order occur in the Canon or Prayer of Consecration.

On the other hand, the compilers of the Book of Common Prayer omitted large sections of the Sarum Missal. Some of this material rejected was from "the proper of the saints," and could not be used, because of the much smaller number of saints' days commemorated in the English Liturgy. There were also two notable omissions of sections of liturgical forms from every celebration of the English Mass. These were the choir parts—always read by the celebrant—and the personal prayers of the priest as he performed certain ceremonial acts, such as the placing of the bread and wine upon the altar at the offertory.

Now, the Anglican Missal published by the Frank Gavin Liturgical Foundation, and its predecessors in England and America, in a sense continues the process begun by the author of the Book of 1549, for the later compilers make use of the entire Latin Missal, translating and adapting it to the service of Holy Communion in the later editions of the Book of Common Prayer. Thus, the English Rite is enriched from the parent Liturgy, and another bond of unity is established in a divided Christendom.

The people's edition of the Anglican Missal under consideration enables the worshipper at Mass to follow the Liturgy more intelligently and "to pray with the understanding," and opens up to the student the source of Western Liturgical Worship. An introduction, and some rather extensive notes in the middle of the volume, are helpful and suggestive to those seeking more knowledge of this branch of theology.

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AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF LATE GREEK PAGANISM*

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THE MOST COMPLETE REVOLUTION in the spiritual life of mankind was the fall of ancient paganism and the triumph of Christianity. It was not only a change of religion, but also the end of an old, highly developed culture and the beginning of a new, fundamentally different one, a new conception of the world and human life which gained the ascendancy. The problem is richly varied and enormously complicated, and if one attempts to solve it according to one formula, the subtler roots are cut off from which this great change was nourished. More than a generation ago the correct insight was attained that the problem is not so simple as a mere contest between classical Hellenism and the new religion, Christianity. Greek paganism had undergone such a thoroughgoing transformation during Late Antiquity that, finally, it differed more from the classic Greek religion than from the one with which it competed for the souls and minds of mankind. The syncretism, the fusion of various religious ideas which characterizes Late Antiquity, embraces Christianity as well as paganism. Since the end of the nineteenth century, this syncretism has been the object of lively scholarly research, the echo of which has reached wider circles also. The final result, which is not yet recorded, should be an exposition of the spiritual and religious milieu, the spirit from which late paganism as well as Christianity emanated. What I have to say here, however, concerns only late Greek paganism, and that in a very specialized form, but it also has a certain significance for Christianity's attitude toward its time.

This eagerly pursued research into the syncretism of Late Antiquity has concerned itself almost exclusively with doctrines and ideas, and only in generalities and in passing with the soil from which these ideas and doctrines sprang. But this is the decisive factor, for had they not

* This paper, except for the introduction, is taken from the forthcoming second volume of my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, in which references and a more complete discussion will be found. It has been published in Swedish in *Svensk Teologiska Kvartalskrift*, XX (1946), 21-31.

found a fertile and favorable soil, they would have withered away. Their origin is to be found in the Orient. During the centuries before the Persian wars, also, a flood of Oriental influences had swept over Greece, but then they were sifted and worked over in the Greek spirit. Why was the effect the reverse in Late Antiquity? Why did the Greek world become ever more Orientalized, especially in religion? There is a conversion, not only of the individual but also of mankind, and such a conversion occurred, a conversion from rationalism to mystical and occult beliefs. The problem is to find the causes of this conversion. There is no lack of means of approach to the problem; there are rich source materials for Late Antiquity's religious experience in the sense which William James gave to the term. The problem is of such fundamental importance that it deserves a close scrutiny.

From Latin literature we know that, in the first century of the Empire, a feeling of fatigue crept over the old world, in spite of its prosperity. Man had become weary of seeking and searching, and had set science aside in order to strive for a just and happy life. In our day, science has been represented as an enemy of religion, dedicated to its destruction. And so it was in the latter part of the classical Greek period, although it is more accurate to say rationalism rather than science, for the Sophists contested belief in the gods with rationalistic arguments. The Greeks had laid the foundations of science and achieved admirable results from Thales to Aristarchos of Samos, but Greek science had an innate weakness: it consisted mainly in logical reasoning, which, starting from separate and not infrequently inadequate observations, stated general laws and principles. It has been reproached for neglecting experiment, the nerve of modern science; at any rate, it used it only sparingly. It reached its apogee in that science which depends entirely on observation and excludes experiment, astronomy. Since materials derived from experiment were not increased, the mill of thought ground itself empty, while, at the same time, appeared a love of the sensational and the miraculous which called forth a special kind of literature, paradoxography. During the first two centuries of our era, science achieved no new results, and philosophers disputed over the time-honored school problems; guidance was nowhere to be found. People were seized with longing for authority, for belief. With their habitual reverence for the authority of olden times, they sought it in ancient writings, or found it in divine revelation. Consequently, the venerable, traditional wisdom of the Orient was highly

prized, in contrast to the Greek craving for novelties. Greek rationalism consumed itself like a fire which goes out for lack of fuel. While science ended in fruitless squabbles over words and in soulless compilations, the religious will-to-believe achieved a new vitality.

The change became perceptible by the middle of the Hellenistic Age (about 200 B.C.), when the weakness and decay of the Hellenistic states had become obvious, and the racial mixture of Greeks with the Oriental peoples among whom they lived was far advanced. The Greeks had come to know the ideas and the wisdom of the Orient, but they were no longer able to test and sift, as they had been in former times; instead, they were content to systematize them according to the prevailing tendency of the times. During this period, the astrological system was constructed in Egypt, on Babylonian foundations. At the same time, Bolos of Mendes, who lived in the Delta, gave to the concept of power that occult sense which prevailed in Late Antiquity. The idea of power had been taken up by science, for example, as an explanation of the magnet's attraction for iron objects, and had become universal, its most outstanding example being the influence of the stars, which determine the lives of men and all earthly events. As ancient science was not able to characterize and measure different powers, power itself acquired a flavor of the mysterious and the miraculous; it became occult power (the word *physikos* often has the sense of occult power). This conception of occult power gave a semblance of legitimacy to magic and sorcery; in fact, late paganism reverted to a primitive conception of power.[1]

Thus religion made science its servant. The so-called science of Late Antiquity is speculative and mystical, and appeals to divine revelations and intercourse with the supernatural world. But, like magic, it always has a practical aim; it does not search purely for the sake of searching. Its fundamental conception was that of sympathy or antipathy between certain objects, plants, or animals, and these are dependent on the conception of power. The analogies which Greek rationalism had made use of pushed up like wild shoots in the hothouse of mysticism. There was no longer any separation between religion and science; both depended upon divine revelation; religion had swallowed up science.

In place of research and science, there appeared faith and revelation, and, because of this, superstition and belief in sorcery increased deplor-

1. For the decay of science and the development of the doctrine of power, see A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, I (Paris, 1944).

ably, legitimatized by the concept of occult powers. In the Orient, the old connection between science and religion had never been broken. The Greeks had always admired the wisdom of the East, and now this admiration increased to a fatal degree. In the Orient there was an unbroken tradition, and much that was wonderful; therefore the Greeks appealed to this wisdom and wrote books under the names of the wise men of the East: Zoroaster, Ostanes, etc. (Hermes Trismegistos belongs to the same company). Such books were recommended by the august names they bore.

Thus, in Greece, science became what it had always been in the Orient, an annex to religion. This change was essentially connected with the religious conversion. In order to understand the religious experience of Late Antiquity, a comparison with kindred phenomena among other peoples and in other times (including our own) is useful. This experience belongs to the realm of mysticism and occultism; its theology is theosophy, which always follows occultism as its theoretical shadow.

As the religion of Late Antiquity appears in the mysteries, in Hermetism and Gnosticism, culminating in theurgy, it is sprung from the same soil as the theosophy, spiritualism, and occultism in our own day. These have made a great sensation in our times, but have concerned themselves exclusively with the after-life and the spirit world. They were limited to certain circles and petered out in time. The kindred movements in Late Antiquity were much more widespread; they turned to gods and daemons, collecting the last energies of dying paganism in defence against the victorious advance of Christianity. This spiritual background of the religion of Late Antiquity is far more important than the question whence the religious doctrines came—a question which can never be answered with certainty. In our times, occultism and spiritualism were European phenomena, but their adherents appealed to the wisdom of India, and represented the mahatmas as the unattained ideal; likewise the theosophists of Late Antiquity appealed to the wisdom of the East. Had the soil not been prepared, this seed would not have been able to grow so mightily, but it had been prepared by the general conversion, the longing for faith. Old seeds, encapsuled during the rationalistic drouth, sprouted new shoots, and from the Orient came other elements which carried the movement further.

There have been mystics in all ages and in all religions. They are characterized by the higher illumination, the striving to be united and fused

with the divine, the *unio mystica*. The forms vary. One is the quiet transport, the contemplative ecstasy, in which sense perceptions fade away and man feels himself elevated into a higher and divine world. This end is attained by quiet contemplation; it is served by the sacred silence practiced by the Neoplatonic mystics, and by the Hindu mystics today. How highly it was valued is witnessed by its importance in Hermetism, and by the fact that *Sige* (Silence) is one of the highest Aeons of Gnosticism. Such an ecstasy is often produced by self-hypnosis, assisted by the monotonous mumbling of prayers and formulas, for example, the Indian *Tat tvam asi* (That art thou). Precisely for this purpose, the Neoplatonists gave high praise to prayer, and recommended it warmly. The magical papyri, also, are full of prayers, for the magicians used the same methods and were filled with the same spirit. The more violent ecstasy, which expresses itself in cries and movements of the body, is related, but the mystics generally prefer the calmer forms. It was well known in Antiquity, for example, the ecstasy of the Pythia at Delphi, but in Late Antiquity it became more common, and served as a means of union with the god. The great theurgist, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus, describes and defends it, distinguishing it from simple derangement.

Contemplation of the divine, revelations, and visions are always and everywhere part of the experience of the mystics. Their importance for Late Antiquity is proved by the fact that not only religious but also pseudo-scientific doctrines, alchemy and astrology, were said to be revelations transmitted by visions of the gods. Knowledge, *gnosis,* was no longer achieved by intellectual work, but through divine revelation. A mighty religious movement is called *gnosis;* in this sense, Hermetism is *gnosis*, divine revelation. It is, certainly, much used as a literary device, but it appears, especially with the Neoplatonists, that visions were truly part of the religious experience of Late Antiquity and played a major role. Religious fanatics of the second century A.D., such as Aristides Rhetor, had visions, and they play a large part in the Hermetic tracts, and in Iamblichus' book on the mysteries– our chief source for the religiosity of the time. Iamblichus says that when the soul beholds the holy phenomena of theurgy, it is invested with a new and higher life, works with a new power, and justly considers itself something more than human. He describes the divine apparitions in detail: the theurgist actually sees the spirit descending. He speaks also of hallucinations of sound and vision experienced when half awake. Such phenomena were evidently

known to the magicians, also, who attempted to produce them, and they were not above using tricks and jugglery to create illusions.

In order to attain to ecstatic and visionary states, the mystics of Late Antiquity used the same means as mystics of other times and places, such as the weakening of the body and the lulling of the senses by fasting and asceticism. They despised the body as a hindrance to the attainment of the higher illumination. The importance for them of pious contemplation, holy silence and prayer, has been mentioned, and the same is true of the revelation literature and the magical papyri, where fasting and silence, purification and much repetition of long prayers, appear as necessary preparation.

The predominance of this state of mind is the most important reason for the ascendency of mystical belief and its manifestations in Hermetism, Gnosticism, and finally in Neoplatonism and theurgy; and it appears again in the Christian mystics of a later age. The feeling of being freed from the corporeal and elevated above earthly existence which ecstasy produces is the reason why the mystic feels that he no longer belongs to this world, but feels himself to be born again as a new, spiritual being, even elevated to the divine. It is the reason why he believes himself to be liberated from Fate, Heimarmene, the chain of causes, why he despises the corporeal and strives to free himself from it by asceticism, regarding it as the root and origin of evil. This elevation is granted through *gnosis,* the true knowledge of God and the divine which is gained by a vision of the divine. Hence springs contempt for those who do not possess *gnosis,* who are not able to see God, but are enchained in the fetters of the body. In the Hermetic tracts, redemption also bears the imprint of this conception; it is founded in the ecstatic feeling of being freed from and elevated above the body, of having a share in the eternal, beheld by the mystic in a vision. Man ascends into the godhead. That is immortality, not of the body but of the soul, in that the soul becomes united with deity.

Occultism is akin to mysticism, a variety which arises in an overripe culture like that of Late Antiquity, and that of modern times, when old beliefs decay and superstition takes their place, investing itself with mystical ideas and forms. In much the same way, a generation ago, occultism and theosophy aroused great interest—Madam Blavatsky and Annie Besant were on everybody's lips, and in England a society was founded for psychical research. There were those who undertook to in-

vestigate the remarkable phenomena which occurred; there were ardent believers; there were charlatans and impostors, and the detection of fraud was not unusual. Spiritualists still use their arts to predict the future—there are still prophesying mediums and sybils. In Late Antiquity this aspect of occultism was predominant; most of the practices described in the magical papyri have exactly the same aim. One foretold the future by staring into the flame of a lamp, or into a water-mirror, and, by many various methods, the dead were called back to life. We make a distinction between occultism and spiritualism on the one hand, and magic and sorcery on the other, the latter being for us only base superstition and trickery. But this distinction was not valid in Late Antiquity. The ancient magicians used occult techniques; in the magical papyri numerous borrowings from the higher religion are inbedded, not infrequently lengthy and touching prayers. For this reason are these texts so important for our knowledge of the religious mentality of the times. Theurgy, the art of calling forth apparitions of the gods, which was the culmination of religion to the later Neoplatonists, was only magic clad in a religious garb.

The theurgists and magicians of Late Antiquity used the same methods and the same phenomena encountered in modern spiritualistic séances, only with certain differences conditioned by the circumstances of the times. One of the most discussed phenomena was levitation, by which a person, without any external aid, and independently of the law of gravitation, becomes lighter and lighter until he can lift himself up into the air, and many such experiments were conducted. Hindu fakirs are able to raise themselves into the air, and the same is recounted of many of the saints, and is still recognized by the Roman Catholic Church as a sign of holiness. It was also told of the Neoplatonist, Iamblichus, who himself mentions levitation in his description of ecstasy. Sorcerers possessed the same ability, and it is often told how they soared in the air. There were also apparatuses corresponding to our psychographs, although differently constructed.

Spiritualism takes its name from the apparitions produced at the séances, and the ancient theurgists and magicians also called up the spirits. But the difference is that, whereas modern spiritualists converse with the spirits of the deceased, the ancient ones had intercourse with gods and daemons, a difference conditioned by the times, the ancient polytheism and belief in daemons having vanished in our day. The ancients, how-

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Let us cast a glance at the situation at the end of Antiquity, when Neoplatonism in the spirit of Iamblichus tried to re-collect and reinforce paganism in its struggle against victorious Christianity, a movement of which the most prominent exponent was the Emperor Julian. In so far as educated people had a genuine interest in religion, they were attached to Neoplatonism, being initiated into as many mysteries as possible, and embracing a theosophy which posed as philosophy. The gods were transformed into powers or philosophical principles; the Highest God was transcendent, incomprehensible and unattainable, so that a mediator, a second god, must serve as a connection with the world of phenomena. This religiosity found its practical expression in mysteries, occultism, spiritualism, and parapsychological phenomena, in asceticism, mantics, and theurgy, which posed as religion. Among the common people, the movement ended in magic, sorcery, and superstition. The more delicate fare of theosophy was served to the educated; to the people, the daily bread of superstition. The psychical indispositions upon which such phenomena depend are infectious, and spread widely; their effect on the susceptible is strong, but most people lack the taste for such matters and regard them with fear and mistrust.

Among the early Christians, also, ecstasy played a great role (prophecy, glossolalia, etc.), but was soon suppressed, just as, somewhat later, were the social utopias of chiliasm. Metaphysical Christianity, Gnosticism, was rejected, as well as the too speculative theology of Origen. Thus, Christianity represented the sound reaction against occult phantoms and theosophic illusions. Of course the Christians, too, believed in miracles, magic, and daemons; they regarded the heathen gods as evil daemons—no other opinion was possible in those days—but, at least, they condemned them and offered protection against them.

The last battle of paganism against Christianity was fought on two very dissimilar fronts. On the one hand were the folk who lived a simple life, undisturbed by the spiritual movements of the age, and maintained the old beliefs and customs. They were chiefly to be found in the countryside, whereas Christianity was pre-eminently a religion of city folk. This rural resistance was passive but tenacious, and, in time, it forced the Church to many concessions. On the other hand were the educated people who really had thoughts about religion. They were not satisfied with mere polemics against Christianity, but were impelled to set up a religious doctrine against the Christian, not only to prove its inferiority,

but, even more, to prove the higher value of the old religion. The sources for this pagan theology are abundant, while the simple folk's passive resistance is noted only casually; its strength is shown primarily in the results. It was not so easily repressed by imperial decree as official paganism. This spiritual battle rightly stands in the foreground of scholarly interest and research, for deep inspection shows that it was decisive for the issue—the victory of the new religion. The last struggles of paganism under the signs of occultism and theosophy were doomed, but they were founded on predispositions in the depths of the human soul which always recur in certain people, and have recurred in later times in forms coined by their age. But such a mentality has never gained such an ascendency as it did in the last days of ancient paganism.

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OUR "DAILY" BREAD

Τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον*

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THE "LORD'S PRAYER," given in Matthew 6: 9-13 and in Luke 11: 2-4, contains in its fourth petition the very unusual word ἐπιούσιος, which has been the subject of much study and controversy. It was much discussed by the Church Fathers, especially in the third, fourth, and early fifth centuries. Apparently these early exegetes found the word hard to understand, and some of their explanations are rather fantastic. However, it seems to have been the almost universal belief of the early Christians, and ever since their time, that Jesus could not have meant anything but *our daily bread.* Consequently the Latin versions of the Gospels before St. Jerome (ca. A.D. 400) read *panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie,* and this was doubtless the form known to and habitually repeated by all Latin-speaking Christians. With much of the discussion by his predecessors St. Jerome was evidently familiar, and his commentary on the passage in Matthew gives practically a summary of the principal opinions held. In the main he agrees with Origen and Cyril of Jerusalem, not with Gregory of Nyssa, or Chrysostom, or Cyril of Alexandria. The author of the Vulgate, at least in the passage in Matthew, translated ἐπιούσιον by *supersubstantialem.* In Luke, however, the best manuscripts and editions of the Vulgate have the familiar word *quotidianum* or *cotidianum.* Perhaps then Jerome changed his mind. But there is another, and I think a better explanation of this discrepancy.

Jerome was evidently translating directly from the Greek, and perhaps his interpretation of ἐπιούσιος was not determined by the familiar Latin form of the prayer in common use. In his commentary on Matthew 6, 11-13, he says:

Quod nos supersubstantialem expressimus, in Gaeco habetur ἐπιούσιον: quod verbum Septuaginta Interpretes περιούσιον frequentissime transferunt. Consideravimus ergo in Hebraeo, et ubicunque illi περιούσιον expresserunt, nos invenimus SGOLLA, quod Symmachus ἐξαίρετον, id est, *praecipuum* vel

* In the common Latin version of the New Testament these words are translated by *panem nostrum cotidianum,* in the English Bible by *our daily bread.*

egregium, transtulit, licet in quodam loco *peculiare* interpretatus sit. Quando ergo petimus ut peculiarem vel praecipuum nobis Deus tribuat panem, illum petimus qui dicit: *Ego sum panis vivus qui de caelo descendi* (John VI, 51). In evangelio quod appelatur secundum Hebraeos, pro *supersubstantiali* pane, reperi MAHAR, quod dicitur *crastinum;* ut sit sensus: *Panem nostrum crastinum,* id est *futurum, da nobis hodie.* Possumus supersubstantialem panem et aliter intelligere, qui super omnes substantias sit, et universas superet creaturas. Alii simpliciter putant, secundum Apostoli sermonem dicentis (I Tim., VI, 8): *Habentes victum et vestitum, his contenti simus,* de praesenti tantum cibo sanctos curam agere. Unde et in posterioribus sit praeceptum: *Nolite cogitare de crastino* (Matth. VI, 34).[1]

From this commentary on the passage in Matthew three facts emerge: (1) Jerome was not entirely certain what ἐπιούσιος really meant. (2) He believed that the original form of the "Lord's Prayer" was in Aramaic, and that, consequently, the meaning of the unusual and obscure word ἐπιούσιος is to be sought in a Semitic word of which ἐπιούσιος is a Greek translation. (3) He did not believe that τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον meant *our daily bread,* but did believe that it meant *the supernatural food which will be given to believers.* Doubtless he assumed that this supernatural food had been or would be given once for all, making all other food unnecessary, and consequently found nothing strange in the words of Matthew: "Give us (this food) TODAY. Just so, in John 4: 4-15, the woman of Samaria misunderstood the words of Jesus: "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst" (Compare John 6: 27-35).

It is difficult to believe that Jerome gave to the same phrase, τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον, essentially different meanings in Matthew and in Luke. There can be no doubt that in Matthew he translated ἐπιούσιον by *supersubstantialem,* for he himself says so distinctly in his commentary on the passage. In spite of that fact, however, the influence of the familiar form of the "Lord's Prayer," repeated daily by Latin-speaking Christians, was so strong that even in Matthew, out of some twenty-three manuscripts cited in Wordsworth and White (*Novum Testamentum Latine secundum editionem Sancti Hieronymi,* Vol. I, 1889-1898), six manuscripts, and the margin of one of the others, substitute the word *cotidianum* for *supersubstantialem.* So even here the popular form prevailed in nearly a third of the extant manuscripts. In Luke, however, practically all our manuscripts of the Vulgate have *cotidianum.* al-

1. Migne, *Patr. Lat.,* XXVI, col. 44.

though Codex δ = Codicis Graeco-Latini Sangallensis Latina Versio (a manuscript of the eleventh century, edited by H. C. M. Rettig in 1836) still preserves the reading *supersubstantialem*. In Luke, therefore, the common Latin form of the prayer did prevail and, as I believe, replaced *supersubstantialem* by *cotidianum* in almost all of our extant manuscripts of Jerome's version. Perhaps that was because he, at least so far as we know now, left no commentary on Luke confirming his translation *supersubstantialem*, and, also, because in Luke the words δίδου ἡμῖν τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν, instead of the words δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον in Matthew, seemed to support the reading *cotidianum*.

In recent times this discussion has been renewed, and many scholars have participated in it, especially since the article by A. Debrunner, published in *Glotta* in 1913. References to many of the modern articles dealing with this matter are given in H. Cramer: J. Kögel, *Biblisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch* (10th edition, 1915) pp. 407-12; G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, II (1935), 587-95; Walter Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des N. T.* (1937), s.v. ἐπιούσιος. See also Frederic Henry Chase, *The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church* (1891), in *Texts* and *Studies* edited by J. Armitage Robinson, Vol. I, No. 3; Georg Walther, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Vaterunser-Exegese* (1914) in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, edited by A. von Harnack and Carl Schmidt, Series 3. Vol. 10., Heft 3; also the articles in *Glotta* IV (1913), 249-53; VI (1915) 28 f.; XII (1923), 68-82; XIII (1924), 167-71; XVI (1928), 137; *Symb. Oslo.* II (1924), 31-42; III (1925), 76 f.; also *Philologische Wochenschrift*, 47 (1927), 889-92 and 1129-31; 48, 1530-36; 49, 689; 50, 1166-68; 51, 825-30, 857-63, and 1277 f.; 52, 342 and 383. The result of all this discussion is summed up by W. Foerster in Kittel's *Wörterbuch* II, p. 595: "The derivation of ἐπιούσιος, and consequently its original meaning, cannot be determined with certainty at the present stage of the problem. Its meaning, however, in accord with what has been said, is expressed adequately in the translation: *The bread which we need give us today* (or *day by day*)."

Enno Littmann, in his review of Torrey's book on the four Gospels (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche wissenschaft*, vol. 34, p. 29) says:

> With regard to this matter I remarked briefly in my pamphlet, *Galla Verskunst* (p. 51), that the petition *Give us today our bread for the morrow* can only mean *Give us now our future bread*, that is, in the language of the New

Testament, *Give us on earth our heavenly food* (the Word of God, cf. Matt. 6: 4; John 6: 32). When so interpreted this petition fits best into its context; consequently, Jerome in his version, *panis supersubstantialis*, has not really offered a literal translation, but has, none the less, hit upon the proper meaning.

That is very nearly my own opinion. But I am inclined to think that Jerome *has* offered a literal translation of ἐπιούσιος. It seems to me that the notion *belonging to* is in the termination -ιος. The noun οὐσία has various meanings. It means sometimes *property* or *estate*, the *material wealth* which anyone possesses. It means also the *essence* or *intrinsic nature* of a thing. Here I think it means *substance* in the sense of actual material things generally, as distinguished from supernatural or spiritual things. The primary meaning of the prefix ἐπι- seems to be *upon*. But this meaning is easily and naturally extended to the sense of *over and above*, as in words such as ἐπιδάρπιος, ἐπιπάρειμι, ἐπιπάτωρ, ἐπιφόρημα, ἐπουσιώδης. Hence I believe that ἐπιούσιος means *pertaining to what is over and above material things*.

But if this interpretation seems to anyone to be strained, the interpretation adopted by Professor Littmann is at least possible. For certainly ἡ ἐπ-ιοῦσα ἡμέρα meant *the coming day*, and doubtless in this expression the ἡμέρα was often omitted, so that ἡ ἐπιοῦσα came to mean *tomorrow*. Consequently, ἐπιούσιος may mean *pertaining to tomorrow*, and *tomorrow* is often used for *the future*. Of one thing at least I am convinced, that ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος never meant *present-day bread*.

Most scholars who have dealt with this matter have been so completely convinced that Jesus himself composed this prayer, and that Jesus could not have had in mind the mystical food of the saints, that they have not been so much concerned to discover what the words ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος mean, as to show how these words can mean *daily bread*, or *bread for the present day*, or *bread for the morrow*. To some extent, at least, these scholars are certainly right. If Jesus had meant that "bread of life" which was himself, he could not have instructed his disciples to pray that this should be given to them, for, as he says elsewhere, this bread was already given (John 6: 27-35); his disciples had only to accept it. If he were thinking of a future Kingdom of God on earth, his instruction to pray that this kingdom should be established immediately would have been inconsistent with what he is reported to have said elsewhere (see, for example, Acts 1:7). But if, on the other hand, Jesus meant daily, natural bread, it is very difficult to understand why the

author of Matthew did not use some simple, natural expression for so simple a concept. If, instead, this author felt obliged to coin a new word, or to use a word so unusual and obscure as ἐπιούσιος, then it seems evident that he was trying to express a concept which was not simple and natural. The meaning of ἐπιουσί[ων] in a papyrus of the fifth or sixth century A.D. (Preisigke, *Sammelbuch,* 5224) is still so uncertain that it cannot be used as evidence. The value assigned, half an obol, is very small; probably the word means something like *extras* or *incidentals.*

Many have considered it monstrous to suppose that this prayer was not composed by Jesus, and doubtless countless others would have been shocked by this idea if it had ever occurred to them. But there is much else in the prayer, besides the petition for ἄρτον ἐπιούσιον, which can not properly be attributed to Jesus. The second petition is: "Thy kingdom come." But Jesus (according to Luke 17: 21) said: "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you," and this seems to me an authentic saying of Jesus. The fifth petition is: "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive (or forgave) our debtors." Whether the ὡς, *as,* means *in as much as,* i.e., *because,* or *in as far as,* i.e., *to the extent to which,* there is a smugness about this passage which is wholly alien to Jesus. At the conclusion of the prayer are the words: καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ, "Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil." Does anyone really believe that Jesus taught his diciples to pray God not to lead them into temptation, as if God would lead them into temptation if they did not beseech him not to do so? The sense is not much better if πειρασμός means *tribulation,* or *trial* i.e., *testing,* instead of *temptation.* Moreover, the significant words which follow are not ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ, but ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. I think that they do not mean *deliver us from evil,* but *deliver us from the evil one,* i.e., *from the Antichrist,* at whose coming, as many believed, great tribulation would be visited upon the earth. In the Greek it is clear that the prayer is deeply imbued with the eschatological speculations of certain Jews and of certain early Christians. One may compare with it Rev. 11-13, and II Thess. 2.

The chief obstruction to an understanding of this prayer, and of much else in the Bible, has been the belief that the whole Bible, as we have it now, is supernatural and authoritative. That belief prevents us from discovering what Jesus really said. It makes out of his teaching a religion of formula, of ritual, of magic. That is why, as it seems to me,

much of what is commonly known as Christianity is superstitious, legalistic, and ineffectual. Jesus taught that we should love God, communicate with him, devote ourselves to him; that we should love our fellowmen, and restrain our selfishness and absorption in our own interests. There is nothing superstitious or legalistic about that doctrine. I believe that it would save the world, if it were not obscured by much which Jesus did not teach.

PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY*

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THE DEMAND SO frequently and so loudly voiced today that philosophy emerge from the thinker's study into the arena of life, and there assume the role of leadership, is directed above all to workers in the field of the philosophy of religion. For what is it anticipated that philosophy may accomplish? Not that it shall give man a control over physical nature which he does not as yet possess, and teach the scientist to manufacture weapons more deadly than the atomic bomb; nor yet that it shall teach the statesman some new political manoeuver, some new principle of economics, or even some new theory of psychology. Philosophy cannot do the work of the sciences, nor yet play the part of worldly wisdom. Yet it may have something to say as to how scientific knowledge should be applied, and as to the goal toward which practical wisdom should strive.

What are the chief characteristics of the world upon which the philosopher's eyes look out from his study windows? It is a world in which atrocities unparalleled in history have just been committed, and in which hatreds have been engendered of a malignity such as has not been felt for centuries. And it is a world in which the most influential ideological development is the spread of what can best be described as democratic materialism, which, rejecting all moral, aesthetic, and cultural values, and with them all the so-called natural rights which were once conceived to pertain to individuals and minorities, recognizes only goods of a material kind, and demands that no limitations be placed upon the will of majorities. Whether the majorities lead or follow, their support is essential to, and their interest is the avowed end of, every contemporary effort to deify the state. This tendency is everywhere present and active, and its triumph will mean the victory of the material over the spiritual, of the state over the individual, of hedonism over idealism, in a word, of this-worldliness over otherworldliness. The individual, his status in the universe, his origin, his worth, his destiny—here

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we have the storm-center of contemporary controversy, and it lies in the very heart of the peculiar domain of the philosophy of religion.

Hence the Macedonian-like appeal, "Come out and help us," is only a contemporary echo of the thrilling cry of the Renaissance audience which greeted Pomponazzi as he entered his lecture-room: *"Dic de anima,"* Tell us of the soul! And they who utter it are more or less confusedly aware that it is specifically the philosophy of religion which they invoke. For it is not the case that philosophy is totally inactive. Not only the passions of despair, envy, ambition, and the lust of power, but also philosophical ideas—such as they are—inspire the totalitarian movements of which I have spoken. Those who call upon us feel that only one side of the case—and that the wrong side—is being vociferously advocated and everywhere listened to; that an inadequate and invalid, yet systematically propagated philosophy is carrying the day, because its opponents are slothful, timid, and disunited. And the curse which they call down upon us is the curse of Meroz.[1]

That this impassioned appeal should be responded to will be questioned by no man who holds—as, I presume, we all hold—that religion is the vital root of all civilization that is worth the having. What, then, should be the philosopher's first step? Should he rush into the fight alone? Or should he do what every man and every nation does in extremity—look about for friends and allies? Now there is a once powerful and still influential organization—or rather a group of organizations—willing and anxious to join hands with the philosopher, upon certain conditions, namely, the Christian churches. Involved in the same peril, confronted by the same enemy, sharing the same fundamental interests, both parties must experience a well-nigh irresistible impulse to cement the alliance. The immediate gain, at least, would appear to be incalculable, whereas disunity and mutual hostility threaten to prove ruinous to both. Thus there is no more pressing theoretical and practical problem confronting the worker in our field than the relation of philosophy to Christianity.

As much as any religion—some of its defenders would say more—conservative Christianity is bound up with certain historic events, with the whole process of revelation which gave us the Sacred Scriptures, and

1. "Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of the Lord, curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty" (*Judges*, 5:23).

which reached its climax in Christ. I say conservative, rather than orthodox, Christianity, because I think it enlightening to realize that this fundamental emphasis upon historic events is compatible with broad differences of interpretation. The Trinitarian sees in the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection the central facts of history. The Arian also, however, saw in the birth of Jesus the descent of the Son of God from heaven, in the character of Christ, the image of the Heavenly Father and the type of human perfection; his death he associated with the forgiveness of sins,[2] and in his resurrection he beheld the guarantee of human immortality. Likewise, the Old School Unitarian of the Humanitarian persuasion saw in the historic Jesus the perfect man, the Lord's Messiah, the future judge of the quick and the dead, and in his teaching he found his unique and infallible authority. How central these things were for both Arian and Humanitarian is brought home to us by Channing's clear intimation that the only justification—fortunately a sufficient justification—for recognizing the Christianity of Trinitarians is the fact that, despite their regrettable although unconscious polytheism, they do at least acknowledge Jesus Christ as their Savior and Lord.[3] Inasmuch, however, as both varieties of Old School Unitarianism have passed away, I need not discuss them, and shall confine my attention to what we term orthodox Christianity.

The Incarnation, say the Barthians, was an event essentially unrepeatable which took place "once for all," and constituted nothing less than a "break through of the Eternal into time." Possibly one should even hesitate to apply the word *historic* to an event which, Professor Brunner tells us, "shattered the framework of history."[4] These Barthian phrases inevitably suggest that the Eternal itself underwent a change, a notion obviously self-contradictory, and certainly inconsistent with the orthodoxy of St. Thomas, who assures us that all that happens in time, including the Incarnation, is willed on the part of God by a single, timeless act. What is of importance to us at the moment, however, is the fact that all forms of orthodoxy maintain that certain events —the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection—actually took place, and that they sustained relations of simultaneity and before and after to all the other events of human history; and this is certainly to assert their historicity. Through these events a process of reconciliation

2. See Channing's *Works*, p. 378; cf. also William Henry Channing's *Life*, p. 207.
3. *Ibid.*; p. 274.
4. *The Mediator;* p. 27.

of God to man has been effected, and the relationship between them thereby profoundly altered; an alteration which is mirrored in the significant fact that, whereas the Jews prayed to God directly, orthodox Christians pray only in the name of Christ, or, in Theodore Parker's scornful phrase, "by attorney." Christ has become the only avenue to God; "no man cometh unto the Father but by me." Christianity, therefore, is *sui generis,* not one religion among others, not the Absolute Religion which realizes the perfections toward which other religions only aspire, but the only true and genuine religion among a multitude of false religions.

Is philosophy, we have now to ask, capable of vindicating these claims on the part of orthodox Christianity by providing them with a rational foundation? Such is not the view either of the Thomist or of the Calvinist. St. Anselm, indeed, did maintain that, having once accepted by an act of faith the central dogmas of Christianity, one might thereafter proceed to demonstrate them, so that they could not only be believed but also known; yet his attempt so to do was adjudged by later Scholastics a failure, and St. Thomas passed upon it the severe condemnation that it exposed Christianity to "the derision of infidels." And certainly the course of subsequent speculation offers no encouragement to repeat the attempt. The most enthusiastic rationalist today would not claim to do more than deduce the general characteristics of reality, and is content to let particular entities and events take care of themselves. Hegel's effort to prove a priori that there could be only seven planets constitutes an emphatic warning which philosophers have taken to heart. The subject, however, merits a more detailed examination, and to it we shall later return. But, first, we must recognize the undoubted fact that, in the general opinion of theologians, faith is the foundation upon which repose the orthodox interpretations of historic events.

What, then, is faith? To this question widely differing answers have been returned. For St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and Roman Catholic Scholastics as a whole, it is essentially "the assent of the intellect at the command of the will." Evidently, therefore, it is something very similar to William James's "will to believe." Yet there is a difference which is worth observing. The Roman Catholic's definition of faith has "respect unto the recompence of the reward." It is bound up with the notions of merit and of justification by works as well as by faith. It does not follow that faith is wholly arbitrary. It can have its reasons. One may appeal

to the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, to the virtues of the saints, to the heroism of the martyrs, to the marvelous spread of Christianity, but these reasons can be only persuasive, not constraining; otherwise one would have knowledge, not faith, and no merit would be acquired.

Now it is obvious that, when a man allows his will to dictate what beliefs he shall accept, he ceases to be a philosopher. He may become an apologist, and an eminent apologist, but he has betrayed what a genuine thinker accounts sacred—his intellectual integrity. Moreover, can anything be plainer than the fact that one's wishes cannot determine the characteristics of an historical event? To assert the contrary, as some Pragmatists have done, and to identify the true with the useful or the beneficial, is merely to evade the whole epistemological problem. I need not elaborate the criticism, since it is a thoroughly familiar one. It is also true, however, that "the will to believe" is nothing more than the individual's decision to act "as if" a certain proposition were true; it is a practical measure, but in no sense does it constitute an intellectual solution. There is, in addition, an objection of a purely a priori kind to be urged against this view of faith, but one which it seems to me should weigh heavily with the theist. What are we to think of the character of a God who would require of man that he subordinate his reason to his will, and would reward him for successfully accomplishing the feat? Is this a God whom a philosopher could worship? Surely none but the most hardened dogmatist can answer in the affirmative.

Another view of faith, which has now only an historic interest, was that entertained by Locke and his followers. Faith, for Locke, is assent to a proposition not demonstrated by reason "upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication."[5] This is not an arbitrary act of will, for the assertion to be believed has its guarantee, and that guarantee is authentication by miracle. Miracles no longer pass unquestioned as historic events, and the attempt to treat them as the sole and sufficient evidence of the truth of Christianity has been abandoned.

There is, however, a third view of faith which is more impressive and appealing than either of its predecessors—that of the Calvinist. By the Calvinist, the notion of merit is emphatically and enthusiastically renounced; and faith, as he conceives of it, is not primarily volitional but intuitive. The saved man is a man to whom has been imparted a su-

5. *Essay.*; bk. IV. ch. XVIII. sect. 2.

pernatural light. By its bestowal he is raised above nature, and, while yet upon the earth, has become a citizen of heaven. Such awareness, as Jonathan Edwards makes abundantly clear, is of a quasi-aesthetic character; it is like the appreciation of art, of music, of literature, or of deportment. Thus faith is not a substitute for vision, it *is* vision, and what it reveals is the divine beauty and holiness of the gospel.

This is, I am aware, a very inadequate summary of a theory which, to be properly appreciated, needs to be studied as set forth in Edwards' splendid prose. But I have tried to stress what I take to be its principal features: the supernatural and transforming character of the illumination, and the intuitive immediacy of the awareness thus awakened. In a sense, indeed, the doctrine may be said to be only an amplification of St. Paul's assertion, "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature."[6]

I have now to proffer three brief comments upon this theory. In the first place, it may be urged that it is marred by inconsistency. The illumined man, we are told, perceives in the Scriptures the traits of divinity. But how is he able to recognize them? The Calvinist is like a blind man, standing on a high peak with his back to the sun, who in that posture is suddenly granted the power of sight. He will then behold the landscape before him bathed in the sun's rays, and all the beauty of hill and valley, forest and river, but how will he know whence the illumination proceeds unless he can turn around and see the sun? Now the Calvinist cannot turn around and see the sun, for Calvin, following the medieval Scholastics, has laid it down that the essence of God, as it is in itself, is unknowable. Faith, then, in the sense of vision, is not self-sufficing, for it permits no comparison of copy with original. We may amend the theory if we dare to assert of the saved man what the Ontologist asserts of every man, that he possesses a confused but direct awareness of the divine essence. The inconsistency thereupon vanishes. There remain, however, two further objections.

It will have been remarked, in the first place, that the divine illumination is directed solely upon the Scriptures. The same Spirit, Calvin tells us, which through inspiration gave us the Scriptures, through illumination reveals their divine nature. But on what grounds is it denied that the Spirit may have inspired the utterances of other men beside the prophets of Israel or the saints of the Apostolic age, and that it may bear witness of them? Is there any experiential justification for the as-

6. II Cor. 5:17.

sertion of such a restriction? Let every man answer for himself. To many students of comparative religion the limitation will certainly appear arbitrary and incredible.

I would ask, in the second place, whether it can plausibly be maintained that religious experience can possibly guarantee the historicity of any fact, or the correctness of any interpretation of the significance thereof. Even as to the nature of the reality presented in religious experience there are differences of opinion among those who do not question the veridical character of such experience. The theist has his view, the pantheist his, the atheistic Buddhist and the Jain have theirs. Let us grant, however, that religious experience can assure a man that he is today in the presence of God. Can it also assure him that God became incarnate two thousand years ago? This would be a tremendous claim indeed, and one wonders how it could conceivably be substantiated. Perhaps the Ritschlain value-judgment with respect to "the moral miracle of Christ's character" will be invoked; but this is a slender foundation for the elaborate edifice of Christian dogma, and appears to presuppose a far greater amount of historical knowledge than we possess. To some it must certainly seem the ne plus ultra of wishful thinking.

Such are the three principal theories of faith; and none of them, it is clear, can satisfy the philosopher. They have obviously been elaborated by men already committted to a dogmatic position which they could not bring themselves to call in question; and this is the worst possible recommendation to one who is seeking, not for edification, but for truth.

Let us next turn to another, and a very different, view of the nature of religion and of Christianity, a view which was first advanced in this country by the New England Transcendentalists, and of which the best exponent—so far as I am aware—was Theodore Parker. I shall state the substance of it in his own incisive words:

> There is but one system of nature as it exists in fact, though many theories of nature, which exist in our own imperfect notions of that system, and by which we may approximate and at length reach it. Now there can be but one religion which is absolutely true, existing in the facts of human nature and the ideas of Infinite God. That, whether acknowledged or not, is always the same thing, and never changes. So far as a man has any real religion—either the principle or the sentiment thereof—so far he has that, by whatever name he may call it. For, strictly speaking, there is but one kind of religion, as there is but one kind of love, though the manfestations of this religion, in its forms, doctrines, and life,

be never so diverse. It is through these men approximate to the true expression of this religion.[7]

In other words, we are justified in speaking of the history of religion only in the same way that we speak of the history of mathematics. We do not mean by the phrase, "the history of mathematics," that the truths of mathematics have changed; we mean only that man's knowledge of these truths has grown, and that the stages of its development have been recorded. In the same way, Parker would contend, we mean by the phrase, "the history of religion," that man's knowledge of his true relationship to God has grown, and that the stages of this development have been recorded. But the relationship itself does not change—it is what it is.

In his book, *The Mediator,* Professor Brunner has termed this attitude "universal religion," and has launched against it his severest anathemas. On this theory, as he indicates, the greatest figures in the history of religion are of importance only as they point beyond themselves to an abiding reality. They initiate no cosmic changes, no volcanic irruptions of the Eternal into time, they perform no actions "once for all." The same truth may be discovered and proclaimed by more than one teacher in more than one land and at different epochs. Such an outlook, he insists, is the antithesis of Christianity, with its Incarnation which took place "once for all."

Undoubtedly it is the antithesis of what Professor Brunner means by Christianity, yet it is important to remember that Parker believes himself to be a Christian, and rather a good Christian. He is in full agreement with the orthodox that Christianity is not one religion among others, but this is because it is not *a* religion at all. It is simply *religion,* and any man who has ever had any religion has been in so far a Christian. It is the peculiar glory of Jesus, he thinks, that he was the first to state adequately what religion is. He stated it, but he did not change it.

If it could be proved—as it cannot—in opposition to the greatest amount of historical evidence ever collected on any similar point, that the gospels were the fabrication of designing and artful men, that Jesus of Nazareth had never lived, still Christianity would stand firm, and fear no evil. None of the doctrines of that religion would fall to the ground—for, if true, they stand by themselves. But we should have lost—oh, irreparable loss!—the example of that character, so

7. See his sermon entitled "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," in the *Century Edition* of his works, p. 8.

beautiful, so divine, that no human genius could have created it, as none, after all the progress and refinement of eighteen centuries, seems fully to comprehend its lustrous life. If Christianity were true, we should still think it was so, not because its record was written by infallible pens, nor because it was lived out by an infallible teacher; but that it is true, like the axioms of geometry, because it is true, and is to be tried by the oracle God places in the breast.[8]

I am not now primarily concerned with Theodore Parker's identification of pure religion with simple theism, and of simple theism with Christianity; what I wish rather to stress is the contrast between the two views before us, one of which sees in some cosmic event the all-important factor in religion, and the other of which regards the unchanging relation of man to his spiritual environment as the essential element. The former necessarily invokes a supernatural revelation which is to be received by faith; the latter appeals to reason—reason in the broader sense of the term as including both the logical understanding and intuitive insight—as its vindicator.

Up to this point we have been looking at the situation from the vantage ground of religion. Let us next view it from the standpoint of philosophy. As we survey the history of human thought we discern in it two main currents which flow side by side down the centuries, one of which we are wont to term empiricism and the other rationalism; and as we examine the course of empiricism and that of rationalism, we find that each in turn constitutes a two-fold stream, the river of thought thus descending through four distinct channels, each of which we must explore.

In the first place, there is the type of empiricism which may be termed sensationalist, inasmuch as it regards sense-experience as the only genuine kind of knowledge. In its pure form, sensationalistic empiricism is obviously identical with what is commonly called Presentationism or Phenomenalism, since it is compelled upon principle to eschew all speculative flights which would carry it beyond the limits of sense-perception. Such a philosophy is evidently incompatible with any religious view of the universe. Even Locke's miracles, while they might perplex it, could contribute nothing to it, for it could not recognize them as miracles without appealing to some other theory of causality than the "regularity view," and without invoking the idea of God, for neither of which could it find any justification in pure sense-experience. We may, therefore, dismiss it from further consideration.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

In the second place, there is the more inclusive and catholic type of empiricism which initially accepts every form of ostensible experience at its face-value, and is prepared to treat it as innocent until proved guilty. Such an empiricism has no more quarrel with religious experience than with aesthetic experience or with sense-experience. Difficulty arises only in the matter of interpretation. Here empiricism is sorely hampered by the discordant doctrines of the great world-faiths, and by conflicting theories in the field of the psychology of religion. The epistemology congenial to it will be either of the nominalist or conceptualist variety; and, while it can easily enough transcend sense-experience, it has no warrant to transgress the limits of the totality of experience. It is, indeed, under constant temptation to commit such trespass, to which temptation, as a matter of fact, it not infrequently yields; yet, when we reflect upon our utter ignorance of the proportion which obtains between that part of the universe which is observed by man and that which is unobserved by him, we see how unjustified is any inference from the characteristics of the one to those of the other.

Could such a philosophy be linked up with a conservative doctrine of revelation, each would afford welcome succor to the other. The theology would impart a cosmic sweep and vision which the philosophy lacks, and the philosophy would, in turn, provide a basis for a theology which floats, as it were, in the air. But there seems to be no prospect of such a connection being established. Experience knows nothing of a cosmic act performed "once for all," nor of an invasion by eternity of the realm of time.

The tendency, in fact, is all the other way. Its ready sympathy with religious experience will prompt such an empiricism amicably to review the data submitted to it by the science of comparative religion, and to listen with friendly ear to the claims of mysticism. Rejecting all dogmatic restrictions not experientially guaranteed, it will hearken with the same tolerant impartiality to the testimony of the Moslem, the Hindu, or the Buddhist, as to that of the orthodox Christian. But this way of thinking leads directly toward "universal religion." For better or for worse thither are they bound who take this road.

We next turn to the two kinds of rationalism. As I have already remarked, the prospect of deriving from rationalism aid and support for any system of supernatural theology does not appear to be a bright one; but we have now to inquire whether this impression is well founded, or

is, on the contrary, the mere offspring of prejudice. The type of rationalism which we shall first distinguish is that which views the universe as a system, the structure of which is composed of relations possessing the attributes of universality and necessity—in other words, of an a priori character. Such a philosophy has no room for a cosmic act which takes place "once for all." To admit the notion of such an act would be to shatter the unity of the system which it identifies with reality. However, such a philosophy may treat of time—whether it regard time as illusory, or as possessing some degree of reality—it is bound to protest against the suggestion of a "break through of the Eternal into time" as self-contradictory, as involving the mingling of two mutually incompatible orders.

The kinship of this type of thought with the outlook of "universal religion" is at once evident. In fact, the tendency is for rationalism to identify religion and philosophy. In so far as they can be distinguished, one regards philosophy as intellectual and theoretical, and religion as emotional and practical. But intellectual contemplation can awaken profound emotion and call forth volition in the form of acquiescence; thus through the ages it has betrayed a perpetual tendency to become for its devotee a way of life. Religion, again, does not limit itself to emotional ardors and to the practice of ethical precepts; it continually seeks intellectual satisfaction in a world-view. Hence, envisaged from this standpoint, the distinction between philosophy and religion is seen to be a purely superficial one, instituted for practical convenience alone, and at bottom we find identity. More surely, even, than the empirical path this road takes us to the same goal—"universal religion."

There is, however, another way in which the universe may be thought of as rational—as the expression of a purpose. If the universe be the expression of a purpose, the purpose which it expresses must be resident in a being who transcends the universe. Such a philosophy, accordingly, will take the form of theism. It may also be urged that the notion of a cosmic purpose involves the dependence of the entire universe upon the divine will, and thus necessitates the acceptance of a doctrine of creation.

Were this the case, I should myself regard it as a very serious objection. The notion of making—of molding, or ordering, or shaping some preexisting matter—is one which actual experience has rendered familiar to everybody. The notion of creation is reached by the arbitrary elimination of Aristotle's material cause; but with the material cause is also

eliminated—I should maintain—all intelligibility, inasmuch as no object remains to be acted upon. However, it does not seem that that the notion of creation is involved in that of cosmic purpose, for the cosmic purpose may conceivably be at work upon some pre-existing reality which it finds malleable—or at least partially so.

Such a philosophy will differ from the broader empiricism which we previously considered, in that it will undertake to support itself by arguments of an a priori nature. By arguments of an a apriori nature, I do not mean arguments which necessarily attempt, as does St. Anselm's ontological argument, to make the passage from idea to reality. All that we need to presuppose is that certain truths are empirically discoverable which, when discovered, are found to have the characteristics of universality and necessity, and that they are susceptible of being used to frame an argument which will vindicate the world-view in question. The cosmological argument, for instance, professes to be a proof of this kind. Now, assuming for the moment the legitimacy of such a position, let us ask whether the notion of a cosmic purpose may be employed to bridge the gap between philosophy and a supernatural theology. May not a cosmic purpose require the occurrence "once for all" of a cosmic event such as the Incarnation?

There do not appear to be any very cogent reasons to be advanced in favor of this suggestion, whereas there are several objections to it which are obviously weighty. In the first place, granted that the world-process is expressive of a cosmic purpose, how are we to discover what that purpose is, and what it includes? In particular, how are we to establish by a priori reasoning that it includes events of such unique character as the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection? These are all rooted in the Fall of Man, which is commonly taken to be their raison d'être; and the Fall, being the result of an act of free will, cannot be deduced by any chain of logical reasoning from the notion of a cosmic purpose.

It may, however, be urged that a rationalism of this sort, which claims to have established a priori the existence, and presumably the perfection, of God, can justifiably argue from the character of God to the nature of the purpose which he has in view. Let us concede that it can so argue. What then? Can it plausibly be maintained that the traditional scheme of salvation, with its God who is placated only by a bloody Atonement, is indicative of the kind of purpose which one would nat-

urally attribute to such a Deity? Is it not primarily upon moral grounds that the orthodox theology has been most frequently and most severely attacked? Surely the conclusion is inescapable that rationalism can proffer it no support.

Moreover, we need scarcely be reminded that the rationalist can attribute to God only a rational purpose, and that, wherever revelation professes to ascend above the level of reason, it can claim from him no credence. Now the central doctrines of orthdoxy, the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation, by the confession of both the Thomist and the Calvinist, are incomprehensible and indemonstrable, and are to be accepted by faith alone.

It is true that, since the time of Hegel, there have been repeated attempts on the part of various Protestant thinkers who have departed from the traditional position, to provide a rational defense of these doctrines. And it might be urged that, even if it be impossible to establish the actual occurrence of a cosmic event, still a case can be made out on purely speculative grounds for the triune nature of God and the necessity of an Incarnation, thus providing—as it were—the theoretical background for such an event. This suggestion—if valid—should interest the defender of either type of rationalism, but, I must confess, it seems to me extraordinary that anyone at this time of day should advance such a consideration in all seriousness. Look at the history of these dogmas! Has any intelligible statement of the doctrine of the Trinity ever been formulated the very intelligibility of which did not involve it in either a Cappadocian tritheism or a Sabellian Unitarianism? And, as to the doctrine of the Incarnation, while Nestorianism is an intelligible theory, and Patripassianism is likewise an intelligible theory, does not the orthodox view, with its doctrine of two natures in one person—whereby two minds, one divine and one human, are made to coalesce in a single individual—do as much violence to the concept of personality as the most blatant pantheism? On the other hand, it is evident that the notion of a cosmic purpose, if it can be accepted as sound, is perfectly compatible with the point of view of "universal religion." And any arguments of an a priori character which are founded upon the concept of a just and loving God clearly lead in the direction of a general revelation rather than in that of a restricted, special revelation, with its arbitrary and unethical scheme of salvation.

The result of our inquiry, then, is the obvious conclusion that be-

tween the philosophy of religion and orthodox Christianity no intellectual alliance is possible. While I do not anticipate complete agreement with the various arguments which seem so convincing to me, nor yet with the conclusion itself—which, indeed, is advanced in the hope of providing a starting point for a fruitful discussion—I propose, nevertheless, to assume for the nonce that the conclusion is sound, and to indulge in a few final reflections.

If I have argued aright, and the contemplated alliance be impracticable, is the fact one which should inspire regret? It is, I think, greatly to be regretted upon two counts. In the first place, were the situation otherwise, the problem which confronts us would be enormously simplified. We should then be spared the distasteful, dangerous, and difficult task of demolition which must unavoidably precede any wholesale reconstruction. With complete intellectual sincerity we could devote ourselves to the defense of the historic faith. We should, indeed, become apologists, but not *mere* apologists; for, in such a case, our thinking would not be diverted from its normal course in order to support antecedently accepted dogmas; its natural development would constitute an adequate defense. Moreover, as we have already seen, the situation from the point of view of the ecclesiastical statesman would be all that could be desired. Intellect, emotion, and volition could concentrate in uninterrupted harmony upon the immediate task of social betterment. We should be like the Presbyterians before the battle of Drumclog, whose preacher closed his sermon with the words, "You have the theory, now the practice!"

Again—and this is a consideration of very great importance—the linkage of generations constituted by the transmission of inherited and precious beliefs is one of the greatest blessings of a healthy civilization, and no man in his senses could contemplate without a shudder the shattering of a continuity which unites the living and the dead. Yet—if our conclusion be sound—shattered it must inevitably be. The rift, you may say, will not go to the very bottom. True, it will not. Nevertheless, it will surely go deep enough to provide all the elements of tragedy. Religion will not die, but it will be changed; and so profound a transformation cannot take place without giving rise to emotional reactions as violent as they are inevitable.

These somber considerations cannot be blinked, but must be squarely faced. And, having faced them, we can scarcely fail to observe another

aspect of the situation which proffers no mediocre consolation. The refusal of the conservative to treat Christianity as one religion among others, to be approached and investigated as other religions are approached and investigated, indicates to the philosophic mind a fundamental weakness, an unwillingness to face the basic issue. A religion which dares not freely submit itself to the impartial scrutiny of the intellect cannot command the unqualified respect of thinking men. To many deeply religious minds, the liberation from dogmatic presuppositions and commitments will be well worth all the sacrifice it costs. And this impression is strengthened by the reflection that orthodox Christianity is tainted by ethical blemishes which constitute a permanent reproach.

It may be urged, however, that what I have done has been merely to state in other words what the liberal has said a thousand times before, and therefore is not worth doing. To this charge I cannot plead guilty, for the following reasons. In the first place, liberalism today is menaced by reactionary movements, Neoscholastic, Calvinistic, Kirkegaardian, and Barthian, led by men of no mean ability. The liberal, once seemingly triumphant, is now on trial for his life. It behooves him, then, with no uncertain voice to plead his cause. And, in the second place, it appears to me that, by some singular obliquity, the logical consequence of the irreconcilable cleavage between philosophy and orthodoxy has seldom been drawn. This consequence is the utter futility of every attempt at compromise.

What I have in mind is the movement called Modernism, to which the majority of so-called liberals have proffered their wavering allegiance. Its attitude is essentially unstable, its outlook confused and self-contradictory, and its principal achievement has been to conceal the radical nature of the changes before us by employing traditional phraseology to state novel and unpalatable conclusions. This attempt to pour the new wine into old bottles is as profitless as the effort to pour the sea into a pool. A movement which is fundamentally on the defensive, whose leaders consider first what concessions are necessary and by what subterfuges they can best be disguised, can no more hope to control the future than the artificially revived paganism of Augustus could intelligently aspire to dominate the Roman Empire. Like a dispirited army, it is beaten before it begins to fight. Its efforts are not only foredoomed to failure, they are positively harmful; for, while they cannot succeed,

they may prolong indefinitely the disastrous period of transition through which we must inevitably pass. What we most need is a frank statement of the vital issues confronting us, and, before the tribunal of truth, let the best cause win!

I come now to the last consideration of all. Philosophers, we are sometimes told, take themselves too seriously, and fail to realize their relative insignificance. I do not refer to the taunts of the Agnostic who, despite his supercilious air, has not proved a formidable opponent, for it is easy to refute him out of his own mouth. His self-satisfaction springs from his self-contradictory presupposition that *he* knows that *we* cannot know. I am thinking of a more plausible contention than his, of the position of those who say, in effect, "You philosophers forget that the average man is not moved, as you are, by abstract ideas. He is stirred by deeds rather than words, by life rather than by logic. To found a religion is the work of the spiritual hero, the seer, the martyr, the prophet, the messiah; and what likelihood is there that such a man will appear among you? When he comes, he will shake the world; the contagion of his example will infect the multitudes; but his thinking, as thinking, will be only second-best, a mélange of popular ideas formed when thought has percolated through to the level of the common man, and picked up more or less helter-skelter. The new religion will have its dogmas and its creeds, promulgated upon authority and received by faith alone, and you philosophers will stand apart, the unregarded witnesses of its birth and growth as you are the impotent spectators of its predecessor's decline and death."

In reply to remarks of this sort there are several points to be made. I should observe, to begin with, that, even if what has been said be true, we should not allow it to deter us from performing our proper function. The philosopher's task, if I may borrow a fine phrase of the Buddhists, is "to beat the drum, to blow the trumpet, and to raise the banner" of truth; to that task he is dedicated, and may not desert it, as Socrates reminds him, "because of disgrace." I should then add that, if the philosopher do his duty, if he think wisely and speak boldly, if he clarify and vivify the intellectual atmosphere, the popular religion that is to come will be nobler and truer because he has lived and taught. For it will not be formed out of nothing; the popular thought out of which it crystallizes will be in great measure the seepings of his own reflections; and the finer those reflections are the better will the seepings be.

Furthermore, I should point out that, in every period, there are men who outgrow and transcend the limitations of inherited and conventional thought, and that, unless a living philosophic tradition offer them sound nourishment, many of them will fall into scepticism or materialism. Such men constitute a menace to their generation, and from this fate it is the permanent business of a sound philosophy to save them.

And, finally, I should caution the philosopher against thinking too meanly of the common man. We must not permit him to shuffle off his responsibility by pleading the intellectual incapacity of his hearers. The average man is not a genius, but neither is he a fool. Let the philosopher think logically and speak clearly and to the point, and he will be heard. One reason why humanity has followed so many bad leaders is that there have been so few good ones. To provide intellectual leadership is the obligation of the philosopher, and, until he have adequately performed it, he has no right to bewail his lack of followers. When we reflect upon the achievements of modern thought during the three hundred years since it burst the shackles of medieval dogma, we have every reason to anticipate that it will progress beyond the state of mental anarchy in which it now languishes, and work out a new metaphysical synthesis which will be truer and more adequate than any which the world has yet known. And, when that fortunate day arrives, the line which separates philosophy from popular religion may well become so thin and shadowy as to be scarcely noticeable. To hope for such a consummation is to hope greatly, yet not, I think, unjustifiably.

"You forget," the objector may interject, "that political events move far more rapidly than the slow process of intellectual enlightenment upon which the philosopher depends. Wherever totalitarianism has established itself, its first act has been to throttle all freedom of thought with the iron hand of power. And, should it conquer in our own land, it will do here as it has done elsewhere. When one contrasts the self-confident and persistently aggressive advance of totalitarianism with the timid, vacillating, uncertain, uninspired policies of the representatives of the free countries, can one doubt which will ultimately triumph? And then what will become of your philosophy?"

While such suggestions should send us with increased energy to our task, the recollection of the recent tremendous manifestation of the reserve of power latent in free lands should also inspire us with hope and confidence. Yet, of course, we do not know what the future will be. What

we do know is that, if history teaches us anything, it teaches that freedom of thought can never be permanently suppressed. Time, then, is on our side. What is to be desired, therefore, is not the hasty emergence of the philosopher from his study to indulge in ill-advised attempts to do other men's work. What the philosopher must do is to make that study the birthroom of a new, spiritually grounded civilization. Free speculative thought, playing upon the great issues of life and death, is—we all know—the greatest power on earth. Resolutely rejecting all compromise with any dogmas—theological or materialistic—let us devote ourselves to it. No alternative, indeed, is open to us while we remain genuine philosophers. For us there is but one course, and that is, as Caesar would say, to "put all hope of safety in valor."

THE CHRISTIAN ANSWER: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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IN EVERY PERIOD OF ITS HISTORY Christianity has been faced with the task of presenting to the world at large a careful and comprehensive statement of its fundamental tenets and beliefs. A hasty glance in the direction of the past will show us that the genius of Christianity has, to no small degree, been in its ability to express itself in the philosophic categories and concepts current at a given time. Such adaptability is not to be interpreted as mere shifting with the fashions of the time, but it rather reveals the power of Christianity to manifest its relevance to a specific time and circumstance through the process of continued interpretation. Perhaps at no time in the past has the need been so great as at present for a re-examination of the meaning of Christianity, and an attempt at casting its fundamentals in a form which may find common ground with contemporary thought in providing a foundation for a new civilization. *The Christian Answer* is a volume which takes up this task with fitting seriousness.

The present symposium of five essays, a product of a number of well-known religious thinkers adopting the name, "The Theological Discussion Group," is an attempt "to find the meaning of Christian faith for our time" (p. ix), and to state this in the most rigorous and provocative way. The underlying persuasion of the writers, according to the introduction by Dr. Van Dusen, is "that Christian faith in its essential convictions is true, and that Christianity, despite the weakness and apostasy of the Churches, is indispensable to the reclamation of civilization" (p. x). This is an important and inviting theme, and one might even suggest that in our day nothing short of a symposium could suffice for its defense.

There is a steady progression of thought in the book, beginning with an analysis of the actual world situation confronting us, and ending with a discussion of the individual professing Christian and the society within which the Christian life must be lived. Paul Tillich's article, "The World Situation," provides the starting point for the entire dis-

* *The Christian Answer.* Edited by H. P. Van Dusen. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945. xi, 195 pp. $2.50.

cussion. This essay, chiefly analytical in character, is absolutely basic and, to employ theological language, it may be said to stand in the relation of "inexhaustible ground" to all those which follow. For this reason, it seems advisable to expound it at some length.

Dr. Tillich distinguishes three periods within the rise and triumph of "bourgeois society" culminating in our present situation. There are: period of bourgeois revolutions, period of victorious bourgeoisie, present crisis in civilization. The first period was marked by the *belief in reason,* or the reliance on the power of an objective structure in man which signified his unique dignity. Reason so conceived is not to be confused with reasoning, but is, rather, the presence within the microcosm of the order inherent in the whole of being. This, then, is the period of the rejection of all authority and custom on the basis of the autonomy of essential man. The second period was characterized by a transformation of reason as a revolutionary principle into what Dr. Tillich happily calls *technical reason,* reason as the instrument of calculation and control within the new system of production and exchange. The crisis of the present emerged from the inadequacy of technical reason so conceived to control actual historical existence, precisely because, in the process of becoming exclusively scientific, it gradually eliminated from itself all universal "vertical" principles which could give meaning and purpose to the special problems of control. In addition to this development, our present period has been characterized by a desperate attempt to convert technical reason into *planning reason,* in the hope of breaking the vicious circle of economic and political problems bequeathed by the breakdown of the automatic harmony of laissez-faire. Stated briefly, our present dilemma is as follows: planning reason in the extreme is absolutism; laissez-faire is self-destruction. Dr. Tillich seeks a solution which is "a way between and beyond these extremes" (p. 8).

Space does not permit a more extended review of the careful and detailed account offered by Dr. Tillich of our present cultural situation as revealed in art, economics, politics, and the intellectual sphere. However, perhaps we can generalize fairly accurately concerning the development which he finds common to each of these aspects of human culture. *Personality* and *community* in their interdependence are taken as the basic concepts providing us with an Ariadne's thread, as it were, for the unraveling of the whole situation. By reference to these, the devel-

opment culminating in the present shows a steady disintegration of that community which is the basis of all personality, and, at the same time, a continuous tendency toward individual self-assertion and will to power. The result in our period is a mood of utter isolation and "loneliness" in which community is a sound without meaning, and all individuals are separated from all other individuals precisely because they no longer participate in an essential ground forming a common bond. The loss of both the concept and the reality of the divine ground of being, according to this interpretation, is at the root of our difficulties.

Brief reference to the analysis of the intellectual sphere must serve to illustrate the application of the general development suggested above. The breakdown of mechanistic naturalism, which at this point we are in the best position to observe, has caused deep reflection upon the very foundations of our secure and "unquestioned" knowledge, as well as upon its meaning for life. This has led in turn to the "existential" philosophies and other philosophies of life. The immediate and passionate concern for a truth relevant to fate and decision has tried to overcome our detached admiration for scientific knowledge the very exactitude of which depends on its indifference to any particular time or personal circumstance. The result is an attempt at philosophy which must deny philosophy. Once again, the movement is from a faith in reason as underlying form and structure toward the negation of reason, in this case to the extent that we are left with the loneliness of the "truth" which cannot be communicated without contradiction. The philosophy of existence, while correct in its critique of the theoretical distance of rationalism in whatever form it appears, ultimately surrenders reason and runs the risk of yielding the battleground of truth and falsehood to the representatives of uncontrolled power.[1]

1. It should be noted that at this point Dr. Tillich suggests something which must be borne in mind by all those writing or speaking about "existentialism." Truth which may be called *existential* has to do with what concerns human existence as such; it "need not interfere with methods of empirical research; it does interfere with the interpretation of the meaning of such research and its results" (p. 32). In this respect, what is indicated by *existential* is not a special kind of truth among other specific disciplines, but some conception of the *relation* of this knowledge to the individual and to the whole of human existence. Dr. Tillich concludes that, as a criticism of abstract scientism and positivism, the philosophies of existence were correct, but as new bodies of philosophical knowledge they are to be rejected as destructive of the criterion of truth. Therefore we may say that there assuredly exists the problem of *existential* concern, but that there is no existential *philosophy*.

This first essay concludes with the suggestion of several normative principles which should serve to guide those who attempt to give specific Christian solutions. (1) The answer can come only out of our historical situation, and it must be universal; thus the Christian Church can speak only as it achieves "ecumenicity." (2) Our present situation must be accepted as fact, and all answers must acknowledge the positive contributions of our period; this means the preservation by the Church of the logos principle above all forms of authority and obscurantism. (3) "The authentic Christian message is never utopian" (p. 44); this means that the Church must stress the ambiguous and self-destructive character of all development in history. (4) The relevance of the central reality of Christendom, Jesus Christ, to all particular situations means that all escapism must be repudiated; in Dr. Tillich's words, "Christianity faces the future unafraid" (p. 44). (5) The Christian answer must come in the form of an interpretation of existence, and also in the attempt to achieve that state of affairs which the Church envisages.

We have dwelt at length on this analysis, but as was indicated above, it is the foundation upon which the remaining essays rest. The second paper, "Christianity and its Secular Alternatives," by T. M. Greene, seems to be the "black sheep" of the volume. It inclines toward apologetic of a kind which is not so much positive, reasoned defense as it is a negative exhortation that Christianity is at least not untenable. This is most evident at the point where faith is defined as a species of knowledge possessing a lower degree of probability than that possessed by what we may call respectable knowledge (pp. 76-77). Dr. Greene seems aware of this himself when, after noting Dr. Tillich's expressed conviction of the truth of Christianity, he continues, "The other authors of this book share this conviction" (p. 45). However, the essay as a whole makes it plain that its author is not at all sure that he is one of the "others."

The first part of this paper deals with three secular attitudes toward Christianity: that of the *ordinary man* whose major difficulty is not intellectual, but practical; the attitude of both *naïve* and *sophisticated naturalism,* in which the intellectual obstacles assume primary importance; and the attitude of *humanism,* which seems to be chiefly worried about the place accorded to reason in Christianity and also concerned over the scope and seriousness of the doctrine of sin. Perhaps the most

illuminating part of this section is the analysis of sophisticated naturalism. Dr. Greene uses as his point of departure several articles appearing in the *Partisan Review* (January-February, 1943), by John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook, in which Christianity and other "antinaturalistic" doctrines came in for scathing criticism and final rejection. Dr. Greene rightly criticizes the arrogant and dogmatic character of these attacks. He points out that Dr. Hook, for instance, was able to muster more religious fervor in his rejection of religion and in defence of science than is customary among contemporary religious proponents themselves (p. 58). Dr. Greene points out some prejudicial assumptions upon which these articles are based (particularly the identification of God with ghosts and the like), which assumptions lead these writers to make hasty statements betraying some lack of information on the matter at hand. For example, the author quotes Sidney Hook's remark to the effect that Reinhold Niebuhr's political views have nothing to do with his theology (p. 57). This is obviously an error, and as Dr. Hook should know, one which, significantly enough, has not been made by any spokesman for the Roman Church.

The second part of this essay is given over to a discussion of central and much disputed concepts such as the supernatural, revelation, reason, faith, dogma, original sin, and the Church. Here Dr. Greene attempts to mediate between a humanism which is more anxious than assured (p. 62), and a Christianity which seems to be neither. At the end one is not exactly sure what Dr. Greene's standpoint is, unless it is revealed in his final appeal to devotional language, which reflects the fundamentally aesthetic character of his position.

The third essay, "Central Christian Affirmations," by George F. Thomas, follows the suggestion of Paul Tillich that the recovery of a theocentric point of view is absolutely necessary as the ground upon which a new civilization might be built. To this end, Dr. Thomas discusses such subjects as revelation, reason, God, creation, man, sin, Christ, and atonement from a biblical point of view. A distinction is employed at the outset which has important contemporary consequences. The writer distinguishes between prophetic and philosophic insight and their respective interests. Christianity in its essential form is regarded as being closer to the former than to the latter. "God has revealed Himself," says Dr. Thomas, "not primarily to *enlighten the minds of men,* but to *bring them into fellowship with His own life and*

obedience to His will" (p. 97). This suggests, as the author goes on to show, an important methodological principle. When we look to the Christian records of the past in an attempt to lay hold on the content of revelation, we must not forget that God appears to the living man of faith primarily as He *is* in immediacy, not only as the ideas *about* Him which we find in the written accounts. The adoption of this prophetic view destroys Bibliolatry, the great sin of Protestantism, precisely because it enables us to avoid the error of fundamentalism which identifies the Divine Word with the obviously human words of the biblical texts. Revelation finds its true place and meaning in the religious context; it deals with life in its totality and immediacy, and is not to be regarded as essentially abstract or theoretical insight. This is not to say that the Christian position is devoid of "logos," that it has no need for careful and precise formulation; it simply emphasizes the concrete historical situations in which revelation comes and to which it is relevant.

This primacy of the interpretation of God's activity in history over the more detached investigation of God's essence apart from history, or, as we have put it above, the primacy of the religious over the philosophical, is central to the author's position. Such an approach makes it possible to bring the Christian message to bear on the present historical situation and also should aid in the attempt to recapture the theocentric view of human existence. Dr. Thomas says, ". . . God is to be met, not primarily in the intellectual contemplation of those who have elevated themselves by the discipline of detachment above the struggles and changes of time, but on the dusty highways of history and in the crises of moral struggle" (p. 103). This should make it abundantly plain that the older theological philosophy dependent on the so-called proofs for the "existence" of God has been abandoned as inconsistent with the nature of God as defined by the New Testament experience. On these grounds it is no longer possible for the modern man to become an "atheist" by so simple a means as the theoretical rejection of these arguments.

On the other hand, and this is what is of great contemporary import, the gap between philosophy and the prophetic or religious view must not be made so wide that only an obviously obscurantist and supernaturalist theology can bridge it. Nor does it seem fruitful to employ, as is often done, the distinction between religion and the enterprise of philosophic thought in order to discredit the contribution of the Greek mind to the Christian world view. Such an obvious rejection of the ra-

tional principle resulting in the radical separation of reason and faith plays into the hands of the neo-Thomists, with their carefully disguised doctrine of the "double truth," and the fundamentalists who welcome a narrow concept of reason that "miracles may abound."

The fourth essay, "Christianity and Society," by Edwin E. Aubrey, is an attempt to show how Christian thought can meet the contemporary *social* problems. The author's method is that of selecting from Tillich's paper four central concepts, security, unity, freedom, and significance, and attempting to show how the Christian norm of love can operate in the achievement of these four goals. Apart from some illluminating remarks on the meaning of immortality (p. 146), there is little in this paper to stimulate the reader, unless it be the author's attempt to convince us of the "realistic" character of his message. Fortunately the other writers have not felt the need for this plea, which is itself not unlike the attitude of those Old Testament prophets whose lack of inspiration is betrayed by their constant reiteration of "thus saith the Lord." The surprising thing is that, in addition to the usual claims made for a "realistic" approach, Dr. Aubrey derives the unity and meaning of the world from realism (p. 137) and, as we go on to discover, God Himself! (p. 138).

The last essay, "Christianity and the Christian," by John Knox, is an excellent statement of the meaning of the developing Christian life and its attendant problems. The thought moves through the themes of our moral dilemma and the will of God, sin and finitude, grace, the new life, and finally the sustaining community. In each category is presented a powerfully written exposition from which a thoughtful person can derive much that is of immediate value in a world perplexing to the last detail. The author states the problem of Christian ethics for the modern individual in the following way: "This problem is created by his recognition, on the one hand, of the absolute truth of Jesus' ethical teachings, and, on the other, of his own inability to keep them" (p. 165). The good life requires more than the ethical "good will" of more optimistic days; it requires the new being, reconciled to the God from whom his sinful character has separated him. The Christian life is just this continual process of the recognition of the true Ground of one's being. Yet while we may and, indeed, do speak at length of the individual Christian, we should not, according to the author, lose sight of the community of which he is a member. The Christian belongs to the Church,

not to any particular church, but to the Church, the sustaining Christian community which seeks to bind men together in that divine fellowship which alone is salvation.

Concerning the book as a whole, it is extremely difficult to speak. There is a note of positive conviction in virtually all the essays. The writers are honestly attempting to interpret the Christian message in the light of our present world predicament. If there are those who are not moved by the arguments, it can certainly not be attributed to any lack of earnestness on the part of the writers. Yet one wonders at the end whether the book really fulfills its avowed purpose. That there is abundant analysis, often acute, and some prophecy, cannot be denied, but, despite this, no clear central idea of *the* Christian answer seems to stand out. Perhaps this is because the statements of some of the authors on other occasions to the effect that it is an error to look for *a* Christian answer to all specific problems is nearer the truth than they have realized. Furthermore, the title of the book is unfortunate. It will prejudice many who may be led to expect more than any theological discussion can possibly give. Nor should any think that the title of a book has nothing to do with its influence. One of the best books ever written on Hegel was largely dispensed with through a quip precisely because it was so titled that one could repeat the damning expression, "he kept the secret," without ever having seen the book! However, although the present volume is by no means a definitive statement, we must be aware that the fundamental intention of all the writers is a valid one. Each writer has attempted to present his particular aspect of Christianity in a way which can have meaning for the modern man. Each writer has tried to bridge the gap between the doctrines of Christianity and the present world situation in all its complexity. One can sympathize with the reader who feels that there is yet much to be done in this process of interpretation, but that a step in the right direction has been taken cannot be denied.

COMMUNICATIONS

Associazione "Ernesto Buonaiuti"

Notice has been received from Italy of the founding of an *Associazione "Ernesto Buonaiuti" per gli studi storico-religiosi,* in honor of the late Professor Buonaiuti, whose contributions to the field of studies in the history of religion were so numerous and so distinguished. From the constitution of the new society we quote the following:

> The Association is non-confessional and non-political. Anyone may become a member who is in agreement with the aims of the society. Applicants for membership must be introduced by two members, and the application must be approved by the Executive Committee.
>
> Sections of the Association may be established in several places. These may be autonomous in respect to their administration and local activities.
>
> The Association will further its aims (a) by the publication of periodicals, monographs, and source material, by granting scholarships to students, and by organizing courses of instruction; (b) by holding regular conferences, etc.

One of the immediate purposes of the Association is the continuance of the quarterly journal, *Recerche religiose,* founded by Ernesto Buonaiuti, under an Editorial Committee composed of Ambrogio Donini, Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, C. Arturo Jemolo, Giorgio Levi Della Vida, Raffaello Morghen, Mario Niccoli, Ettore Paratore, Raffaele Pettazzoni, and Alberto Pincherle.

Those who are interested in obtaining further information, or in joining the Association, should address Professor Raffaele Pettazzoni, or some other member of the Committee, at Via Marcello Malpighi 6-A, Rome.

A Correction

In a review of *A Short History of the Copts,* by William H. Worrell, published in our November issue, mention was made of the author's "recent retirement," which Professor Worrell hastens to assure us is a mistake. He writes: "I am not in any sense 'in retirement'; I am not emeritus, nor in the process of becoming one." The Editors wish to apologize for the error, but we are not sure whether it is cause for rejoicing or regret that Professor Worrell is not (in the words of our reviewer) "from the leisure of his retirement" preparing another valuable work on the history of the Copts. But all things in due season.

BOOK REVIEWS

Prometheus: Das griechische Mythologem von der menschlichen Existenz. By KARL KERÉNYI. (*Albae Vigiliae,* Heft IV) Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1946, 82 pp. Fr. 6.00.

Die Geburt der Helena, samt humanistischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1943-45. By KARL KERÉNYI. (*Albae Vigiliae,* Heft III) Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1945. 139 pp. Fr. 8.00.

The two works under review belong to a new series edited by the author in conjunction with Professor Eitrem, of Oslo, and Professor de Tolnay, of Princeton, with the purpose of "promoting a better understanding of classical antiquity and the study of the history of civilzation in general." The first four volumes of the series which have been published so far are all written by Professor Kerényi and deal with problems of Greek religion and mythology. In contrast to a type of scholarship which contents itself with the description of the external form of religious practices or hunts for superficial parallels in all the corners of the earth, Professor Kerényi wishes to grasp the spirit of Greek religion and to show the everlasting value and profound human significance of the religious ideas and phenomena with which he concerns himself.

The grandiose figure of Prometheus is certainly a most fitting subject for such an undertaking. In the first chapter of the book devoted to this subject, the author points out that the Prometheus of Goethe's famous poem, "Prometheus," is very different from the Prometheus of Hesiod and Aeschylus, and that his relation to Zeus and to mankind is largely determined by biblical and gnostic rather than by classical Greek concepts. In the last chapter he comes to the conclusion that Goethe's poem, *"Grenzen der Menschheit,"* the famous counterpart to his Prometheus, though not quite free from modern sentiment, comes very near to what he considers the ultimate meaning of the last play of Aeschylus's Prometheus-trilogy, which, in his opinion, was the *Prometheus Unbound,* and not, as Wilamowitz and others believed, the *Prometheus, Fire-Carrier.* The main results of the rest of the work, in which he tries to find out the essential meaning of the original Prometheus-myth, can be summarized as follows.

The liver of Prometheus, which is eaten by the eagle of Zeus every day and grows again during the night, is a symbol of darkness. This shows that Prometheus himself belongs to the realm of darkness and

that his suffering is the suffering of darkness from the light of day. Prometheus is also connected with the moon, and the periodical healing and renewal of his wound is related to the waxing and waning of the moon, an analogy to the breast-wound inflicted by Achilles on Hera, who is also related to the moon, according to a story told in the Iliad (v, 392-94). But the darkness of Prometheus is also the darkness of human existence. The fact that, in one group of stories, Prometheus appears as the father or as the most exalted of the *Kabeiroi,* who are sometimes depicted as primeval men, shows that he is a representative of mankind. His conflict with Zeus is a symbol, not only of the contrast between the misery and suffering of human life and the bliss and happiness of the gods who rule the world and have established a harsh and pitiless order which leaves Man no possibility of improving his lot without incurring severe punishment, but also of Man's rebellion against this order. By two correlated primeval deeds *(Urtaten),* the stealing of the fire and the invention of the killing of animals for food, Prometheus has tried to make human existence more bearable. By the invention of sacrifice he has tried to placate the gods, while, at the same time, attempting to deceive them so that they will accept the less valuable part of the meal in which gods and human beings are henceforth to participate. The result is still greater misery for mankind and Prometheus's own age-long punishment.

In the last chapters (VII-XII), the author tries to show that Aeschylus' Prometheus-trilogy did not, as most scholars believe, end with a compromise between Zeus and Prometheus, at least not in the sense that not only Prometheus, but Zeus also, was compelled to make concessions, because Prometheus is in the possession of a secret which Zeus must know if he is to escape his doom, and knowledge of which he cannot acquire except through the free will and consent of his antagonist, Prometheus. In the author's opinion, Prometheus' resistance is completely broken. He wishes only for death. Whether the secret is finally revealed by himself or by his mother, Themis, this revelation is not part of a bargain but a "symbolic *beneficium*" and a token that Prometheus has given in. It is by the free grace of Zeus that Hercules frees Prometheus from his fetters and kills the eagle who has devoured his liver, and that Chiron is accepted as a substitute who goes down to Hades voluntarily so that Prometheus may live. But the ring which Prometheus receives from Castor and the wreath which he wears, and which his worshippers

wear at the Promethean festivals, are symbols of Prometheus' submission to the rule of Zeus and hence of his own—and mankind's—continued bondage.

Many of these interpretations are certainly very suggestive, though the last line of Cicero's translation of a passage from Aeschylus' *Prometheus Unbound, "amor emortis terminum anquiro mali,"* seem to provide a rather small basis for the claim that Prometheus must have surrendered unconditionally to Zeus, in spite of the fact that, at the end of the *Prometheus Bound,* the prophetic god had proclaimed in no uncertain words that he would never weaken and that he would not reveal his secret unless Zeus should first have freed him of his fetters. There is, however, a rather essential objection to the author's method as a whole. He tries to reconstruct *the* Prometheus myth, yet many of the symbolisms and other features which he finds—and there are many more than I was able to mention in the brief summary given above—do not seem to fit very well into one consistent picture. Many of these features are derived from traditions far apart in space and time. Nevertheless, they are treated as if all of them were part and parcel of essentially the same myth, and this in spite of the fact that, as the author himself points out, Hesiod's Prometheus story, for instance, contains elements which must have come from different traditions and do not altogether agree with the general character of Prometheus as he appears in Hesiod's work. But if it is true that foreign elements have intruded, even in one of those very few cases in which we do have something like a fully elaborated Prometheus story in an extant work of Greek literature, one is perhaps entitled to ask when and where that very complex original and fundamental Prometheus idea, so enormously rich in symbolism, which the author tries to reconstruct, could have existed. In fact, this is only one part of a much larger methodological question.

The author is a disciple of W. F. Otto. His master's book, *"Die Götter Griechenlands,"* is one of the most brilliant and stimulating works on Greek religion that have been published in many decades. Otto is unsurpassed in the art of making a Greek god come alive as a real personality and, at the same time, in his divine beauty. Yet he is at least as much an artist as a scholar, if not more. Though he is always completely familiar with all the evidence, he chooses from the different traditions those elements which fit into the picture that he has made himself and that he keeps before his eyes, rejecting or neglecting the

rest. In some cases this artistic method has induced him to disregard the historical changes in the character of a god as seen by the Greeks of different periods. In regard to Apollo, for instance, there is strong evidence to show that at one time he must have appeared as a predominantly hostile, dangerous, death-bringing god, while in a later time, largely no doubt under the influence of Delphi, he becomes, above all, the great healing god, the savior and purifier. It is true that even in his later period his dark and dangerous side was never completely forgotten and that, likewise, in the Apollo image of the earlier period there were latent potentialities which could later be developed into the predominant features of the Delphic Apollo. But it is doubtful whether the two sides of his nature were at any time so completely balanced or whether they were ever conceived of as two complementary aspects of essentially the same character, as it appears in Otto's description. Similar observations could perhaps be made concerning Otto's portrait of the god Dionysius, to whom he has devoted a special book. Nevertheless, there is a very great difference between Otto's beautiful portraits of Greek gods and Kerényi's attempts to describe the essential character of Prometheus.

The reason for this difference may, of course, be partly subjective, since Otto's eminently artistic gifts, his ability to visualize a figure and to separate the essential from the non-essential, also the combination of lucidity, force, and richness of expression in his language, are of the rarest and cannot be replaced by scholarship alone. But— and this is methodologically much more important—there is perhaps also an objective reason. The gods with whom Otto deals are, so to speak, living gods, gods whom one may encounter in person. At least there are numerous stories of how individual human beings encountered one or the other of these gods and of what it meant to *them*, that is to the human beings. Many of these gods may have a pre-Greek or non-Greek origin and may, at some remote time, have completely changed their character. But, at an early period in the development of Greek religion, each one of the most outstanding gods of this type becomes associated with a specific religious experience or, rather, with a specific manifestation of the divine. The quality of this experience then gives unity to the character of the god and pervades all his often seemingly contradictory functions. This element is so strong in Greek religion that, in direct contrast to the Romans who have the most elaborate formulae to invoke a divine

being, whether god, goddess, or neither they do not know, a Greek who feels the presence of a god is seldom in doubt as to the god's individual identity. The same identity of character of the god can then often be found in traditions, legends, cults, and religious practices widely separated in space and time. This gives a certain justification to Otto's method of building up his portrait of a god from features taken from traditions of very different provenience, though even he has not always avoided oversimplification.

Prometheus, however, was never a living god in the same sense. Though he had a cult in various places no historical individual ever dreamed of meeting him in person,[1] and his few encounters with individual legendary human beings, like Hercules, Io, Chiron, are all decidedly part of *his* myth and not of *their* story. In other words, he is not the product of religious experiences, of encounters with something divine, like the gods with whom Otto deals in his works, but a result of speculation. This is implicitly acknowledged by Kerényi's own analysis, which is throughout concerned with speculative ideas. Kerényi is absolutely right when he points out that Prometheus is everywhere closely connected with the fundamental problems of human existence. But it is of the very essence of human speculation about human problems that it continually tries to find new solutions. This is exactly what we find in the few elaborate versions of the Prometheus myth in extant ancient literature. The same is true of the modern versions of the Prometheus myth, whether they be by Shelley, Goethe, or Spitteler. To compare these versions with one another and to reconstruct lost versions, if this is possible, is certainly interesting enough. But for the same reason it seems impossible to reconstruct *the* Prometheus myth, or, if it were possible to reconstruct the *earliest* and original Prometheus myth (but how could we ever be certain of having found the earliest version?) to do so by taking the material for its reconstruction from the most widely separated traditions.

All this certainly does not mean that the work under review is without value. On the contrary, it contains many most valuable and interesting observations. But it might have been much more fruitful if the author

1. An exception is, perhaps, the "potters' god" in Athens, whom U. von Wilamowitz *(Aeschylus, Interpretationen,* Berlin, 1914, pp. 144 ff.) discusses (cf. also Aristophanes, *Birds,* 1494 ff.). But this potters' god has little connection with the Prometheus whose mythology Kerényi tries to analyze, and Kerényi himself does not even believe that this god has anything to do with Aeschylus' trilogy, as Wilamowitz does.

had followed a different method. The importance of the methodological question may perhaps also excuse the length of the present discussion. It occurs all too often in scholarly works, especially in the difficult field of the history of religion, that a method of investigation which has proved successful with one kind of object is transferred to an object for which it is not suitable. The present work seems to be an especially interesting case of this kind.

The second book under review is a collection of nine articles by the same author, previously published in periodicals. With the exception of the three last ones, which are concerned with more general humanistic problems, all of them deal with questions of Greek religion. The first article, "The Birth of Helen," has to some extent the same deficiencies as the book on Prometheus. There are too many symbolisms in the original myth *(Urmythus)* which the author tries to reconstruct from comparatively late sources and with the help of very distant parallels. But the third article, "The Mysteries of the Kabeiroi," is very good. In its first part it contains very pertinent remarks on the nature of Greek mystery cults and the difference between the experience of an ancient *mystes* and of a modern mystic. Its second part is not quite free from the same kind of vague reconstructions which are characteristic of the *Prometheus* and *The Birth of Helen*. But since, in this case, the author has a more concrete subject, they remain within somewhat narrower limits.

Both of the works under review can be used with great profit by a critical reader. But their bold revelations should not be accepted without sober criticism.

KURT VON FRITZ

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The Sikhs. By JOHN CLARK ARCHER. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946. xi, 353 pp. $3.75.

This account of the Sikhs, and of the growth and changing emphases which have characterized their religion in its development, is always conscious of the sources, the environment and the cross-currents with which they were involved. This means that, in the ups and downs of the life of their religion, the author gives full consideration to the Hindu

background and environment, and to the varying fortunes of Islam and of Christianity, both as religions and as political powers in relation to them, keeping in close touch with historical data. A good deal of local, illuminative character is supplied all along the way. The author carries on his study of comparative religions (with Sikhism as his base) with a definite emphasis, approaching the Sikhs without an adverse bias to begin with, but with a balance of give and take. This emphasis may be described as a sort of realistic view of religions, appreciating the many problems which they have in common. For example, in his chapter on "Nanak the Factual and the Formless," he raises issues which require the attention of Muslim and of Christian teachers also: "What then has finally happened to Nanak's person? . . . He was an historical person; he is also a theological construction."

Another subject for frank discussion is revelation. Commenting on the fact that the Sikhs have not yet come to a theory on that point, Professor Archer says:

> It would not be difficult, therefore, for them to learn that no sacred scripture *as such* has been verbally inspired, that God has never chosen to speak to all men through *one* and only one linguistic medium—Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, Vedic, Latin, Hindustani or Gurmukhi. Had God spoken finally in Hebrew, for example, one might logically contend that all peoples should learn Hebrew as the avenue of final truth. The practical handicap in this is readily apparent. It is better to understand that God has spoken in any language most appropriate to his hearers! If then it is apparent that men find difficulty in exchanging among themselves by many tongues the fruits of revelation, they may come to know at last that the words of *any* tongue are symbols and that fuller reality lies without them and beyond them and must be sought and found by surer means also.

Again:

> Sikhs have a succession of their own, as have Christians, Hindus, and Muslims, and all of them are channels in the process. Sikhs have been quite familiar with such human agencies as gurus, brahmans, sufis, sadhus, sannyasis, bhagats, mullas, clergy, saints and their own granthis. An assembly of them all might yield convincing lessons in morals and religion and indicate what, after all, is the *ideal* life of man. There would be opportunity not only to compare the modes of dress and personal appearance, but personal habits, also, with reference to hemp, liquor and tobacco, for example . . . the economic order, and war and peace. Is there justly a Christian, a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh inter-

pretation of the ideal of life, all of which practically are mutually exclusive? The bare necessity of facing these issues thus is in itself enlightening, but a sober conference on them would be inevitably constructive.

Once more:

Nanak, Mohammed and Jesus, for example, had in mind a very minimum of ritual observance, and not one of them had for his own use the sacred canon which his followers have used. . . . The followers of all these faiths might come to understand that forms and furnishings and buildings (which they may be intent on using) are, like the words of scripture, *symbols*—as are also the very *names* of God. This is the way of conservation, continuity and progress by immediate and realistic means, instead of provincial competition against limited historical backgrounds and in the light of abstract theory and dogma.

The author offers five conclusions from his comparative study:

1. Religions do not live in isolation, and no one historic religion can solve its problems except in relation with other faiths.

2. No religion in historic times has arisen of and by itself; nor has it lived within itself, especially if it has been a "missionary" religion.

3. The historic impact of a missionary religion upon any other has been fragmentary, partial and sectarian. . . . The passage of time, even so, has already taken a toll of the faith's originality and unity, and its subsequent extension has been usually sectarian. . . . Moslems and Christians who entered the Punjab were themselves sectarian.

4. No one religion, nor any sect of one religion, has displaced or has absorbed another faith or sect, nor does it seem that it ever could accomplish this. . . . That is, it cannot uproot or destroy what is indigenous, and if it has become indigenous it has lost its own 'ecumenicity.' . . . There is still a sounder content to conversion, a process other than the substituation or annhilation. one ol general alteration and mutual adjustment.

5. The history of particular conversion, including a study of individual converts, shows amply and convincingly that the convert in becoming such has not changed radically and fundamentally. . . .

These conclusions furnish food for thought for teachers of comparative religion and for formulators of missionary policy. The author feels that the practice of brotherhood among faiths is greatly to be desired.

The object of this review has been to present the author's point of emphasis, the historical milieu in which Sikhsism grew, and his conclusions growing out of the study. He is not always as sympathetic or as liberal as he would have himself be. But that is hardly to be expected of anyone. There are points to be questioned, some "facts" to be verified, often

loose use of technical terms and unsatisfactory documentation, all of which might receive the attention of a reviewer; but it has seemed best to hold to matters to which students of the history of religions might give more of their time.

George W. Briggs

New York City

Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume. New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1945. English Section, xi, 446 pp.; Hebrew Section, xi, 446 pp.

The two weighty volumes represent the tribute of love and admiration to Dr. Louis Ginzberg, Professor of Talmud and Rabbinics at the Jewish Theological Seminary and dean of American Jewish scholars, by his friends and fellow workers on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Due to war conditions, the publication was delayed by two years.

The English section opens with Solomon Goldman's "Portrait of a Teacher," a fervid tribute of affection and esteem of a gifted pupil for a beloved master and guide, appraising his stupendous achievements in most branches of rabbinic learning, and particularly in Haggada, Halaka, and Geonic literature. The charming features of the wise hearted, genial and witty personality are brought out, as well as the distinguishing qualities of the keen scholar, erudite editor of obscure texts, and expositor of knotty Talmudic problems, who "goes about his work methodically, skillfully, with an artist's warmth and concentration, and with uncanny familiarity."

The vastness of Dr. Ginzberg's scholarship is demonstrated by Boaz Cohen's "Bibliography of Professor Louis Ginzberg," covering his writings from 1894 to 1945 and produced in German, English, and Hebrew. Among the 115 items listed are such basic works as the *Legends of the Jews* (7 vols.), 4 volumes of Geonica and Geniza Studies, and the three volume commentary on the Palestine Talmud. In addition, 405 articles in the Jewish Encyclopedia are listed, several of them representing important contributions to Jewish learning. The range of the master's interest extends from a volume of poems, with which he began his career, to biographies of Jewish worthies, folk-lore, comparative religion, Cabbala, lexicography, etc. In the words of Robert Gordis: "Through his

mastery of all branches of Jewish literature and cognate fields, and his brilliant use of the comparative method, he has illuminated almost every phase of Jewish history, law, institutions, literature, theology and linguistics."

Twenty essays are included in the English volume and twenty-one in the Hebrew. The editors hoped to secure a measure of uniformity of content by limiting the papers to fields to which Dr. Ginzberg made signal contributions, and by laying special emphasis on works in the realms of Talmud and Halaka, his special fields of investigation. They succeeded with regard to the second aim in the Hebrew section. The English volume, while in no way inferior to the other, is marked by no particular element of unity. This defect may be laid to the virtue of Dr. Ginzberg's universality of interest.

Bible scholarship is enriched by four excellent studies. W. F. Albright reconstructs "The List of Levitical Cities" in Joshua 21 and I Chronicles 6. He reverses the opinion of Wellhausen and his followers that the list in question is artificial, and establishes its historicity. The two forms of the list, he maintains on the basis of the Greek variants in the LXX and archeological data, go back to a single original, and their discrepancies are due to scribal errors. The date of its original form, he conjectures, is about 975-950, B.C.E., not long before or after the death of David.

Shalom Spiegel's "Noah, Danel and Job" deals with the three names in Ezekiel 14:14 ff. in the light of the recently discovered Ras Shamra inscriptions. He succeeds in extending our knowledge of the name Daniel in Ezekiel in the light of Canaanitic literature and mythology. While the imaginative reconstruction of the "Danel" legend appears attractive, the treatment of Job (the Prologue and Epilogue) is not as convincing.

H. L. Ginzberg's "Psalms and Inscriptions of Petition and Acknowledgement" elucidates a number of moot points in the understanding of the Psalms. Offering a revised translation and evaluation of the Ben Hadad stele, and adducing instructive Palmyrene and Egyptian parallels of thanksgiving inscriptions, he applies the results to biblical study. He suggests that Neb-Re's song stands in the same relation to Psalm 30 as Akhenaton's hymn does to Psalm 104. Furthermore, the practice of the Egyptians and other ancient peoples of making public acknowledgment in epigraphic form had its parallel in Israel as well. This ex-

plains the superscription of Hezekiah's thanksgiving in Isaiah 38:9, *miktab,* writing. With this as guide, he reverts to J. D. Michaelis' interpretation (1792) of the term *miktam* in the titles of Pss. 16 and 56-60 as a variant of *miktab,* "an inscription upon a slab." This interpretation derives support from the Targum of Psalm 16:1. Saul Lieberman corroborates the hypothesis with an example from the Tos. Sab. 17:8, where the Erfurt and Venice manuscripts read *miktamin,* while the textus receptus has *miktabin.*

In his study of "The Relationship of Biblical and Rabbinic Hebrew," Robert Gordis expounds a number of biblical words and expressions in the light of their later usage. His method is predicated on the sound proposition that for all the variations between these two phases of Hebrew, there is an organic unity between them. He illustrates his thesis by securing clearer meaning in the passages examined.

Extra-Canonical literature is represented by two studies. Elias J. Bickerman in his essay on "The Date of IV Maccabees," proposes that the work was written "between 18 and 55 C.E., that is about 35 C.E. with a scope of fifteen years or so in either direction." Charles C. Torrey presents "A Revised View of First Esdras." His studies in this apocryphon, begun in 1907, are here corrected and revised. He regards it not as an independent book, but as a fragment of the oldest Greek version of the Chronicler's work, preserved after Theodotion's version of Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemia was adopted as the standard generally known as the LXX.

The versions are represented by Alexander Sperber's "Specimen of a Targum Edition," on I Samuel 17, and by Ralph Marcus' evaluation of the "Jewish and Greek Elements in the Septuagint." Despite the slippery ground of differentiating the characteristic elements of Judaism and Hellenism, Dr. Marcus' analysis leads him to conclude that the Greek elements of the LXX are merely superficial and decorative, while the Jewish elements are deep-lying. The LXX serves as another link in the chain of evidence supporting the view that "the Jews of the diaspora were externally more Greek than Jewish but internally more Jewish than Greek."

Rabbinic literature is represented by only one essay, in which A. Marmorstein offers a somewhat forced analysis of "The Introduction of R. Hoshaya to the First Chapter of Genesis Rabba." We may place in this section Solomon Gandz's "Complementary Fractions in Bible and Talmud."

Four studies are devoted to historical subjects. Isaiah Sonne's investigation of "The Schools of Shammai and Hillel" departs from the current interpretations of their divergences on political or social and economic grounds, or of the respective methods of interpretation of Scripture, and tries to discover them within their procedure and reasoning themselves. While Ralph Marcus meticulously avoids "discovering" Greek elements in the LXX, Sonne boldly applies the categories of Greek philosophy to the discussions of the Pharisaic schools. Their apparently simple differences in ritual turn out to be based on the tensions of the "one" and the "many," "impressively represented in most of Plato's dialogues," and on the concept of causation. In one view, "causation constitutes an inherent link unifying cause and effect almost to the point of identity, while the second view tends to reduce causation to a mere external succession in time without real unity much less identity between cause and effect." He ventures to find vestiges of Sophistic thinking in the school of Hillel: "They consist in a certain indifference to objective truth, and in overemphasizing one's own self as 'measure' of all values." This leads him to the thought that "we have gone too far, especially in the last four decades, in our glorification and exaltation of the Pharisees in general, and the Hillelites in particular. . . . It is now time to do justice to the Shammaite principle" (p. 291).

As evidence of the Sophistic trend of the school of Hillel, Dr. Sonne cites the legal fiction of *Prosbul,* devised by Hillel to overcome the economic severities resulting from the release of debts by the advent of the sabbatical year. He seems to overlook the importance of legal fiction in both civil and ritual law, a point clearly demonstrated by Samuel Atlas in the Hebrew section of the present work. Furthermore, the Shammaites no less than the Hillelites recognized its importance, as is evident, for example, from their acceptance of the Erub, i.e., of the fictitious joining of courts in order to overcome the biblical prohibition of carrying things on the Sabbath.

Dr. Sonne cites Hillel's Golden Rule as a further example of Sophistic teaching: "When Hillel had to define the ethical principle to a prospective proselyte who did not yet recognize the objective 'measure' of the Law, he found no other definition than his famous 'What is hateful to thee do not to thy fellowman.' " This rule, in his judgment, rests entirely on the Protagorean principle that "man is the measure of all things." He interprets it to mean: "Thou are the measure of what is good

and what is bad" (p. 291). Surface resemblances do not always indicate essential identity; the negative as well as the positive form of the Golden Rule goes back to Leviticus 19:18, where it is presented as a divine command (See Targum Jerushalmi *ad loc.*). Furthermore, in quoting this rule, Hillel was not "defining the ethical principle," but rather teaching the impatient Roman the basic doctrine of the Torah, while he stood on one foot.

Dr. Sonne's objection to the characterization of the Shammaites as "strict," in contrast to the more moderate views of Hillel, is not justified by the examples which he cites. For example, Sukka 2:8 reads:

> Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the requirement to dwell in a booth (during the feast of Tabernacles). A minor who can get along without his mother is obligated to observe the law of *sukka*. Once, when the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth (to a son, during the Feast), he removed some of the roof-plaster and covered the place above the bed with twigs for the sake of the little one.

Dr. Sonne proposes to erase the words "for the sake of the little one" and considers Shammai's action as intended to provide a sukka for the mother. That, indeed, would soften the "cruel severity" of Shammai, but at the price of violation of the context, for the incident is clearly cited in contrast to the ruling of the Mishna that a minor dependent upon his mother is not obliged to dwell in a sukka. The greater regard for the context on the part of the Shammaites does not alter the rigorous literalism of their interpretations of the law. As biblical exegetes the Hillelites may have been more faulty than the Shammaites, but as exponents of a growing *halaka* and going beyond the text to meet the exigencies of new life situations, they merit the highest praise.

Dr. Sonne cites the respective attitudes of the two schools toward the grounds for divorce as another example of the Hillelite disregard for the context of Scripture. A careful examination of the facts does not permit such a conclusion. The Mishna Gittin 9:10 states:

> The School of Shammai taught that a man may not divorce his wife save in the case of adultery, for it is written, "Because he found in her anything *unchaste*" (Deut. 24:1). The School of Hillel maintain that he may divorce her even *if she burnt his dish (hikdiha tabshilo)*, for it is written, "Because he found in her *anything* unchaste."

The phrase, "she burnt his dish," as the Aruch suggests (sub *tabshil*),

may be taken euphemistically for conjugal relations (as in Berachot 62a, Pesahim 112a, and possibly in Tosephta Ketubot 7:6; cf. Yoma 75a; as an expression of moral misbehavior it appears also in Ber. 17b and in Sanhedrin 103a). Rashi interprets the opinion of the Hillelites as referring to *shear debar sirhon,* any other kind of indecency. Divorce is thus limited to either moral blemish or to sexual unfitness, a view that is quite within the context of the biblical passage.

"Civil Bondage in Jewish and Roman Law" is illuminatingly treated by Boaz Cohen. While both systems permitted citizens to be delivered into bondage as distinct from slavery, the bondman enjoyed a superior position and greater rights among the Jews than among the Romans.

Guido Kish's "Jewish and Christian Courts in the Middle Ages" elucidates some forms of Jewish self-government in medieval Europe. German law, he points out, went beyond the Spanish in giving strict recognition to Jewish law and Jewish courts. Thereby it operated strongly in favor of Jewish communal autonomy.

"The Shebet Yehuda and 16th Century Historiography," by A. H. Neuman, is an excellent deliniation of Ibn Verga's classic and its place in Jewish literature. This "historical anthology" is viewed as "the earliest sociological study of the Jewish question." "It utilizes historical anecdotes from earlier writers for background, and intersperses them with original stories created by the fertile imagination of Ibn Verga, not as factual narratives, but as a mirror which reflects the truth under the artist's lights and shadows." While amassing numerous individual episodes, the central theme of the narrative is "the anamalous position of the Jew among the nations and the roots of the insensate hatred which caused the unending Jewish tragedy."

Salo W. Baron sketches the underlying ideas and methods of Levi Herzfeld, a forgotten pioneer of modern Jewish historiography and "the first Jewish economic historian." A moderate religious Reformer and an objective historian of post-exilic Judaism, his chief claim to fame rests upon his pioneer *Handelsgeschichte der Juden,* which has not yet been superseded by a more comprehensive work.

The volume also contains three essays on philosophic themes. Israel Efros comments on "Saadyah's Second Theory of Creation in its Relation to Pythagoreanism and Platonism." Leo Strauss analyses "Farabi's Plato," based on F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer's edition of *Plato Arabus, II. Alfarabus: Dē Platonis Philosophia* (1943). Inasmuch as Maimoni-

des regarded Farabi as the greatest authority in philosophy apart from Aristotle, Strauss considers a study of this Arab philosopher as a first step toward the understanding of the thought of the great Jewish schoolman. His interpretation of Plato shows Farabi to have identified philosophy "with the scientific spirit 'in action,' with skepsis in its original sense of the term, i.e., with the actual quest for truth which is animated by the conviction that the quest alone makes life worth living, and which is fortified by the distrust of man's natural propensity to rest satisfied with satisfying, if unevident and unproven, conditions." It is by reading the Guide against this background, Strauss thinks, that its unexplored depths can be fathomed.

The intimation that skepticism is at the core of Maimonides' thinking gains no support from Harry Austryn Wolfson's searching analysis of "Maimonides on Negative Attributes." The problem of attributes for Maimonides was primarily logical, "arising from his view that any statement about God must have the validity of a logical proposition. The question, as seen by him, is merely whether identity is a logical relation." After probing the nature of the various logical relations that must exist between subject and object in logical propositions and excluding identity from this category, Maimonides seeks more satisfactory explanations to justify the attributes of God. He finds two such explanation: first, they are actions; and second, they are negations. But, whereas the predecessors of Maimonides used negations "only to indicate that negative terms predicated of God are to be understood as a denial of their opposite; in the affirmative form they have no meaning at all. Maimonides, however, uses the negative interpretation of divine predicates only as a means of justifying the affirmative form in which certain terms must be predicated of God." The distinction between negation and privation in Islamic philosophy and in Maimonides is carefully drawn.

The Hebrew section of the *Jubilee Volume* contains only one essay in the field of Bible. Moses David Cassuto re-examines the chronology of the "Ten Generations from Adam to Noah" in the light of Sumerian chronologies of the mythical kings, and suggests that they are based on the round numbers 60 and 7. The bulk of the volume is devoted to Rabbinics. Two of them are lexical. N. H. Torczyner examines the phrase, *asah 'azmo mistapek,* and Samuel Krauss, the name of the gate *Tadi* in the Herodian Temple. Louis Finkelstein contributes "Notes and Emen-

dations on the Sifra." J. Epstein supplies a verbal commentary on the twenty-fourth chapter of Mishnah Kelim.

Chanok Albeck presents an introduction to Midrash Vayikra Rabba. An examination of its sources and their relations to Lamentations Rabba, the Tanhuma, and the Pesiktas, leads him to the conclusion that, contrary to current scholarly opinion, the Midrash Rabba on Leviticus is one of the oldest midrashim. It was composed not much later than Genesis Rabba, i.e., about the end of the fifth or sixth century.

Michael Higger edits "R. Moses ibn Musa's Commentary on the Thirteen Rules of R. Ismael," from a manuscript in the possession of the Jewish Theological Seminary. Aaron Freimann supplies a "List of the Early Commentaries on the Talmud," a corrected and enlarged form of a list which he previously published in David Hoffman's *Festschrift*. It presents works in manuscript and in print, in the order of the tractates of the Talmud.

Two systematic studies are contributed by S. Atlas and by Solomon Zeitlin. Atlas defines the concept of legal fiction in the philosophies of Vaihinger, Savigny, and Solomon Maimon, and applies it to the sphere of the Halaka. He distinguishes four different types of legal fiction in the Talmud, and illustrates each with telling examples. Zeitlin analyzes the principle of "Derelictio in Tannaitic jurisprudence" and draws instructive parallels from Roman law.

The field of history is represented by a number of essays. Hayyim Tchernowitz deals with "The Zuggot and the Temple of Onias." He reviews the data concerning the "Pairs," believed to have headed the Sanhedrin from Maccabean times to the end of the first pre-Christian century, one as president and the other as vice-president. Rejecting the current view, he advances a different solution of the question as to why "pairs" of scholars are named. In his opinion, one presided over the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem and the other over the Sanhedrin at Alexandria, which he assumes to have been connected with the Temple of Onias at Leontopolis. While he illuminates numerous phases of the history of the period, his main thesis remains a mere guess without adequate proof.

Abraham Weiss re-examines "The Problem of the Court of Seventy One." On the ground of rabbinic testimony he deduces that it formed not a court but a representative body of the type of a senate, though occasionally it was charged with the task of judging important cases and of deciding on the enforcement of certain laws. However, a smaller

body of twenty-three of its members performed all the juridical duties of an ordinary court and also acted as a court of appeal from the decisions of other courts of the land.

Saul Liebermann contributes a fascinating essay on "Sin and its Punishment, a Study of Jewish and Christian Visions of Hell." He draws upon rabbinic haggadas and early Christian parallels in which the principle of "like for like" is applied to otherworldly retribution. In these visions of horror Lieberman recognizes the reflection of the tortures which the Roman authorities inflicted upon their Jewish and Christian victims. The essay represents a fine contribution to the study of comparative religion.

An essay by Alfred Freiman is devoted to "Yehiel, the Father of R. Asher, on the Study of the Torah." While this tract by the father of the famous Talmudist is a mere compilation of Talmudic and midrashic material, it clearly reflects the prominence given to study in the saintly circles of the German Jewish mystics.

The life of R. Solomon Luria is sketched by S. Asaph, throwing much light on the critical methods of the great sixteenth century Polish Talmudist and his commentaries. A lesser sixteenth century celebrity, "R. Joseph D'Arli as Teacher and Head of an Academy in Siena," is presented by Alexander Marx on the basis of material derived from manuscript collections of letters used as models of style and composition. From the fragmentary materials he draws the outlines of Jewish education in Italy in the middle of the sixteenth century.

From the same century, Isaac Rivkind produces "A Responsum of Leon de Modena on Uncovering of the Head," edited from a manuscript of the British Museum. In it the famous rabbi of Venice cites the sources from the Talmud and the Codes bearing on the question, and establishes that the prohibition of uncovering the head is based not on the halaka but rather on the ground of special piety. In his customary manner he quotes parallels from Greek, Roman, and Christian sources. Rivkind's elaborate introduction takes cognizance of the fact that 1945 marks a centenary since the practice of worshiping with uncovered head was introduced in the Reform Temple of Berlin, whence the practice spread to the Reform congregations in America and other countries. The objectivity of his excellent investigation is marred somewhat by his resentment of the custom as foreign to historic Judaism.

Jewish philosophy is represented by three essays. A. S. Halkin edits

"A Fragment of Saadyah's Introduction to His Commentary on the Pentateuch" from the Geniza in the possession of the Jewish Theological Seminary. One portion treats points of Hebrew grammar, and the others concern themselves with the defence of the Oral Law against Karaitic attacks. A translation is added of Kirkisani's summary of Saadyah's views and a fragment on the same theme by a disciple of the Gaon.

Abraham Joshua Heschel, in an attractively written essay, raises the question: "Did Maimonides Believe That He Attained Prophetic Inspiration?" Interestingly, in the English table of contents, the title is mistranslated: "Did Maimonides Strive for Prophetic Inspiration?" It may be taken as a "Freudian slip." The testimony adduced by Dr. Heschel at best admits the question as to whether he strove after prophecy, but, by no means, as to whether he believed that he attained it. In a crucial passage in his introduction to the third part of his *Guide,* he states that his knowledge of the theological foundations of the Torah *(Maaseh Bereshit* and *Maaseh Merkaba)*

> is based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration (and is therefore not infallible). . . . It has been formed by what I learned from Scripture and the utterances of the Sages, and by the philosophical principles which I have adopted. It is therefore possible that my view is wrong, and that I misunderstood the passages referred to. Correct thought and divine help have suggested to me the proper method (Tr. M. Friedlander).

These are not the words of a man with prophetic pretensions, but of a modest seeker after truth. His reference to "divine help" is a mere expression of piety and has no possible reference to prophetic gifts, for he clearly states that "divine help" is merely a step that may lead to prophecy but does not qualify a person for the prophetic office (Guide, II, 45). As to his consciousness of high moral and intellectual attainments, we must bear in mind his claim that "even if one has the capacity for prophecy, and has duly prepared himself, it may yet happen that he does not actually prophesy. It is in that case the will of God (that withholds from him use of the faculty)." He cites biblical and rabbinic opinion in support of his belief that "it depends chiefly on the will of God who is to prophesy, and at what time" (*Ibid.,* II, 32). His genuine writings contain no intimation that he believed himself chosen for that role. The "Treatise on Eternal Bliss" can hardly be admitted as testimony. It is one of a number of forgeries aiming to make the distin-

guished philosopher the exponent of mystic doctrines. Even Bacher, who upholds its genuineness, noted its strong deviations (on ceremonial commandments, prayer, ecstasy) "from Maimonides' mode of thought" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, o.s., IX, 289). It seems to have been written for the purpose of overcoming the master's radical ideas of the hereafter. Abraham Maimonides' strong Sufi leanings have no bearing upon his father's convictions. Abulafia's claim that he derived his mystic ideas of prophecy from Maimonides may be dismissed as an attempt to gain support for his personal views from a high source. Finally, Maimonides' lifelong absorption in the problem of prophecy stemmed from his concern with the foundations of Jewish belief. In his endeavors to ground Judaism in reason, he was compelled to turn again and again to its vital spring, prophecy. This does not prove that he was smitten with a prophet complex. The fact that Dr. Heschel ends his painstaking investigation with the words of Joseph: "interpretations belong to God," may be taken as an indication that he has not been able to find grounds for a positive conclusion.

"The system of Isaac Albalag," the popularizer of Averoes among the Jews, is lucidly outlined by Julius Guttmann. The little known philosopher is brought back to life, with his ideas of creation, of God's relation to evil, and of the relation of faith to reason.

The volume ends with Gerhard Scholem's edition of "A Lost Chapter of the Midrash Hane'elam" from a Cambridge manuscript. Its importance consists in that it forms the first draft of an early source of the Zohar. Scholem's introduction represents another fine contribution to his interpretation of the Cabbala.

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The Apocryphal Literature. A Brief Introduction. By CHARLES CUTLER TORREY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. x, 151 pp. $3.00.

The venerable author of this book offers a brief introduction to the apocryphal literature of the Old Testament.

A *General Introduction* (§§ 1-8) deals with the historical classification of the apocrypha, their use in the Early Church and the New Testament, during the Reformation and afterwards, and with the controversies over

their use in different countries and Churches. Semantic considerations made him aware of the fact that "the current classification of the Jewish post-canonical [the reviewer would prefer: extra-canonical] literature as Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha is outworn and misleading" (p. 11). He proposes to understand under "aprocrypha" all the extra-canonical Jewish writings, thus returning to the usage of the Early Church, Jerome, and the rabbinical designation *Sifre hizonim*, "outside books" (cf. M. Joel, *Blicke in die Religionsgeschichte* I [Breslau, 1880], pp. 68-76).

Composition and translation of the apocrypha from Hebrew and Aramaic into Greek were done by Jews and not by Christians. "It was by the Jews of Egypt, in the first instance, that this important literature, rejected in Palestine, was preserved, until the time when its adoption by the Christians caused it to be left in their hands" (p. 13). In the light of our present-day knowledge of Judaism we know that the Apocrypha [italicized below] formed a part of the Hellenistic-Jewish Bible whose conspectus (R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* [New York, 1941], p. 68 f.) was as follows: Pentateuch; Joshua, Judges, Ruth, I-II Kings (= I-II Sam.), III-IV Kings (= I-II Kings), I-II Chronicles, *I Esdras,* II Esdras (= Ezra-Neh.); Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, Job, *Wisdom of Solomon, Ben Sira,* Esther (with *additions*), *Judith, Tobit;* the Twelve Minor Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, *Baruch,* Lamentations, *Epistle of Jeremiah,* Ezekiel, Daniel (with *The Hymn of the Three Children or the Prayer of Azariah,* the story of *Susanna, Bel and the Dragon), I-II Maccabees*; *III-IV Maccabees*; also *The Prayer of Manasses,* found in a few Septuagint manuscripts after the Psalms. An outline of the history of the *Septuaginta* seems indispensable in an introduction to the O. T. apocrypha since the Hellenistic Jewish Bible in its widest sense, together with Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachos, were later abandoned by rabbinic Judaism, which may have ultimately considered the Greek translations of the O. T.—without any exception—as belonging to the "outside books." This outline cannot be given without taking into consideration the canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures (see Solomon Zeitlin, "A historical study of the Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures," *PAAJR.* III, 1931-32), and the place of the apocrypha in tannaitic Judaism.

A *Special Introduction* (§§ 9-36) is devoted to the individual writings, certain selected portions of which receive separate treatment, such as the story of the *Three Guardsmen* in *I Esdras,* the Letters prefixed to II

Maccabees, and the author's critical proof that the so-called "Martyrdom of Isaiah" never existed as a separate Jewish or Christian document.

The book includes also those apocryphal writings "which in the language of the Early Church *would have been* [the reviewer's italics] classified as apocrypha" (p. vi). To this rubric are evidently ascribed the *Psalms of Solomon, the Sibylline Books, Henoch, Assumption of Moses, II Esdras, the Apocalypse of Baruch, Jubilees, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,* and *the Book of Adam and Eve.* The *Lives of the Prophets* and the *Testament of Job* "have not appeared before in the works of this description," according to Torrey's assumption. However, Paul Riessler (*Altjuedisches Schrifttum ausserhalb der Bibel* [Augsburg, 1928]), has already included these two pieces in his collection of O. T. apocrypha, still the most comprehensive of its kind in any language.

The book as whole, projected in 1894-95, shows traces of a gradual development. While the story of the *Three Guardsmen* (§ 11) covers almost six pages, because the author once dealt with it in a lengthy study, *I and II Maccabees* are dealt with on six and one half and four pages, respectively (§§ 17-18). This indicates an obvious want of proper proportion in importance allotted to the latter writings.

The treatment is descriptive, as far as the content of the writings is concerned, and critical as to their historical transmissions. Unfortunately, we are not given the learned author's judgment about the influence of the Stoic popular philosophy, of pre-Christian Jewish Gnosis, Christian Gnosticism, of Greek, Semitic, Hellenistic, and Jewish and Christian genres of literature, to be found in many of these writings.

Since the author himself suggested a very broad definition of the term "apocrypha" we miss other Jewish religious apocryphal writings, such as the *Letter of Aristeas,* for instance; or the Ezechiel apocryphon (Cf. Wallach, "The Parable of the Blind and the Lame," *JBL.* 62 [1943] 333-39); or the Alexandrian Ezechiel (Joseph Wieneke, *Ezechielis Judaei Poetae Alexandrini Fabulae* [Muenster, 1931]).

The references to the literature quoted in individual paragraphs can be supplemented as follows:

§ 9: to the standard works, add Paul Riessler, *Altjuedisches Schrifttum ausserhalb der Bibel* (Augsburg, 1928); Otto Staehlin, *Die Hellenistisch-Juedische Litteratur* (W. v. Christs *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* II, 1; sixth ed. [Munich, 1921]); Motzo, *Saggi di Storia e Letteratura Giudeo-Ellenistica* (Firenze, 1924); Paul Volz, *Die Eschatologie*

der Juedischen Gemeinde (2nd ed., 1934), pp. 1-62, dealing with the apocalyptic apocrypha.

12B: to the Hebrew origin of the *Susanna* story cf. Heller, *MGWJ* 80 (1936), p. 127 f.

17-18: Bévenot, *Die beiden Makkabaeerbuecher* (Bonn, 1931); Abraham Kahana's Hebrew translation and commentary to I Macc; Elias Bickermann, *Der Gott der Makkabaeer* (1937), and other studies by the same author.

22: cf. the editions of *Ben Sira* by R. Smend, W. O. E. Oesterly, Israel Lévi, and N. Peters.

23: cf. Isaac Heinemann, *Poseidonios' Metaphysische Schriften* I (Breslau, 1921), 136-53, for the influence of the Stoa on the *Wisdom of Solomon.*

24: A. Dupont-Sommer, *Le Quatrième Livre des Machabées* (1939); now E. J. Bickerman, "The Date of Fourth Macc," *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* I (1945), 105-12.

25: on the Gnostic origin of the *Odes of Solomon* see Hans Lewy, *Sobria Ebrietas* (Beiheft 9 zur *ZNTW.*, 1929), pp. 82 ff.; Hugo Gressmann, in E. Hennecke, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* (2nd ed., 1924).

26: Benno Guilelmus Badt, *De Oraculis Sibyllinis a Judaeis Compositis* (Thesis, Vratislaviae, 1869); on Ps. Phokylides see B. S. Easton in *Anglican Theological Review* 14 (1932); A. Kurfess, "Das Mahngedicht des sog. Phokylides im zweiten Buch der Oracula Sibyllina," *ZNTW.* 38 (1939).

27: L. Gry, "Mystique gnostique en finale des Paraboles d'Henoch," *Le Muséon, Revue d'études Orientales* 52 (Louvain, 1938), 337-78; H. Odeberg, *3 Henoch or the Hebrew Book of Henoch* (Cambridge, 1938).

28: W. J. Ferrar, *The Assumption of Moses* (1918).

29: A. Kaminka, "Beitraege zur Erklaerung der Esra-Apokalypse and zur Rekonstruktion ihres hebraeischen Urtextes," *MGWJ.* 76 (1932) and *MGWJ.* 77 (1933); Bruno Violet, *Die Apokalypsen des Esra und des Baruch* (1924).

30: see Br. Violet, *op. cit.*, to paragraph 29.

31: cf. H. H. Rowley, *The Relevance of the Apocalyptic,* and his discussion of Solomon Zeitlin's *Jubilee* studies, and the latter's reply in *JQR.* 36 (1946), pp. 12-16.

34: R. H. Charles, *The Ascension of Isaiah* (1918).

It is to be hoped that a revised and enlarged edition of this brief in-

troduction to the Old Testament Apocrypha will lead toward a handy English *translation* of the texts, and finally to a more concise *Handbook*, both of which remain an urgent *desideratum*.

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Religion in Russia. By ROBERT PIERCE CASEY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. viii, 198 pp. $2.00.

It is very difficult to review this book of popular lectures without seeming to enter into religio-political polemics, for it is primarily an apology for the actions of the Patriarchs Sergius and Alexei, and it undoubtedly expresses the sentiments which they feel. Along with this, it contains a great deal of valuable material drawn from various relatively unknown sources and filling out certain aspects of Russian religious life. At the same time, it ignores or treats as of little consequence other phenomena that are still unclear or that complicate the situation. There are also interesting digressions which do not always add significance to the story.

The clearest and most definite chapter is that on Antireligious Theory in Russia. Here the author has well outlined the process by which the Soviet government developed its anti-religious policy and has given a satisfactory summary of the main steps taken by the Soviet government against the Church and religion. This leads him to an enthusiastic approval of the policy of Sergius as locum tenens and later Patriarch, whom he regards as motivated by "not only the courage of conviction but also a single-minded concern for the care of souls" (p. 112).

This is all to the good, but the question involuntarily arises as to whether the entire revival of Orthodoxy was due to the activity of this group that was co-operating with the government. The various journals published by Yaroslavskii and under his influence speak again and again of the discovery of priests and even bishops who were secretly ordained and consecrated at the risk of their lives for carrying the sacraments and the services of the Church to regions where all the churches had been closed. In a real sense Orthodoxy was preserved in the Soviet Union by going into the catacombs, and at least part of this underground work was apparently not under the direction of Sergius. There have been few reports of the fate of such work since the re-establishment of the Patriarch-

ate, and whether it has been absorbed by the official Church or still remains secret is unknown.

The book contains the usual diatribes against the Nazi invaders of the Soviet Union and, in approving the policy of Sergius, does not try to do justice to the position of the Orthodox in the Baltic states and elsewhere who had seen their independent countries overrun by the Soviets as allies of the Nazis, their flocks scattered and deported, and who hoped that the falling out of the totalitarian powers might aid them in securing the independence which they had lost. It is no tribute to their intelligence that they expected anything from the Nazis, but the attitude of the official Patriarchal Church shows at least as much concern for the desires of the Soviet government as it does for the care of souls.

It is still an open question, despite the glowing encomiums of the patriarchs, as to whether the Orthodox Church is not as much under the informal control of the irreligious and anti-religious Soviet government as it ever was under the tsars, when it was formally made an organ of state. In view of the political actions of the Soviet government in the devastated countries of Europe, it is far from proved that the reunion of the separated groups among the Russian emigration has not been assisted by political pressure. That is the main point raised by the "Theophilists" in America, and the progress of the negotiations in Moscow by the delegates from the United States (after some representatives had been refused passports) does not remove all suspicions that it is politics and not canonical irregularity that is the continuing cause of the schism.

In the history of events before 1917 there are some surprising statements. The equating of Pobedonostsev and Rasputin as products of the same system (p. 26) is at least original. The study of Russian native dissent is very superficial, and abbreviated to the point where it becomes unclear if not inaccurate (pp. 38 f.). It is surprising to see such men as Hertzen (1800-1870) and Karamzin (1766-1826) grouped together as "The Romantics of the end of the eighteenth century." On the other hand, the pictures of the various procurators of the Holy Synod are good and enlightening.

The real merit of the book, then, is to be found in its reflection of the official position of the restored Patriarchate. It views the history of the Church through its eyes and emphasizes the part in the ideological struggle between religion and Communism that the Church takes. It

cannot be regarded as a well-rounded study which will be of permanent value in making known to the Western religious world the real contributions of Russia to Christianity and the unification of the world. Yet it is easy reading and may well serve as an introduction to many who wish to have a rapid survey of the Russian Orthodox Church.

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Men and Movements in the American Episcopal Church. By E. CLOWES CHORLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. ix, 501 pp. $4.00.

As a matter of historical record no great Communion is ever free from tensions for very long. Modernism, fundamentalism, changing theological emphases, social programs of a provocative character are the issues making for a clash of opinion of a serious character in some of the large present day Christian Churches. The Protestant Episcopal Church is no exception. For well over one hundred years there has been serious divergence among the members of this Communion centering around the doctrine of the Church, some members taking a high view of the Church as an institution for the development of a full Christian experience, and others a low estimate. Hence the terms High Churchmen and Low Churchmen. The purpose of this volume by Dr. Chorley, the historiographer of the Church, is to trace the origin and development of this heated issue by the device of focusing interest on the men who assumed the leadership of the rival ecclesiastical parties, and by tracing the principles involved in the controversy largely through their published statements.

The title is thus too comprehensive, misleading, and somewhat disappointing. While the history of this century-old controversy is excellently presented and makes racy reading, it really only tells the story of conflicting views about the instrument which, through all this period, was performing the function for which as a Church it was created. It is not the story of the men and the missionary movement that carried the Church across the virgin continent and among far distant peoples, or of the Church's great experiment with constitutional Episcopacy, or of the social gospel in action, or of the significant part this Church has played in the development of modern ecumenicity. It is necessary to state this

lest the uninitiated reader form the conclusion that the energies of the Church were consumed in party strife. It is to be hoped that Dr. Chorley one day will use his historical talents to round out the picture.

The first few chapters of the book deal grimly with the sad quality of Church life in the post-revolutionary period, marked by such sterility and ineffectiveness as to call forth from Chief Justice Marshall "the belief that the Church in Virginia was too far gone to be revived." Deism within and neo-paganism without seemed to mark it for extinction. The turning-point for the better was a quiet revival of Evangelical religion finding leadership in Bishop Meade of Virginia, Bishop Lee of Delaware and such presbyters as Dr. Stephen Tyng of New York and Dr. Gregory Bedell. The distinguishing doctrines of this school were "the Scriptures as the only rule of faith; man, an utterly lost and helpless sinner; pardon, the direct gift of Christ; justification by faith without works; the Church as the blessed company of all faithful people; Episcopacy as having existed from apostolic times" (pp. 60, 61). The golden age of Evangelicalism was in the decade either side of 1840.

Dr. Chorley feels that the High Church tradition in the American Church really began early in the eighteenth century with the defection of a considerable portion of the Yale faculty from Congregationalism to Episcopacy, and that this tradition was fostered in Connecticut, especially by Bishop Seabury, where it was more or less a local matter until Bishop Hobart of New York brought it out of Connecticut into the larger life of the Church around 1820. He soon attracted to his cause a large number of bishops and presbyters whose interests centered in the institution of the Episcopate as guaranteeing a valid ministry, a doctrine which the Evangelicals set little store by. Receiving a great impetus from the publication of the Oxford tracts (1833-1841) this movement made steady progress in all sections of the Church, especially in the East, and in the region of Illinois and Wisconsin where Bishop Kemper, first missionary bishop and High Churchman, had prepared the soil. Meanwhile the area of controversy was progressively enlarged with the institution of more frequent services of Holy Communion, a claim for the Real Presence therein and its sacrificial character, the introduction of the altar in place of the communion table, the addition of vestments, ornaments, and ritual and a tendency in some quarters to repudiate the Reformation. The author's recapitulation of the movement from the beginning to the present is as follows: "In the process of time the High Churchman

became the Catholic; the early Catholic Movement has been merged with the Anglo-Catholic. The Anglo-Catholic group may be subdivided into three: the Conservative, the Pro-Roman, the Liberal Catholic" (p. 426).

Dr. Chorley seems to feel that the future of the party lies with the Liberal Catholics. Incidentally, in this connection, Bishop Gore, who is something of the patron saint of this numerous group, is quoted as giving rather an indirect testimony to the Reformation and the freedom won by it for the Church: "I could never endure to be otherwise than a free thinker. I mean by that that whatever obligation I may have inherited or contracted to any traditional system of belief or thought, I could never allow it to blind me to anything which might seem to be truth" (p. 249).

The bulk of the book is a well documented account of the resistance and friction generated by the conflict of ideas during the sixty years ending with the withdrawal from the Church of the Reformed Episcopalians in 1873 under Bishop Cummins. Because of the method chosen by the author of presenting the story by centering it in men with the consequent retracing of steps, the chronological sequence is not easy to follow. There is also much to regret in the paucity of the material in the section dealing with the Broad Church movement. Dr. Chorley's general conclusion that, as a result of the century of conflict, the two ecclesiastical parties with which the future seems to rest, the Liberal Catholics and the Liberal Evangelicals, are not as far apart as they were sixty years ago, will be largely accepted.

This volume is unquestionably the most thorough treatment of the subject published to date, and as such will be a permanent contribution to the literature on the life of the Episcopal Church. In its careful research, use of materials and endeavor toward impartiality it is a tribute to the author's historical skill.

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What Is Christian Civilization? By JOHN BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945. 59 pp. $1.00.

Do we possess a Christian civilization? Or, provided we have one, how can it be preserved? During the last three decades this crucial ques-

tion was the subject of all serious discussions concerning the basic problems of human existence. There are those who complacently bask in the conviction of their own complete Christianity, and there are others who positively deny Christian civilization to have come forth on earth at all; it may, perhaps, be called one of the most valuable assertions of the Barthian theology that there never was a Christian civilization nor ever will be one, in so far as it means an order of the general human life, grounded in and determined by the spirit of Christ and the fulfilment of his ethical commands.

It was a good idea of the author of this small book to choose the Christian civilization as the subject-matter of a special discussion in which he seems, by and large, to share the above opinion. He does not furnish a distinct statement of what Christian civilization is; nor does he discuss the question indicated by the title chosen, "What is Christian civilization?" The reader surely will excuse him, because of the impossibility of doing so in few pages. Through the entire book, however, we find the author deploring the disharmony between our civil and our religious civilization, and expressing his desire that the peoples be permeated with the Gospel and with a compatible civilization.

In his historical survey (Chapter I), Baillie says that, in the Middle Ages, the beginning of a new synthesis of Christianity and civilization and "the brave attempt to bring the whole of life under the control of Christian standards" resulted in "a Christian feudalism," because the structure of the previously existing society was not altered. Calvinism, he goes on, made a step forward by realizing a Christian socialism, through which "the nations most indebted to the Calvinist tradition have proved themselves the most resolute of the West." This, however, was a last attempt to search for Christian civilization; thus, the inference may be drawn that Christian civilization has never been achieved.

The second chapter deals with "the Christian attitude towards contemporary civilization." There was no more progress, Dr. Baillie argues —and I think he is right—because Christianity can not succeed if it accommodates itself to the distorted social system that was brought forth by the industrial revolution. Christianity cannot thrive within the "chill impersonality" of this new community, nor with the ever decreasing "opportunity of privacy and solitude." Nevertheless, he appears to acknowledge enough of Christendom among us to enable him to lay "the greatest stress on the distinction between the open Christian civili-

zation of the modern period and the compulsive and conscriptive civilization that preceded it."

What, then, is this "open Christian civilization of the modern period?" Are we to answer this question with the insight that "our Christianity" is no more than a façade, an outward profession of piety, camouflaging an essential worldliness? Probably not, for, Dr. Baillie, refusing this characterization of the present situation, asserts that, although we are not holding to the religious foundation of our moral practice, this latter one notwithstanding has "professed moral standards" endowed with a "conscience still recognizably Christian." It rather seems to me that the author in the same breath disproves his own contention, for, he defines this "Christian conscience" of ours as "the fact that we judge other men and nations . . . by norms of conduct which Christianity introduced into the world."

Truly speaking, I wish that we might not judge, but save whatever Christianity we have by not judging! Rather would I, more wholeheartedly than Dr. Baillie, raise my voice, and join him in raising his on behalf of the important role being played by those who prophetically warn against secularization. But Dr. Baillie, to avoid a decision concerning a crucial point, finds it justifiable to object to the prophetic element, in accordance with his attempts to diminish the personal factor in religion.

On the other hand, I hope that most readers of Chapter III ("The Future of the West") will agree with Dr. Baillie's rediscovery of metaphysics as the backbone of the Christian devotion which modern man strives after. He correctly states that Gilbert Murray's de-historized Christianity, purged from "mythology," actually evidences his, and many other peoples,' alienation from the true understanding of religion. In this connection, however, it would have served clarification if the position of Gilbert Murray, once mentioned, had been criticized more in detail. It gives us little satisfaction that the famous linguist's thesis is opposed by the definition that a myth "is a fanciful picture which attempts to find for ideals a background in reality," for, in most cases, it is not ideals that the myth is expressing but the transcendental reality itself, the most high truth itself, which appeared on the far horizon of human consideration and pondering. It would be very important, once for all, to destroy the false conception of the myth with which men like Murray are working with the effect of undermining Christian belief.

Myth, indeed, is a way of expressing the highest perceived reality beyond things and sensual happenings, as it is divined or conceived at a certain time, in terms of the popular world-view and metaphysics. For, not religion, as Eduard von Hartmann suggested, but the myth is folk-metaphysics, presented in a picturesque or narrative manner.

The author, therefore, is perfectly right in emphasizing that the present-day metaphysical hunger is a symptom that the world looks forward to a return to an affirmative religious belief. We may be permitted to add that the best remedy against a false nationalistic mythology is a biologically founded metaphysics, satisfying this hunger in a natural manner. Not only the single case of Professor Joad is a typical example of a belief based upon metaphysical training and the longing for divine grace; since 1931 I have observed among the students of the various faculties of German and Austrian universities the unhesitatingly expressed desire for metaphysical discussions. *If that desire had been satisfied, history would certainly have led to a different end.*

Although the author admits that our present civilization lags far behind what a Christian civilization would be, he speaks of a "historical permeation of our society by Christian ideas and ideals," calling this process a "development for which we must be profoundly thankful to the Lord of history." But, after all, he cannot prove that this process of permeation has been achieved in history, for by permeation we understand the effect of becoming thoroughly leavened; whereas, actually, we can not claim more than that, time and time again, such a leavening process has been aspired to. What, however, does such "historical permeation of our society by Christian ideas and ideals" mean? What is the relation of this process to the Christian civilization? We must conclude that the relation is a rather far-fetched one, since the author will hardly be inclined to regard Christian ideas and ideals as the standards establishing a Christian civilization, although, to be sure, he is so fond of those indistinct conceptions that he formulates even his principal proposal by saying "that if Christian ideas do not regain something of their former hold upon our national life, we shall sooner or later fall victims to such pagan ideas as have lately been resuscitated in Germany —and not in Germany alone."

Of course, in order to arrive at the Christian summit of civilization, we have to "regain," but certainly not "something," let alone "ideas and ideals." That "something," certainly never, never in all history,

was enough, and has, therefore, vanished. What we need, what our civilization requires, is, instead of ideas and ideals, the divine spirit, "the pledge and instalment of our common inheritance" (Ephes. 1:14), the spirit of Christ that comes with Grace, yet Grace not only in the sense of a remedial declaration or as the antidote against committed sins, but Grace taken in the Paulinian and Augustinian consummation of the notion, the spiritual energy by which the human race, if it is granted another span, can tread the way of its permanent ascent.

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Justice and the Social Order. By EMIL BRUNNER. Translated by MARY HOTTINGER. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. vi, 304 pp. $3.00.

Emil Brunner has written a second major book on Christian Ethics. The first, *The Divine Imperative,* has a good claim to be the best full length Protestant study of Christian Ethics written in our time. This volume is an important supplement to *The Divine Imperative,* because it fills gaps in that work and brings the discussion of contemporary issues up to date. Professor Brunner is the continental theologian who is best understood and most appreciated in this country. His mind is that of a mediator who tries to do justice to many points of view. On the European continent he is at present a very controversial figure who does not have the influence that has come in recent years to Karl Barth. He is too much of a mediating thinker to satisfy the thirst for absolute proclamations that is characteristic of the younger generation on the continent. This volume will not increase his influence among Protestants in Europe, because he deliberately avoids a Bible-centered approach to the problems of Christian Ethics. He is trying to develop a body of principles which, while they have for him a definite Christian sanction, can be understood in varying degrees by those who do not start with biblical presuppositions. This methodology serves to exaggerate the difference between Brunner and Barth.

Brunner believes that the moral principles which have been associated with Natural Law, and to the understanding of which non-Christian thinkers have made important contributions, can come to their own and be seen without serious one-sidedness and distortion only

under the influence of the Christian revelation, but he recognizes positive value in non-biblical ethical theory, both as a basis for co-operation between the Christian and the non-Christian and as a means of elaborating the Christian's own analysis of moral problems. It is in this elaboration of moral principles that this volume fills a gap in *The Divine Imperative,* which left the Christian standing under the commandment of love in the face of the concrete choice without such principles to guide him.

This volume is divided into two parts, the first a discussion of the basic theoretical issues, and the second a rather brief study of such areas of ethical application as the state, the family, the economic order, and international relations.

The basic concept in the whole volume is the concept of "justice." Brunner recognizes that the word, *Gerechtigkeit,* in the German title of the book and its biblical equivalents refer to what we call "righteousness" in the broadest sense. He limits the meaning of "justice" to the narrow sense of the just rendering to every man of his due. He also limits his consideration of justice to the structure and policies of institutions. Justice, in this sense, is a requirement of love, but it is also quite other than love and much less than love. Brunner affirms both the separateness of justice and love and the common ground of both in the will of God, but he does not seem to see the need of a more dynamic interaction between justice and love.

Brunner is illuminating in tracing the relation between justice and equality. He reveals here the hierarchical bias that is evident in *The Divine Imperative,* but most of what he says on this subject is in principle independent of that bias. He says that what we find in experience is a mixture of equality and inequality. Even if one attempts to act according to the principle of equality in dealing with a particular group, that must be done in such fashion as to take account of the differences that characterize that group as a whole. The safest example that Brunner gives of this is that children must have advantages as children. One reason that this is a safe example is that everyone at some time should share these advantages. All arguments for special advantages that are open to the members of all classes or races at a particular stage in life, or because of particular capacities or needs that are determined as matters of fact by some objective tests, are really arguments for equality. I doubt if Brunner really goes beyond this in his stress upon real differences of

need and function. He stresses the contribution of the Christian view of life in purging at least the conscience, and to some extent the practice of what has been Christendom from the acceptance of slavery and other wholesale inequalities that seemed rational to Aristotle, the great expert on the theory of justice. Even so simple a phenomenon as the queue in a theater cloakroom is, for Brunner, made possible by the message of the Bible. Apart from that message there would be classes of men who would have no rights in the queue.

Brunner frequently brings back his discussion to the one point that there is a blending of equality and inequality in the human situation which is ignored by a purely rationalistic conception of the rights of man, and which is missed by a conservative traditionalism that starts with things as they are. This blending can be seen from the Christian perspective if full account is taken of the faith that all men are made in God's image and are equal before God and if, at the same time, there is attention to the created order that does, as a matter of fact, include inequalities or differences. It is here that Brunner allows what he calls "natural feeling" to settle too many questions (see pp. 147 and 154). What we feel to be natural may not be the "order of creation." As a believer in the idea of the universality and pervasiveness of sin, Brunner needs to be on his guard against the readiness of all men to assume that they have a natural right to some advantages over others.

The same attention to the order of creation gives Brunner the clue to the proper relation between individualism and collectivism. He believes that there are individual rights that stand over against the claims of society, but he also believes in the essentially social nature of man. There is no "social contract." Rationalistic individualism and totalitarian collectivism both go far astray. Brunner makes the interesting admission that if the Christian had to choose between a consistent individualism and a consistent collectivism he should choose individualism. Fortunately, he does not have to make this choice.

It is difficult to summarize Brunner's discussion of particular social problems. He comes, as always, to a mediating position. He sees in the state both the most inclusive structure of the community and also, and primarily, the authority that has the right to use force to preserve order, the only authority that has power of life and death. He has what seems to me to be an exaggerated fear of the state as state, partly because he was living, when he wrote this book, in an oasis surrounded by totali-

tarian societies. He rightly stresses the orders of community that are prior to the state and rejects with great emphasis a positivistic conception of law that makes the state the ultimate authority in matters of justice. In the section on the family, he does not repeat his illuminating discussion of monogamy in *The Divine Imperative* but takes it for granted. Here, again, the hierarchical principle seems to me to be exaggerated. It may fit the European family more than the American family, which, at its best, knows a full sharing of authority by husband and wife of which this book knows nothing. Even in the patriarchial family the wife often finds ways of sharing the de facto authority. Brunner is right in his polemic against an abstract feminism that ignores the differences in the created order between the sexes, but, in discussing the family, he goes too far in identfying the created order with the family customs developed in a world dominated by a false conception of male supremacy both in the Church and in the community. In his discussion of the economic order, Brunner continues to follow the middle way toward a mixed economy. He is dominated by the fear of Communist totalitarianism. This makes his discussion here quite different from that in *The Divine Imperative,* where he was more interested in showing the evil of Capitalism. His chapter on the international order is an addition to his earlier book that is obviously necessary. He avoids the utopianism of the world state and the cynicism of those who believe that nothing can be done to prevent a third world war. This chapter is written by a citizen of a small power who believes in the special moral vulnerability of the great powers, but who still realizes that unity between the great powers is a primary necessity, and believes that it is possible that even the great powers may be wise enough to co-operate for the sake of peace and order, and that there may be among them a genuine concern for justice.

I have already hinted at several criticisms. I shall now deal with them more fully:

1. Brunner has an inadequate conception of the relation between love and justice. He separates them wholly, so far as the areas to which they apply are concerned. Love belongs to personal relations, and justice to institutions. He sees that justice and love make quite different demands. The pure love of *agape* has nothing to do with the *suum cuique* of justice, with the world of claims and counter claims. It does not ask

what a man's due is, but gives to men what they do not deserve. On the other hand, Brunner says over and over again that love must will justice, that a just order is a necessary institutional condition for all human welfare and, as such, from the motive of love the Christian should work for it. Also, he says clearly that both justice and love are grounded in the will of God. My chief criticism here is that institutions and impersonal relations are made better when ideas of justice are influenced by love. It is possible to love masses of men whom one has never seen, and to whom one must be related through institutions. This is not the love of personal affection, but it may be the love of *agape* that wills the real welfare of those persons and is willing to make sacrifices for them. If there were not minorities at least who were driven by this love for men to whom they are related impersonally, there would be even less of justice possible. The formula of justice, to each man his due, is in isolation an empty formula, and it requires the imagination and the sensitivity of love to discover that all children, for example, are due the means of health and education quite apart from the economic advantages of their parents. This is justice, but it is justice lifted by love.

2. Brunner's hierarchical bias comes out everywhere. It leads him to accept too uncritically the patriarchal view of the family, supported in this case by a Biblicism that he usually avoids. St. Paul's ideas are made absolute as the only true reading of the divine creation. The Swiss army, for example, becomes for him, along with the Christian family, an example of true community; we see the same bias in his dealing with universal suffrage. Brunner believes that a democratic society based upon the ultimate criticism and consent of the people is the best form of society where possible, but he doubts if it is possible in many places today. He regrets that democracy has been put over against totalitarianism as the one significant alternative. I think that he is right in this, and that there are various forms of law-respecting authoritarian states which would, at the moment, in some countries be better than either totalitarianism or attempts at democracy. But there is a ground for universal suffrage, and for the participation in government of those who seem to Brunner to be unfit for such a role. It is the fact that there is no one so unfit for political life that he doesn't know how a given policy affects him better, in some ways, than wiser men, with a higher place in the hierarchy, can know it.

3. Brunner's distrust of the state is partly the result of the development of totalitarianism, and partly of his rather negative theology of the state as chiefly the coercive authority made necessary by sin. Brunner does not do justice, so far as his emphasis is concerned, to the necessity of state action in view of the fact that our problems are now nation-wide and world-wide, and no smaller units are adequate for dealing with them. Nor does he explore the possibilities of pluralism within the structure of the state itself. He emphasizes federalism in the sense that each social unit, including the individual, retains rights as against the state, but there are possibilities of community action under the general auspices of the state which have more hope than anything which he sees in political life. The public school system in the United States, at its best, illustrates this kind of activity. The non-political public corporation, such as the British Broadcasting Company, is another example.

This distrust of the state causes Brunner to rule out socialism as an alternative open to the Christian. This involves an absolute judgment on the basis of a very limited experience with types of socialist organization. Brunner's chief fear, again, is directed against Russian Communism. Would he reject British socialism as, in effect, a forerunner of totalitarianism? I do not know what his attitude is now toward the Christian Democratic parties on the continent which are socialistic. Europe has already gone beyond Brunner's version of a mixed economy. Brunner adheres more rigorously than the Papal encyclicals to the rejection of socialism as a form of economic organization. I am not interested in arguing for or against socialism but I am arguing against any conception of Christian ethics that dogmatically denies that there can be a non-totalitarian form of socialism which would, in some circumstances, be the best alternative for the Christian.

All such criticisms are incidental to my appreciation of this book as a most helpful analysis of the problems of social justice, and as an attempt to develop ethical principles by which Christian love must be guided wherever social institutions are concerned. The presentation of a basis upon which Christians and non-Christians can collaborate is one feature of it which should be warmly welcomed.

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Stadiernas Teologi: En Kierkegaard-Studie. By VALTER LINDSTRÖM. Lund: Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1943. 370 pp. Kr. 8:50.

In the preface to this scholarly and well documented volume, the author modestly refers to his own "efforts" at entering into Kierkegaard's "world of thought." In the judgment of the present reviewer, Valter Lindström has succeeded in writing an illuminating exposition of the theological significance of the so-called levels or stages of human life, and the relationship and contrasts of the different spheres to the Christian stage. The book is written in a concise and intelligible style, and the clarity of the presentation should make it a helpful guide to the qualified reader who seeks to enter with discriminating appreciation into the Kierkegaardian literature.

At the outset and throughout the volume, Lindström places emphasis upon Kierkegaard's decisive conviction of the inescapability or inevitability of man's relationship to God. All men stand in relation to the omnipresent, invisible, and omnipotently sovereign Absolute. As the creation of God, man's life is altogether under the power of God. The Eternal ceaselessly declares, "Thou shalt," thereby excluding all possibility of self-sufficiency in man, who must always stand with "fear and trembling" before God. Efforts to find proofs for God's existence must be ruled out: "It would never occur to anyone to prove that God exists if he had not previously ignored Him" (p. 41). Kierkegaard's anthropology is examined in the light of these basic views. Lindström takes special pains to stress the essential divergence of Kierkegaard from the idealistic philosophy whose anthropological terminology he has largely used. Man's absolute self and the interpretation of spirit as the image of God must not be interpreted to mean the identity of man's being with God (pp. 113-14, 221-23). Neither may any such conclusion be drawn from Kierkegaard's recognition of similarity between man's eternal validity and the immortality of the soul (p. 54). Kierkegaard sharply criticizes the efforts to find proofs for the truth of immortality (pp. 55, 121). Man's absolute self, i.e., the self in its eternal validity, may be characterized as "God's individually determined creative will for every man" (p. 57). Man as absolute does not have to search for God's will in some "general norms which are valid for all men but in God's special meaning" or purpose for himself as a creation of God (p. 61). Simultaneously however with the recognition of his eternal validity, man inevitably discovers that the absolute validity is not realized in his life, and it

therefore confronts him as "judgment and demand" (p. 62). In the context of this thought, it may be of special interest to note that Lindström rejects the charge that Kierkegaard's "total view" (p. 34) ascetically represents sin as necessarily involved in the finitude of temporal existence (cf. pp. 64-65, 85, 89, 136, 144, 191-93, 290, 308-09).

In choosing the absolute self, man is also choosing the good, which is identified with the absolute self. The good accordingly possesses the concrete and individual character of the eternally valid self, and is determined not abstractly but with reference to the specific situation of every man. It is only before God, his Creator, that man can learn what the good is. And, simultaneously, that which God excludes as evil, since it contradicts His Will, must necessarily become evident (pp. 66-67). It involves no unfavorable reflection upon Lindström's fine exposition to observe that many seriously-minded readers may justifiably desire to know more concerning the specific character of the concrete good than Kierkegaard has indicated (cf. p. 298).

When man chooses the absolute self, he is also choosing freedom. Freedom, like the good, has the concrete character of the absolute self (p. 67) and consists in man's responsible relationship as spirit to the will of God (pp. 68; 354). Contrary to the Hegelian thought, Kierkegaard makes use of the old trichotomy regarding man as body, soul, and spirit (p. 73): man is a "synthesis of body and soul borne by spirit" (p. 74). Man's determination as spirit includes his simultaneous being as body and soul. It is through the spirit that man finally stands in responsible relationship to his Creator (p. 75). Although man lives in a temporal succession, the past, present, or future instant which is marked by eternity confronts him with the will of God which must rule and shape his life (p. 82). Through the category of the ineradicable instant as the reflex of the eternal in time, man as a temporal being receives the impact of the eternal (p. 83). The fact of the presence of the eternal, which is prerequisite for man's despair, is not dependent upon man's conscious recognition of that fact. Not to be consciously aware of one's despair is also a form of despair (pp. 96, 212-13). "The existence of the God-relationship is not made dependent upon whether man is conscious of it or not. . . . But on the other hand the role of consciousness is not discounted. According to Kierkegaard's interpretation, it is included within man's God-given mission that he shall be conscious of his God-relationship" (pp. 99-100). This simultaneously implies that he shall be conscious of his own char-

acter as spirit and self (p. 100). It is man's defective will which is to blame for his lack of consciousness of himself as spirit and for his sin in not allowing the spirit to break through (p. 100). Lindström emphasizes the dominating influence of the personal, ethical, and voluntaristic aspect in Kierkegaard's anthropology, involved as it is in an inescapable relationship with God's creative will (p. 115). "In conscience God has the power. . . . Through conscience man is God's captive . . . (p. 117). "The Eternal takes hold of him on all sides" (p. 268).

Kierkegaard accuses his contemporaries of substituting society or the race for the definitely Christian category of the specific individual standing before God. To stand as an individual before God is higher than to be related to the race, or to be related to God through the race (pp. 120-21, 226-28, 244, 253, 255). The substitution of the race for the individual has injured the belief in personal immortality wherein man standing before God must answer to God for his deeds. It has resulted in a falsified Christology, affirming not the Christian faith that Christ is the unity of God and one individual person but, instead, that Christ symbolizes the unity of God and humanity abstractly interpreted, thus incarnating the supposed divine essence of the human race.

Chapter Three is a discussion of the general revelation of God as the inescapable One. The omnipresent God confronts the conscience of the ethical man with His Word through the world of nature. All creation is a sermon telling us that God rules and exhorting us to let God rule (p. 137). After a brief review of the development of the schematic arrangement of the different spheres of existence in Kierkegaard's thinking, Lindström discusses, in Chapter Four, the relationship between the subjective and the objective in Kierkegaard's interpretation of Christianity, and considers also the pedagogical purposes which, according to Kierkegaard, are served by the account of the stages of human life. How Kierkegaard arrived at the use of the concept of the esthetic, the decisive characteristics of the esthetic stage, and the reasons for interpreting the Hegelian system as an expression of the esthetic point of view, are the principal subjects examined in Chapter Five. Chapter Six presents the ethical as paradox identified with the general revelation, and includes observations on the relation between individual and social ethics. Lindström defends Kierkegaard against the charge that his emphasis upon the individual jeopardizes or cancels social ethics (cf. pp. 58-60, 125-26, 137-38, 245-46, 251-52, 254, 279-80, 339-42, 349).

The essential character of the religious sphere known as A is compared with the ethical stage, and is described in Chapter Seven as consisting in suffering, which in its highest expression rises to the consciousness of one's absolute guilt before God. This consciousness of total guilt indicates the greatest existential depth which is possible within the type of immanental religiousness known as A (pp. 290-91). The fact of universal guilt does not, however, do away with man's theoretically inexplicable freedom. The Christian sphere of existence known as B is characterized by faith in Christ, who is the absolute paradox. This necessarily leads, in Chapter Eight, to a discussion of the paradox of the forgiveness of sins and of man as a new creation, and also of Christianity as invisible and passionate inwardness and discipleship. The final chapter deals with the problem of coming to a decision concerning the regulative principle of the series of the stages.

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The Trinity and Christian Devotion. By CHARLES W. LOWRY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946. xviii, 162 pp. $1.50.

This book, which was written by Dr. Lowry in response to an invitation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, was selected for 1946 Lenten reading jointly by the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Its purpose is "to study a particular Christian doctrine, the doctrine of the Trinity, in relation to the life of devotion." What is here given, then, is not the widest philosophical, free formulation of the meaning of the concept of God as Trinity in Unity; nor is it the Augustinian "enigma" of Roman Catholic emphasis. Dr. Lowry's explanation falls somewhere between these two. It is an honest and scholarly, but not altogether unsectarian, attempt to illuminate a doctrine which was not, in its origins, meant to be enigmatic. The doctrine of the Trinity was, rather, designed to be an essential, understandable teaching about the nature of God. Dr. Lowry presents it as the Council of Nicaea clarified its meaning, as Athanasius tried and held true its choicest values, as it was incorporated into the body of Christian doctrine, and as it has been further elucidated and expounded by the Articles of Religion of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Church of England.

Against the doctrines of the Arians, Athanasius offered the opposed view that "the Word was of the very essence or being of the Father" (and not a baser substitute, as Arius claimed), ". . . that God Himself, the Being of beings, had entered into human history in a human form." This Athanasius upheld, in opposition to the Arian heresy, which contended that human nature was too poor a thing to harbor divinity. Athanasius, indeed, insisting through years of bitter and dangerous controversy, on the "true incarnation," was contending for the dignity of man, more than for the condescension of God.

Dr. Lowry states that the Christian religion is, in the first instance, a story or epic. "It is the narrative of the acts and words of God to men, performed and uttered with a view to disclosing His Divine nature and will and to rescuing and putting back on the right track the special object of his love—the race of men." Christianity, in the second place, is a body of doctrine. In the third, it is a world view. As story, it is recorded in the Bible. As a body of doctrine, it shows forth a varied scope: it is teaching (to be taught); it is a formulated dogma (to be accepted and elucidated, rather than continuously subjected to new questioning and judgment); it has its own precise, linguistic expressions. By these means it asserts that "the one, living, and true God . . . is a Trinity of persons, . . . faces, or media of manifestation, or centers of consciousness, . . . within a fundamental and absolute unity of being, consciousness, and will." As the First Person, God the Father, He is transcendent, the Source of all Being. As the Second Person, God the Son, or Jesus Christ, the Word, He is the immanent manifestation of the rationality of the world and also its channel of communion with the transcendent Father: affirmation that "the human intellect, as well as the human will, has a divine quality, . . . and is *in little*, like the mind of God." As the Holy Spirit, the Third Person, "both as Spirit and as Love, He is in a special manner the content of Deity, or, as Augustine liked to say, the vinculum or bond uniting the Father and the Son."

Thus Dr. Lowry recalls to our minds the story or epic of the Trinity, and follows that by his explanation of the doctrine in its relation to worship. In treating of what he calls the third phase or stage, Christianity as a philosophy or world view, the author is less effective. The reason for this, no doubt, is that, being forced to choose between a philosophical exegesis and the presentation of an analysis fit for Lenten reading and devotions, he chose the latter. Under the circumstances, very prop-

erly so, only, we cannot have our cake and eat it. There is far more in Athanasius and his opposition to the Arian teachings than comes out in this Lenten instruction: there is a whole philosophy of man in his relation to God.

By a strange indifference, or miscarriage of religious instruction, a very small percent of the members and clergy of the Protestant Christian churches have any but the vaguest idea of the meaning of this central doctrine of their faith, the Doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine is not mere verbiage, nor is it remote abstraction. It has emerged out of centuries of human experience and discriminating human thought at its best. It is well that Christians understand this doctrine. Protestantism, at the source, takes it as *to be understood.* Therefore, such volumes as this of Dr. Lowry should be hailed with acclaim. The author, Rector of All Saint's Church, Chevy Chase, Washington, D. C., a practical minister of the gospel, has known how to keep his book at all times readable. It is not only the Protestant Episcopal Church of America and the Church of England who owe him a vote of thanks, and a reading. All Christians are to some degree in his debt.

Cornelia LeBoutillier

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The Creative Mind. By Henri Bergson. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. 307 pp. $2.75.

The Creative Mind is a book of essays published in France some twelve years ago under the title of *La Pensée et le mouvant.* It revolves about the nature of philosophic method, and includes tributes to Claude Bernard, the physiologist, to William James, and to Ravaisson, one of Bergson's philosopher-fathers. The essays, written between 1903 and 1923, were, with two exceptions, originally published in journals or as prefaces to books, but up till now only one of them, "An Introduction to Metaphysics," has been translated into English. None of the major ideas in *The Creative Mind* are new to readers of Bergson's earlier works. It will not pacify his enemies or anger his friends, though it should interest both them and the neutrals of a later generation.

In his youth, Bergson says, he was a follower of Spencer, because Spencer had a genuine concern for facts. But Spencer's theory, like that of

most other philosophers, is robbed of life by a practical but specious conception of time. Time is really the unique, indescribable inner life that all of us experience. Yet we have come to regard time as uniform and decomposable into moments, each one of which mechanically determines the next. We suppose that if we knew the present well enough, we could predict the future, and, after an event has taken place, we always look back for its antecedents that brought it into being. We refuse to see that the present, though it includes and continues the past, is originating, creative, something more than a sum total of past events.

To know the true time within ourselves, we need direct vision, unrefracted by the prisms of language or habit. "Intuition" is probably the best name for this intimate insight. Once we learn how to exercise it, the phantom problems of metaphysics will disappear, the problem of what the first cause could have been, or of why the world is coherent. We imagine a primitive void to which something was added, and a disorder that submitted to order. But absolute nothingness and absolute disorder are mirages of ideas, indicating only that we are not able to find what we are looking for.

To the extent that we distend our will, try to reabsorb our thought into it and get into greater sympathy with the effort which engenders things, these formidable problems recede, diminish, disappear. For we feel that a divinely created will or thought is too full of itself, in the immensity of its reality, to have the slightest idea of a lack of order or lack of being.

Bergson very emphatically denies that he is anti-scientific. Science is not relative, because the articulations of intellect are modeled on the articulations of matter. There is no difference of value between science and metaphysics, and the two, properly understood, will fecundate one another. It is only that science is by nature incapable of recognizing the spirit, for it is a tool to help us control matter.

Bergson also denies that his philosophy leads to mental inertia, an accusation made against him by Santayana and others. He says that we should repudiate facility in thinking, and court difficulty. Intuition is not instinct or feeling; it is reflection, tension, concentration. Each problem must be attacked separately, with complete reverence for facts, and slowly we shall build up a metaphysics as cumulative and correct within its own sphere as science within the sphere of dead nature. If we make the effort vigorously enough, "we shall have greater strength, for we shall feel we are participating, creators of ourselves, in the great work of

creation which is the origin of all things and which goes on before our eyes. By getting hold of itself, our faculty for acting will become intensified."

When Bergson died, in 1941, his unfinished manuscripts were destroyed, as he had asked. Judging by remarks he had made to his friend Benrubi, he had not been able to do much literary work in his last few years, and we may assume that Bergson's record lies before us substantially complete.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a highly mechanistic attitude was common among scientists and philosophers. Absolute idealism was even more widespread among the latter, and, in its familiar Hegelian form, it wandered at times in a cloudland of its own, into which facts were admitted only when they agreed to conform themselves to theories. As for Kant, he led too often into a baffling scepticism. In these surroundings, Bergson's philosophy was persuasive. It was hostile to the great abstract systems, respectful toward facts, described experience appealingly, and encouraged a kind of religious, optimistic attitude.

Crude mechanism and Procrustean absolute idealism no longer have any vogue, and Bergson read today has the air of fighting an old battle. In a way, he has won some of his objectives. But if science has become less mechanistic in the sense he particularly disliked, the change has taken place as an internal development, with little if any influence from non-scientists; and vitalism in biology has lost ground.

Bergson thought that his philosophy would give us important new insights. He wrote about duration and about the nature of discovery, both of which he believed he had in a measure discovered, but he hardly made any other discoveries. He said that philosophy on his plan would be cumulative. So far there has been no cumulation, only, on his own part, a conscientious reworking of an old point of view, to which the French Spiritualists had given a more dynamic form.[1] He believed that intuitionism would make people more thankful, optimistic, loving, and creative, than any other philosophy. This is obviously questionable, and cannot be decided on theoretical grounds alone. No one has even begun to prove that Bergsonians are superior in loving-kindness or invention or artistry to non-Bergsonians.

1. Bergson's theory of "duration" is, incidentally, very like the theory of one of the schools of Buddhist philosophy.

Bergson admired the music of Debussy. He was receptive to the idea that his philosophy, like Debussy's music, was an effort to draw the contours of our subtly variable inner experience. Bergson's writing has a fluid, musical movement; he tries to convince more by imagery than by abstract reasoning. He is not impressive for sheer reasoning, which, according to him, is not able to lead us to spiritual truth. He is impressive for honesty, shown when he refused to adopt arguments that would have been helpful to him; for conscientiousness—he studied a problem thoroughly before he drew conclusions; and for his picture of the flow of our lives. He is a prose artist and a poetic image-maker. He is a good metaphysician, too, if we mean by that someone who helps the world take on a fresh poetic aspect.

BEN-AMI SCHARFSTEIN

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BOOK NOTES

Prayer: The Compulsive Word. By Gladys A. Reichard. (Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, VII) New York, J. J. Augustin, 1945. x, 97 pp. 25 figures. $2.00.

Professor Reichard has for many years been an assiduous visitor to the Navaho peoples in the southwest United States, and has contributed many excellent monographs and articles based on her field trips. The present study, which adds to these, describes and interprets the Navaho world of prayer. A chapter is devoted to each of these topics, Function, Content, and Structure, of the prayers; and a chapter to "Explanation and text of a Prayer from the Male Shooting Chant Evil-chasing." The Navaho, we are told, conceive the world as an entity in which the strands intercross and no aspect can be separated from any other. Even opposites are interlinked. Good is good, and evil is evil; but evil is merely something not yet made good.

The main objective of Navaho prayer is to ward off threatening evil—usually a specific one, it seems—or to convert a present evil into good. The prayer is embodied in a specific form of words, chanted by a priest, or chanter, at a specific time and place and for the benefit of a specific person who is "prayed over."

Navaho prayers, and those of Pueblo Indians in this culture area, are rhythmic and repetitious of word and phrase, as in the appeal to Holy Man:

> "With your strong feet rise up to protect me,
> With your sturdy legs rise up to protect me,
> With your strong body rise up to protect me,"

and so on. Then, as though to assure fulfillment of these wishes, the prayer passes from appeal to declaration: ". . . you will protect me . . . evils will pass me. . . . This day I shall recover," and so on. By much importunity, in proper statement, does the chanter ensure the success of the prayer. Thus, it seems, in a continuous recital, prayer becomes spell; the chanter becomes an enchanter.

Prayer: The Compulsive Word is a valuable addition to our knowledge of Navaho ritual and belief, and a considerable addition to the comparative study of the prayers of primitive folk. Who does not envy the Navaho's appeal and conviction:

> "Surely this day happily I go about, I say.
> May it be beautiful before me,
> May it be beautiful behind me,
> May it be beautiful under me,
> May it be beautiful above me,
> May all be beautiful around me,
> May my speech be controlled,
> Restoration-to-youth According-to-beauty I have become, I say.
> May all these things be so."

Wilson D. Wallis

The Third Day. By ARNOLD LUNN. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Book Shop, 1945. xliii, 177 pp. $2.75.

In this book, Mr. Lunn, an enthusiastic convert to Roman Catholicism, sets forth a defence of the faith that is in him. As the title indicates, the central theme is the resurrection of Jesus, but Mr. Lunn touches on all manner of other subjects as well: papal infallibility, the miracles at Lourdes, Christian Science, spiritualism, evolution, and biblical criticism—especially biblical criticism. This Mr. Lunn rejects root and branch, maintaining with all his might the Johannine authorship and the absolutely historic character of the Fourth Gospel. The Johannine authorship is defended particularly by an appeal to what Irenaeus says about Polycarp. The historic character is defended by an appeal to the naturalness of the narrative; no "forger," he claims, could give so convincing an impression of the truth of the facts narrated.

Mr. Lunn is a master of lucid English, and he writes with passionate sincerity. None the less, readers, including even those who accept his central theme, will wish that he had familiarized himself somewhat more with the literature on his topics. As regards the Fourth Gospel, for instance, the "seamless robe" figure of Strauss is not the final word on the unity of the work. The appeal to George Salmon and William Sanday overlooks the fact that both of these scholars in later years held very different opinions. Most of us will continue to believe that the story of the woman taken in adultery is no part of the Gospel at all. And the narrative of the healing of the man born blind, to which Mr. Lunn devotes much space, contains, as he does not realize, a glaring anachronism when it concludes with "they put him out of the synagogue." This treatment of Christions by Jews in Palestine did not originate until the last decade of the first century.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

The Sarcophagi of Ravenna. By MARION LAWRENCE. New York: College Art Association (Study No. 2), 1945. 66 pp. 26 Plates. $2.50 .

The monograph by Professor Lawrence is the fourth in a series on early Christian sarcophagi, a series started in 1927 with *The City-Gate Sarcophagi.* A fifth is promised, which will deal with the late sarcophagi in Gaul, and will bring the whole problem down to Merovingian times.

A dual purpose is evident in *The Sarcophagi of Ravenna,* i.e., to give as accurate as possible a description of the forty sarcophagi still extant in Ravenna or traceable to that city, and to classify and date them from internal evidence and stylistic comparison, in the absence of almost any external evidence. Not that this task has been neglected by former scholars; but in the face of almost complete disagreement by everybody on everything, Professor Lawrence feels justified in taking up the question and building up from scratch, while giving an admirable account (in 296 copious footnotes) of the labor and opinions of her predecessors.

The study starts by collecting the features which set apart the sarcophagi of Ravenna from almost all others found in the West: carving on all four sides; uniform architectural treatment; a semi-cyclindrical lid suggesting a barrel vault; two new types—a "lintel type" and a "panel type"; fewer figures on these lintels, mostly three to five, against thirteen to twenty on the earlier frieze and columnar sarcophagi; no narratives: instead, dogmatic and symbolic themes confined to the smallest number of actors possible, a flat back wall without spatial setting, and ultimately the substitution of purely symbolic motives such as lambs, peacocks, and crosses for even the last few remaining persons.

To determine the origin and establish a sequence, the sarcophagi are divided into two classes: the figured and the symbolic ones. Each group is accorded the same treatment: description, iconography, ornament, and the conclusion which sums up, classifies, and sets the group into the historic sequence. Two charts, one for the main figure motives, and the second for the symbolic details conclude the study, providing the eye with the well-known satisfaction of quick visualization.

However, in spite of the exceptional care taken in "fingerprinting" every single member of the family; despite the formidable scholarship in tracing every motive to its parallels, past or future, and despite many valuable single observations, the sarcophagi of Ravenna do not seem to come to life. The division into figured and symbolic ones is unworkable, as the figured ones show exactly the same symbols on their backs and ends as the purely symbolic ones. As a matter of fact, the sarcophagus of Theodore (Fig. 6), which, for stylistic reasons, figures so prominently among the figured sarcophagi, has only symbolic carvings on all four sides. The establishment of a "Rinaldo workshop" remains unconvincing as the stylistic differences among its members seem enormous, their parallels confined to minor details like capitals or draperies, the main points of resemblance (fewer figures, the empty background, the semi-cylindrical lid) common to all Ravennate examples illustrated. The very uniqueness and type of the sarcophagi of Ravenna, so evident to the observer, remains fundamentally unexplained.

What was to be expected in a monograph on the sarcophagi of Ravenna was the correlation, in detail, of the undated sarcophagi with the datable monuments of Ravenna, especially the mosaics; a study of the Arian heresy (which came to power in Ravenna with the Goths) and its influence on Christian iconography; a discussion of workshop conditions in Ravenna, where not only the bishops were foreigners, but also the mosaicists, the stone-masons, and their stone; a more than casual reference to the tempestuous history of Ravenna in the time of our sarcophagi, with its formidable protagonists, who brought all sorts of ideas, fashions, and people to Ravenna. These died there and were buried after the ways of their forefathers, in the rites of their churches, and in a tomb reminiscent of home. More even than in their houses and community temples will the spirit of nations reveal itself in their graves, in whose forms and ornaments they will show the hopes which they hold out for their eternal abode.

HELENE KAUDER

Physics and Philosophy: A Study of Saint Thomas' Commentary on the Eight Books of Aristotle's Physics. By JAMES A. MCWILLIAMS, S. J. (Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. II.) Washington, D. C.: The American Catholic Philosophical Association. 1945. viii, 143 pp. Paper, $2.00; cloth, $2.50.

Work upon the rather unexplored territory of St. Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle is highly desirable for a variety of reasons, but, more especially, as an investigation into one phase of cultural transformation and the history of ideas, and also for the possible light to be cast upon the methods and philosophy of St. Thomas and the use which St. Thomas made of the text of Aristotle. Unfortunately, though *Physics and Philosophy* calls itself "A Study of St. Thomas' Commentary," its claim to that title is not quite justified.

It is difficult to see how the term "Study" can be applied to a book of some 140 pages of text in which 27 pages are given to an introduction which inaccurately and impressionistically roams over the field of Physics; 21 pages to a translation of part of one book, the third, of St. Thomas' Commentary; 68 to a summary of the entire Commentary, in which summary there is neither historical nor analytical scrutiny nor historical elucidation of terms and arguments for the modern reader, and in which the shifts and distinctions between St. Thomas' *Commentary* and Aristotle's *Physics* are not at all brought out; and 8 pages are given to what is called an analysis of Aristotle's Physics, but is merely a summary restatement of Aristotelian propositions and terms, with again no examination of meanings and contexts. Certainly, the actual text of St. Thomas' commentary is hardly touched upon, and the reader must emerge without much more knowledge of it than he began with, and with a great deal of misinformation besides. Witness Father McWilliams on Aristotle and the void, in which hypothetical statements of impossible consequents are converted into categorical assertions, by which mechanism Newton and Aristotle are rendered identical; or, again, by the treatment of inertia illustrated by the famous example of the projectile and the air. And the Aristotelian and the Newtonian terms are used interchangeably, as if the frame of reference and the meaning were the same for both.

Indeed, the intention of the book is altogether unclear. It is obvious that it is not a study of St. Thomas' *Commentary*. Nor is it clear whether it is intended for expert or for student; examination seems to show that it is intended for neither. For the expert, mere assertion and verbal citation *and juxtaposition* will not do; for the student, mere summary of unfamiliar terms without elucidation must be unintelligible. What other possible audience it was intended for the book does not hint.

The introduction seems to suggest that basically the purpose is to make a rapport between Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Descartes and Newton, as if there were a continuous thread of true and explicit doctrine in the field of Physics, with St. Thomas supplying the link between ancient and modern. But the attempt is not explicitly expressed: the procedure is wholly confused and unsatisfactory, consisting in arbitrary identifications and manipulations of terms

and arguments. Historical, analytical, and verbal contexts are ignored or too sketchily treated. No single concept or idea is at all clearly and adequately defined, or traced in its historical relations. Such expressions as momentum, inertia, mass, are arbitrarily introduced and interchangeably used. Aesthetic and quite impressionistic claims as to the superiority of St. Thomas' *Commentary* over Aristotle's *Physics* are made, but the lack of definition and strict reference and attention to backgrounds make such claims superrogatory.

No service is done to the thought of St. Thomas by this book. If its aim is to make him an anticipator of modern doctrines, or even to make his teaching identical with contemporary teaching in Physics (at least in principle), then he must become a mere historical curiosity—what need to learn his language when our own serves the same purpose—and surely the thought of St. Thomas, even in Physics, has more importance for us than that. If the aim is to make him otherwise intelligible and important, the book is so opaque a medium to the actual thought and meaning of St. Thomas' work that either St. Thomas' thought will be confused with the contents of Father McWilliam's book and so dismissed, or else the attempt to penetrate to the meaning of his ideas will be given up as a bad job.

LINCOLN REIS

The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. By MAURICE J. GRAJEWSKI, O.F.M. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. xv, 211 pp. $2.25.

The reputation of Duns Scotus as *doctor subtilis* rests in large part upon the extraordinary intricacy of conceptual and terminological distinctions which he introduced into scholastic discussions. Few modern students possess the patience required to master this complicated language in a degree sufficient for appreciating the coherence, power, and richness of the philosophy of which it is the instrument, or for recognizing how close this philosophy is, in its essential principles and method, to the aims and procedures of contemporary philosophical inquiries.

Father Grajewski's dissertation is a conscientious and well documented study of the famous Scotist "formal distinction." The treatment is doctrinal rather than historical, and presupposes considerable familiarity with the technical formulations of the scholastic commentators and textbook writers of the past four centuries. In Part I of his study, the author examines and rejects the claims that the Scotist distinction is reducible either to the "real distinction" or to the "virtual distinction." In Part II, he develops a precise determination of the nature of the formal distinction, in terms of Scotus' concepts of diverse types of identity and difference, and through a comparison of various earlier formulations of similar "neither real nor logical" distinctions. The third part of the study exhibits the applications of the formal distinction to the main problems of metaphysics, psychology, and theodicy, and its intimate connection with the

Scotist concepts of *natura absoluta, haecceitas,* and of the univocity of the concept of being.

The treatment is thorough, and apparently dominated by the essentially sound principle that the philosophy of Duns Scotus is neither an elaboration nor a corruption of Thomism, but a coherent philosophy that stands on its own feet. A consideration of the foundations of Scotus' thought, and of his basic conception of the end and method of philosophy, would have helped to make more intelligible and significant the detailed discussions to which this dissertation is restricted. In this connection, it is surprising that the extensive bibliography contains no mention of Gilson's penetrating study in the *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Age,* Vol. II, on "Avicenne et le point du départ de Duns Scot."

ERNEST A. MOODY

We Shall Rebuild. By GEORGE MACLEOD. Philadelphia: Kirkridge, 1945. 140 pp. 60 cents.

Dr. MacLeod's book is a vivid, but not too objective, description of the attempt being made by some Protestant Scotsmen to bring the Church nearer the life of our age. The book concerns itself with the history and purposes of the Iona Community—a small experiment in social reconstruction based upon the power of worship and an incarnation theology.

The movement was started in 1938 by George MacLeod as a reaction to the "watered-down theology of the Modernists" and the rapidly widening gulf between the religion of Jesus and the daily life of both ministers and laymen. MacLeod wished to bring together a group of clerics and workers under a "rule" that would, in some real sense, indicate and make strong their spiritual and economic interdependence. For three months each summer, the nucleus of the Community gathers at Iona, a small west coast island, to engage in manual labor (rebuilding the Abbey of St. Columba), worship, and study of new methods for presenting the Gospel of Christ to the modern generation. During the winter months, cell-groups meet in the various factory towns to carry out the aims and purposes evolved at Iona.

In many ways this Community is a further example of the increased emphasis upon a supernatural theology that can be found among the reformed churches on the continent. However, it does not, as so many do, spend itself in erudite and often obscurantist debate, but rather attempts to put into actual practice the religion it claims to find in the New Testament. In fact, one gets the impression that the group is much more interested in the life of devoted religious social service than in a rational interpretation of their faith. They decry the nineteenth century attempt at "intellectual evangelism," and substitute for it an evangelism of prayer not unlike certain aspects of the Wesleyan Revival.

The Iona Community is an interesting experiment, and it, as well as its American imitators, may have significant social and religious implications.

JOHN R. EVERETT

Education and the Faith of America. Brooklyn, New York: The Packer Collegiate Institute, 1945. 77 pp.

In the spring of 1945, the Packer Collegiate Institute of Brooklyn sponsored a conference on "Education and the Faith of America" as a part of its centennial celebration. The four addresses given at that conference (by Ralph H. Gabriel, Frank D. Ashburn, Mary Ely Lyman, and Willard L. Sperry) and three addresses given on other occasions during the celebration (by Luther A. Weigle, Paul D. Shafer, and Alan Valentine) make up this volume.

The general concern of these addresses is with the responsibility of schools and colleges for developing moral character in their students, and with the relation of our religious traditions to character education. All are practical rather than theoretical by intent, and their most general common proposal is that educators take more positive account of our religious traditions.

Professor Gabriel's address on "Our Spiritual Heritage" is concerned with American democracy as a set of ideals which, a century ago, were generally accepted by Americans as standards of action. These "moral and religious foundations of American life" are: (1) the fundamental moral law, (2) free and responsible individuals, equal before the law, (3) the hope of progress, and (4) America's national destiny as exemplar of democracy. Professor Gabriel finds the sources of these ideas and attitudes in the conditions of life on the American frontier, and in the traditions exemplified by the Puritans, the Quakers, and the Enlightenment. The essay is written with warm feeling for the kind of faith he describes, and with a strong sense that Americans need to recommit themselves to this spiritual heritage.

Dean Lyman's address on "The Training of Americans" begins by describing the need for character to sustain the sacrifices required by democracy.

> We need people who have the stuff in them to make them act for social cohesion in the family, the community, the state, and the world; to act for that social cohesion even when this common good cuts across their personal, immediate satisfactions; to act without compulsion for that common good; to give what it costs freely and with a sacrificial ardor. Here is the challenge of our time to our educational system.

This kind of character can be created and sustained, she believes, only by a dynamic and fearless kind of religion. Therefore colleges should be concerned to nurture this kind of religion. She suggests that a college can implement such a concern by courses for the study of religion, by specifically religious campus activities, and by a religious motivation pervading the college community as a whole.

To this reviewer there seems a more important difference between the study of religion and college religious activities than Dean Lyman makes explicit. It is not the essential business of courses in religion to elicit religious commitments. In this respect there is, or should be, a clear distinction between a course in religion and a religious organization on a college campus.

Dean Sperry's address on "The New Need for the Old Faith" is urbane and suggestive. It is urbane in that it is directed to a sophisticated state of mind,

which it also reflects. We have begun, he says, "a reflective reconquest and repossession" of our heritage as Americans. This is being done in our literature, painting, and music. But we have not yet adequately reviewed and reinterpreted and repossessed our religious tradition. In our modern reaction against it, we are in danger of throwing out its moral idealism along with the letter of its theology. Schools and colleges, as well as churches and homes, have a responsibility for reappropriating our religious heritage.

The Dean's point about the lag in our understanding of our religious roots is timely and well taken. If we are to grow from these roots, such understanding is needed both by liberals, to whom he is talking, and by conservatives, whose strength he tends to underestimate, though for somewhat different reasons.

One note might have been more clearly sounded in these addresses. That is the importance of nurturing the spirit of inquiry in religion. This is obviously connected with the problem of religion in American education. So long as our religious traditions are conceived as final answers to the problems of religious thought, rather than creative suggestions in the course of an inquiry, so long will many of the more vigorous minds on faculties and in student bodies feel that the educational values of these traditions are dubious. No meeting is very interesting unless there is some important "new business" on the agenda.

WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN

Christianity in Crisis. By ERIC MONTIZAMBERT. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1945. xi, 224 pp. $2.00.

The Canon of Grace Cathedral, San Francisco, draws on his experience as a former University Pastor in presenting the Christian faith in a form suitable for integration into the mental patterns of thinking men. This oft-attempted task he discharges only partially, despite his homiletic gifts, by reason of a certain looseness of organization, sometimes nearly approaching non sequitur. His thesis is that "philosophical theology is a scientific synthesis of the values unearthed by the combined intellectual ventures of man," and that such a synthesis can be based upon the historic creed of the Church. He deals critically and sanely with the Bible, the historical events referred to by the creeds of the Church, their relevance to individual orientation, and their social implications. The man is well-read, and his prose moves. It is a pity that his lucid, though too brief, discussion of *mythos* did not commit him to a decision as to whether the creed *is* a "Symbol," or contains "symbols," or what precisely a "symbol" is. The standpoint of the early part of the book becomes later a little too conventional to remain consistent. Nevertheless, the harassed layman or puzzled student for whom it was written will find considerable new insight, although the absence of an index in a book so sketchily organized will hardly facilitate the finding of any answers quickly.

EDWARD J. MACHLE

World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. ix, 247 pp. $2.00.

This is a serious and disconcerting examination of our cultural foundations. The first essay begins with a serious challenge to our religious teachers and our whole educational system: "A large part of mankind has lost the ability to reach decisions regarding private and public affairs in terms of unequivocal and definite standards of conduct and thought." And, apparently, our religious institutions have lost the ability to learn. The editor, who is the author of the last essay in the series, says: "The original phrasing of the title of this lecture was in affirmative form: What the war has taught the churches. I now prefer to put it interrogatively, and to indicate my own convictions as to what the churches *should* be learning from the impact of the war." Several of the writers make contributions bearing upon these facts and upon what needs to be done within our civilization. These range all the way from the ponderous, academic "The Task of Cultural Rebuilding" to the realistic appeal, "Relief as Reconstruction." In the former, we face the "fundamental disintegration" of our culture; in the latter, the necessity of our meeting the immeasurable needs of other peoples. These responsibilities are ably discussed in essay IX. "I have a profound feeling," says Mr. Nourse, "that we have not kept sufficiently alive a realization that economics is a social science. . . . It seems to me that a very large part of our business community still are too hard-boiled, too hard hearted, too lacking in a sense of responsibility."

This makes pertinent the essay, "Re-education on a World Scale," requiring a spiritual re-birth.

> The obligation of education to inculcate the idea of the worth and dignity of human beings, who may behave and think differently because of differences of culture, but who, none the less are created in the same common mold. But such education must begin at home and must be developed from the smallest hamlet upwards rather than through the machinery of an international organization at the top.

From the reviewer's point of view, the spokesmen for religion in essays X, XI, and XII make the poorest showing. One wonders why the religious community so often muffs the ball. As Professor Edman says (p. 37):

> The attempt to explain and exploit the nature of man simply in terms of external relations, as it were, is a compensation, I think, for the tradition, largely aided and abetted by religion, of thinking of man as a private, isolated, solitary soul to be saved, a soul concerned only for its own welfare and its own private being.

This all adds up to the essay on "World Citizenship," which everyone will profit by reading, for it is all too true that world citizenship is "an ideal that is rapidly going by default" (p. 210).

George W. Briggs

Pontus Wikner: en studie i hans religions filosofiska och teologiska åskådning. By Bertil Block. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1943. viii, 233 pp. Kr. 6.

It is just fifty years ago since a Swedish-American theological professor, S. G. Youngert, brought out in this country an outline of the history of philosophy based on the lectures of Pontus Wikner. But the book was in Swedish, and the name of Wikner has been unknown here except to a few who could read that language. But even in Sweden the interest in Wikner was not great until the past decade or two. Now in retrospect he is seen to have struggled with issues and come to conclusions in line with thinkers of today.

Block's study shows Wikner as an independent mind in the last half of the previous century. He broke with Hegel and with Bostrom, the Swedish philosopher whose idealistic teachings dominated the universities of Lund and Uppsala. Wikner's interest was in a narrow sphere—the relationship of God and man, the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal. Block distinguishes between three decades in Wikner's development—the 60's, the 70's, the 80's. He moved from the pantheistic idealism of the times toward a realism which was characterized by a biblical dualism and an emphasis on the individual. But, in his reinterpretation of the relation of God to man, he fell back into a speculative conception of man as a manifestation of the divine energy which is operative in nature and history. But he has gotten into closer touch with the realities of experience and wrestled with the consequences of Darwinism. Wikner's influence was less evident in Swedish philosophy than in religion, where he definitely impressed the men who became leaders in the Swedish Church—Ecklund, Billing, Söderblom. One detects a relationship between him and the Lund theologians who have led Lutheran thinking of today into new channels.

Block's book is characterized by clarity and thoroughness. For the student who can read Swedish it is a good introduction to the study of Swedish thought in the last hundred years.

Conrad Bergendoff

Metodisk Inledning till en Kristen Socialetik. By Folke Holmström. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1943. 333 pp. Kr. 10.

This volume is an introduction to Christian Sociology with an emphasis upon methodology. It is very apparent throughout the book that the author is writing against a background where the implications of the Christian faith for the social order have not been given much emphasis. Contemporary events have driven theologians to a recognition of the fact that the Church must recognize a responsibility for the character of society, or else society will prove to be the destroyer of the Christian faith. This volume is a distinct contribution to this emphasis.

The author considers a number of attempts to find a basis for a Christian social ethic. Some have tried to find such a basis in the love of God. The author

takes the position that this point of departure tends to quiestism and a weakening of the sense of moral responsibility. Consideration is also given to the attempt to find a basis for a Christian social ethic in the Christian "world view" itself. The criticism is offered that such an approach tends to theological theorizing and may lead to little practical results. Christianity stresses eternal principles, but they must be translated into concrete reality. Others have tried to find a basis for a Christian social ethic in the orders of creation. The author insists that the orders of creation must be intimately connected with the gospel if the ethic is to be Christian. The orders of creation do not in themselves give an ethical content.

The author also considers the churches and Christian group organizations as the subjects of Christian social ethical action. He points out the danger that moral standards may be lowered if the emphasis is placed exclusively upon this approach. He insists that the Christian personality is the logical subject for Christian social action, and that this personality has the responsibility to see to it that Christian principles are applied in the social order, and thus the Lord Jesus Christ Himself is the source of power for Christian social action.

It is refreshing to note that European theologians are commencing to think seriously about this problem.

A. D. Mattson

Studies in Occult Philosophy. By G. de Purucker. Covina, California: Theosophical University Press, 1945. xv, 744 pp. $5.00.

The book under review is the third of a series by the same author, the two others being *Messages to Conventions* and *Wind of the Spirit*. It is claimed by the compilers that *Studies in Occult Philosophy* "presents the deep philosophical and mystical reaches of Theosophical doctrine." Its contents include the talks given by the author at the study evenings at International Headquarters, reprints from various Theosophical magazines, and inquiries from students scattered all over the world, with replies by the author. The subjects discussed are encyclopedic in nature: theological, philosophical, ethical, mythological, occult, and so on. Matters of a scientific nature, such as the meaning of cosmic rays, the life-period of a planetary chain, and the theory of evolution are discussed with an assurance and finality which will puzzle the scientists working in the universities. The pages are interspersed with Sanskrit words and references to the Hindu scriptures. The premises, arguments, and conclusions will, no doubt, have their special appeal to students of Theosophy, but they appear meaningless to those who are not initiated into its mysteries. A few illustrations are given at random.

Discussing cycles, the learned author points out that "the solar system is an animate organism guided by intelligence." As the planets in this system, endowed with a little movement of their own, proceed along their orbits, their pattern changes, not only introducing the varied fortunes and destinies of mankind and of the inhabitants of other planets, but also bringing about "the

karmic changes and modifications of the solar system." The author claims to have discovered the key by which the writers of the Hindu *Purānas* calculated the time duration of the cycles, though the Hindus themselves regard these figures as fanciful and speculative.

Regarding the cradle land of the human race, G. de Purucker is absolutely sure of its having been in Central Asia. The land was covered with highly developed civilizations. Hundreds of wonderful cities flourished there. From different parts of this tract migrated people to India, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, and Europe. On the outskirts of this highly civilized land lived the remnants of the Atlanteans. The Aryan race was born seven or eight million years ago. They lived in Central Asia, "flowing with crystalline waters, filled with wonderful verdure," three million eight hundred odd thousand years ago.

About Christianity the learned author has the following to say: original Christianity "was a sanctuary teaching, that is, a teaching of the Adytum, of the inner part of the temple." "Earliest Christianity was a movement of very earnest Theosophists and quasi-Theosophists." Christ was one of the initiates.

The author describes cosmic rays as a fluid, like the vitality that "emanates" from a human being. The sun feeds on the refuse of space. This latter remark is from the *Secret Doctrine* of H. P. B.

Thus it runs, through the entire volume of 744 pages. The book is full of scientific terms and references to the Hindu scriptures and old Christian writings. It will appear as meaningless jargon to men and women trained in the modern way of thinking. But the author carefully points out that "its appeal is to the mind already bound to Theosophy, already dedicated to a constant and determined search for truth." Theosophy obviously is synonymous with truth. The "explanation of life and its multitudinous mysteries" given in the book is derived from occult sources, the inspiration of the mahatmas.

It will not be altogether out of place to sound a note of warning. The Theosophists have always claimed the Vedas as one of the sources of their inspiration. They have pounced upon ideas here and there from the sacred books of the Hindus as pegs to hang their peculiar doctrines from. But Hinduism is as far apart from Theosophy as Christianity is from Christian Science. Even in such matters as the theory of reincarnation, the law of karma, evolution, and the various bodies of a human being, the Theosophists have distorted the Hindu viewpoints. It would be wrong to form an estimate of Hindu religion and philosophy from the writing of the Theosophists, though one need not doubt their admiration for the ancient spiritual knowledge of India.

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

The Sacramental View of Life. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. Gambier, Ohio: Kenyon College, 1945. 18 pp.

This small pamphlet, a reprint of the Bexley Hall Easter Lectures for 1945, by the Dean of Drew Theological Seminary, is noteworthy as a concise statement (and, incidentally, beautifully written) of the contribution of Platonism

to Christian sacramentalism. Taking for his text a line from Spenser, "For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make," Dean Hough discusses the relation of soul and body under three heads: the primacy of the spiritual, the creative activity of the spiritual, and the characteristic genius of the material in expressing the meaning of the spiritual. "You are asking ultimate questions when you insist on some sort of reply to the interrogations as to whether the body somehow secretes the soul or the soul—the ultimate soul of the universe—creates the body. . . . All your thinking and feeling and acting will be of one quality if you give one answer, and will be of another quality if you give the other answer" (p. 4). He declares that "the definitive contribution of Platonism" is "the belief that the invisible perfection is more real than the visible imperfection," and describes the sacramentalist as "one who swears his life away to the ideal." It is no accident that it was men raised in a sacramental tradition, such as Kingsley and Maurice, who contributed so much to the development of consciousness of social responsibility, for, implicit in the *sacramentum* (oath) is the sense of personal responsibility for bringing the material under the control of the spiritual in all realms of life, and a firm faith that it can be done!

M. B.

Can These Bones Live? By Roger Babson and Dudley Zuver. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945. x, 254 pp. $2.00.

This book is another example of the deep desire to preach—a surpressed desire of many laymen. Usually the result is banal in the extreme—vague generalizations falling back upon hackneyed quotations in moments calling for illumination and explanation. The cardinal fault of this book is its failure to realize the extreme complexity of human life and of the Church. Hence its criticism is largely caviling. The absurd charge is made that the churches are to blame for World War II for failing to take a firm stand for a just treaty in 1919 (p. 109)! The Church is chided for not following Jesus' words on the resisting of evil as the recipe for ending war, and on the following page pacifists are held up as "cranks." Its bad procedure of misstating the opponent's position is manifest in the attacks upon idealists as "word-slingers," "wavers of the magic wand of rhetoric," etc. The spiritual level of the millennium is the best index to the intellectual quality of this book. It will end the liquor traffic, but no reference is made to war, race problems, the social order generally, but we are assured of one thing, "the Stock Exchange would open for trading at the stroke of ten" (p. 252)! Roger Babson could have written a useful book if he had drawn the material from his own experience and put aside the temptation to preach which he disparages so excellently.

Frederick Reustle

Pirke Aboth. Translated and edited by R. Travers Herford. (3rd ed.) New York: Jewish Institute of Religion, 1945. vii, 176 pp. $2.00.

This new edition of Herford's commentary on "The Sayings of the Fathers" is most welcome. Mr. Herford, the well known Christian interpreter of Pharasaic Judaism, explains and illuminates the classical compendium of rabbinic thought with understanding and fine insight. His work has been widely acclaimed. The present edition contains a new introduction which enhances the value of the volume.

Abraham Heschel

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XV. New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1945. xviii, 196 pp. $2.50.

This volume of the proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research contains the second installment of Adolf Kober's detailed study, "Jewish Monuments of the Middle Ages in Germany," with a map of the cemetery at Cologne and fifteen photographs of monuments from various Jewish cemeteries. It also contains the second installment of an article by Bernard D. Weinryb, entitled, "Studies in the Communal History of Polish Jewry," documented with sixty-six pages of Hebrew text, transcribed from the *Sepher Hazikronot* III, a portion of the minute-books of the Poznán community.

Toward Peace and Equity. New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1946. xiii, 152 pp.

These recommendations of the Committee on Peace Problems of the American Jewish Committee, of which Judge Joseph M. Proskauer is President, deal with certain basic problems, under the following headings: Protection of Human Rights, Restoration of Rights, Repatriation, Migration, Palestine, and Proposed Provision for the Peace Treaties, and in terms of the present situation.

American Jewish Year Book, 5706: 1945-46. Vol. 47. Edited by Harry Schneiderman and Julius B. Maller. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1945. xxx, 760 pp. $3.00.

This very valuable publication contains a number of special articles, including one on "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Jewish Crisis," a biographical sketch of Henrietta Szold, and an account of "French Jewry under Nazi Occupation." The section, "Review of the Year 5705 (1944-45)," consisting of some 350 pages, gives a comprehensive picture of the present Jewish situation, both at home and abroad. The calendars of Jewish holy days, the directories of Jewish organization, periodicals, and Jews in public office, and the comprehensive tables of statistics, all combine to make this an indispensable reference work.

The Children's Passover Haggadah. Translated freely by Ben-Ami Scharfstein and illustrated by Siegmund Forst. New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1945. x, 46 pp.

This charming volume is useful for the class-room as well as for the home, for it gives a vivid impression of the living appeal and emotional content of the Seder feast. The drawings are exceptionally expressive, and the text is presented with great simplicity. Hebrew and English are on opposite pages. The book is certainly a valuable asset for the teaching of Judaism.

Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies. By Robert Heine-Geldern. New York: Southeast Asia Institute, 1945. (Reprinted from *Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies*, pp. 129-67). 21 illustrations.

An historical survey of archeological research in the East Indies from the seventeenth century to the present time, with recommendations for future work still to be undertaken, and for the conservation of important sites and monuments.

Huna: The Workable Psycho-Religious System of the Polynesians. By Max Freedom Long. Los Angeles, Calif.: Huna Press, 1945. 32 pp. 25 cents.

In this study of healing magic practiced by the *kahunas,* native priests of Hawaii, the author attempts to reconstruct the underlying philosophy in terms of ancient occultism and modern para-psychology, apparently with the purpose of making it the foundation of a new church called the "Huna Fellowship."

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PANDORA, PROMETHEUS, AND THE MYTH OF THE AGES

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THE STORY OF PANDORA, as told by Hesiod in his *Works and Days*,[1] is very well known. Prometheus has brought fire to the mortals. To offset this benefit bestowed upon them against his will, Zeus, in his wrath, decides to make them bring upon themselves their own doom by sending them an evil which they will gladly accept. He therefore orders the gods to create a beautiful woman with a clever mind and a knowledge of many useful arts, but with a wily and faithless heart. This woman he sends to Prometheus' brother, Epimetheus, as a gift. But she brings not only herself, but also a jar in which all evils are contained. Prometheus has warned his brother not to accept the gift which the gods are going to send him, but Epimetheus, lacking his brother's foresight, disregards the warning. He accepts the gift of the gods. Pandora, driven by curiosity, opens the jar, and although, in her fright, she tries to put back the lid at once, all the evils escape and fall upon mortals. Only Hope is caught and remains in the jar.

Innumerable attempts have been made to solve the two logical difficulties which the story, in this form, contains. If Hope was in the jar containing the evils, it must be an evil. Yet Hope is generally considered a good. This difficulty seems to find an easy solution through the fact that some early Greek writers actually considered hope an evil.[2] The second difficulty, however, cannot be so easily eliminated, and, in connection with it, the first difficulty returns. If the evils that escape from the jar befall mortals, it seems logical to assume not only that the one thing that remains in the jar is also an evil, but also that mortals are safe from it; for, if the human race has to suffer from the evils that escaped and from those that remained, what harm was done by open-

1. Hesiod, *Opera et Dies*, 90 ff. cf. the different version of the story given in the *Theogony*, 560 ff., where, however, the name of Pandora does not occur.

2. See, for instance, *Theognis*, 637-38; Euripides, *Suppl.*, 479; etc. What seems, perhaps, most convincing: when Prometheus says that he has given mankind "blind hopes" (Aeschyl., *Prom.*, 252), these hopes, it is true, make it possible for man to live, but since they are blind hopes and since man's life is miserable, they are a doubtful gift.

ing the jar? Obviously, in this case, once Pandora and the jar were accepted, it did not make any difference whether the jar was opened or not.

By far the most interesting attempt to solve the difficulty was made by A. Lebègue,[3] who translated ἐλπίς as *la prescience du malheur* and regarded it as an evil which mankind is spared (or, as he, perhaps characteristically, translated "which is denied to man"). This is certainly a most ingenious solution, since it solves all the difficulties in such a way that the story can still be understood. Yet it can hardly be correct. For while it is true that ἐλπίς in Greek literature does not always mean the expectation of a good, but may sometimes also be used to designate the expectation of either good or evil,[4] or, in very exceptional cases, even of a definite evil, the first meaning is so prevalent that no one, reading the story as it is told by Hesiod, could have understood ἐλπίς, as "expectation of evil." But even granting that ἐλπίς, without any qualifying attribute, could mean "expectation of evil," it certainly never means foreknowledge of any kind. Yet this is the most essential point. For though true foreknowledge of evil may be denied to mankind, certainly nobody can deny that human beings sometimes expect evil, however much they may, at the same time, comfort themselves with vain hopes.

All other attempts to give a "logical" interpretation of the story are less consistent. S. M. Adams,[5] whose explanation is cited with approval by W. C. Greene in the most recent discussion of the story,[6] argues that mankind in fact has those evils that escaped from the jar as well as the evil that remained in it. But the evils that escaped from the jar are, in his opinion, those about which mankind can do nothing, while blind hope, which remained in the jar, is an evil for which men are, at least in part, responsible. Obviously this interpretation implies that, if Pandora had not opened the jar, men would still be subject to all evils and would also be responsible for all of them, while as it is, they are not re-

3. A Lebègue in *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux* (1885), pp. 249 ff. His interpretation was taken up by P. Waltz in his book *Hésiode et son poème moral*, p. 56, and then again defended in *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 23 (1910), 49-57.

4. Cf. Thucyd., VII, 61, 2; see also Hesychius, s. v. Ἐλπίς.

5. S. M. Adams, "Hesiod's Pandora," in *The Classical Review*, XLVI (1932), 193 ff.

6. W. C. Greene, *MOIRA*, (Cambridge, 1944), p. 31.

sponsible for any evil except their blind hope. It is hardly necessary to say more about this interpretation.

T. A. Sinclair,[7] taking up an old suggestion of Welcker, claims that hope, since it remained in the jar, is denied to men, and that this means that the human race is "hopeless." But "hopelessness" in the sense that there is no hope *for* someone, and hopelessness in the sense that someone *has* no hope are obviously two entirely different concepts. Since many men are full of hopes, it is only in the first sense that hopelessness can reasonably be predicated of mankind in general. But in this sense the word can in no way be derived from the Greek word ἐλπίς. Only a man who thinks in German, English, or perhaps in Latin terms, can give or understand this explanation—certainly not a Greek.

It is hardly worth while to discuss other "solutions" of this kind, since the principle of explanation on which all of them are based is demonstrably wrong. What is said about hope does not represent the only difficulty in the story as told in the *Works and Days,* though it may be the only "logical" difficulty. In the introduction[8] we are told that Pandora has a shameless or brazen[9] mind and a wily character, but these qualities of hers have nothing to do with the story of the jar containing all evils. On the contrary, when she quickly puts on the lid again she is obviously surprised and frightened by the results of her action. It was not her cunning or wiliness that prompted her to open the jar, but her curiosity. As far as her intentions are concerned, she is quite innocent. What is said in the introductory lines about her wily character and all her other qualities cannot be understood at all in terms of the story as told in the *Works and Days,* but only in terms of the other version of the same story, which is told in the *Theogony.*[10] In the *Theogony,* however, she does not bring a jar containing all evils. She is not called Pandora, either, but Woman. She herself, as the representative of the tricky female sex, is the evil that Zeus has sent to mortals in a most attractive and charming guise, so that they will easily be enticed to accept this evil and to harbor it in their midst.

Obviously, then, the story as told in the *Works and Days* is not con-

7. *Hesiod's Works and Days,* edited by T. A. Sinclair (London, 1932), p. 14.

8. *Works and Days,* 67.

9. The Greek word is κύνεος, which literally means "doggish." But shamelessness was the outstanding quality of a dog in the minds of the ancient Greeks.

10. Hesiod, *Theogony,* 570 ff.

sistent, since it contains elements of at least two different versions.[11] This fact alone should have warned scholars against the assumption that the story could be interpreted as if it were an allegory which must be logically consistent. Stories of this kind can be understood and interpreted only by means of an analysis of their history. But here one has to guard against another fallacy. Though attempts to find a logically consistent explanation of the story as told in the *Works and Days* have never ceased up to the present day, many scholars have realized that this is impossible and have, consequently, looked for a different approach. In nearly all cases, however, their investigations have been based on the assumption that one has merely to find the ultimate origin of a story in order to discover its "true" meaning.

The error inherent in this approach may, perhaps, best be illustrated by a discussion of the most consistent attempt of this kind.[12] "Pandora," the *All-giver*, is also an epithet given to Mother Earth, and a very appropriate epithet indeed, for Mother Earth is certainly the giver of all good. But, according to an old belief, Mother Earth harbors also the souls of the dead. On a certain day of the year the souls of the dead are released and may swarm out into the upper world and among the living. What is more, at the Attic festival of the *Pithoigia* the dead swarm out from a jar or *pithos*, a scene that has also been depicted in ancient vase-paintings. The ghosts of the dead are naturally feared, and they may do all sorts of harm to the living. Here, then, there seems to be a natural connection with the box of Pandora which contains all evils, and which is also described by the word *pithos*.

It is quite possible that this is the ultimate origin of the Pandora story, but it is also apparent how remote all this is from the story told by Hesiod. A Pandora made by Hephaistos[13] and sent to mortals is not, or no longer, Mother Earth. The evils which befall mortals in Hesiod's story are most decidedly not the ghosts of the dead; and it would cer-

11. Concerning the question of whether the inconsistencies in Hesiod's Pandora story may have been caused by "interpolations" see *infra*, p. 256.

12. See Jane Harrison, "Pandora's Box," in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XX (1900), 99-117.

13. *Works and Days*, 60 ff. and *Theogony*, 570 ff. It is quite possible that this part of the story was influenced by a myth represented in a vase-painting (Harrison, *loc. cit.*, p. 106), according to which the Earth Goddess rises from the earth under the hammer-blows of Hephaistos. But the Earth Goddess is certainly not *made* by Hephaistos.

tainly be most artificial to explain the hope which remains in the jar as the hope for a good harvest. No innocent ancient reader of Hesiod's poem would have fallen upon this interpretation. Therefore, however ingenious and interesting Jane Harrison's explanation of the origin of the myth may be, it can contribute very little to the understanding of Hesiod's story.

It is of the essence of stories of this kind that they are retold innumerable times, and that whenever they are retold they change their meaning slightly. This change of meaning may occur in two different ways: if the teller of the story is a genuine philosopher, he may give the story a new and consistent meaning;[14] if he is not, the story may become confused. But the confused versions of stories of this kind are no less interesting than the consistent ones. In fact, they may be more interesting, since, in their very confusion they illustrate the deep contradictions in man's position in this world. At any rate, in order to be understood, they must be viewed as part of the pre-philosophical history of philosophy, and in order to achieve this, one must consider them from the point of view of the philosophical problem that they contain.

The problem inherent in both of the Hesiodean versions of the Pandora story is that of the origin of evil. The *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* are full of stories which have something to do with this problem, or rather with the more comprehensive problem of the provenience, the development, the history of evil in this world. An analysis of these other stories is much more important for a full understanding of the Pandora story than even an absolutely stringent demonstration of the connection of Hesiod's Pandora with Mother Earth would be.

In the *Works and Days* the Pandora story is followed immediately by the myth of the five ages, which, in a way, has the same theme. This interrelation between the two stories is emphasized by the similarity between the two couples of lines which describe, respectively, the happiness of the golden age and the carefree life of the human race before the arrival of Pandora.[15] The viewpoint of the two stories, however,

14. Aeschylus, for instance, has given a new and consistent interpretation to the meaning of hope in the life of man in connection with the Prometheus story. But he is a more logically consistent philosopher-poet than Hesiod.

15. 90/91: πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων νόσφιν ἄτερ τε κακῶν καὶ ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο·

112/13: οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Κρόνου ἦσαν ὅτ'οὐρανῷ ἐμβασίλευεν ὥς τε θεοὶ ἔζωον ἀκήδεα θυμὸν ἔχοντες νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων καὶ ὀιζύος·

is different. In order to show this, it is necessary first to interpret the myth of the ages in detail, since this story also presents a number of difficulties in the version told by Hesiod.

In contrast to other versions,[16] Hesiod's tells of five ages, the golden age, the silver age, the bronze age, the age of the heroes, and the iron age. In this series the age of the heroes has a peculiar position in two respects: its name is not derived from a metal, and it interrupts the continuous downward trend which is characteristic of the sequence of the other ages. It is both obvious and universally acknowledged that the insertion of this age reflects the glory that the Homeric poems had given to the heroes of the Trojan War. These glorious heroes, in the form in which they are depicted by Homer, could not possibly be included in the deteriorated ages, yet the warlike character of their glory made it equally impossible to identify them with the golden or the silver age. And besides, they were not sufficiently remote in time for such an identification to be made, and the king of the gods in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is Zeus, not Kronos, who is assumed to have ruled at the time of the golden age. This is why they had to be inserted as representatives of a special, unique age.

The meaning of the differentiation between the bronze age and the iron age is less apparent. According to Wilamowitz,[17] the bronze age and the iron age are essentially identical, both of them giving expression to Hesiod's pessimistic view of the age in which we live. The differentiation between the two ages would, then, merely reflect the historical fact that bronze, as the metal from which weapons and tools are made, had recently been replaced by iron. But the description of the two ages by Hesiod does not favor this explanation. The warlike, harsh, and merciless men of the bronze age[18] have still a certain greatness by

16. Hesiod is the only extant ancient author who tells the story of five ages. For, though the prooemium of the fables of Babrius in the codex Athous has also five ages, the same prooemium in the Papyrus Bouriant has only three, and a comparison of the two versions and of the version of the codex with Hesiod shows clearly that the papyrus has preserved the original and that the additional lines in the Athous are interpolated by a reader (perhaps a schoolmaster; for Babrius's fables were used very much in ancient schools) who wished to make Babrius's story agree with Hesiod. The story of three ages is told by a good many authors, for instance Aratus 1, 96 ff., Antipater (Anth. Pal. v, 71), etc.

17. *Hesiodos Erga* erklärt von U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, 1928), pp. 139-40.

18. *Works and Days*, 145 ff.

which they are clearly distinguished from the pettiness of the men of the iron age, whose main characteristics are faithlessness, trickery, and lack of loyalty.[19] On the other hand, there is a striking similarity between the men of the bronze age and the heroes. The representatives of both ages are essentially described as great warriors spending their lives in continuous warfare, stronger, bolder, and mightier than the men of the iron age, and less subject to the petty misery that is characteristic of our own life. This fact was noticed long ago by Nietzsche,[20] who drew from it the conclusion that these two ages represent in fact the same thing, namely the heroes of the Trojan War and of other legends, but seen from two different viewpoints. For, he claims, it was natural that the aristocracy should look up to these heroes with veneration as to their ideal ancestors, while to the common man those same glorious knights must have appeared as hard and brutal men, though also free from the ordinary weaknesses of human nature, like the men of the bronze age in Hesiod's poem.

There can be hardly any doubt that this view is essentially correct, though the actual process through which the two opposite images of the same figures developed was probably a good deal more complicated. Traces of some of the elements that entered into this process may perhaps be found by considering the fate after death of the men of the different ages in Hesiod's story. The fate after death of the first three ages is uniform in every single age. The men of the golden age live on as benevolent guardian spirits (δαίμονες) on the earth.[21] The men of the silver age live a blessed life under the earth.[22] The men of the bronze age have gone down nameless to the dark realm of Hades.[23] But, in regard to the heroes, we find a strange distinction. Some of them die.[24] What becomes of them after death we are not told. Others (οἱ δέ), however, are removed by Zeus to the Elysian Fields, in the Islands of the Blessed, where they live a life of everlasting bliss far from the land of mortals.[25]

All this is rather revealing. In the Homeric poems all the great heroes

19. *Ibid.*, 175 ff.
20. Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, chapter 11.
21. *Works and Days*, 121 ff.
22. *Ibid.*, 140 ff. For the interpretation cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
23. *Ibid.*, 152 ff.
24. *Ibid.*, 166.
25. *Ibid.*, 167 ff.

of the Trojan War, with the one exception of Menelaus,[26] have the fate of the men of the bronze age in Hesiod's story and, after death, lead a dreary existence in the netherworld. In the poems belonging to the so-called epic cycle, the number of heroes who are believed to live on after death in some place of bliss is greatly increased, though they are still an exception. But there is also the popular belief, very widespread in the Greek motherland, in individual heroes who live on after death, not in some far away land but in a cave, on a mountain, or under the earth, in every case, however, right in the country where they have lived and died. These heroes are not identical with the heroes of the Trojan War and are of a different character.[27] But the fact that they bear the same name of "heroes" indicates that the two groups were felt to have something in common. It is also noteworthy that the men of the silver age in Hesiod have the same fate after death as most of the local heroes worshipped in the Greek motherland.

These interrelations help to explain some of the features of Hesiod's story. In the Homeric poems the common warriors may be called heroes when they are called to or addressed in an assembly,[28] but on the whole very little attention is paid to them. Their function is rather to provide the background against which the few really great heroes (Achilles, Diomedes, Odysseus, Agamemnon, etc.) can be seen in the full light of their glory. Though some of these great heroes are the descendants of gods, Homer makes all of them, except Menelaus, share the fate of or-

26. *Odyssey* IV, 560 ff.: Proteus has prophesied to Menelaus that at the end of his life he will not die, but will be removed to the Elysian Fields where Rhadamanthys lives. This passage is usually considered as a "young" part of the *Odyssey*. But it is not necessary to go into the question of the history and composition of the Homeric poems. It is quite sufficient to be aware of the fact that Menelaus is an absolutely unique exception, and that the much greater heroes—Achilles, Patroclus, Agamemnon, etc.—go down to Hades. On the other hand, this does not mean that the idea that some of the Trojan heroes had a better fate cannot have existed until some time after the final composition of the present *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. It is by no means impossible that the author of these poems eliminated the idea for poetical reasons.

27. It has often been pointed out that the local heroes seem to have originated in two different ways. Some of them seem originally to have been local gods, who, after having been partly superseded by more generally accepted and therefore higher gods, nevertheless continued to be revered locally as semi-divine beings. The majority of the local and popular heroes, however, seem to have been historical persons who, as lawgivers, prophets, or saviors of the land in a great danger, had left their imprint on the country and continued to live in the memory of the people as benevolent spirits.

28. See, for instance, *Iliad* II, 110 ff.; XIX, 34 ff.

dinary mortals. To him they *are* mortals, and one may say that it is part of their human glory that they are so glorious in spite of the fact that they are mortal. But it is also natural that, in popular belief, the idea should have taken root that such glorious heroes could not share the fate of ordinary human beings, and that a better lot must have been reserved for them. This belief has found expression in the stories of Telemachus, Telegonus, etc., in the epic cycle.

In Hesiod the various elements of this development have entered into a strange mixture. The ἥρωες Δαναοί, who in Homer are quite ordinary people,[29] have, through the beautifying power of poetry, begun to share the glory of their leaders. So the whole generation of the Trojan War, along with their ancestors and immediate descendants, have become something quite apart and infinitely superior to the men of the present. Though the term *heros* in Homeric poetry, with its stress on warlike qualities, has a somewhat different emphasis from that which it has in the Greek motherland, where it may designate any great man whose influence survives after his death whether he was a warrior or not, the identity of the term can hardly have failed to produce a certain transference to the Homeric "heroes" in general of the kind of veneration felt for local heroes. Yet the difference between the really great heroes and the common crowd, which is so marked in Homer and still more emphasized in the epic cycle, was not entirely forgotten; so in Hesiod's poem it is expressed in the strange differentiation between two groups within the heroic age in regard to their fate after death. It is, then, not surprising that, though the local heroes of the motherland were not distinguished as another generation or age from the Homeric heroes, their typical fate after death could not also be brought in as a third possibility for the same generation. So their fate after death is attributed to the men of the silver age. But the unnaturalness of this connection shows again how traditions of different provenience have been brought together.

It is also possible to reduce Nietzsche's theory to its correct limits. Hesiod's own position may have been influenced by the fact that his parents had come from Asia Minor.[30] Yet Homeric poetry, by that time, had in all likelihood also penetrated to the motherland, so there can be hardly any doubt that, not only to the aristocracy but also to the com-

29. Cf. *Iliad* II, 198 ff.
30. Cf. *Works and Days*, 633 ff.

mon man, the Homeric heroes must have appeared in a light of superhuman glory. But, somewhere in the process in which the old stories were handed down from generation to generation by poets and story tellers, a critical element must have come in, giving expression to the ambivalent attitude of the common man to his leaders, who all too often are also his oppressors, and producing the story of the bronze age as a counter-image to the glorious image of the Homeric heroes. This is in no way surprising, for the ambivalence in the attitude of a lower toward a higher social class was no less common in ancient times than it is at the present day.[31]

What distinguishes the bronze age and the age of the heroes in Hesiod from the golden age and the silver age is a certain measure of historical concreteness. Though—in contrast, for instance, to the *Nibelungenlied*—we are no longer able to date with any degree of accuracy the event or events which have given rise to the legends and poetical tales on which Hesiod's story of the bronze age and the age of the heroes is based, there can be no doubt that, in however idealized and poetical a form, they do in some way reflect the memory of an actual historical period. This is obviously not the case with the golden and the silver ages, which are idealizations of an entirely different type.

The story of the golden age does not in itself present any serious difficulty to the interpretation. It is a most beautiful expression of man's longing for a lost paradise, of the sublimating power of memory, of the

31. An interesting example of this attitude and the consequences which it may have for the logical consistency of a popular story, may be found in the account of the three great pyramid builders in Herodotus II, 124-34. According to this story, Cheops and Cephren were harsh rulers, who forced the people to hard toil in the building of their gigantic tomb pyramids, whereas Mycerinus was a mild ruler, and contented with a much smaller pyramid. But, shortly after the beginning of his reign, he was informed by an oracle that he had only six more years to live. When he complained to the gods that he should have to die so young when his cruel predecessors had enjoyed long life, he received the answer that it was his punishment for having relieved the people of their sufferings, when it had been decreed that they should suffer 150 years for their sins.

In actual fact, the size of the three pyramids is proportionate to the lengths of their builders' reigns, from which it follows that Mycerinus had made his subjects work just as hard as his predecessors. But, in the explanation of why one pyramid was smaller than the others, the ambivalent attitude of the folktale towards the great and harsh rulers is most naïvely expressed: it is *they* who are the great kings (not their benevolent successor), and, in the end, it turns out that it was they who really acted according to the will of the gods.

veneration which any sound and healthy people has for its past and for its ancestors, and, on a somewhat lower level, of the belief, so common among men, in the good old times when life was gayer and easier, and when men were honest, straightforward, strong, healthy, and free from the degeneracy of the present. That the men of this glorified past are still living on in some way and surround us invisibly as good daemons or guardian angels, furthermore, is no less natural a belief than the conviction that the great lawgivers and other individual benefactors of a community or a nation are still somehow living in the place where the beneficial influence of their life and deeds continues to be felt. But it is equally clear that the golden age again is essentially not one of many successive generations, but one way of seeing the past. It is, therefore, quite in keeping with the real and original meaning of the golden age that, in the great majority of the cases in which it is mentioned, no reference whatever is made to any of the three ages which, in Hesiod, separate the golden age from that to which we belong.[32]

In contrast to the golden age, the silver age presents again a special problem. In a way it seems to fit into the general scheme of continuous deterioration which is so strangely interrupted by the age of the heroes. For, on the face of it, the men of the silver age appear less good than those of the golden age, but better than those of the bronze and iron ages. Yet, from another point of view, there is no real continuity even here. The main characteristic of the men of the silver age is that they never grow up mentally until they are a hundred years old. When they finally have reached maturity their lives soon come to an end, and even in that last stage they still suffer much from their inability to give coherence and guidance to their lives, and are unable to keep evil away from one another. Zeus, it is true, does away with them because they neglect to worship the gods, but this feature of the story seems to have been introduced mainly in order to explain why the silver age did not continue until the present. For the transition from the golden to the silver age does not require a special explanation, since it coincides with the transition of the rulership of the world from Kronos to Zeus.[33] Even so, however, the men of the silver age seem to neglect their duties to the gods because they lack sense, rather than because of bad will.

32. That the simple contrast between the present and the golden age under the rule of Kronos (ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος) was proverbial in Athens as early as the last quarter of the sixth century B.C. is shown by Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 16, 7.

33. *Works and Days*, 111; see also *infra* pp. 242 ff.

The transition from the silver age to the bronze age, then, is not merely a deterioration. From the moral point of view there may be deterioration, though it is somewhat difficult to speak of moral superiority on the part of the men of the silver age where there is nothing but immaturity and lack of sense, even if this condition is combined with a more or less peaceful attitude. In all other respects the strong, virile, and energetic men of the bronze age seem decidedly superior, and even the men of the iron age, in all their wickedness, have at least a greater maturity. On this account it seems also strange that the silver generation of all people should have, in Hesiod's account, the fate after death which in popular belief is attributed to the great lawgivers, prophets and statesmen, the intellectual, moral, and political leaders of their countries. This strange discrepancy further confirms the conclusion reached above[34] that this fate was attributed to the men of the silver age only because, in Hesiod's poem, the generation of the heroes had already been provided with a different fate after death according to a tradition developed through the Homeric and post-homeric epos.

But what does the generation of the silver age then really represent? The most ingenious explanation seems that given by E. Meyer.[35] He believes that, in contrast to the golden age which Hesiod took over from older traditions, the silver age is altogether Hesiod's own invention. In this section of his story, Hesiod, in Meyer's opinion, wished to convey the idea that the all too easy life of the golden age must result in degeneration. In other words, in contrast to the kingly men of the golden age, the silver age represents the princes born to the purple and hence soft and degenerate. In this interpretation Hesiod's account acquires a strange similarity to Polybius'[36] view of the transition from kingship to tyranny or from a truly aristocratic to an oligarchic regime, a similarity which is perhaps not quite unrelated to the fact that E. Meyer's own fundamental interpretation of history[37] has a marked affinity to that of his ancient predecessor Polybius. Yet, however ingenious this explanation may be, if this was the idea that Hesiod was trying to convey, he did it in a very strange fashion. For the golden age com-

34. See *supra*, p. 235.

35. E. Mayer, "Hesiod's Erga und das Gedicht von den fünf Menschengeschlechtern," in *Genethliakon. Carl Robert zum 8. März 1910* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 178 ff.

36. Polybius, VI, 7, 7 ff.

37. Cf. especially his *Elemente der Anthropologie* in vol. I, 1 of his *Geschichte des Altertums*.

prises many generations of men, and the men of the silver age are not their descendants but replace them as an entirely new creation consequent on the transition of the rulership of the world from Kronos to Zeus. What is more, a princeling born to the purple may have many vices and may also be soft and degenerate, but a person who becomes wise only when a hundred years old and then will not survive this change for the better for long, has little relation to what is characteristic of a *porphyrogennētos*.

The distinguishing characteristic of the description of the silver age, in relation to the story of the other ages, is the pronounced humorous element which it contains, and which seems deliberately heightened by grotesque exaggerations. For, if one insists on strict logic, one may find it somewhat difficult to explain how a man of the silver age could stay "with his dear mother" until he became wise, that is a hundred years old, since his mother, according to Hesiod, could not survive for very long after she had become wise, or, if not yet wise, she would have to remain with *her* dear mother, and she again with hers, an arrangement that would make matters slightly complicated.

If one abstracts from this element of grotesque exaggeration in the story of the silver age, one is reminded strongly of the way in which some tribes in Central Europe, especially in Switzerland and some parts of Southern Germany, speak of neighboring tribes as somewhat slow-growing and dim-witted people who do not become wise before the age of fifty, or sixty, or seventy, whatever the case may be. There are usually, again, various versions of what will happen when that limit is reached. In some cases it is said that once they get that far they become exceedingly clever; in other cases the view concerning their abilities at a more mature age is less optimistic. This latter view seems implied in Hesiod's story, but the general idea is more or less the same.

There is, of course, the very essential difference that Hesiod does not speak of a contemporary tribe but of a previous generation belonging to a mythical past. But this does not make it impossible to interpret one story by the other. The contemporary tribes about which such humorous remarks are made, are always those who, by their more alert and progressive neighbors, are considered old-fashioned, backward, and somewhat untouched by the current of modern progress. It is clear that this view can be applied not only to a neighboring tribe but also to a preceding generation. On the basis of this analogy, Hesiod's story of

the silver age looks very much like a humorous exaggeration of the way in which, in any "progressive" era, bright and precocious children look upon their parents, whom they are apt to consider as nice, harmless people, but slightly lacking in a satisfactory knowledge of life as it really is, and not quite up to the sophisticated and somewhat wicked ways of modern times. This explanation seems to fit Hesiod's description of the silver age much better than does E. Meyer's identification with princelings born to the purple, since the latter should have entirely different characteristics.

Despite all this, it is by no means necessary to assume that this is the idea that Hesiod wished to convey with his story of the silver age. It is much more likely that he tells the story in the main as he found it, and fitted it as best he could into the general framework of his version of the legend of the ages. There is only one element that can hardly have belonged to the original story, since it does not at all agree with the rest.[38] This is what Hesiod tells of the fate of this generation after death. But it is merely the new systematic framework in which the story now appears that compels Hesiod to say something about this question; in the original version it probably was not touched at all.

Whether this explanation of the original meaning of the silver age be accepted in its entirety or not, there are certain facts which, once pointed out, can hardly be denied. The story of the ages in the form in which it is told by Hesiod, even in its first part, is certainly not simply a story of continuous deterioration. For, with all its harshness and cruelty, the bronze age is clearly in some respects superior to the silver age; and that the age of the heroes does not fit into a scheme of continuous deterioration has always been evident. It follows that all ages, with the exception of the iron age which represents the present, are essentially not different periods of the past, but different ways of viewing *the* past. There is only this difference, that the golden age and the silver age have, so to speak, no definite location in time, while the bronze age and the age of the heroes, though having no absolute chronology expressible in years or centuries, nevertheless reflect a more or less definite period celebrated in tradition and poetry. It follows further that, as far as the character of the ages is concerned, their sequence is of secondary importance. This has perhaps also interesting implications for the question as to the origin of the story.

38. See *supra*, p. 235.

It was long ago pointed out that Hesiod's myth of the ages has parallels in early Persian and Indian literature. In the Mahābhārata[39] the four ages are connected with the four colors of white, red, yellow, and black, but in the Persian story of the dream of Zarathustra,[40] they are characterized by the four metals gold, silver, steel, and iron. Here, then, the relation to Hesiod's version seems very close; and R. Reitzenstein, who dealt extensively with the problem,[41] has not failed to draw the conclusion that the "origin" of Hesiod's story is to be found in the dream of Zarathustra. In fact, there can be hardly any doubt that there must be some connection, but this connection exists only in regard to one aspect of Hesiod's myth. Both in the Indian and the Persian form of the story there is an unbroken, one might almost say systematic, sequence of deterioration. In the description of every single age the same good and bad qualities are mentioned again in order to point out that, in each successive generation, men had less of the former and more of the latter. This fits Hesiod's purpose within the framework of his *Works and Days* very well, for he undoubtedly wishes, above all, to point out the contrast between the wicked present and the golden past when righteousness and justice were still to be found on this earth. But, as the previous analysis has shown, with the exception of the golden and the iron age, the descriptions of the ages as given by Hesiod do not agree with his main purpose. Yet it is exactly these descriptions that make Hesiod's version of the myth so much more interesting and alive than the systematic versions of the Indian and the Persian tradition. It follows that, contrary to E. Meyer's opinion,[42] what is most characteristic of these descriptions cannot have been the invention of Hesiod. They are obviously the result of the philosophizing—serious and humorous—of probably several generations of Greek story tellers on the relation between the present and the past. This is why they do not fit into one logical scheme. But it is a signal proof of Hesiod's genius as a poet that, in spite of the logical difficulty created by their adaptation to his scheme, he did not spoil them in the least.

There is, however, still another inherent difficulty or inconsistency in

39. Mahābhārata III, 11234 ff.

40. See E. W. West, *Pahlavi Texts* I, 191 ff. in Max Müller, *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. V.

41. R. Reitzenstein and H. H. Schaeder, "Studien zum antiken Synkretismus. Aus Iran und Griechenland," *Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, VII, 62 ff.

42. *Op. cit.* (note 37), p. 174.

the Greek myth of the golden age that has not yet been touched upon. The golden age is the age of Kronos. All the other ages fall under the reign of Zeus. Yet Kronos is described as a rather wicked god, whereas Zeus, in Greek poetry in general, and also in Hesiod, represents a higher order. How, then, can the golden age belong to the reign of Kronos and all the deteriorated ages down to the terrible and depraved iron age to the reign of Zeus? That Hesiod noticed the difficulty and was embarassed by it is obvious. As E. Meyer has pointed out,[43] Hesiod reveals, this embarrassment quite clearly when he does not say, as one would expect, that Kronos created the men of the golden age, but says, instead,[44] that they were created "by the Olympic gods who were at the time of Kronos." This vague and somewhat inconsistent designation of the divine creators of the golden race obviously serves to avoid the attribution of the creation of this generation to Kronos or to the Titans, who properly would represent the generation of gods contemporary with Kronos. But, for the same reason, there can be no doubt that the connection of the golden age with Kronos is older than Hesiod.

The most striking feature of the story of Uranos, Kronos, and Zeus, as told by Hesiod, is the duplication of events. Uranos does not allow his children to come to the light. They therefore hate him, but are too much afraid to revolt against him. Kronos, however, the youngest of his children, finally takes courage and, with the help and the advice of his mother, overcomes his father and becomes his successor as ruler of the universe. Then the whole sequence of events is repeated. Kronos again prevents *his* children from coming to the light by swallowing them. Zeus, however, is saved from this fate by his mother Rhea, and, with her help and advice, overcomes his father and becomes his successor as ruler of the gods and of the universe. There are a few minor differences between the two sections of the story: for instance, Uranos prevents his children from leaving the womb of their mother while Kronos swallows his children himself; whereas Kronos manages to escape from the womb of his mother, where he is kept as in a prison, Zeus, through a clever trick of his mother, is not swallowed by his father and is brought up in secrecy to take revenge both for himself and for his brothers. But, on the whole, the similarity is most striking. There is even a slight, but perhaps significant, additional analogy in the fact that Kronos is al-

43. *Ibid.*, 170.
44. *Works and Days*, 110-11.

ways called ἀγκυλομήτης, while Zeus has an especially close relation to Μήτις, which may be interpreted etymologically as measuring reason.

What, then, is the meaning of this duplication and why, if Zeus in so many respects appears to be nothing but a second Kronos, the antagonism between Kronos and Zeus? In fact, if one looks at the character of the three gods, as it stands out very clearly in Hesiod's poem, an antagonism between the two gods who stand at the beginning and the end of the sequence would seem much more natural. Certainly, though both of them may be sky gods, there is a much clearer and more pronounced contrast between them than between Zeus and Kronos. Uranos, though somewhat, but very imperfectly, personalized, is anything but anthropomorphic. He is a part of nature, or rather, together with Gê, he *is* nature; but, as the story clearly shows, unreasoning, overwhelming Nature in all its most oppressive force. There is nothing human, nothing intellectual about him. Zeus, in contrast, though his "original" nature as a sky god may not be entirely obliterated, is an intensely intellectual and humanized god. Though, as the greatest and most powerful of the Olympic gods he is still of superhuman stature, he is not, so to speak, beyond human measure. The same is true in an even higher degree of his fellow Olympians.

Zeus is not only an intellectual god, but also a god of wisdom. He is the guardian of human institutions, which through him receive divine sanction, and of justice in general. Inasmuch as he rules over nature he represents a natural order which is understandable to human beings, and, even though he may appear remote in his power and majesty, he can at least be approached with sacrifices and prayers, while other Olympic gods have still closer relations with human beings. In the Uranos myth as told by Hesiod, it is implied that no human beings nor anything comparable to human beings existed at the time when Uranos ruled the world. Yet it is clear that under the rule of Uranos, or to express the same idea in a non-genealogical form, in the face of that overwhelming and lawless power of nature which Uranos represents, man finds himself or would find himself in a state of utter helplessness and bewilderment.

Essentially the same contrast[45] between a god or gods who represent

45. Concerning the similarity and the differences between the Greek and the Babylonian myth see also Paula Philippson, "Genealogie als mythische Form" in *Symbolae Osloenses, fasc. supplet.* VII (Oslo, 1936), especially 6 ff. and 34 ff.

the primeval forces of nature and a god who represents a humanly understandable order has also found expression in Babylonian mythology, where Apsū and Tiamāt appear in the role of Uranos and Gê, while Marduk, the leader of the younger gods and later ruler of the universe, appears in the role of the Greek Zeus. But in the Babylonian myth this contrast is expressed in the form of a direct antagonism between the younger and the older gods, leading to a revolt of the latter against the former. There is no intermediate stage as in the rule of Kronos and the Titans in Hesiod's story.

The position of Kronos in the Greek myth is very peculiar. He is the brother of the Titans and is himself counted as one of the Titans. But the nature of the Titans in the *Theogony* and in Greek mythology is also ambiguous. It is obvious and has often been pointed out that the twelve Titans enumerated in *Theogony*, 133 ff., Okeanos, Koios, Krios, Hyperion, Iapetos, Theia, Rheia, Themis, Mnemosyne, Phoibe, Thetys, and Kronos, can hardly be considered as altogether identical with the Titans against whom the Olympic gods later[46] fight the great battle called Titanomachia, by which Zeus finally establishes his rulership over the world. For, as a result of their defeat in this battle they are hurled into the depths below the earth and kept there as prisoners. Yet, even disregarding Kronos, who, according to the story, has been conquered by Zeus before the battle begins, this can certainly not apply to Okeanos, Hyperion, Rheia, Themis, and Mnemosyne, and it would be very strange if applied to Theia, Phoibe, and Thetys. The sons of Iapetos—who are all counted as Titans—Atlas, Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Menoitios, have each an individual fate, though in some cases a fate similar to that of the Titans of the Titanomachia, but for different reasons. They can, therefore, not be considered as participants in the battle either. So of all the Titans mentioned there are only three who could possibly have participated in it. What is even more significant, the names of the Titans: Okeanos, the Ocean; Mnemosyne, Remembrance; Prometheus, the one who thinks ahead; and Koios, Kreios, Iapetos, Kronos, names which have no, or no easily discernible, Greek

46. *Theogony*, 617 ff. The question of whether parts of the Titanomachia in Hesiod are later interpolations, as F. Jacoby (*Hesiodi Carmina*, rec. F. Jacobi, pars 1: *Theogonia* (Berlin, 1930) and others believe, cannot be discussed here, and the question is not relevant to the main problem.

meaning, show that the various Titans are of very different character and provenience.

Again, it is impossible to discuss in detail the innumerable problems connected with the Titans. It is sufficient to point out some aspects which stand out most clearly and are most significant. In the Titanomachia two elements have obviously come together.[47] Some of the Titans, especially Kronos and perhaps only Kronos,[48] seem to have been pre-Greek gods who, in consequence of the Greek conquest of the Pelasgian world, were overcome and replaced by Zeus and the Olympians. In this respect, then, the Titanomachia seems to be the mythological reflection of a historical process. The second element, however, is much more in the foreground in the ancient descriptions of the battle. These descriptions of the Titanomachia are very closely related to those of the Gigantomachia, the battle of the gods against the Giants. The similarity in general character, though not in the details, is so great that, even in antiquity, the *Titanomachia,* which belonged to the so-called epic cycle, is occasionally quoted as *Gigantomachia.*

This does not mean that the Titans and the Gigantes are *originally*

47. The problem of the origin of the Titanomachia and its relation to the Gigantomachia is very complicated, but practically all scholars, even though approaching the problem from very different angles and arriving at very different results in regard to other aspects of the problem, have been compelled to acknowledge in one way or another the presence of the two elements characterized below. Cf. especially the three outstanding contributions by Maximilian Mayer, *Die Giganten und Titanen in der antiken Sage und Kunst* (Berlin, 1887); Max Pohlenz, "Kronos und die Titanen," in *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 19 (1916), 549-94; and U. von Wilamowitz, "Kronos und die Titanen" in *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie,* phil.-hist. Kl. 1929, pp. 35-53, especially p. 48.

48. Kronos is the only one of the Titans mentioned by name who can be proved to have been a real god, for the fact that Prometheus was revered by the potters in Attica as their divine patron certainly does not prove that he is an old god, especially since this "cult" is entirely isolated and obviously of comparatively late origin. Also, as Wilamowitz has shown very clearly, in the case of Kronos there can be no doubt that the struggle of Zeus against him reflects the historical fact that at one time the Greek god Zeus had to fight for his claim to be the supreme god against an earlier deity. As to the Titans, however, who, though without names, participate in the Titanomachia, it is not impossible that they owe their status as gods—in contrast to the Gigantes who were never considered as gods—merely to the fact that they had become associated with Kronos through their common antagonism to Zeus. At any rate, and only this is of importance for the problem under consideration, they were considered as earlier gods overthrown by Zeus and the Olympians in early Greek mythological speculation.

identical. In fact, it is most difficult if not impossible to determine what is original in these myths, and there is this difference, that the Titans are always considered as gods, while the Gigantes, in some stories, appear merely as savage tribes of superhuman strength and stature. In the description of the battle, however, whether it be the Titanomachia or the Gigantomachia, the Titans and Gigantes are clearly personifications of the brute forces of nature.[49] In this form the concept of the battle is not exclusively Greek. Analogies to it can be found in the mythology of many tribes both ancient and modern. A very well known analogy is the constant struggle of the gods in Nordic mythology against the giants, who represent mainly meteorological forces: hail, snow, storm, cold, etc. It is only logical that with the Greeks these natural forces of a Nordic climate should be largely replaced by volcanic forces, destructive winds, and the forces of the sea, but the underlying idea is essentially the same.

There is the one great difference that in Nordic mythology the struggle between gods and giants is never brought to a final conclusion. Though the gods are always victorious they never achieve a final victory, and the struggle is ever renewed in individual contests. In the Greek myth both the Titans and the Gigantes are definitely subdued. Nevertheless, allowance has to be made for the all too apparent fact that the brute forces of nature still manifest themselves down to the present day. This is achieved by the assumption that the fettered and imprisoned giants sometimes stir uneasily, straining their chains and threatening to throw off their fetters.

This attempt to solve an inherent difficulty, as well as other features of the Greek myth, show clearly that in Greek mythology the old Indo-Germanic concept of a battle between the gods and the brute forces of nature has entered into new combinations. On the one hand, it has been combined with a myth which reflects the historical process of the overthrow of pre-Greek gods by the gods imported and adopted by the Greek conquerors; this is the Titanomachia. On the other hand, it has been combined with historical legends of savage tribes of superhuman strength and stature, but of essentially human character, who have no regard for the gods and their divine laws and order, and who, therefore, are subdued and punished by the gods; this is the Gigantomachia.

49. See M. Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff. and 130 ff., Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

In both cases it is apparent why, in contrast to the original Indo-Germanic myth, the victory of the gods must be definite and final. But it is only the first combination that is relevant in the present context.

On the basis of these considerations it becomes possible to determine more clearly the position of Kronos and the Titans in the myth of the three ages of Uranos, Kronos, and Zeus. The Titans have been inserted into the general scheme because room had to be made for an earlier generation of gods who were overthrown by the Olympian gods, but who were certainly not identical with Uranos and Gê. But it is through their partial identification with the giants of Indo-Germanic mythology that they become part of a consistent whole. The natural forces, which are personified partly in the Titans of the Titanomachia, (though not in Kronos, Prometheus, and a good many other Titans who are mentioned individually),[50] partly in the Gigantes, and partly in other mythological figures like the Kyklopes,[51] the Hekatoncheires,[52] etc., are not in the same category or of the same order of magnitude with Uranos and Gê, the representatives of nature in its most overwhelming aspect. Yet it seems most appropriate that they should appear as the unruly children of Uranos and Gê, for they still represent untamed nature in its most violent, yet at the same time intermittent and sporadic, manifestations.

Kronos has been variously interpreted by different scholars as an earth daemon, a fertility god, a harvest god, a weather god, and a sky god; all of which is merely another confirmation of the obvious fact that these identifications with one or another abstract function are totally inadequate to describe the character of any god that has ever been a real god in any religion anywhere or at any time. But, whatever the other facets of his character may have been, it is clear that Kronos was always considered as a ruler, either of the whole universe in the period before Zeus, or, under Zeus's rule, of a part of the universe, for instance, of the Islands of the Blessed. This is something essentially different from the way in which any god may be called a lord. Secondly, it is equally clear that, in contrast to the Titans of the Titanomachia, he is certainly not a representative of the untamed forces of nature. What is stressed in his character is *not* brute force, but intelligence, even if a tricky,

50. See *supra*, p. 244.
51. Cf. M. Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 104 ff.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff. and Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

devious, or "crooked" intelligence. In early representations in Greek art, Kronos is very similar to and, if anything, less, not more gigantic than Zeus. If it is permissible to reduce the relation between Zeus and Kronos to a formula (which, like all formulas of this kind has to be taken with a grain of salt) one may say that the Titans are a projection forward, on a reduced scale, of the age of Uranos into the second period of evolution, while Kronos is a projection, on a reduced scale, backward into the same intermediate period of what is most characteristic of the rule of Zeus and the Olympians.

If this makes it easily understandable that Kronos could have been connected with the golden age, the question remains how Zeus, who represents a more perfect, a better, a more intelligent, and a juster order, can have been the god under whose rule the human race deteriorated from the bliss and justice of the golden age to the wickedness and misery of the iron age.

The notion of a struggle of the gods against the unruly forces of nature, the notion that a humanly comprehensible order has been established through the victory of a younger god over older gods representing overwhelming and incomprehensible nature, the notion, finally, of a lost paradise or of an age of bliss in the remote past, all these ideas have many parallels in the mythologies and religions of other nations. But the combination of these elements in one great scheme is Greek, and it is here that, as a speculation on the conditions of human life, they become most interesting.

Zeus presides over the regular order of nature.[53] He has also from very early times been the guardian of the sanctity of the oath and of the right and duty of hospitality, the protector of fugitives and suppliants, and, at the time of Hesiod, he could be invoked as the guardian of justice in general. In other words, he is the representative both of natural and of human, that is, moral and social, laws. In the myth neither kind of laws, not even the laws of nature, appears as eternal. This is not so strange as it may seem at first sight, for to human beings the acquisition of insight into the laws and regular order of nature is natu-

53. An interesting illustration is the Sarpedon story in *Iliad*, XVI, 431 ff. The time has come for the great hero Sarpedon to die. But Zeus loves him. He is sorry to see him die and deliberates with himself whether he should not save him from death. But when he discusses the question with his wife, Hera, he is reminded by her, that the whole order of the world will break down if one exception is made, he gives in immediately.

rally more or less identical with the establishment of this order itself. What is more, the most impressive manifestation of this order, apart from the daily revolution of the sky, is the regular change of the seasons, and, in an agricultural society, the gods who make the grain grow and who have taught man how to sow and harvest it, collaborate in upholding and emphasizing this order with man, who, ploughing, sowing, and harvesting, practices what he has been taught by the gods.

It is clear that the taming of nature, which, in the myth, appears as the establishment of a new divine order in nature, is closely associated with the creation of a stable social order. Hence the double function of Zeus. Yet there is a difference. The taming of nature is almost never reversed, except in those occasional inroads of violent natural forces which are symbolized in the giants and to some extent in the Titans. Not so the social order. The moral order and ethical values may be eternal, and philosophers like Socrates and Kant may have been guided in their actions by the moral law in all its purity, but in the actual historical life of ordinary man even moral precepts and ethical values appear in the form of concrete traditions and customs and, in practical life, they are more efficient in this impure than in their purest form.

Moreover, there are many things in human life which must be definitely regulated, though from a purely moral point of view it may be a matter of indifference whether they are regulated in one way or in another. Where common events of greatest emotional impact are concerned, such as birth, marriage, burial, and the like, these regulations are, under normal conditions, surrounded by a sacredness no less great than that of moral precepts, and the relation between the two types of traditions in common consciousness is usually very close.[54] In order to be sacred these traditions must be old, or at least their sacredness is enhanced by their antiquity. Yet inevitably, with changing conditions, some of these traditions, though not their purely moral kernel, must change, and where there is no change whatever a society becomes stagnant and decays. In order to prevent this stagnation, man must believe in and work toward what appears as a better future. On the other hand,

54. A striking example of this is the case of Antigone. If she had been a Persian it would have been her sacred duty to prevent the body of her brother from being buried in the ground, even against the command of a tyrant; that is, she would have to do the very opposite of what she does in Sophokles' play. Yet only a sophist will contend that therefore her struggle against Kreon and her disobedience are futile, and that it was not her moral duty to act as she did.

again, because of the close connection between morally indifferent traditions and the traditional incorporations of moral principles, any change in traditions also affects practical morality, and it is a general observation that in periods of rapid change, when old traditions are breaking or are broken down on a large scale, there is also widespread moral uncertainty and an increase in criminality. In a way, therefore, the present is always more wicked than the past.[55] Or, from another point of view one may say that the belief in a better past is just as important for the mental and moral health of a community as the belief in a better future, and it is always a very dangerous symptom when in a society these two opposite beliefs are seriously out of balance.

In the myth of the ages in its connection with Zeus and Kronos, this paradox of human existence has found a beautiful expression in three different ways or on three different levels. It has found its most direct expression in the connection of the golden age with Kronos and of the iron age with Zeus. For, even where the value of tradition is recognized, it is an essential and inevitable tendency of man to strive for a more perfect order, purified and freed of accidental, historically conditioned, and antiquated traditions; and it is therefore natural that the more perfect order should appear as the end of the process of evolution. Yet, since this process means necessarily a partial destruction of fixed and venerable traditions, it means also strife, struggle, complication, uncertainty, and a less common and less strict adherence to generally accepted rules; it is, therefore, understandable that, inevitably, under the more perfect order of Zeus mankind should appear less moral and more corrupt.

The apparent or real simplicity of the past in contrast to the present is a central point in the myth not only of the golden but also of the silver age. But the contrast between the two ages in Hesiod's story reflects the difference in the attitude of two different groups of men towards this simplicity. To the conservative half of mankind this simplicity appears as a great and glorious good which has been lost, so the

55. There is, of course, one important exception. When, after a revolution which has destroyed traditions violently and on a great scale, things again become settled and a more stable order returns, those representatives of the human race who love traditions and are natural admirers of the past will often have a great abhorrence for the revolutionary period which has preceded the immediate present. But they will usually have, at the same time, a more than ordinary love for a more distant past. So this is one of those exceptions which confirm the rule.

past is glorified as the golden age. To the progressive and sophisticated mind the same adherence to simple and fixed rules of conduct appears as simple-mindedness and is humorously characterized in the peaceful but dim-witted and helpless race of the silver age.

Finally, in the story of the bronze age and the age of the heroes, the expression of this ambivalence of man's attitude toward the past is complicated by a combination with the ambivalence of man's attitude towards certain human qualities and certain phases of human life, in this case specifically toward military prowess and the glory and misery of war. It also reflects, in addition, the ambivalent attitude, in a feudal age, of the common man towards his aristocratic masters, whom he admires and the harshness of whose rule he may at the same time, nevertheless, resent.

All this certainly does not mean that Hesiod invented all these stories in order to illustrate human life in all its different and contradictory aspects. It is quite clear that he tells them essentially as he found them, making only such minor adjustments as were absolutely necessary to make them fit somehow into his general scheme. Individually they are undoubtedly the product of many different poets and story tellers, each one of whom, through the special twist which he gave to an old story, emphasized a different facet of human life. This is another confirmation of the view that what is most significant in an ancient myth is neither its origin, the *Urmythus* which so many scholars try to reconstruct, nor what it has in common with the myths of other nations and periods, which has been the main object of comparative mythology, but just the opposite: the various forms and interpretations that are given to it in the course of centuries.

There is one other aspect of the story of Kronos, Zeus, and the history of the human race which has still to be considered, and this will lead back to Prometheus and Pandora, from whom the analysis has taken its start. Kronos, in contrast to Zeus, who is married to Μήτις, that is, measuring reason, is called ἀγκυλομήτης, the "crooked-minded." "Crooked" in this connection, however, is not primarily used in a moral sense; it rather means *devious, roundabout,* and "crooked-minded," therefore, *wily, tricky,* or simply *clever,* without any direct moral connotation.

In the story of Kronos as told by Hesiod, one does not find very much to implement this characterization, except the fact that Kronos attacks

and overpowers his father while he is embracing his mother. There is, however, another very important figure which bears the same epithet, Prometheus.[56] Prometheus is also given another and similar epithet, ποικιλόβουλος,[57] "planning, inventing, excogitating manifold tricks"; and in this case the characterization *is* implemented by a number of significant stories. In the *Theogony* these stories are related as follows.[58]

When the gods and the mortals came to a settlement at Mekone, Prometheus divided up a big ox. Then he placed the meat and the entrails on one side in a hide, covering them up with the ox's belly. On the other side he placed the bones, covering them up with fat from above and from below. Having done this, he asked Zeus which part he wished to take for himself and for the gods, and which part he wished to leave to mortals. Zeus, in his divine knowledge, knew that Prometheus wished to deceive him. Nevertheless, he intentionally chose the bones, which had been presented under the more attractive appearance. In his wrath, however, he *did not give*[59] the use of fire to mortals, but Promethus tricked him again (!) stealing the fire in a reed and bringing it to mortals. Upon this Zeus takes his revenge by sending to them Woman, who, under a very attractive appearance, will be the cause of unending trouble.[60]

The story contains several points which have no direct bearing on the main problem but are of some interest, because they show again how ever new reflections have entered into the same old story. It seems somewhat strange that Zeus should deliberately choose the worse part of the offering though, in his divine knowledge, he knows that Prometheus wishes to cheat him. Even if it is said that it does not matter to the gods what part they get, since they are not dependent on human nourishment, that Zeus insists on the division only in order to test Prometheus' honesty, and that he allows himself to be cheated in order to have more reason for punishment, it still is very strange that all this remains unexplained and, above all, that, at this juncture at least, the punishment does not fall on Prometheus at all, but on the mortals, who have not even been mentioned as participating in the planned decep-

56. *Theogony*, 546; cf. also 510.
57. *Theogony*, 521; cf. also 560.
58. *Ibid.*, 536 ff.
59. *Ibid.*, 563.
60. *Ibid.*, 585 ff. Cf. also *supra*, p. 229.

tion. What is even more striking: when Prometheus deceives Zeus a second time and steals the fire, there is no indication that Zeus again intentially allows himself to be cheated, and the repetition of the motif would, in fact, be quite absurd. This is conclusive proof that, in the original story, the gods were actually deceived, probably by the mortals on the advice of Prometheus and not by Prometheus directly, and that the version presented by Hesiod is that of a poet or storyteller who considered it unworthy of the highest god that he should actually fall a victim to the trickery of Prometheus.

The connection between the story about the offerings to the gods and the story of the theft of fire is also clearly secondary; for, unless a fair division of the slaughtered animal between mortals and gods is the condition on which the gods are to grant man the use of fire—but in this case it would be most essential that the fact be mentioned, which is not the case—the mortals must already have been in possession of fire in order to be able to make this kind of offering. Yet, when it is said that Zeus, in order to punish them for their dishonest trick, does not give them the use of fire, the opposite assumption is made. This inconsistency is further emphasized by the fact that, in the passage of the *Works and Days*[61] where the same story is mentioned, Zeus *hides* the fire, with the implication that before it had not been hidden. Clearly, then, the first part of the story, as told in the *Theogony*, was originally a separate story with the sole purpose of explaining the strange fact that in the most frequent form of Greek animal sacrifices the gods did not receive the better parts of the victim.[62]

There can be no doubt that the most essential part of the Prometheus legend is the theft of the fire. In an overwhelming majority of the many ancient versions of the Prometheus myth this is the sole basis of Prometheus' later sufferings and of his whole struggle with Zeus. But in

61. *Works and Days*, 50.

62. In actual fact, the Greeks knew two different types of animal sacrifice with rather different meanings. In one type, the holocaust, the animal is burnt. This is a real sacrifice in the sense that man gives up something to the gods. But there is also another kind of offering which consists in inviting the gods to look down upon and to participate in man's most joyful activities. Here it is quite appropriate that man himself should enjoy the meal which at the same time he offers up to the gods. The problem which the Prometheus story tries to solve results from the fact that there was no definite theory clearly distinguishing the meanings of the two types of offering. See also *Review of Religion*, X (1945), 18 ff. and 27.

a second version of the myth, which Hesiod tells in the *Works and Days,* the theft of fire appears in still another and most interesting combination. Zeus hides from the mortals not only fire but also their livelihood.[63] What this means is explained in the following lines, where it is said that *otherwise,* that is if Zeus had not hidden man's livelihood because of Prometheus' offense, man would not have to plough the fields and sail the seas, but would find his nourishment without such labor. This provides also another link with the story of the golden age, for it is in almost the same terms that Hesiod describes the life of that blessed generation.

Again the story, as told by Hesiod, presents some logical difficulties. True, if man's livelihood depends on the use of fire, then to take fire away from him is to hide his livelihood. But this is obviously not the meaning of the story, for the making of ploughs and the building of ships clearly presupposes the use of fire. Yet the fact that man has to use ploughs and ships is the consequence of Zeus's having "hidden his livelihood." If, on the other hand, before Zeus had hidden his livelihood, man could live a happy, easy, and blessed life without ploughs and ships, why not without the use of fire? It seems clear, also, that the use of fire, the use of ploughs, and the use of ships are essentially in the same category as advances in material civilization. Yet ploughs and ships are not taken away from man along with fire, but quite the contrary; the necessity of using them is imposed on him by the gods as part of his punishment.

Again, however, the logical difficulty gives the key to the story. Especially, if one considers that the description of the life of man, as it was before he had to use ploughs and ships, corresponds in part to the description of the golden age, the implication is clear that, in the Prometheus story of the *Works and Days,* the acquisition of technical knowledge and the taming of nature is the consequence of man's having been driven out of a natural paradise. It is, perhaps, not uninteresting to compare this with the Old Testament, where man is driven from paradise because he has eaten from the tree of knowledge. This knowledge is not technical knowledge; it is the knowledge of Good and Evil. But that the philosophy of the Prometheus story is not quite foreign to the Old Testament is proved by the fact that Cain is the first agricul-

63. *Works and Days,* 42 ff.

turist, and that his descendant, Tubalcain,[64] is the forefather of all iron workers, the earliest type of industrial labor.

Here, then, we find still another aspect of the ambiguous position of man in regard to the past and to the "progress" of the human race, and the reflection of still another paradox of human existence. That the taming of nature is one of the most important factors in the progress, not only of human civilization, but of the world as a whole, is clearly expressed in the myth of Kronos' struggle against Uranos and of Zeus's victory over the Titans. There are also many Greek legends in which the introduction of agriculture appears as a blessing—a precious gift given to mortals by a benevolent god. Yet, in the Prometheus myth of the *Works and Days*, three of the earliest and most fundamental steps of man's conquest of nature, the use of fire, the ploughing of the soil, and the building of ships to sail the seas, are considered either as an offense against or as a punishment imposed by the gods. In Hesiod's story, it is true, the toil, the danger, and the consequent misery connected with these new human activities, are stressed. But the description of the golden age, which is the counter-image to this life of toil, leaves hardly any doubt that the inventor of this part of the Prometheus legend would not have regarded the reduction of the working week to forty hours or less, and a high standard of living according to modern concepts, as a fulfillment of his dreams and an approximate return to the blessings of the golden age. The implication seems, rather, that the taming of nature through the tricks and inventions of man leads to an estrangement from nature and to a loss of that harmony with nature in which, in some remote past, he is believed to have lived. In other terms, one can also say that nature may be viewed both as man's enemy whom he has to combat and tame and whose secrets he has to find out if he wishes to raise himself to a higher plane, and as the friend and mother of all living beings, from whom man, in his vain desire for something better and higher has become foolishly and to his own detriment estranged.

That the image of the golden age in Hesiod implies the existence of a social order and the observance of moral principles, while nature outside the human world seems to be indifferent to morality, is of course no valid objection to this interpretation. It merely shows, what by now

64. *Genesis*, 4, 22.

has been demonstrated over and over again, that the stories of Hesiod are hardly ever completely consistent, because they reflect, not one, but many facets of human life. Nevertheless, there is one basic theme which, in very different forms and very different aspects, is present, sometimes more, sometimes less directly, everywhere in the myth of Uranos, Kronos, and Zeus, in the legend of the ages, and in the Prometheus story. This is the paradox that of all living beings man is the only one that is never satisfied with a definite and settled life, is always bent on changing the world and trying to raise himself above the conditions in which he lives, and who, nevertheless, in achieving his ends, at the same time always creates new dangers, new difficulties, and new kinds of suffering for himself.[65]

It remains to complete the interpretation of the Pandora legend and to show its relation to the myth of the ages and to the Prometheus myth. The misogynic version of the *Theogony*[66] obviously stands apart; its meaning is so clear that it does not require any special interpretation. But the difficulty of interpreting the version of the *Works and Days* also disappears after it has been demonstrated over and over again that all these stories in Hesiod are not simple allegories, but the result of a long process in which the same story has been reinterpreted many times and often given a new twist, so that it is not surprising if the final product is not perfectly consistent and logical.[67] Basic, obviously, is a tale according to which man's misery is due to a woman's ill-advised curiosity. If the object of this curiosity is the contents of a box, the story naturally can have two alternative forms: either the box contains the goods, in which case to *have* the goods in the box means to possess them, and if the box is opened they fly away and man is deprived of them; or the box contains the evils, in which case to keep them in the box means to keep them from doing harm, while if the box is opened they are free to fall upon mortals.

Innumerable tales with fundamentally the same idea can be found

65. On a different level and in a form foreign to the ancient Greeks, there is perhaps something analogous in the Christian experience that a man on the road to saintliness is more exposed to the attacks of evil spirits than an ordinary man who is neither very good nor very bad.

66. *Theogony*, 570 ff. and 590 ff.

67. Credit must be given to Albin Lesky (*Gnomon*, IX, p. 174) for having pointed out that the Pandora story of the *Works and Days* is obviously the result of the combination of more than one version and has no perfectly logical explanation.

all over the world, and in this form the story is not very profound. It becomes philosophical only through the introduction of Hope. Originally, no doubt, Hope was in a box containing only goods, and it is the one good that remains after all the others have escaped. In this case, the logical difficulties which have puzzled so many scholars in the Hesiodian version of the story do not arise. But the melancholy observation could hardly fail to be made that this one good that remains is a precarious good, since hope is often deceptive. From this observation it is not very far to the suspicion that hope might not be a true good after all, but rather an evil, since it deceives man about his real position in the world. In this way hope could get into the box of evils, and the logical discrepancy that man has both the hope which is supposed to have remained in the box, and the evils which have escaped from it, passes unnoticed.

Yet it is in this secondary and logically inconsistent form that the Pandora story becomes really suitable to form an integral part of the Prometheus myth. For hope, as the anticipation of a seeming or real good, is a very essential factor in that indomitable tendency to work for a better future by which man is distinguished from all other living beings, and which makes both the glory and the misery of his life. Since man, unlike other living beings, does not live merely, or even mainly, in the present but at least as much, if not more, in the past and in the future, to be without hope for him is to despair, *de-sperare;* and despair, like hope, in its full sense is exclusively human.

In Hesiod's *Works and Days,* hope is one of the gifts, whether good or bad, given to the human race by the gods. In Aeschylus' grandiose Prometheus trilogy, it is not Zeus but Prometheus who gives to mortals hope, along with fire. So the myth is again given a new turn and, at the same time, a new and more consistent interpretation. Of fire it is said that it was given as the beginning of and the necessary means toward all technical skills.[68] So, what for Hesiod's version was merely claimed as a logical implication, is here directly expressed. Of hope Prometheus himself says that he gave *blind* hopes[69] to the human race, because without them it would not be able to live. Prometheus gave these gifts to mortals because he took pity on them. But the view of human life expressed in this first part of the trilogy is utterly pessimistic,

68. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound,* 26.
69. *Ibid.,* 252.

for both gifts are precarious. This is emphasized by the chorus, who, although sympathizing with Prometheus and deploring the harshness of the new ruler of the universe, nevertheless tells Prometheus that he was wrong.[70] Why he was wrong the chorus does not say in this passage, but it becomes clear through the play as a whole. Zeus had decided to let the human race perish because it was too wretched to be allowed to live. Prometheus, in defiance of Zeus and out of pity, has made it possible through his gifts for man to live, but has not saved him from his misery. This is his wrong.

But, like most of Aeschylus' trilogies, his Prometheus trilogy did not end on a note of pessimism. After many myriads of years Zeus and Prometheus are reconciled. Zeus allows the human race to live. It seems that the human race is not cured of its inherent weakness, but a higher and more spiritual order of justice is established from which man can benefit, so his hope is no longer entirely vain.

The myth of Prometheus, with the very rich symbolism which it had developed at an early time, has continued to stir the imagination and to evoke the speculations of philosophers and poets down to the present time. Many new versions and new interpretations of the ancient versions have been added in the course of centuries. Some of these are more, others less, profound. But the deepest significance is not to be found in the beginning of the history of the myth, the *Urmythus,* or at its end, or in the middle, or at any other point of its development, but in the sum total of the various versions and interpretations. For it is only through the unconscious collaboration of many men with different experiences and different views of life that the myth unfolds its rich potentialities and becomes the expression of so many aspects of one of the most profound paradoxes of human life.

This unconscious collaboration of many poets, and storytellers in creating the rich symbolism of a myth is the element of truth in the otherwise fantastic notion of the romanticists of the early nineteenth century that a poem could have been made by a people or a nation rather than by an individual poet. But it is interesting to observe that what is true in this idea applies much more to Hesiod, who is a definite and recognizable historical personality, than to Homer, about whose life and person we know nothing. For the speculative elements in the *Iliad,* concerning, for instance, the relation between Zeus and fate, are

70. *Ibid.*, 261 ff.

the expression of a rather definite philosophy and much more consistent than the speculative elements in Hesiod's works. A careful reader of Hesiod can hardly escape the conclusion that he failed to unite these many logically inconsistent stories in one scheme, not because he was aware of a deeper significance behind the seeming inconsistencies, but, on the contrary, because he was not aware of them.

This does not mean that Hesiod was a poor poet and merely put together without understanding what others had created. It is a rather remarkable fact that Callimachus, the most sophisticated of the poets of the most sophisticated age of Greek poetry was a great admirer of Hesiod and praised him more highly than he did Homer. At least, he exhorted his fellow poets to imitate Hesiod rather than Homer, and, what is more, he himself in a way imitated Hesiod. But his imitation is a rather peculiar one. In his hymns, as well as in his *Aetia,* he tells old myths and stories with apparent childlike simplicity, yet everywhere, behind this seeming simplicity, one can recognize the highly refined and sophisticated artist who looks upon these stories both with the love of an artist for their inherent simple beauty and with the humor and irony of a sophisticated mind. All this is done with consummate art. There is, of course, no such sophistication in Hesiod. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that Callimachus looked on Hesiod also with concealed irony. He was aware that, with all his simplemindedness, Hesiod is a true and great poet who never spoils the stories that he tells, even if he is not aware of all their implications; and Callimachus had an undiluted admiration for his model, even though, when imitating him, he of necessity created something only apparently similar, but in fact very different.

This relation between Callimachus and Hesiod incidentally also reveals another aspect of the paradox that underlies the myth of the ages and the Prometheus myth. In the analysis of the myth of the silver age it has been pointed out that, to the progressive and sophisticated mind, the seeming or real simplicity of the past may appear as a defect. But not all sophistication has the same relation to progress. There is a certain refinement and sophistication which, just because it has reached a limit, longs for simplicity and tries to return to a simple past. This can result in works of great poetical beauty, but, as a return to real simplicity, it is hardly ever a success.

It is perhaps permissible to mention in conclusion one other mani-

festation of man's paradoxical attitude towards the past, since it has some bearing on the method followed in the present analysis. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was a general fashion to find a deep and superior wisdom in ancient myths and legends and, to a lesser extent, even in the religious beliefs and practices of so-called primitive tribes. In more recent times there has arisen a school of thought which has followed the opposite principle: the cruder and the more stupid an ancient or "primitive" myth or religious practice appeared in the analysis, the more "scientific" the analysis was supposed to be. Very lately there has been a certain reaction against this principle, but a haughty attitude towards ancient and "primitive" traditions is still prevalent, even among those who profess to think otherwise. In actual fact, wisdom is neither at the beginning nor at the end, nor is it the privilege of any one period or nation. Like its opposite, it is spread everywhere, even though not always evenly. But we would lose a great treasure if we were to give up the accumulated traditions of mankind for the sake of a science which, while extremely clever in the invention of methods for the collection and fixing of facts, and the isolation and clarification of very special aspects of human life, is all too often totally devoid of wisdom in regard to the whole.

THE BOND OF PERFECTNESS: THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF PERFECTION IN WESTERN CULTURE AND THEIR CHRISTIAN SYNTHESIS

HERTA PAULY

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID recently about the neo-Germanic mentality, the "Nibelungen" spirit, which found itself once again, this time in a dream of world conquest, and then lost itself in the nightmare resulting from total defeat. In condemning this fanaticism, it may be surprising to discover at the bottom of it an ideal —of which the phenomena we have witnessed in recent history are but a fatal aberration. This ideal, I propose, is neither uniquely German nor foreign to the cultural and religious temperament of the Western world, but on the contrary, it is highly characteristic of its conception of perfection.

The conception of perfection of the Western world is not uniform, but reveals a certain unstable balance between two alternate forms. One of these is essentially Platonic; the other appeared in its most unmixed form in the spirit of pre-Christian medieval Europe, as expressed in the literature of that period. The classical conception of perfection is most clearly defined in Plato's philosophy. It rests on the assumption of two separate worlds, the real and eternal, and the actual and finite world of existence. Since the former, by definition, is the sole realm of perfection, no perfection is possible in this world. Closely connected with the question of the possibility of perfection is the one which is of primary interest here, namely, the question as to what perfection consists of.

Plato conceived of the eternal as a realm of absolute, unlimited harmony which the finite world—being a fragmentary and distorted image of the other—can never achieve but only "reflect." Applied to art, this idea of reflection produces a style which strives for a harmony produced through structural unity and completeness. Applied to practical life, this harmony is pursued by assigning to each life impulse and capacity its well-defined place (as in the *Republic*). Through this technique, a mean of achievement and, at least, a formal harmony of life is secured through the limitation of its parts. Thus, over against the unlimited,

absolute harmony of the eternal, the "reflected" harmony of the finite world rests upon limitation. The reflected patterns afford an equilibrium of parts in place of the "real," absolute harmony which is out of reach. A union of the finite and the infinite is denied in principle; the finite world cannot go beyond reflecting the formal aspect of true harmony, but it can achieve balance and order. The finite world can avoid excess, but it cannot achieve absolute harmony in which excess would be absorbed in the unlimited.

While denying the possibility of absolute perfection, Plato's conception of perfection in the finite world rests upon it: the reflected form of absolute harmony is that of an all-inclusive, consistently harmonious state.

This, however, is not the only possible conception of perfection. Speaking of the "Germanic" mentality, Gottfried Weber, concluding from his comprehensive study of early German literature, characterizes it as follows:

> It is the concentration of all energies of life on some ethically fruitful moments which the Germanic man treasures, not comfort; hence his abrupt hurrying from one climax to another (*Gipfeltechnik*), disregarding the valleys which he finds unappealing and uninteresting, and the absence of epic and calming intermediate links. The sole theme of life is the counter-motion of heroic will and those fateful obstacles of an inner and outer kind, the struggle of both, which calls forth the greatest exertion and tension, and presses toward vehement release.[1]

Implied in this idea of the good life is a conception of perfection quite different from that of Plato. A harmonious state of being does not appeal to this temperament and, consequently, does not constitute its vision of perfection. Life rather draws its strength and meaning from those focal moments or periods when the various strands of life converge in a meaningful event. Perfection here is understood as a quality not depending on extension and equilibrium. It is a perfection realized in time and space but not measurable in terms of these; it is

1. "Die Zusammenfassung der Lebensenergien auf einige ethisch fruchtbare Augenblicke schaetzt der Germane, nicht das Behagen; daher das sprunghafte Eilen von einem Hoehepunkt zum andern. (Gipfeltechnik), das Uebergehen der als uninteressant empfundenen Niederungen, das Fehlen episch und beruhigender Zwischenglieder. Das einzige Lebensthema ist das Gegeneinander von heldischem Wollen und jenen schicksalhaften Widerstaenden aeusserer und innerer Art, der Kampf beider, der hoechste Anspannung hervorruft und zu erschuetternder Entladung draengt."

intensive, not extensive. Therefore, the tendency here is not to promote a stable balance of parts, but their submission to a few central, worthwhile, objectives. The ideal of co-ordinated diversity is rejected in favor of an all-absorbing unity. Life focuses not on totality but on climax-centers. Since a climax, however, does not last in an ever moving world, to seek the perfect man has to keep moving from one climax to the next. This partly explains the chivalric praise of *adventiure* (adventure) which became the accepted mode of life for the knight.

Implied in the *Gipfeltechnik* is, of course, that the experience and insight, the enrichment and chastisement received in these climactic events, do not simply disappear without trace and effect. They represent the culmination of the events preceding them, and they shape the physiognomy of life in the future. They are the spiritual and vital pulse through which ordinary life is directed and sustained.

The danger of this mode of life is that it may lapse into mere sensationalism and shallowness—the hedonism of the chivalric age. It avoids, however, the *ataraxia* tendency, another form of hedonism, which is the danger of the alternate ideal. Another danger of the *Gipfel* tendency is that it may lead to a monomania in which the radius of life grows smaller and smaller, until only one objective remains in complete isolation, from which, however, the objective cannot be reached because of the absence of "intermediate links," or because in its pursuit man destroys everything surrounding it and consequently himself in the end.

On the other hand, *Gipfeltechnik,* with its "concentration of the life energies on some ethically fruitful moments," if applied to a worthy cause, represents the more courageous and more creative ideal, because it recognizes not only the necessity of a "heroic will" in a world sorely burdened with "obstacles of an inner and outer kind," but it also recognizes the possibility of a creative and meaningful life, (not merely an ensured life) and, contrary to Plato's more cautious striving for the mean, based on the assumption of the impossibility of true harmony and absolute goodness, *Gipfeltechnik* explores the heights and depths of human existence in which there can be no radical separation of the "two worlds."

There are two motifs in Plato's thought which show affinity with the conception of the perfect implied in *Gipfeltechnik:* the motif of Divine Madness and that of Recollection. The former refers to the spirited

"part" of the soul, the latter to its intellectual capacity. Both serve as a link between the two worlds: recollection as an ever available one; *mania,* the ecstatic, in certain climactic moments. Yet, both serve as a *mental* link only, inasmuch as through them man gains glimpses of the real and eternal, but they do not actually bring the two worlds into contact.

The ideal of an intensive rather than extensive perfection is, however, not uniquely Germanic. It is also found, for example, in the Arthurian legends. Nor can it be considered typical only of that period. The idea of a centralized rather than extensive and all-inclusive perfection seems to a high degree characteristic of our whole Atlantic-Western culture. This is especially evident as applied to the evaluation of personality.

Although the three classical periods—the Early Renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in some but not all respects, the High (Italian) Renaissance, and the classical age of the eighteenth century—favored the well-rounded personality, the dominant ideal of the Western culture has not been that of all-round perfection. The Greek ideal of *to agathon,* the well-proportioned good, has, on the whole, not been that of Western humanity, even though the advantages of the balanced and extensively developed personality have always been acknowledged, and educationalists to this day have tried to cultivate it.

The ideal personality of the pre-Christian Middle Ages in Europe, to judge from the literature they produced, was the "hero," that is, the person who excels in one or several respects. His consistent perfection was demanded only at a later period, the Early Renaissance, when the Greek ideal of a combination of all virtues had been accepted. The High Renaissance, while resuming the Greek aspiration to totality, also preferred the outstanding personality of special excellence. While impressed with many-sidedness, this age did not insist on perfection of an individual in every respect. The emphasis was on excellence, not on harmony.

The Romanticists, while heirs to the classical period of the eighteenth century, paid homage to the "genius," the person of unique talent. Here, again, the life ideal is excellence and infinite expansion, not completion and equilibrium. Since that time, the value-criterion for personality has actually, although for good reasons not always overtly, been whether or not, colloquially speaking, "he's got something on the ball," and not whether he measures up to standard in every respect.

It must be acknowledged, however, that every age which has valued this type of personality has also recognized its dangers, socially and aesthetically, and modified this ideal by its own criticism. So, the knight, inclined toward extravagance, ruthlessness, and self-glorification, had to become more disciplined. His craving for *aventiure* had to be submitted to a higher objective, lest his life lapse into a meaningless, merely episodic form of existence. The criticism was voiced in terms both Greek and Christian, with the consequence that the perfect knight finally had to satisfy simultaneously the traditional pagan ideal of heroic action, the Greek ideal of moderation and prudence, and the Christian ideal of humility. He had to be humbly and wisely active.

Romanticism, also, recognized the danger of excess and the self-destructive tendency of a one-sidedly dionysiac ideal, criticised, for example, by Goethe,[2] as well as in the exclusive appreciation of the "creative" and novel. Ordinary life, too, had to be explored for its values. This, Adalbert Stifter's, argument represents a direct criticism of the tendency toward *Gipfeltechnik* as described by G. Weber. Those under its spell, inclined to concentrate only on the high points, fail to recognize the resources of ordinary life, the valleys. Stifter's criticism, however, proves as one-sided as the ideal he criticizes. He arrives at the view that life is meant to be taken in small sips; its greatness is found in the many little things.[3]

How does this conception of perfection implied in *Gipfeltechnik,* so far presented strictly as a cultural ideal, compare to the Christian conception of perfection? Do they correspond, or does Christianity share the Platonic idea of inclusiveness and limitation?

Platonism and Christianity, like Augustine's two cities, are often hard to tell apart and yet impossible to identify. One fundamental difference, however, is that the latter does not share Plato's unconditional dualism of the eternal and the actual world by which the achievement of perfection is ruled out a priori. Thus, although Platonism and Christianity converge in a pessimism regarding the possibility of perfection in this world, there is always a question whether its denial from the

2. *The Sorcerer's Apprentice; Hermann und Dorothea. Faust.* In the latter, without wishing to confuse the issue, it should be observed that in one respect Goethe finds the dionysiac in the wish to *give duration* to what is good only as a moment: "Verweile doch du bist so schoen."

3. Adalbert Stifter, *Der Nachsommer.* "Kleines ist mir gross."

Christian side represents an "empirical" fact only, or whether it claims to express a law of existence. Even the vision of the Kingdom—sympathetic as it is to the Platonic "other world"—is never completely and unhesitatingly projected into the beyond but is, in part, understood as a potential reality, and an imperative, of this world. St. Paul observed, "If in this life only we have hope for Christ we are of all men most miserable (I. Cor. 15:19). How much worth is the word "only?" St. Augustine, in his symbolism of the *civitas dei* and the *civitas terrenae,* expressed the view that the latter can at best achieve a compromised and incomplete peace. Here a Christian agrees with the Platonic view in which only a partial realization of the good is to be counted on, although Augustine explains this limitation almost entirely by human failure—sin—, and only to a very small degree as due also to lack of wisdom, independent of sin, but not metaphysically as does Plato. But Augustine also expresses the departure of the biblical view from Platonism, affirming that the two worlds do meet in temporal existence, especially through divine grace or the order of *caritas.* Hence, while, on the one hand, the absolute good becomes spoiled in the temporal world of relative goods and evil, on the other hand, the materials of this world may be changed, transfigured, through the creative and redemptive intervention of the divine spirit.

Secondly, Christianity does not interpret the world of existence as a reflection of the eternal. Nor does it conceive of the relationship between them as that of two parallel planes (or a plane and a sphere), but rather describes them as two worlds in contact, with the divine "entering" and giving direction to the historical. This entering is variously described as grace, divine love, or revelation. In this view the "other world" does reach this one, not symbolically, in a reflection, but actually; yet not in a sense of totality. It cannot be preserved as an entity, but active, it fuses with the organism of life, although it may, at least seemingly, withdraw its presence again.

There is a similiarity between this conception of the divine entering the historical at various points and *Gipfeltechnik.* In the pagan context in which Weber describes it, it does not have the religious point of reference (despite the belief in fate); in its dynamic form, however, and in the concentration on special focal points in life, a kinship is evident. The Old Testament, especially in its accounts of the epiphanies of God and its interest in certain moments of unique significance in the course

of history, religious and national, shows this characteristic,[4] whereas the New Testament transferred this interest in the focal points more to the individual inner life, especially to conversion and other forms of inner transformation. In this connection, one may mention also the *scala perfectionis* of the mystics. However, the Christian spirit in general, and, therefore, its idea of perfection, can by no means be interpreted as identical with that of the *Gipfeltechnik*.

First of all, historically—when Christianity was first introduced into Northern Europe, it met with considerable resistance. This was so largely because its ideal of personality conflicted with the pagan ideal in certain basic respects. It ran counter to the latter's heroic ideal and the unbroken vitality of the pagan spirit. In order to make Christianity appealing to these people, it was first necessary to heroicize the figure of Christ. One literary offspring of this approach was the Old-Saxon poem, *Heliand (ca.* 850), but only a later age proceeded directly to Christianize the hero. For these pagans, as for any prospective converts, the requirement of meekness and a relatively contemplative form of spirituality, the ethic of "turning the other cheek" and refraining from vengeance, were a stumbling block. Therefore, such demands as to love one's enemies, etc., were strongly compensated for by promises of reward, especially in terms of honor.[5] The *Heliand*, with the explicit mission of a reconciler, made more concessions to the native taste than was possible without compromising the Christian spirit.

On the other hand, the poem is clever in playing up those aspects of the life of Jesus which would appeal to these people, and which had parallels in their own culture. Their appreciation of the leader-follower relationship, for instance, found in Jesus and his disciples an equivalent in which loyalty and devotion to a cause appear in close association with loyalty to a person.[6] Steadfastness and perseverance were easily identified with *stête*, as against *wanken* and *zwifel*.[7] In an accelerated form this attitude becomes part of the *Gipfeltechnik*, in that it

4. Weber also refers to the structural kinship between the Germanic spirit (he is concerned only with this Germanic aspect) and the Old Testament—its heroic features such as the stories of Judith, the three men in the fiery furnace, etc. Cf. his *Der Gottesbegriff des Parzifal* (Frankfurt am Main, 1935), p. 11.

5. Typical also are the descriptive words used for Jesus, such as *Sigidrohtin*, the "Conqueror-hero," "the powerful," "the strong," and the like.

6. Cf. the Arthurian legends.

7. *Wanken*, to waver, to capitulate; *zwifel*, doubt.

demands, at least periodically, the concentration of all energies on one objective, entailing disregard of the accidental and mediocre, as well as a degree of asceticism.

In this respect, the author of the *Heliand* thus tried to enlist the *Gipfel* spirit for the Christian religion by bringing out affinities between the two, such as appreciation of an uncompromising devotion to a worthwhile cause. Obviously this attitude carries the germ of fanaticism and may be especially catastrophic if applied to a bad cause. In the *Nibelungen* epic, for example, we find this motive carried to such extremes that the Nibelungen engage voluntarily in a long journey and a battle which they know from the start they will lose. Nevertheless, they enter it for reasons of honor as well as revenge.

While the *Heliand* does bring out points of affinity between the native and the Christian ideals, there is no doubt that the mission of this poem was more a matter of adapting than of adopting Christianity. At a later period, however, the knight had to strive for an all-inclusive perfection by the standard of the Greek ideal of a combination of all virtues.

It must be acknowledged now that, at this period, we can no longer isolate the extensive ideal of perfection as being Platonic, inasmuch as Christianity, in its uncompromising and unlimited ethical demands, also strives for a consistent, all-inclusive perfection: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Mat. 5:48). On the other hand, the New Testament does not, throughout, dwell on the extensive perfection of man but insists on the essential perfection of faith, love, and "a better hope, by the which we draw nigh unto God" (Heb. 7:19),—"charity, which is the bond of perfectness (Col. 3:14). St. Paul goes so far as to declare: ". . . my strength is made perfect in weakness. . . . I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me" (II Cor. 12:9). For him, God's grace "is sufficient." Paul's praise of human weakness, both as found within and coming from without, expresses in extreme, if not paradoxical form, one outstanding aspect of the Christian faith: not particular perfection, but a complete commitment of faith is the essential Christian virtue for, as in the story of the rich young ruler (Mat. 19:16 ff.), particular virtues sometimes may mean no more than a camouflage for the lack of an essential commitment. Not a number of virtues, but "the abundance of the heart." What is the dimension of "abundance?" It is the infinite,

abundance is excess; it is that which transcends all measure. This excess, however, is centered too, not detached and accidental, but it may challenge and sometimes break the stable balance of the Platonic mean. While the latter affords the security of a stable balance achieved by reason, the Christian excess of love, transcending the mean, draws its strength and steadiness, as well as its justification, from faith.

Concerning the possibility of total perfection, its Christian symbol, the Kingdom, is conceived of as "to come," or else to be completed, at the end of history. (It is not important here whether "on earth" or "in heaven.") The possibility of total perfection in history is thus denied. Concerning total perfection of the individual personality, Jesus, when addressed as "Good Master," replied, ". . . none is good save one, that is, God." The possibility of a totally perfect personality is thus implicitly denied—even though it is demanded (cf. the Sermon on the Mount).

However, if we look at the people Jesus chose for his disciples, or at his comments on those with whom he came in contact, we find that he did not choose or value them by a standard of consistent and detailed perfection, but by their possession of certain central qualities,—great faith, love, or humility. Even such excellences were not necessarily consistent, as Peter's case may suggest. The central perfection of faith, love, and humility, as well as the practical virtues of courage and loyalty to the faith are, however, frequently acknowledged and are the very criterion of a Christian. While the New Testament thus conceives of total perfection as an ultimate demand, the central perfection of the heart is the essential task of human existence. All "extensive" goods, or virtues, are derived from this and are secondary to it.

The Christian idea of a "centered" perfection thus corresponds in its dynamic and form to the *Gipfeltechnik,* but to this it adds the religious dimension and reference. This means that the Christian conception of perfection gives to the *Gipfel* form a content which also distinguishes it from the classical perfection. It adds the content of the infinite or divine.

In the Christian conception, therefore, both "worlds" are involved. This has some important consequences: While in a *Gipfel* constellation the separateness of the "two worlds" is overcome, the actual twofoldness is presupposed—a conception which did not disturb the pagan mind which lived in a more self-sufficient world. It is interesting in this respect

that, following the spiritual struggle between paganism and Christianity in medieval Europe—a struggle which centered in the breaking of the pagan *hubris*—the resultant Christian mood was distinctly depressive, manifesting itself in an outspoken otherworldliness. The separateness of the two worlds, earth and heaven, was stressed, and the reconciling, redeeming aspect was minimized. Christ, in some of the early literature, is not so much the one who overcame the world from within, but the fighting hero who rescues man's soul out of the hands of the devil who holds dominion on earth.[8] The world remains a valley of sorrow, the *civitas diaboli*, with no meaning of its own. All real value was projected in the life hereafter.[9] With this emphasis, the high-Romanesque[10] Christian spirit repeats the Platonic pattern. The image of the two cities had changed from its Augustinian dialectical sense to that of a complete dualism in which there is no hope in this world. It displays the Platonic dualism, but what is more, without its solution: it does not resort to ordering the world, but conceives of it as in a state of arrest, or under a "ban" from which it can be released only through intervention from without.

Hartmann von Aue (A.D. 1220) still has this picture of the world, but he restores it to its truly Christian proportion by stressing that God makes demands upon man before he offers his redeeming grace. This implies that there are resources also in the world for overcoming the gulf. In this poem, however, man's part in the process of redemption is reduced to his overcoming selfishness and lack of faith. The love of a woman whose complete unselfishness is expressed in her offer to die for Heinrich in order to save his life—and this is what he sought—could not redeem him; it rather tempted him to be an emotional and ethical parasite. Freely extended love and forgiveness, unless they evoke a change of heart in the loved one, do not redeem but, rather, corrupt him. Even the love of God, the purest and most self-giving, cannot become effective in the world, but remains crucified unless man actively responds to it. Heinrich's final change of heart, the willing acceptance of his destiny, is immediately met by God's saving intervention. *Der Arme Heinrich* is a perfect example of *Gipfeltechnik* in its Christian form.

8. Cf. for instance, *Die Erloesung* (author unknown) ed. by Friedrich Maurer.

9. The monologue of the girl in *Der Arme Heinrich*, by Hartman von Aue, for example.

10. The early Christian period in central Europe, ending *ca.* 1200.

Wolfram von Eschenbach, in his epic poem *Parzifal,* goes much farther in his affirmation of man's activity in the process of redemption, and the possibility of achieving perfection. He conceives of it as a gradual process in which man, despite ups and downs—due to error!—improves through development and learning. The resources for and, therefore, the possibility of perfection are conceived of as, for the most part, immanent in human nature, and the need for grace from without is relatively small, constituting no more than the finishing touch.[11] Gradualism thus combines the Platonic conception of an all-inclusive perfection with the climactic conception of *Gipfeltechnik:* perfection thus is seen as one final peak.[12]

It may be observed that the two poems sketched above are representative of two basic types of Christian philosophy, redemption religion proper, and gradualism, or attainment religion. It would be futile to uphold either one of them as "more" Christian than the other, since the New Testament can furnish each with sufficient evidence of authenticity. Each type, however, if carried to its extreme, will be found to diverge noticeably from the Christian spirit. Gradualism may ignore the limits of human resources and achievement and lose sight of the need of grace in which all biblical faith recognizes the ultimate source of perfection. When redemption religion becomes too strongly dualistic, it either "denies" the world, whereby it also distorts the idea of divine grace into a quasi-magical power which it expects to alley the diabolic *perpetuum mobile* of the world. Or it may, in effect, "deny" the "other" world and concentrate on making perfect adjustments to the fact of imperfection, as does Plato. The religious tragedy of this solution found its classical expression in Dostoevski's Great Inquisitor who, paying allegiance to an ecclesiastical system erected to overcome the depths, also excluded the heights.

The conception of perfection of the Western world[13] thus reveals a constant struggle between the two types here discussed. The *Gipfel*

11. In Wolfram's gradualism thus may be recognized the transition from the Augustinian to the Thomistic picture of the world.

12. Plato's gradualism is of a typological rather than developmental kind, cf. the *Republic,* although the gradual ascent of the *Timaeus* resembles the type here discussed. Plato, however, ascribes the *Gipfel* to the infinite world.

13. Since this article was written, the Princeton University Press has published a small book on this subject, *The Idea of Perfection in the Western World,* by Martin Foss.

variety may dominate in the Atlantic-Western world, but the tension between the two types is present in every religion or life-ideal which tries to come to terms with the two principles, the absolute and the relative. Platonism arrived at two standards of perfection. Starting with the absolute, but finding it inattainable, it posits a substitute standard of extensive, but limited perfection. The *Gipfel* conception of perfection strives against diversity, that is extension, trying to reduce it infinitely.

Christianity attempts to include and relate creatively both dimensions, by making the central perfection of the heart the beginning, and the unreplaceable foundation of an infinite, never complete, process of extensive perfection.

THE CONCEPT OF DREAD: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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The Concept of Dread (with the subtitle "A simple psychological deliberation oriented in the direction of the dogmatic problem of original sin") was published only four days after the *Philosophical Fragments*,[1] in June, 1844. In many ways this "simple" deliberation is the most difficult book Kierkegaard ever wrote. Although he attaches a pseudonym (Vigilius Haufniensis) to the volume, he uses a direct rather than an indirect mode of discourse, and we may therefore assume that, for the most part, he is expressing his own convictions.

The Introduction discusses the relations between psychology and dogmatic theology, with side glances at the roles of philosophy and ethics. S.K. wished to get the lines of demarcation straightened out because Hegelianism had blurred them by claiming to make reality-as-a-whole apprehensible as a logical system. His main objection to "the System," in this book and elsewhere, was that since it failed to provide for real contingency and freedom, it could not make room for "history" (in Kierkegaard's sense) at all. Then, to make matters worse, it confused religious reconciliation, which overcomes guilt, with logical reconciliation, which overcomes contradictions in thinking. Consequently S.K. attempts to show that sin cannot properly be approached in a mood of philosophical disinterestedness; nor can any amount of thought make it rational.

One might easily suppose that sin can best be treated as a topic under ethics, but Kierkegaard declares that a merely ethical approach founders upon the concept of sin. The ideal demands of ethics make us aware of our failures, but they do not give birth to a new life. Religious faith, on the other hand, begins with a reality—the reality of the "new life"—instead of being based merely upon ideals. Hence ethics, by deepening a man's awareness of moral conflict, can prepare the way, but it cannot furnish the solution.

* *The Concept of Dread.* By Søren Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton University Press, 1944. xiii, 154 pp. $2.00.

1. See *The Review of Religion*, January 1943, pp. 143 ff.

Now what about the relations between theology and psychology? The former takes for granted the actual operation of sin in the race as well as in the individual. The latter (which Kierkegaard regards as the science of "mental states") can study the abiding state out of which sin continually comes into being, but it cannot bridge the gap between potentiality and actuality. In other words, psychology, as a science, is interested in general formulae; the concrete, personal reality of sin falls outside its purview. Thus theology begins where psychology leaves off, according to Kierkegaard, and furnishes the explanation which it cannot reach.

Chapter I is entitled, "Dread as the Presupposition of Original Sin and as Explaining It Retrogressively by Going Back to Its Origin." Kierkegaard was a pioneer in formulating a Protestant doctrine of original sin which would steer between the opposite extremes of Pelagianism and Calvinism. Before dismissing him as "morbid" (because he missed the privilege of seeing how well the race would turn out in the twentieth century?), his critics should, at least, examine his arguments carefully. As a matter of fact, he rejects the traditional, "morbid" view because it puts Adam outside the history of the human race instead of discerning in him a symbol for what happens in the experience of every individual; it postulates a fantastic state of original righteousness and then explains individual sin through Adam's fall, instead of showing how sin arises in each man directly. Moreover, the traditional view encounters difficulties in connection with the Atonement, for if Christ made satisfaction for original sin, either Adam was subject to it like everyone else, or Christ cannot save him.

Kierkegaard's own thesis is that every individual is both unique and at the same time bound up with the history of the race. Theories which stress racial solidarity fail to do justice to individual responsibility. Those which stress unconditional individual free will fail to take into account the fateful influence of racial factors. The essential thing to grasp about the origin of sin is that it involves a "qualitative leap," an act of freedom. The abstract understanding, when dealing with the story in Genesis, begins with man as righteous and then keeps on talking until sin "somehow" appears. This explanation is like the childhood rigmarole which, by beginning with "one nis ball," "two nis balls," etc. finally gets to something qualitatively different—"tennis balls." In short, the traditional attempt to make the transition from

"no sin" to "sin" fails because it must somehow get Adam naughty *before* he commits the first sin, and then, of course, it is not the first.

The sinfulness of the race acquires a history, and each individual is born into the context of this history. But quantitative accumulation cannot by itself explain how the individual succumbs. Sin does not get started in the child merely through his imitation of adults; nor can biological propagation explain its transmission, for the individual's freedom is involved in making himself what he becomes.

The proper employment of the idea of original righteousness, therefore, is to equate it with that innocence and ignorance which every individual loses through his own act. The Fall should also be re-interpreted as something which one likewise originates, instead of being regarded as similar to an epidemic disease. At this point, a clear conception of how psychology and theology can supplement each other is of the utmost importance. Psychology can describe how prohibitions provide the *occasion* in which man makes the leap into sin. But psychology can easily falsify the picture if its tracing of causal connections is allowed to conceal the fact that evil desire, sin, and guilt burst upon the scene simultaneously by a radical and discontinuous break, instead of coming into being by progressive stages.

The theological explanation is connected with the concept of dread. The account in Genesis recognizes that man in his innocence is ignorant of the difference between good and evil. As soon as moral distinctions arise, there is already something wrong; conflict has already broken out. So long as innocence lasts, however, the spirit is dreaming, and the difference between self and other is a "nothing." But it is precisely this "nothing" which produces dread. Dread arises at that point where "nothing" and "possibility" intersect. It is not fear of something definite yet it is in this possibiilty of making something out of nothing that freedom (spirit) is born. Dread is therefore ambiguous; it is both fascinating and repellant, both captivating and alarming. And because it is ambiguous, dread furnishes the middle term, corresponding to the qualitative leap from innocence to guilt. A psychological description of dread is as close as we can come to that "explanation" which only the qualitative leap itself can furnish.

Kierkegaard goes on to provide more specific clues to the meaning of this seemingly vague account. He regards man as a synthesis of soul and body, united by spirit. The spirit is present from the outset, but

dreaming. In a sense, it is a hostile power, for it disturbs what would otherwise permit man to be simply an animal, free from the torments of a higher destiny. Yet it is also a friendly power, because it enables man to reach integration at a higher level—i.e., as a "person." Man desires to flee from it into a vegetative existence; yet he must cling to it in order to remain human. Thus innocence is not mere brutishness; it is ignorance qualified by spirit. Knowledge of good and evil stands outside this condition, projected in dread as an immense "nothing," a frightening, tantalizing "I know not what."

Therefore it is a mistake to assume that man in his innocence (Adam before the Fall) can understand God's prohibitions; to attribute an evil desire to him is to get ahead of the game. A prohibition merely induces dread because it awakens the possibility of freedom—a "being able" to do what, whether good or evil, he does not yet know. Further than such observations psychology cannot go; but it can verify them constantly by watching human life. (There is one part of the story, however, which baffles Kierkegaard—the serpent; for the serpent's role conflicts with the idea that every man is tempted by himself.) In order to go further, one must put aside the method of science, which abstracts from emotional and subjective factors for the sake of reaching general formulae that cover objective, public data. Instead, one must apprehend the origin of sin in himself, as something which, with the ambiguity of dread, comes into the world neither by necessity nor by abstract free will. Yet everyone can do this; and everyone who tries to understand sin by attributing its origin to someone else, while exempting himself, *eo ipso* misunderstands it.

Chapter II is entitled, "Dread as Original Sin Progressively." Although the cumulative effect of sin in the history of the race cannot by itself *necessitate* the initiation of sin in the life of the individual, it makes dread "reflective" by opening up two opposite alternatives. First, collective sin is a constant reminder of a possibility which hangs over the head of the individual; secondly, salvation now appears as a possibility which he both loves and fears. When salvation is finally reached through travail, "possibility" is put behind. This does not mean that freedom has been annihilated, but it plays a new role when all moral tension, all conflict between "wish" and will, has disappeared.

When sin comes into the world, it affects not merely the life of man, but the whole creation. This effect Kierkegaard calls "objective dread."

Since man is a unity of soul and body, he cannot be regarded as cut off from nature, hence anything that disrupts man has repercussions that extend indefinitely. "Subjective dread," on the other hand, is that which accompanies the leap of the individual into sin. Freedom gazes down into the abyss of possibility, becomes dizzy, and succumbs. "That very instant everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain. . . . Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in impotence" (p. 55).

Through sin, sensuousness becomes sinful; it is not intrinisically evil, yet the complete victory of spirit involves reducing the erotic to a matter of indifference. "In Christianity the religious has suspended the erotic, not . . . by an ethical misunderstanding of it as sinful, but . . . because in spirit there is no difference between man and woman" (p. 63). This "Either/Or" between sex and spirit represents Kierkegaard's own situation, though he seems to have been more pre-occupied with the possibilities of eroticism than with overt action. At any rate, his own personal relationships lie behind what look like general statements. When he thinks of his father's guilt and how it influenced his own life, he is compelled to recognize that cumulation of sensuality in one's forebears can give rise to an intensification of it in the individual. Yet to exonerate the individual by throwing all the blame on the race, would be to overlook his guilt, while to deny that racial evil plays a fateful role would be to overlook his innocence. The impotence mentioned above consists in the fact that the individual is both guilty and innocent.

Although egotism should be included in the definition of sin, those theories which virtually identify the two overlook sensuality. Moreover, it is strange to find a philosophical system (Hegel's) which makes no real place for the individual self identifying sin with selfishness. Actually, sin is the cause of egotism as well as of sexual guilt. Everything is thrown into confusion when the issue is reversed and selfishness is regarded as the cause of sin.

Chapter III is entitled, "Dread as the Consequence of that Sin which is the Default of the Consciousness of Sin." One could hardly guess from the topic that Kierkegaard proposes to show how man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, as well as of body and soul. Nevertheless, the real theme of the chapter is that the leap into sin

takes place in an "instant" which is the intersecting point of eternity with time. Witty people might be inclined to say that S.K. suffered from a case of "leaping dialectics," for sin and faith both involve a leap. They might also accuse him of "instantosis," for "the instant" remained one of his central categories to the end of his career. Yet nothing in his writings rewards careful study more richly than his passages on the interrelations between history and the eternal.

The problem of time cannot be solved by logic because it treats "the instant" abstractly, and leaves the present as an absurd middle-point "which lies between movement and repose, without occupying any time" (p. 75 n.). Christianity, on the other hand, takes history seriously as the setting in which man exercises freedom in seeking a right relationship with eternity. Therefore, in order to understand either sin or atonement in Christian terms, it is necessary to employ some means other than (Hegel's) logic. Since each moment (and the sum of all moments) involves process, there is no way of defining the "now" as a fixed point of reference without transcending flux. Usually we are not aware of this fact because we spatialize time and regard it as an extended line which is itself standing still. Actually the "pure present," regarded as an invisible moving point, sandwiched in between past and future, is empty. But if we define "the instant" as the point where eternity touches time, then it may be incomparably swift, and yet filled with content and value. Properly understood, "the instant" is an atom, not of time, but of eternity; it is a finite attempt to fulfill time. Hellenism, because it sought eternity through escape from time, was oriented backward; it sought perfection prior to history (e.g., the Socratic doctrine of "reminiscence"). Christianity is oriented forward, and seeks an eternity which can transform history.

The spirit makes possible a synthesis between the temporal and the eternal in man. Therefore a man could exist merely in the temporal, as nature does, only if he could succeed in killing the spirit and ceasing to be human. From the standpoint of spirit, the future is the most significant aspect of time, since it includes all that has preceded and may, therefore, stand for the whole. For example, we speak of a "future" life when we mean "eternal" life. But strictly speaking, the central Christian concept is that of "the fullness of time," the instant as eternity. Therefore the Christian conceptions of conversion, atonement, and redemption are misunderstood so long as past and future

are seen in simple continuity with each other on a flat plane of history. The entrance of eternity into time alone can explain the decisiveness of past sin as something to be undone, and the decisiveness of the resurrection as a future which brings into history something not naturally immanent within it.

How does Kierkegaard apply these considerations to the theme of dread? In the state of innocence, the possibility of the eternal manifests itself as future; one always dreads the future, never the past. When freedom succumbs in the presence of possibility, the temporal *becomes* sinful. Temporality is no more intrinsically evil than is sensuousness, but as soon as sin is posited, it is sinful to try to live merely in the temporal, and death becomes terrible instead of natural. Conscious dread may be excluded by a retreat into spiritlessness; but then unconscious dread lurks as a waiting nemesis for every empty life.

There are two other respects in which dread may be attached to an incomplete awareness of sin. The first is typical of Hellenism, where fate is the object of dread. Since, in this instance, the concept of individual guilt is not yet fully developed, the notion of fate is obviously sub-Christian; yet the doctrine of original sin has frequently been thrown into confusion in the history of theology by being made equivalent to fate. The true correlate to fate is the idea of genius. Ordinary probabilities mean nothing to the genius; everything depends upon how he stands with his secret friend-and-enemy, "destiny"; and his greatness, whether it is constructive or catastrophic, depends upon the fact that by reason of his faith in destiny he does not react to peril and triumph as other men do. Yet the genius can never satisfy himself, since he can never get beyond temporal determinants—luck, honor, fame, power. His only alternative is to turn back upon himself reflectively, become religious, and replace fate by providence. Nothing is proved by the fact that a genius may remain happy without becoming religious; Talleyrand, for example, remained extroverted and gained the temporal immortality of popular acclaim; but, by avoiding the torments of religious transformation, he lost the kind of eternal immortality which is available to every ordinary man.

The second type of dread (which is characteristic of Jewish legalism) attaches itself to guilt. In a sense, Judaism is more advanced than Hellenism, but its recourse to sacrifice also fails to remove dread, as is proved by the fact that the sacrifice has to be repeated. Only an atone-

ment which overcomes guilt once for all can supersede the repeated sacrifice. Once again, the doctrine of original sin has frequently been confused by attempts to explain guilt as a result of abstract free will. The true correlation should be between guilt and the idea of the religious genius. No one today devotes attention to the problem of the religious genius whose penetration into the meaning of his personal freedom (*not* abstract free will) so enmeshes his life with the history of the race that he feels as though the sins of the whole world had united to make him guilty. Yet his problem is, in principle, everyone's problem, since it is false to assume that only certain eccentric individuals have to worry over the relationship between freedom and guilt, while others are temperamentally so constructed that the dilemma does not apply to them.

Chapter IV is entitled, "The Dread of Sin, or Dread as a Consequence of Sin in the Particular Individual." As we have seen already, Kierkegaard regards the distinction between good and evil as something which grows out of sin, instead of vice versa. It is only as a consequence of the "Fall" that the self splits into two factions which war with each other in moral tension. This thesis is directed against the traditional assumption that man begins with a free will whereby he can choose between known goods and evils, "somehow" makes a wrong choice, and thus falls into sin. Kierkegaard is right in contending that the traditional view is nonsense. No one possesses knowledge of moral distinctions prior to the exercise of freedom; and no one is "free" in the sense that he can turn in an equally uncaused fashion toward either the good or the evil.

After the leap of freedom into sin, however, dread attaches to concrete objects—the good and the evil—instead of to "possibility." It is easy to see why dread attaches itself to evil; for even though "every repetition of (sin) is not a simple consequence but a new leap" (p. 100), evil makes the recurrence of sin increasingly difficult to forestall. So one dreads the threat of sinking deeper, while clinging to the very things which threaten his doom. (Here the ambiguity of dread is observable once more.) If after a while dread decreases, that may merely show that sin is triumphing; but when remorse becomes increasingly intense, while remaining impotent to stop the dragging march of sin, it may literally drive a person insane. Frequently it drives one into escapist vices instead. The only genuine remedy is faith—the courage

to believe that continuance in sin is a new sin. Such faith frequently cannot arise until a man has been brought to the brink of despair. He has remained immobilized between a futile remorse which delays action and a tormenting conscience which demands action. At last he gains a "new self" through the Atonement, which cancels and obliterates sin once and for all.

It is more difficult to understand how dread can attach itself to the good. The New Testament, to be sure, depicts the demon-possessed as afraid to come into touch with the good, but our age has forgotten all about the demonic. We deal with it under categories like fate and misfortune, as something analogous to congenital insanity. Instead of helping the sufferer, this merely protects our own egotism. "One dare not in a deeper sense think of such troubles, and so one spares oneself by compassion" (p. 107). A genuine compassion will involve such suffering identification with the demonic person that in fighting for his sanity we have to fight for our own. It will also involve a clear discrimination between how much the mania is due to fate, and how much it is due to guilt. We rightly shudder at how insane people were treated in the past, but the opposite extreme, which completely exempts them of responsibility for their malignant human relationships, leads to treating them as things instead of as persons.

Because man is a synthesis of soul and body, the demonic may manifest itself at various levels, ranging from physical illness to moral disorder. There is a trace of it in every man, as surely as he is a sinner. Accurately defined, the demonic is dread of the good. It seeks to shut itself off from the possibility of reintegration and salvation. Therefore, the demonic involves a kind of "shut-upness." When it is tricked into coming out into the open, it regards such self-disclosure as a betrayal. "Shut-upness" must not be confused with the reserved self-possession which accompanies the highest kind of freedom. The demonic individual is a prisoner; the free man, though self-contained, is constantly open toward other persons. One test of the difference is—silence; the demonic individual cannot endure it, and he can sometimes be broken down by a man whose God-relationship is so strong that he can remain silent.

One need not travel far in order to observe the varieties of the demonic; he need only pay attention to himself and a few others. The problem is especially important in connection with children, because

they need to be brought up by self-possessed people and protected from contact with the demonic. The former know how to let the child walk alone whenever he is able to do so, and this allows the child to remain "open." Those who try to do everything for the child make him a spiritual parasite with a tendency toward "shut-upness."

The demonic dreads the good, because the latter involves transparency—not in the sense of spiritual disrobing in public, but in the sense of being able to face the truth about oneself unafraid. So the demonic is like somnambulism from which the victim awakens only when his true name is called.

By taking account of both physical and mental factors, Kierkegaard's discussion points toward a dynamic definition of salvation or wholeness. To begin testing whether a man is "saved" in terms of his "openness" instead of his verbant assent to dogma, would mean a revolution in Christendom, and Kierkegaard is right in seeing that the New Testament furnishes the basis for the revolution. He adds an astute list of the various ways in which men, including religious men, are involved in a conflict between the good (God) and the demonic. Some want revelation to take hold of them from the outside and *force* them to be more open. Others achieve transparency to a certain degree, holding back only a tiny portion, which becomes the point where isolation begins again. Still others reveal themselves, but *incognito* (as S.K. himself did). "This is the most subtle contradiction of shut-upness. . . . Examples of it are to be found in poetic existences" (p. 114). Finally, some men transform revelation itself into a complicated mystification.

He devotes special attention to a case where what the demonic conceals is so terrible that the individual dare not utter it even to himself, because it might tempt him again. There can be little doubt that this special case refers to an incident in Kierkegaard's own life. The terrible act occurred when he was not master of himself. "What decides whether the phenomenon is demoniacal is the attitude of the individual toward revelation, whether he is willing to permeate that fact with freedom, assume the responsibility of it in freedom" (p. 114). In one sense, S.K.'s spiritual career was an effort to rescue himself from the demonic by permeating his whole life with responsibility. And if his hypersensitivity led him to exaggerate his own sinfulness, it also placed him far ahead of his time in psychological insight.

His detailed analysis of the demonic need not be followed further

here, except to note that he was aware of its psycho-somatic expressions in hysteria, hypochondria, etc. What concerned him most was the demonic as a form of spiritual bondage associated with lack of certitude. "He who has observed the contemporary generation will surely not deny that the incongruity in it and the reason for its dread and restlessness is this, that in one direction truth increases in extent, in mass, partly also in abstract clarity, whereas certitude steadily decreases" (p. 124). Kierkegaard sees both skepticism and rigid orthodoxy as forms of unfreedom, because in opposite ways they are unable to accept the truth as it applies to the individual inwardly. What, then, can bring a man to certitude? He answers, "seriousness"—that seriousness which prevents life from being reduced to a meaningless game or an inflexible formula. If a man cannot take his own life seriously, then he is comical, no matter whether he is solemn or frivolous about other pursuits. Of course it must be understood that, when Kierkegaard talks about "taking oneself seriously," he is referring to man's capacity for the Eternal—not to the owlish egotism which we usually associate with the phrase. Those who deny the Eternal in man must try to make temporal life self-sufficiently meaningful through hedonism, prosaic common sense, or practical bustle.

The concluding chapter is entitled, "Dread as a Saving Experience by Means of Faith." "If man were a beast or an angel, he would not be able to be in dread" (p. 139). As it is, only three courses are open: to become spiritless because he evades dread, to sink under it because he cannot evade it, or to pass through it redemptively. Only by faith can dread, the possibility of freedom, be educative.

Those who have not experienced the perils of spiritual freedom may regard it as enchanting, and reality as harsh. But one who has been brought up on "possibility" knows that it is dreadful as well as benign. He knows that terror, perdition, and annihilation may at any instant strike any man. Now finite relationships, whether commonplace or of world-wide importance, only educate finitely; one can always keep a little distance from them. If one is to learn absolutely, he must fashion possibilities out of himself, even though the next instant what he fashions may usurp control. Then, if he does not try to evade the dread which would save him, he receives everything back again. What he gets back is not some finite gain, but infinity. Undeniably, such a person is exposed to the danger of suicide. If he so misunderstands his

anguish that it drives him away from faith instead of toward it, he is lost. But if he can stand it to have his soul thoroughly winnowed, then faith will eradicate dread. The man of faith has no fear of fate and accident, for he has already relinquished everything they could take from him. He possesses a security which cannot be reached so long as guilt is measured merely by the finite standards of society; for instead of becoming a ludicrous paragon of relative virtue, he has learned dread of the Infinite. That is why he is able to pass through circumstances amid which practical and worldly people lose their wits and their courage. In a word, one who has a Christian understanding of guilt can find repose only through the Christian remedy of Atonement.

BOOK REVIEWS

Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization. By HEINRICH ZIMMER. Edited by JOSEPH CAMPBELL. New York: Pantheon Books (Bollingen Series VI), 1946. xiii, 248 pp. 70 illustrations. $4.50.

Heinrich Zimmer's death in 1943 was indeed premature; some account of him will be found in the tributes written by various authors in this Review for November, 1943. He left behind him "two bins of notes and papers." In the present volume, Mr. Campbell has reconstructed from the roughly typed sheets the substance of the lectures that Zimmer had been giving at Columbia in 1942, illustrating them with some of the paintings and sculptures that are interpreted in the lectures. This arduous piece of editorial craftsmanship has been unselfishly and very skilfully carried out.

Zimmer's broad scholarship was anything but of that "objective" and merely analytical sort that deals with living Oriental cultures as one might with a dead body. He had never, indeed, yet been to India; but to have studied in India, merely as an observer while, as Jung expresses it, "hiding one's own heart under the cloak of a so-called scientific understanding," may do less for a scholar than can be accomplished if he immerses himself so deeply in the literature that this becomes for him a serious and transforming experience. Indeed, if one does not believe—*crede ut intelligas*—that the content of the recondite subject of our study can contribute to one's own more abundant life, it will remain impenetrable to all mere learning, however extensive. If not in the flesh, then at least in the spirit, the scholar must *im Dichters Lande gehen,* and must have participated in the lives of its inhabitants. So only can he interpret as Zimmer interprets.

It had been Zimmer's specialty to study and expound the Purāṇas, those lengthy and encyclopedic, more or less popular books of genesis and theology, iconography and morals, which so many other Indologists have been inclined to neglect. If the Puranic myths often appear at first sight fantastic or even absurd, they in fact embody a profound philosophy, and Zimmer had the gift of making this apparent or even obvious. Everyone will be impressed by the stories of the Parade of Ants and Vishnu's Māyā.[1] I am especially glad that Zimmer renders this

1. For a Chinese story of rather similar quality, see Li Fu-Yen's "Tu Tzu-chun," in Chi-chen Wang's *Traditional Chinese Tales* (New York, 1944). The story is in fact, as Wang says, of Indian origin.

last, much abused word, *Māyā,* by "art"[2] rather than by "illusion"; he who creates by means of his "art" being the Divine Architect, and the world his "artifact" or "device." As such, the world is no more or less unreal than are our own artifacts which, because of their relative impermanence, are unreal when compared to the art which "remains" in the artist. There is nothing peculiarly Vedantic in the doctrine of Māyā as being the maternal "power" *(sakti)* by which the Divine Understanding acts;[3] even the Stoics employed the familiar figure of the rope and the snake to make it obvious that things are not necessarily what they seem to be; and the "unreality" of things created, when compared to that of their Creator, corresponds exactly to what is implied by St. Augustine's *"quo comparata* nec pulchra, nec bona, *nec sunt"* (*Conf.* XI.4). Nor is it by any accident that the Buddha's mother's name was Māyā. "Our Lady Māyā" is, in fact, the Theotokos, Sophia.[4]

A great European Indologist once poured scorn on the notion of the Buddha's tongue, which is said to cover the world in which he is teaching and to reach even the heavens, like Agni's "tongues" of fire: he simply did not realize that, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, the "tongue" of an Angel represents the power by which he expresses his mental concept, and that this operation abstracts from here and now; of which the Buddha's "long tongue" is merely the iconographic equivalent. Zimmer was better equipped, with his wider knowledge of the language of myth. He is able to make the mythological formulae transparent and significant even to the modern reader. He can do this sometimes with dramatic simplicity, as, for instance, when in discussing the theory of cycles he speaks of the whole life of a Brahmā as lasting for "only" a hundred years, although every day of these years lasts for 4,320,000,000 human years. On each of these days the cosmic history repeats itself; not absolutely, but in the same way that even in our own experience there are certain fundamental events that recur, daily and yearly, for example sunrise and sunset, or the succession of seasons. Zimmer reminds us of this when he says that the Boar, when salvaging the Earth from the depths of the Flood at the beginning of our present age, "passingly remarks to her: 'Every time I carry you thus . . .' " and

2. As also in Monier Williams, *Sanscrit Dictionary,* "Maya: art, wisdom."

3. "All this the Lord hath measured out by his most auspicious Māyā" (*Bhāgavata Purāṇa* III.5.25).

4. "Natheless unborn . . . yet am I born of my own Māyā" (*Bhagavad Gītā* IV.6).

when he goes on to say that "for the Western mind this casual comment of the ageless god has a gently minimizing, annihilating effect."

The problem of the "eternity of the world" does not, in fact, exist as such for India. *This* universe had a beginning, and will have an end; but another, of which the Apocalypse also speaks as "a new heaven and earth," will succeed it. But from the standpoint of timeless and ultimate reality, all that is not a matter of temporal sequences, but one of instantaneous eventuation; and in India, "every moment of existence is measured and judged against the backdrop of this vast pleroma." In this connection, however, that of the world process *(saṁsāra,* St. James's "wheel of becoming"), I think that Zimmer takes the mythological expressions of the concept of "reincarnation" too literally and individually. In the personal sense in which modern readers understand the term "reincarnation" (rebirth in this world), the doctrine is certainly not Vedic; and even in Buddhism, "further becoming" is not of individual "souls," but only the perpetuation of a process with which the enlightened Buddhist no longer identifies *himself;* and the Vedantic doctrine, Śankara's to be precise, like that of the Vedas, is that it is the immanent deity that transmigrates: "No other transmigrant but the Lord" are his words. From this point of view, the "reincarnation" of which the Purāṇas seem to speak must be regarded merely as a *façon de parler,* in the same way that "I" or "mine" may be said by a Buddhist "conventionally," i.e., for practical everyday purposes, although he is perfectly aware that, in the last analysis, there is no truth in the words *"I* am" (or "was" or "shall be"), and may not wonder, *"what* was, or am, or shall *I* be."

One of the most important principles to which our author constantly reverts is that of the coincidence of opposites (future and past, life and death, good and evil, etc.) in the ultimate reality of the "supreme Identity." The contraries are a sine qua non for the very existence of a sensible world but, as the Scholastics express it, there is one science of both, so that in the intellect, as it were, the lion and the lamb can lie down together. It follows, of course, that "Liberation" is from subjection to the necessities of a choice between the alternatives; and this is, in turn, an enunciation of the doctrine of the Middle Way—that Strait Way that leads, for example, through the eternal and indivisible Now that at once unites and divides the "Clashing Rocks" of the past and the future, which are the veils or walls that stand in the way of the vision of God.

These "opposites are fundamentally of the one essence, two aspects of the one Vishnu,"—not that the one is two, but that the two are one, as Hermes Trismegistos said. Zimmer, however, discusses the divine polarity mainly in connection with the image of the *mixta persona* of Śiva together with his Śakti represented as Ardhanārī, hermaphrodite —or, what comes to the same thing, that of Hara-Hari, uniting the sacerdotal and royal aspects of divinity, respectively male and female in their mutual relationship. Very properly and efficiently he makes this biunity the basis of his explanations of the erotic symbolism that is often described as "Tantric" and thought of as "late," but is already implied and recognizable in the Vedic Mitrāvaruṇau in whom Mitra is male to Varuṇa, in the relation of Prajāpati to Vāc and in that of Krishna to the "Brahma-womb," and likewise in that of the creative bifurcation of the solitary Self or Spirit (Ātman) that is originally "as it were a man and a woman closely embraced," and in the corresponding reunion of the separated principles,—a reunion, because the circle is never really left unclosed, so that evolution and involution are to be regarded as components of one and the same "world-picture."

> In contradistinction to the modern philosophies of the West, which are purely intellectual pursuits, clarifying, labelling, describing, and systematizing the contents of human thought, Indian wisdom, based as it is on the thought-transcending experiences of yoga, aims at a total transmutation of human nature and at an altogether new awareness of oneself and of the world. . . . Indian symbols of art voice the same truth as Indian philosophy and myth. They are signals along the way of the same pilgrim's progress, directing human energies to the same goal of transmutation. Our task, therefore, as students of Indian myth and symbol, is to understand the abstract conceptions of India's philosophical doctrines as a kind of intellectual commentary on what stands crystallized and unfolded in the figures and patterns of symbolism and art, and, conversely, to read the symbols as the pictorial script of India's ultimately changeless wisdom (pp. 195 f.).

Here Zimmer describes the task that he had set himself and for which he was eminently qualified; the present volume reminds us of all the more that we might have hoped for from him.

In a brief "Conclusion," Zimmer discusses the fact that "our Christian Western tradition has long refused to accept the wisdom of the pagans on an equal footing with the body of revelation that it cherishes and worships as its own." This anomalous situation, combined as it is with the quite extraordinary ignorance of Eastern metaphysics and

theology that still prevails in Western countries, even in academic circles, presents an almost insuperable barrier to the mutual understanding of Eastern and Western peoples, and inhibits their effective co-operation in these times of a crisis by which the whole world is equally affected.[5] It would seem to run counter also to the acceptable words of St. Ambrose, that "whatsoever is true, by whomsoever it has been said, is from the Holy Ghost." It is, of course, a one-sided position, for the Christian claim to "complete perfection" (Professor F. S. C. Northrop's words in *East and West,* 1946, p. 437) presents no difficulty to an Oriental, who can readily grant it without in any way disparaging his own position; for while he would agree (in the Buddha's words) that "Truth is one, there is no other," he is also quite aware that "nothing can be known except in accordance with the mode of the knower," and that it is therefore inevitable that there should be dialects of the one spiritual language and common universe of discourse, the terms of which in the various traditions are merely cognate forms derived from constant etymons. The Oriental, indeed, can hardly treat the Unitarian or any merely ethical position seriously as a religion; but he can accept the divinity of Christ precisely because he is assured of the divinity of Rāma and Krishna; "knowledge," as Aristotle remarks, "being of that which is always or usually so, not of exceptions" (*Met.* VI.2.12, XI.8.3). "Since, then," as Farīdu'd Dīn 'Aṭṭar says, "there are different ways of making the journey, no two birds will fly alike. Each finds a way of his own . . . one by means of the Miḥrāb, and another through the Idol."

As Zimmer observes, there was "a moment (represented strikingly in the figure of Pico della Mirandola) when the last walls of orthodox exclusiveness seemed about to yield, and Ovid, Homer, the Kabbalah, the Koran, were being found to be in essential accord with the sacred pamphlets of the Christian movement." He might, indeed, have referred to other moments of genuine catholicity, represented by such men as Philo and Plutarch, Dante or Eckhart, who spoke of "unser eltisten meister einen, der die wahrheit ie vant lange und lange vor gotes gebürte." To whom, indeed, did Christ refer when he said, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance?" Who were

5. I am thinking here not of the virtually illiterate proletariat, but of those who should know better; for example, of these at St. John's College, whose choice of a hundred best books is quite unaware of anything east of Suez.

those "righteous?" The day will yet come when the different religions shall have outgrown their isolationism, and all men, both Christian and Heathen, as Malory says, eat at one table. A dear and respected Roman Catholic friend in England lately wrote to me: "Here *only* love can conquer. And Sri Ramakrishna on this point is an alter Christus. He is Christ's own self." Marco Pallis' Lama teacher said of Christ, "I see that he was a very Buddha."

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Boston Museum of Fine Arts

Der Weg zum Selbst, Lehre und Leben des indischen Heiligen Shri Ramana Maharshi aus Tiruvannamalai. By HEINRICH ZIMMER. Edited by C. G. Jung. Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1944. 262 pp.

This volume was the first published of the posthumous works of Dr. Heinrich Zimmer, who passed away, at the age of fifty-three and at the height of his powers, in the city of New York, in the spring of 1943. The manuscript had been left with friends in Switzerland when the author departed from Germany for America. It appears now as a handsome volume, with an introduction by Dr. C. G. Jung and a sensitive appreciation of Dr. Zimmer by Professor Emil Abegg, who assisted Dr. Jung with the details of publication.

As Professor Abegg observes, one of the most remarkable, yet least obvious, of Dr. Zimmer's powers as an interpreter of Oriental thought and civilization, was his ability to translate. "Never has anyone succeeded in bringing Indian literary works so close to us through the sheer technique of the verbal rendering. . . . Such a skill in translation was made possible only by a power of vision totally new, opening all the depths of Indian thought; and by, above all, a hitherto unequaled psychological understanding" (p. 7).

The Hindu saint and sage here introduced is the celebrated Holy Man of South India, Shri Ramana Maharshi, now living and teaching in Tiruvannamalai. Dr. Zimmer's account of his early spiritual development, his experience and enactment of the *meditatio mortis,* and then his pilgrimage to the great temple of Tiruvannamalai, where, with the inevitability of a natural event, he experienced Enlightenment, and, at the age of seventeen, passed into the state of the silent

monk, the homeless, wandering ascetic, is as unaffected, powerful, and humanly moving a document of the call to saintliness, as one could wish to find. The young man's meditating presence, even in a land of numerous meditating presences, aroused the wonder, and soon the great reverence, of those who chanced upon him. Before long, he was the center of a conventicle of seeking, questioning souls, and his spoken words, written down, together with a few brief passages from his own pen, amounted to a canon of instruction. The present volume is a translation and skillful arrangement of those documents.[1]

The Way to the Discovery of the Self, as described by Shri Ramana, is the way, simply, of unremittingly asking: "Who am I?" "Go and ask yourself, and you will discover who you are. . . . Address the question to your self, seek the source out of which your 'I' has emerged, and the answer will come to you" (p. 88). "Whoever has experienced the highest truth of his own existence, has experienced it as a supreme Reality, which subsists behind himself and behind the world" (p. 146). "The bliss of the pure Self can unfold only to an Imagination that has been clarified and made steady, as the result of constantly practiced meditation. He who has experienced in himself this bliss, is 'redeemed while in this life' " (p. 209).

This is the ageless teaching of India—the wisdom of the Vedas and Upanishads, and of the rishis and sannyasis of the millenniums—made fresh and vivid in the living experience of one of the really great of the present day, and brought to ourselves through the work of an unsurpassed interpreter.

The introduction supplied by Dr. Jung, on the other hand, is concerned to devaluate both the metaphysical tradition of India and the personality of the present teacher, and to represent the superiority of Dr. Jung's own definition of the Self. This is done by slightly misrepresenting the teaching of the Maharshi. Dr. Jung ignores the Maharshi's distinction between the "Personal Self" *(jīva)* and "Imperishable Self" *(ātman)*, as well as that between the "Personal God" *(īshvara)* and "Imperishable Being" *(brahman)*. In India, just as in the West, the popular religions (e.g., Vaishnavism, Shaivism) treat of the interrelationship of Man *(jīva)* and God *(īshvara)*, recommending to the worshipper the at-

1. A bibliography of nineteen titles is given by Dr. Zimmer, pp. 259-60: two are brief articles; the rest, little volumes published by the Sri Ramanasramam, Tiruvannamalai. The majority are in English.

titude of love and service *(bhakti)*. Dr. Jung misrepresents the situation, therefore, when he writes of the "Man and God" polarity as peculiarly Western, contrasting it with the "Eastern" polarity of "the Ego and the Self" (pp. 15-19), and even concluding from the prominence of the idea of "service" in the teachings of the nineteenth century saint, Shri Ramakrishna, that that earlier teacher was more strongly influenced by the West than the twentieth century Shri Ramana—and was hence more "modern" (pp. 18-19). Shri Ramana knows well enough the way of devotion, and has, in fact, a good deal to say about it (pp. 72, 111, 113 f., 151 f., 118, 221, 226). The attitude belongs, indeed, not to the West, but to the stage of popular and preliminary meditation.

Dr. Jung states that to a Westerner the Oriental identification of the Self with God seems shocking. But to an Oriental, too, such an identification would seem shocking, if it were the "Personal Self" *(jīva)* that were equated with the "Personal God" *(īshvara)*. Quite the contrary: according to the teaching, it is only when the "Personal Self" is transcended (by means of the exercises and difficult disciplines of Yoga, Meditation, Devotion, Selfless Works, etc.) that the "Imperishable Self" *(ātman)* can be realized; and it is then this "True Self" which is experienced and taught as the Imperishable Substratum of all created forms *(brahman)*. Nor is that an experience known only to the alien Orient; compare St. Paul: "With Christ I am nailed to the cross. And I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. 2: 19-20); and compare the words of Jesus: "I and the Father are one" (John 10: 30).

It should be noted that the "Self" of Dr. Jung's well known psychology corresponds to the "Personal Self" *(jīva)*, not the "Imperishable" *(ātman-brahman)*, of Shri Ramana's orthodox Hinduism, the psychologist's goal being to "integrate," whereas the saint's is to transcend this personality. Shri Ramana knows, and states, as well as Dr. Jung, that this "Personal Self" is a function of the ego (pp. 205-11), and that without a body and an ego there would be no Shri Ramana around to experience the Self (p. 210). The Hindu's discussion of the *jīva*, its world, and its God, is always "psychological"—not the least "metaphysical"; only the *ātman*, which the analytical psychology of Dr. Jung does not regard, is treated in the latter way. By ignoring this detail and then contrasting his own view of the Self with the Maharshi's discussion of the *ātman* (omitting entirely the Maharshi's discussion of the *jīva*), Dr. Jung has made it a little too easy for himself and

his Western readers (for whom the metaphysical is an outmoded form of experience and discussion) to assume the superior part. But since the misconstructions are precisely those most commonly met with in Western judgments of Hindu material, it is perhaps not without value to have both the criticism and the text under the same cover. The circumstance may illustrate the world's need for such humble and perspicacious interpreters as was Heinrich Zimmer.

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Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines. By RENÉ GUÉNON. Translated by MARCO PALLIS. London: Luzac & Co., 1945. 351 pp. 12/6.

Man and His Becoming, According to the Vedanta. By RENÉ GUÉNON. Translated by RICHARD C. NICHOLSON. London: Luzac & Co., 1945. 188 pp. 12/6.

In the words of Christopher Morley, "the most important calculable coefficient in the scandalously emotional algebra of book reviewing" remains the critic's frame of mind or prepossession. Were our momentary prepossession not the terminology of a science that is fast approaching the Buck Rogers stage, but the regular business of Orientalism, we might be resentful of the brusqueness—seldom encountered so overtly in a Frenchman—of one who knows he is right and is not afraid to tell the world so. For Guénon's main job in both books is to make ruins of philosophical systems, declare nonsensical the grammatically flawless translations of trained philologists, and brush aside the fanciful structures of occultists as so much rubbish, though not without putting something solid in their place. The plain fact is that our author is shockingly unconcerned about the number of his friends or followers. On the one hand, he is not speaking for himself; he speaks in the interest of something bigger, which he has, unhappily, chosen to call tradition. And, on the other hand, he is luckily finding a natural soil in the dissatisfaction growing day by day with which thoughtful minds survey the position in which the peoples of the West *and* of the East have maneuvered themselves in the past decades. There is the West, aggressive, proud, professing Christian principles and progress,

hardly cognizant of Eastern peoples and their aspirations. Over against it is the East, meek, receptive, secretly worshipping Western prowess, deploring its own inferiority, but smolderingly resentful of Western superiority, with a heart bleeding for the native gods or ideals born of its own soul. Here Guénon takes hold. East and West have the same tradition, progress is false, by finding the East the West will rediscover its long lost tradition.

These books do not deal with religion, and yet they do. If we grant Guénon that religion has three aspects: dogma, moral precepts, and a form of worship, and if we hold communion with our own soul, we must confess—unless we are particularistic, orthodox, or Catholic—that all three have become faint echoes rather than potent forces. The word dogma itself is relegated to the academic and hardly understood generally, either as label or content. The moral aspect has been smartly punctured by the war and, above all, by the atom bomb. Worship is reduced to an insignificant occasional function prescribed by social custom. We should thus be well prepared for Guénon's message, of course not quite in the sense which this thinker wants us to be. The fact that what students of comparative religion have called the Eastern religions lack in reality those phases we have mentioned, should appeal to a religiously indifferent age. Yet the West, unfortunately, lacks even the appreciation of what Guénon again calls by an unhappy name, a metaphysic, which is not necessarily a substitute for religion but is the very core of man's intelligent being. And it is real intellectuality, not intellectualism, which Guénon begs us to embrace and in which he finds the West singularly deficient.

This "metaphysic," he claims, and we concur with him, is inaccessible from a purely philological point of view alone, or through an attitude receptive merely of sentimentality, mysticism, and moralism. The Orientalists who, ever since Max Müller wrote on the six systems of Indian philosophy with Buddhism, Jainism, and the Carvāka on the outside, are given to understand forcefully by Guénon that there is an essential difference between a Western philosophical system and a *darśana,* or view, which these represent. The Sāṅkhya, for instance, is not a self-contained dualistic system, as Richard Garbe would persuade us, but it deals selectively with one point of view which leaves out of account the ultimate reality approachable only through metaphysics. Atomism likewise, whether it appears in this or that Indian

darśana, never was intended to represent the ultimate answer to ultimate questions. Similarly with the Yoga "system." The only legitimate claim to metaphysics is held by the Vedānta, to whose essential features one of the volumes is devoted exclusively.

The fundamental thesis of all of Guénon's works, one of which we reviewed before, is that only a single view of the world, in a metaphysical sense, is right and possible, and that now only the Orient, particularly India, is the guardian of it. He will not deny that Taoism, some Mohammedan thinkers and Westerners, also possess that insight. What he terms metaphysic does not coincide with the metaphysics as known from the history of philosophy since Aristotle. It is "entirely detached from all relativities and contingencies, philosophical or otherwise." It is "essential knowledge of the Universal" and implies "permanent and changeless certitude," and is the "very negation of the notions of evolution and progress." Thus defined, our academic philosophers and the run of other thinkers in the West would, indeed, possess a "metaphysical incapacity." For we frown upon such intellectual intuition and oppose knowing and being, which is inadmissible from Guénon's point of view.

Of course, it would be easy to condemn Guénon's contention and to say he is reactionary in his thinking, cobwebby, anti-evolutionist, cynical of progress and antimoralistic. He could be charged with missing the point in the whole development of critical thinking in the West which started with the Greeks. Perhaps the levelling of such criticism did have a peculiar cogency in the past. But applying the pragmatic test and looking at the present-day situation in the light of "by their fruits ye shall know them," more and more people are bound to ask themselves whether Guénon has not really put his finger on the sore spot: the mental and conational attitude of Western man, who has at last succeeded in thoroughly confusing all issues and now wrangles in hundreds of speeches about the parliamentary procedure to be established for committees that have, at the most, an advisory capacity in the great task of curing the ills of the world. We outlaw force, but we do not outlaw insincerity and hypocrisy, more sinister because covert. We make the moral point of view supreme, but research which molds the lives of each one of us is geared to "objectivity."

There is no doubt, even though we have broken the Eastern physical spearhead by crushing the Japanese war machine, the billion and a

half people of the Orient will send other spearheads to the West against which we are spiritually unarmed. The author suggests the thought that no armor is available, and looking at the sad state of Western "spirituality" we are inclined to agree with him. But he also suggests that instead of spelling final ruin, this spiritual engulfing of the West by the East will be equivalent to a homing of the mind and heart.

The *Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines* is the pilot work for a series of others that will deal more in detail with Hindu views, while *Man and his Becoming according to the Vedānta* is the first of the specific works. The repetitions which are found in the latter should be welcome rather than irritating to anyone unfamiliar with the burden of Guénon's message. The mode of presentation of the Vedāntic doctrines is one of the best that we have seen since J. C. Chatterji's *India's Outlook on Life*. Quotations are interspersed with annotations and asides, while the footnotes garner in matter that is illustrative and comparative. Some conceptions should prove difficult to the reader. They are the Sanskrit terms like *karma, mokṣa, saṁsāra,* etc., to which the author and translator have given a new garb in order to rid them of hackneyed Western conceptions and impart to them a new precision. We are referring to such ideas as immortality of soul, reincarnation, transmigration and the like. They do lack the necessary objectivity when plotted against the background of Western intellectual developments. In Guénon's works, we thus meet with such terms as longevity, prolongation of individuality, posthumous evolution, and deferred deliverance, which are refreshing in their novelty. In the light of the more significant and broader implications of the author's position, we are willing to rate as minor any criticism which we might have as to the details in the interpretation of certain of the Sanskrit terms.

What we like most in these books is that they offer suggestions to the thoughtful and (really) intelligent in this bewildering age that will make their self-complacency and Occidental provincialism a bit shaky. Particularly such statements as that knowledge is strictly private and incommunicable, should stimulate reflection and question the legitimacy and competence of some pandered wisdom. In India and China, we are informed, it is one of the gravest insults that one can offer to a thinker to praise the novelty and originality of his ideas.

Now, if we are willing to consider this not only an oddity to be passed over with a smile and a shrug of the shoulders, we are well on the road toward an appreciation of what Guénon has to say. And it will, perhaps, be realized then that, in the interpretation of the Orient and the great and very needful task of casting bridges between East and West, Guénon occupies a pioneering place.

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New Testament Life and Literature. By DONALD W. RIDDLE and HAROLD H. HUTSON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, vii, 263. $3.00.

This work is designed to present the results of modern scholarship to the student who is seriously interested in the New Testament "as a book of literature, of history, and of religion." Its authors modestly refer to it as a "first reader," introductory to the subject rather than a work for scholars. Its excellent arrangement, brevity, and compactness reflect this purpose—the readers in view are college students and others with similar preparation. The distinctive feature of the work is its thorough-going use of modern tools and results of research. Form Criticism, for example, is fully used in the three chapters on the career of Jesus, as is also the test of environmental fitness. There are, of course, limitations to both these methods: as the authors say of the latter, "The main problem involved in the use of this method is the identification of normative Judaism of the first century" (p. 68). "Normative" Judaism (G. F. Moore's term) is not the same thing as "normal": it was the Judaism which was "rising" in the Tannaite period (as Moore described it), out of the flux and variety of earlier teachings, schools, and tendencies, and became stabilized in the Talmuds, Midrashim, and Prayer Book—or rather, in the standard *practice* of rabbinic Judaism. Hence the problem: how much of this normal Judaism was already standard in the first century? That some of it was, is indubitable; but only a thorough study of the sources can provide an even approximate answer on many points. This situation, of course, makes it possible for the conservative apologist to stake out large claims, but he, too, is un-

der obligation to read the sources, and defend himself point by point. Judaism became much more "normal" (i.e., more like its later expression) after A.D. 135, and as a conequence of the vast retrenchment and reconstruction following the catastrophic Second Revolt. How much of what was no longer permitted in the period from A.D. 150-200, say, had really been normal—or at least common—in 50-70, or more likely in 20-40? That is the major question.

A similar caveat is needed with the other criterion, that of form. "Its proper use demands a keen sensitivity for literary form and history as well as the knowledge of environment required for the first technique" (p. 68). But this is not the literary critic's art of appreciation—say of the perfection in form of a chorus of Sophocles or of an ode of Pindar. It is a sense acquired only by long and sympathetic study of "oral literature" (as the Chadwicks have called it), and especially of religious traditions of various types (especially Jewish, underlying the written literature), resulting in a familiarity with the processes of tradition—which are hard to define in any canons or "laws" of form. This is one of the serious limitations of Form Criticism (or of its practice!). But our authors are concerned with results, and they do well to give us those of a recognized expert in this field, Professor Martin Dibelius.

The chapter (IX) on "The Rise of Christianity" sets forth analytically the main factors in the separation of the Christian movement from Judaism, and concludes that this took place very early: "the new movement effected the transition to gentile spheres of influence almost immediately" (p. 104). The Christianity of the New Testament, they recognize, was Greek, i.e., Hellenistic, and great as was the influence of St. Paul, the Hellenistic factor was by no means limited to the Pauline sphere. Another criterion they employ, even in determining the sequence of Paul's letters, is the great crisis the apostle was forced to meet (the Judaizing movement); as a result, the letters are arranged as follows: (a) I and II Thess., Phil. (except 3:2-16), Col., Philem., all of which antedate the crisis; (b) I Cor., Gal., II Cor. 10-13, Phil. 3:2-16, which reflect it; (c) II Cor. 1-9, Rom., written afterwards. Duncan's theory of the imprisonment letters is adopted. One may question this, and also the identification of the Galatian crisis with the Corinthian; but the results are set forth consistently and persuasively.

The chapters on the Synoptics, on the publication of the Pauline

corpus (with Eph. as its "covering" introduction), and on the remaining books of the New Testament, are written from a point of view much the same as that of Professor Edgar J. Goodspeed. A final chapter deals with "The Evolution of the New Testament: Canon, Text, and Translation," and there is a good appendix on "Leading Ideas of the New Testament," in which much use is made of the late A. C. McGiffert's *God of the Early Christians,* without noting, however, the exaggerations contained in the thesis of that work. An extremely good "Select Bibliography" and a full index conclude the volume. The book will undoubtedly have a wide reading and use in college and seminary courses. One only wishes that the English style had been smoothed out in several spots—these will be dealt with before long, let us hope, in the preparation of a second edition.

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The Religion of Dr. Johnson and Other Studies. By W. T. CAIRNS, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. xiii, 137 pp. $2.50.

The Reverend William T. Cairns, author of the five essays in this volume, died in 1944. A clergyman of the Scottish Church, he composed these selections for various societies without intending to publish them. The essays are of more than passing interest, however, for, in addition to a clear, pleasant style, Dr. Cairns had a fund of critical ideas that merit the consideration of readers.

The first and most generally interesting of the essays is "The Religion of Dr. Johnson." Although there has been a prodigious amount of Johnson scholarship, Dr. Cairns has contributed some fresh and highly appreciative comments on the spiritual life of the great man. The diverse elements of his character, the author remarks, were unified by his consistent and unashamed devotion to Christian principles. Virtually everyone who wrote about him attested to his piety, but perhaps the best evidence of his deep religious faith exists in the posthumously published *Prayers and Meditations.* When they first appeared, many, even among the Evangelicals, were shocked to find the great critic of the age admitting that, despite his good resolutions, he was often too

weak to keep fasts, to attend church, or to read the Bible according to the schedule he had planned. Readers too often failed to see in the prayers and reflections a record of the true humility and repentant self-abasement of a great Christian.

Several of Dr. Johnson's friends who were with him in the final weeks described his death, but Boswell, absent in Scotland, had to depend on the records of others and a cross-questioning of the witnesses. Although he succeeded in weaving together an interesting narrative of these last days, "one is conscious of a certain stammer," Dr. Cairns remarks, "as though the writer were uneasy and could not bring himself to say what his literary conscience would not allow him to suppress." There is something to be said for this view. While Boswell reported several instances of the dying man's piety, he was a little too much concerned to show him expiring like a noble Roman. He failed to reveal—what we get from the accounts of Hawkins, John Hoole, and Hannah More—that Johnson was at the last preoccupied with religion almost to the exclusion of other thoughts.

What explains Boswell's unusual reticence? This essay offers the interesting and somewhat credible theory that he did not want to give the impression that Johnson died an enthusiast. There was a rumor that the great man, in the last year of his life, had come under Evangelical influences. In this connection Cairns refers to a curious letter, found among Hannah More's papers, according to which, at the approach of death, Johnson asked to consult a clergyman and described the "views and character" of the sort of person he wished to see. Someone suggested a Mr. Winstanley, and Hawkins sent him a note. The clergyman (apparently Thomas Winstanley, rector of St. Dunstan's-in-the-East) was too ill and too abashed to visit the great man, but, supposedly, he sent him a letter which gave him considerable consolation. Other letters followed, and through them and the influence of Mr. Latrobe, it was alleged, Dr. Johnson was converted.

Having raised this extremely interesting issue, Dr. Cairns missed an opportunity to relate it to another set of circumstances. In a different connection he introduces a prayer that Johnson uttered when he received communion, just eight days before he died. The text given here is from the manuscript in Johnson's own hand. Cairns notes that Boswell's version of the prayer is shorter, but he fails to point out that the omissions may be particularly significant. For instance, the authentic

copy includes the clause: "forgive and accept my late conversion." Although this passage appears in the *Life* by Hawkins, it does not occur in Strahan's edition of the *Prayers and Meditations*, nor in Boswell, who got his text from Strahan. If there is any truth in the theory that Johnson was converted to Evangelicalism, then this part of his prayer becomes very meaningful.

The second essay, "John Newton: A Vindication," contains a vivid description of the early and turbulent career of the slave trader who became an Evangelical clergyman. Dr. Cairns was so much interested in vindicating the man, however, that he failed to supply details that would contribute to a more balanced impression. He remarks, for instance, that Newton "seems never to have given way" to the vice of drunkenness in a hard-drinking age. While it is probably true that he was seldom intoxicated, Newton himself referred to an incident in his youth when he challenged his shipmates to a drinking contest. He confessed that he was the first to succumb, and that he nearly lost his life in a rash attempt to dive overboard to retrieve his hat.

After many years in which writers have pictured Newton chiefly as a harsh Calvinist, this portrait may have a corrective value. The Evangelical clergyman did possess remarkable industry, a genius for making friends, and a sense of humor. But Dr. Cairns, perhaps because he had a special sympathy for the Calvinist movement, was too eager to defend him. At one point occurs the observation that "we can only be thankful that in Olney Vicarage Cowper gained a refuge in his extremity which perhaps he would have found nowhere else in the world." As readers of Cowper's *Memoir* know, he had found a much better refuge with Dr. Cotton. It is hard to believe that Newton had a healthy influence on him even during the years when he was rational. The clergyman, quite apart from his religious profession, was probably too self-assured and too insensitive a personality to make a good counselor for the shy poet.

Because so little has been written on the hymn in recent years, readers will particularly appreciate the fine critical essay in this volume entitled "The Constituents of a Good Hymn." A truly good hymn, it is maintained, must have "a real singable melody, with strength and progress and climax to it." It must also reveal "sincerity, simplicity, dignity, fervour, imagination." Finally it must be free of "anything merely conventional, sentimental, or sophisticated."

The two concluding essays deal with historical aspects of the Scotch Church and are of more limited interest. "Jupiter Carlyle and The Scottish Moderates" is a record of the Moderate group as revealed in the forthright autobiography of a stalwart divine of the eighteenth century. "A Reformation Diarist and His Times" is based on the diary of James Melville, nephew of Andrew Melville, who continued the work of John Knox.

The author of this volume appears to have been a seasoned and tolerant antiquarian. His essays are pleasant reading, and though he did not pretend to write always with the scholar's objectivity, he has thrown some interesting sidelights on literary and social history. Students of the eighteenth century will be particularly interested in "The Religion of Dr. Johnson." While the essay leaves much to be said, it is extremely provocative and is written with a fine appreciation of the truth worth of the man.

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The Common Sense Theology of Bishop White. Selected Essays from the Writings of William White, 1748-1836, First Bishop of Pennsylvania and a Patriarch of the American Church with an Introductory Survey of his Theological Position. By SIDNEY A. TEMPLE, JR. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. x, 169 pp. $2.50.

Bishop William White was one of the creators of the American Episcopal Church. At the time of the Revolution, when many lay and clerical Anglicans considered that their religion bound them to allegiance to Britain because the British King was the head of their Church, White was one who stood firmly behind the independence movement in the colonies, and by extension of this position advocated the independence of the American Episcopal Church from its British parent. His theoretical position that the sanction for episcopal ordination resided ultimately in the church membership, and only derivatively in the episcopal succession, provided a practical basis on which separation of English and American churches could take place without abandonment of the episcopal principle.

Having been chaplain to the Continental Congress, as well as au-

thor of this plan for instituting a democratically based episcopate in his Church, White was one of the first to be chosen as a bishop in America, and, in fact, his was the only name to be considered for the diocese of Pennsylvania. In this place he remained for more than fifty years, and from this place his efforts were constantly and successfully directed towards the building of a solid organizational and administrative structure for the American Church. This is the aspect of White's work which has been the chief theme of his biographers, from Bird Wilson's *Memoirs,* in 1839, to W. H. Stowe's *Life and Letters of Bishop William White,* in 1937. The chief historians of the American Episcopal Church have also concerned themselves with the same facet of White's work.

In the recent *History of the American Episcopal Church* by William W. Manross, however, and in other works by the same author, there appears the suggestion that White is of interest as a theologian as well as an ecclesiastical executive. It is this suggestion that Dr. Temple has chosen for analysis in the essay composing Part I of *The Common Sense Theology of Bishop White.* Part II consists of nine selections, some of previously unpublished material, from the writings of Bishop White, justifying Temple's characterization of his theology as "common sense" in the title of the book, and "empirical" in the title of the introductory essay. Bishop White would probably have agreed with Dr. Temple that these two characterizations are virtually synonymous, though this might be questioned if the term "common sense" is given the technical meaning which it had in the Scottish philosophical tradition.

Dr. Temple subsumes his discussion of Bishop White's theology under four major heads: Revelation and evidence, theory of the Church, theory of man, and theory of sacramental efficacy. In these areas the author finds that, while White followed in the tradition of the Carolinian divines of his Church, his thinking was influenced by the generally liberal atmosphere of enlightened Philadelphia. It was in the spirit, not in the letter, that the Enlightenment affected White; the extremes of deism, for example, he carefully avoided. Enlightenment was the pervasive temper of his thought, though he accepted no specific doctrine of the Enlightenment. This may be accounted for because, as Temple shows, the philosophy of John Locke, out of which so much of the thought of the Enlightenment stemmed, was also the heart of

White's philosophical position. The influence of Locke may also explain White's lack of sympathy with the strains of mysticism and "enthusiasm" which other members of the Episcopal clergy found congenial.

White carried Locke's *tabula rasa* psychology beyond the mind and into the will which, in opposition to the Calvinist theory of Jonathan Edwards and others, he conceived without innate moral or immoral direction. As a consequence of this position, his view of original sin differed sharply from that of the Calvinists. In the important essay, "The Analogy of the Understanding and of the Will," published from manuscript by Temple, White inquires how "professing Christians" can believe that "by nature we are 'averse to all good and inclined to all evil,' " when it follows from the Lockean psychology extended to the will by analogy that "we have no knowledge of the one or of the other and no disposition to either of them but only susceptibility of it, to take its direction from subsequent contingencies" (p. 88). White further maintained that "if to a mind in the beginning of the exercise of intelligence there should be prudently and seasonably stated the excellency and the advantages of justice, of truth, and of other virtues, with the baseness and the bad consequences of their contraries, it would be inconsistent with our observation of human nature to deny that the preference would be correctly bestowed" *(Ibid.)*. Thus, at the same time as he accepted one of the cardinal thoughts of the Enlightenment, the perfectibility of human nature, he also gave support to what he considered the central position of the Episcopal Church on the question of original sin, that "Original Sin is the fault of corruption of the nature of every Man," rather than the Calvinist doctrine that the nature of every man is corrupt. From our vantage point it is possible to question the thoroughness of the "observation of human nature" which led White and others like him to their optimistic position; in his own day, however, his doctrine led White to accept a more humane position with regard to salvation of unbaptized infants than did his Calvinist confreres, and thereby to err, if err he did, on the side of the angels.

In the fragment "Of Philosophic Necessity," which Temple reprints from White's *Comparative Views of the Controversy between the Calvinists and the Arminians* (Philadelphia, 1817), White argued for the freedom of the will, taking his evidence from man's consciousness of

freedom. After a review of the literature, he contended that the necessitarian scheme as accepted by the Calvinists and advocated by Edwards "overthrows the foundation of moral praise and blame." Further, he asserted that "under the operation of the [necessitarian] theory, a man may be sensible of misery, but surely cannot be conscious of guilt" (p. 96), because consciousness of guilt must be dependent upon responsibility. Finally, he maintained that the doctrine of philosophic necessity led to a materialism like that of Joseph Priestley, that consistently the necessitarian scheme must extend to God himself, and that necessity was therefore unacceptable to the Christian thinker.

These brief statements of Bishop White's position on two controversial issues of his day serve to show that in White the American Protestant Episcopal Church can claim a theologian of distinction, who is well worth study, although he lacked the metaphysical genius of Jonathan Edwards. Dr. Temple has performed an important service for students of American religious thought in making White's essays available, and has presented a clear and valuable statement of White's ideas and their sources in his introductory survey.

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Religion of a Scientist: Selections from Gustav Th. Fechner. Edited and translated by Walter Lowrie. New York: Pantheon Books, 1946. 281 pp. $3.50.

This book contains condensed translations of Fechner's *Die Drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens, Ueber die Seelenfrage,* and *Nanna, oder das Seelenleben der Pflanzen,* and briefer extracts from some other works, avoiding those already translated into English by other translators.

The selections, together with the editorial work, present the main features of Fechner's philosophy of religion, without much of the detailed and elaborate speculations of the *Zend-Avesta.* It is properly emphasized that Fechner's method is induction and analogy, with emphasis upon the latter. The defects of the method are repeatedly noted, with Fechner's own statements and the notable criticism by Wundt (pp. 76 ff.).

For Fechner, the motives of faith are historical, practical, and theoretical, and the motives of faith grow into its grounds. In his statements about the practical motive, he has some statements which show again that pragmatism is a new name for some old ways of thinking; it is strange that William James omitted them in his chapter on Fechner in *A Pluralistic Universe*. "Man believes what he likes to believe, what is useful and good for him to believe. . . . Why may we not infer . . . that what is serviceable to men and their best guide is also the most true?" (pp. 102, 111). The practical defines the direction of the theoretical principle (p. 120).

Fechner's main thesis is that, just as each of us is immediately and unmistakably aware of his own soul in his body and assumes that other men have souls, he may, and if he shares the "daylight view" he will recognize by the aid of analogy the existence of an earth-soul, star-souls, and, above all, the Universe-Soul, or God. Although this is a panpsychism, God is regarded as personal, and basic doctrines concerning the moral bond between men and God, life after death, and personal mediators are accepted or retained (p. 101). The life of a man after death is compared to the memory of a perception, which lingers after its original has passed.

Fechner has alienated many by his faulty analogies and his fanciful panpsychism, but the editor rightly points out that in philosophy of religion he made a notable approach "from below," from what he took empirically to be the facts of ordinary experience and science.

The editor has taken occasion to give expression to a number of his own views, which accord with the Kierkegaard type of supernaturalism, and to tint the work with these colors. His introductory chapter contains some strong statements about Darwinism which, to put it mildly, show no evidence of his having read the work of Dobzhansky. Mechanistic determinism is strongly condemned, with Fechner's way of opposing it regarded as a major contribution, although not the final answer.

With or without the editor's views, the book has the value of bringing together a good selection of material from Fechner and calling renewed attention to him. In the opinion of the reviewer, so long as Fechner is taken at face value, with a conception of soul which is scientifically outmoded, it is difficult to get a responsible hearing for him. Fechner's panpsychism increases this difficulty. No amount of

spraying nature with the qualities of mind will make those qualities stick there. Certainly there are great differences between nature and mind; it is as erroneous for panpsychism to seek to obliterate them as it is for supernaturalism to exaggerate them. Another way to deal with the data is to recognize that the differences, like all differences, are correlated with resemblances; the structures and processes of nature resemble those of mind, and of life, too. More empiricism than Fechner could command reveals other and stronger analogies than he inferred and Wundt rightly criticized.

Judged from this standpoint, Fechner acquires a new importance. With all his defects and limitations, he is a kind of landmark among those who have looked to nature to serve as the ground of faith rather than to obscure or hinder faith. Just after his time, the huge influx of data from the laboratories and observatories all but swamped the religious interpretations of nature, and philosophy turned to idealist speculations, pragmatist satisfactions, or critical theories of method, instead of trying boldly to face the bewildering universe. Fechner's importance is not so much, now, that he was a panpsychist as that he was a cosmicist, and belongs among the men who have tried to find themselves religiously at home in the universe of the sciences.

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Religion in America. By WILLARD L. SPERRY. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. xi, 318 pp. $2.50.

Dean Sperry in this volume, which is one of a series on "American Life and Culture" planned by the Cambridge University Press, describes American religious life for British readers. Few men could portray the more intimate and vital aspects of American religion as he has done, for it takes an extraordinarily wide "acquaintance knowledge," combined with a rare sympathy and liberality of spirit, to produce so homely and authentic an account of those aspects of religion which belong to folk culture, and which can not be gathered from creeds, histories, and church disciplines. There are, to be sure, informative appendices (compiled by Mr. Ralph Lazzaro of the Harvard

Divinity School), which give a statistical survey of the history and diversity of our churches and denominational schools. But the distinctive merit of the volume is that it gives us a literary record of what is most familiar in American religious life and which, for that very reason, no American author would recount if he were not addressing a foreign audience. Chapter VII, "The Parish Church," is particularly valuable from this point of view.

It is easy enough to assert as a general paradox that "the given hereditary Calvinism of New England could survive so complacently beside the resolute cheerfulness of daily life," but it takes experience and insight to show in detail how this is so. Similarly, it is not difficult to satirize Andover's "bold ascription of eternal life to its creed" as Oliver Wendell Holmes did in his *Wonderful One-Hoss Shay*, but it is difficult for one who has driven the old shay to feel an honest apprehension of doom. "Churches, behind their bland self-confidence, are uneasy and apprehensive. Their dissolution may be nearer and more total than they know. There is always the sober warning of the Gospel that the Kingdom of God may be taken from ecclesiasticism and given to some other order nearer the spiritual and moral realities of things" (p. 17). To feel and portray this apprehensiveness in contemporary ecclesiasticism, not as a theme of apocalyptic romanticism but in sobriety, is a rare achievement among religious leaders. Dean Sperry is here writing not merely as a reporter, but as a leader; especially his two philosophical chapters, "Presuppositions" and "Second Thoughts," are an expression of critical leadership, an attempt to present the living resources and perils for religion in America. He has the rare ability to prescribe like a family physician for churchmen of all denominations.

Even the chapter on "American Theology" remains true to the chief aim of the book, and discusses theology not as a theoretical enterprise but as an expression of religious experience. Dean Sperry selects Jonathan Edwards and William James as extreme but nevertheless representative exponents of the contrasting strains of American piety. In both the Calvinistic and the liberalistic wings he finds that

> there never has been in America, and there is not now, that felt distinction between the sacred and the secular which is a commonplace in most religious circles. . . . Our situation is not, however, quite as simple as it may seem, for back of our equalitarianism there lies the old prophetic ideal of the whole

of life lived as a single consistent experience. In fact we may have levelled religion down too far, but in theory we still cling to the hope that we may also level common things up" (pp. 146-48).

Thus Dean Sperry suggests that, in spite of our much boasted separation of church and state, the American people has managed to keep religion and secular life intertwined. He neatly states his own philosophy of religion and of theology when he prophesies that, instead of producing a clarification of the divergent tendencies in current religion and culture, the present generation will continue to live in a confused, middle way, leaving theology to wrestle with the thesis that "the idea of religion presupposes the paradox of God and man met in one experience" (p. 157).

There are two chapters in the book which spring less directly from Dean Sperry's wide and deep acquaintance with American religion than does the book as a whole, and yet they add to the distinction of the volume, since they deal critically with important but often neglected aspects of American religious culture—"The Negro Churches" and "American Catholicism." The survey of Negro religion is derived largely from the standard works of Woodson, Mays and Nicholson, and Myrdal, and it emphasizes the extent to which the Negro and his culture is "part and parcel . . . of our national heritage . . . an aspect of ourselves" (p. 182). The survey of American Catholicism is based directly on Theodore Maynard's *The Story of American Catholicism,* a book which was a particularly fortunate choice for English consumption. After giving a faithful report of the substance of Maynard's history, Dean Sperry adds a few comments to indicate prevalent criticisms of American Catholicism, such as these: no wide concern in American Catholicism for the contemplative life, too vocal and uncritical in its patriotism, too much invisible government, too unwilling to accept separation of church and state permanently, too dogmatic and dictatorial against communism.

In general this volume is a well-documented defense of religious freedom and diversity. There is little of the customary apology for the profusion of American sects, and much of the attempt to show how special circumstances call for particular churches with distinctive missions. In the chapter on "Church Union" Dean Sperry makes some pointed remarks on this theme in criticism of the theories of re-union held by Anglo-Catholics:

The Church Universal, which the ecumenical movement now contemplates, is not for us a church which proposes to suppress all that is implied by schism. It may not revive the Inquisition or renew the wars of religion. It proposes rather to comprehend religious differences. In that sense of the word we are not returning to a past which should never have been abandoned; we are looking to a future which as yet has never been realized (p. 244).

The book ends with the usual plea for "inner repentance and outer reform," but, in this case, the subjects for repentance and the objectives for reform are unusually well defined. Though the volume was written for Englishmen, it can be of the greatest service for Americans, who can ill afford to be indifferent to so critical a portrait by an American so well informed and so genially earnest.

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Discerning the Lord's Body: the Rationale of a Catholic Democracy. By Frederic Hastings Smyth, Ph.D. Louisville: The Cloister Press, 1946. xii, 216 pp. $3.00.

Frederick Denison Maurice directed his mission as a Christian Socialist to "unsocial Christians and unChristian Socialists" (*The Christian Socialist,* January 25, 1851, p. 97). In much the same spirit, Fr. Smyth, Superior of the Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, has formulated his theology of Redemption and the Eucharist, with its proposed expression in liturgical practice and social action. He stands generally in the tradition of Anglo-Catholic social Christianity, but demands a more radical (in all senses of the word) understanding of its principles.

Fr. Smyth's main thesis can be briefly stated, though doubtless with some injury to his carefully worked out train of thought. He does not, of course, attempt in this work to prove or commend, the main principles of the Catholic faith, except indirectly by exhibiting their operation as he sees it. Christian Redemption is the real overcoming of evil in a basically good world; hence its completeness demands a thorough re-ordering of the patterns of personal and social life, and cannot be satisfied with an escape from the sorrows of the world. Religion of the latter type Smyth criticizes as "extricationist" and basically heretical, no matter how prevalent it has often been in professedly orthodox

circles. For the process of re-ordering he finds it useful to adopt the word *metacosmesis,* which occurs in Plato (*Laws* 892A) in the sense of a new arrangement. The idea, one might note, is that of Romans 12:2, although the phrases used there are not immediately available for technical use owing to their wealth of association. This metacosmic process began with the humanity of Christ and continues in the Body of Christ, the Church; the faithful share in it through the Eucharistic Liturgy, in which they offer the whole structure of their lives to God in the Offertory, so that the offered gifts may return to the worshipping Church, transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ, to be a source of power for the further transformation of human life. The divine life thus shared in the Eucharist is both a standard to which the common life of the world must conform and a source of power for its transformation.

Smyth's formulation of Christian social theory aims to bring together the liturgical movement within historic Christianity and the Marxist analysis of our political and economic structure. He argues for the essential harmony of the religious life whose center is corporate worship, and the social program whose goal is the co-operative society —one might again quote Maurice, who once said that those who believed in the Holy Communion ought to be holy communists. Smyth recognizes the obvious difficulties in the way of putting his views into practice. Most Christians shrink at the idea of committing their lives to the cause of social transformation, while for orthodox Marxists religion is at heart a delusion which will vanish when its social cause in a class society is removed. Smyth would share with Marx the anticipation of the "withering away of the state" as an organ of class domination, but would expect it to be followed by the true "establishment of the Church" in a society truly Christian, alike in structure and in profession. However Catholic and Communist his theory, his immediate practice is sectarian (in the technical, not the opprobrious sense)—centered, for the moment at least, in groups like the Society which he heads, whose corporate co-operation in social change may be limited to gestures such as providing coffee for strikers (p. 140). There is nothing, of course, against beginning where one can; if Fr. Smyth ever converts either a parish or a union the situation would be different. Meanwhile, his preaching and practice is a valuable guide for those who accept the general principles which he represents, and hope to ex-

press these principles somehow within the existing structure of the Church on the one hand, and of political and economic life on the other.

It is regrettable that, after working out his own views, with their ample precedents in historic theology, so carefully, Smyth is somewhat cavalier in dealing with those from whom he differs. In this connection he does not wholly escape the Pelagian tendency of Anglicanism. He is aware of the danger of Pelagianism in the emphasis which he places on the human contribution to redemption, liturgical or social—usually he remembers that this contribution is itself a work of grace, though he can write "even merely human efforts, if they be rational and carried through with determination, can accomplish much more for the improvement of human life than a good many people seem to imagine" (p. 198). He accuses "Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, and other Neo-Orthodox" (*ibid.;* a curious phrase—one might as well write of "Richard Hooker, John Calvin, and other followers of Luther") of an excessive belief in original sin, in denying that any likely social order can be an adequate preparation for the final redemption of all things. On similar grounds he attacks the pluralism commended in Maritain's *The Rights of Man and Natural Law.* I do not object to Smyth's differing with these writers; but, if he is going to discuss their ideas at all, he ought to do so seriously, and not simply brush them aside—especially since he is dealing with those who share his aspiration for an intelligent formulation of Christian and social principles. And perhaps it must be said to him, in the words of St. Anselm, *nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum.* We must certainly form our actions by the standard of a redeemed world; but the times and the seasons are not in our power (Acts 1:7), nor do the Gospels offer any great encouragement to those who expect the Kingdom of God to appear immediately (Luke 19:11). One may agree with Fr. Smyth that in propaganda we often have to balance the dead weight of conventional Christianity, which too easily finds excuses for social inaction. But surely serious theology can take a balanced view. Will a socialist society be free from the root sin of pride?

It remains to be said again that Fr. Smyth's book contains much of value for all who are interested in incarnational theology, in the Christian approach to politics and economics, and in the theory and practice of the Liturgy. Special attention may be directed to his suggestions

for the more adequate expression of the symbolism of the Offertory, as an offering of bread and wine representing the lives which we bring to Church to be consecrated.

E. R. Hardy, Jr.

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The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner. By Cornelius Van Til. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1946. xx, 384 pp. $3.75.

The author of this book is Professor of Apologetics in Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia. His purpose in writing it is to prove that "the theology of Barth and Brunner" is a "new modernism." His argument is as follows: Modernism is the product of the Critical philosophy of Kant. The theologies of Barth and Brunner emanate from the same philosophy. Therefore, they are a new modernism. This simple argument is presented with an erudition, intricacy, and forbidding ponderousness uncommon in American theological writing today. Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Feuerbach and Overbeck, Bosanquet and Bradley, James and Dewey, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and others, appear dressed as modernists, and some make elaborate speeches proving that they are unquestionably guilty. Dr. Van Til asks of them all the same questions: Do you believe in the "self-contained God?" Do you believe in "direct revelation"? Do you believe that man is a creature first and a knower secondly? They all answer in the negative, often elaborately and with numerous citations culled out from their writings for the purpose, and thus condemn themselves as unchristian man-deifiers.

Dr. Van Til recognizes that Barth and Brunner set themselves to do away with the immanentism of the old Modernism of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and their followers. He has read their works and knows how often and how passionately they criticise the latter and insist upon the transcendence of God. But he is neither impressed nor taken in by their pious talk. He knows one thing: they do not believe in "direct revelation." They do not believe that the Bible mediates to us, with literal symbolism, the very words of God. On the contrary, they think that the Bible is a collection of human writings, a product of the human mind, revealing its usual errors and shortcomings.

This theology is still nothing but an anthropology and that an anthropology of the autonomous man. There is in it no God who first speaks to Himself internally before He speaks to man. There is in this theology no created universe that is made and upheld by the Logos and as such directly reveals the Word. There is in it no man created so that, when normal, he is able to hear and actually does directly hear the Word of God. . . . There is instead only the sovereignly circular activity of man, who as Parmenides of old, still determines by the reach of his mind what can and what cannot be real (p. 159).

Dr. Van Til's thesis is that, starting with the mind of the autonomous man, Barth and Brunner have repudiated the orthodox doctrine of revelation and with it the whole of orthodox Christian theology. Now, there is no question that Barth and Brunner have been critical of human thoughts about God. They have insisted that there is a radical difference between knowing God and knowing the things in the world. They have insisted that God being the Creator and not the creature, He is known by faith and not as the objects around us are known. Dr. Van Til is right. Barth and Brunner are not Fundamentalists. They do not believe in "direct revelation." But the reason he gives for their position is at best partially true. If we are to give them some credit for saying what they mean, we must recognize that their critical theology is ethical as well as epistemological. It is the unrighteousness in our world that led Barth to question our knowledge of God. Barth has denied the "normal man's" direct knowledge of God because of our idolatries first and because of "Critical philosophy" secondly. He will not bow to the "orthodox system" because the dogmatic pretensions of the Fundamentalist are too far removed from his behavior as a Christian. He does not believe in "direct revelation," because in fact sin does not permit such a thing. In short, for Kierkegaard, Barth, and Brunner, as for Calvin, *sin* is the great impediment to our knowledge of God. Dr. Van Til is not impressed with the epistemological significance of sin. And in this respect, he is a "scholastic" and not a Reformed theologian. In his failure to do justice to the binding effects of sin, he himself is a modernist rather than a "Reformed" theologian. Both modernists and fundamentalists want security with a "direct revelation." They both resent the critical theologians, because the latter deny them their security while sin abounds. But we *are* insecure. No appeal to "reason" or "orthodoxy" will alter that fact. It is true, we shall not be saved by "Critical philosophy." But

it is even more true that we shall not be saved by uncritical philosophy as indicated in this book. The Christian faith is that we are saved by God, "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

In so far as the Crisis Theology shares the introversion of the modern mind, it is less than an adequate restatement of the Gospel for our time. Dr. Van Til might have criticized and corrected it in the light of the theocentric faith of Reformation theology. But he has not done it. Instead, he has written a pretentious and boring book, showing little of the understanding of a generous spirit. Books by theologians on theologians are almost universally misleading, and this book is the misleadingest we have read for a long time.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

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BOOK NOTES

Light from the Ancient Past: The Archeological Background of the Hebrew-Christian Religion. By JACK FINEGAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. xxxiv, 500 pp. $5.00.

It is a *lieu commun* to assert that any subject connected with the religion of the Bible must be examined in the context of the Ancient Near-Eastern culture in general. No serious student of the Hebrew-Christian origins would now dare to undertake any inquiry pertaining to his subject without trying at first to obtain a picture, as clear and as complete as possible, of the civilizations which flourished while the books of the Old and New Testaments were being written. The Bible may have for theologians a unique authority among the other monuments of the literature of mankind, but it was not born in some heavenly vacuum. It grew within the realities of human history. The reconstruction of the biblical background, which the archeological excavations of several decades have made possible to a remarkable degree of accuracy and vividness, has thus become the prerequisite of any study of the Hebrew-Christian religion. The purpose of biblical archeology is not that of "confirming" the validity of the biblical record, but rather that of replacing biblical religion in the historical milieu from which it emerged. While several monographs of outstanding value in this field have been published in relatively recent years (one thinks among others of Gressmann's *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder*, Barton's *Archeology and the Bible*, and Jean's *Le Milieu Biblique*), there existed until this year no extensive and up-to-date picture of the biblical world compressed within the covers of a single volume. Dr. Finegan should therefore be congratulated for having written this "archeological background of the Hebrew-Christian religion."

The author, who is now Professor of New Testament at the Pacific School of Religion, has performed in masterly fashion the task of compiling, digesting, and presenting the work of hundreds of specialists which is often scattered in scholarly journals of difficult access. The story runs at ease through more than thirty crowded centuries. Starting with the Mesopotamian beginnings, and continuing with the Egyptian panorama, the author proceeds to penetrate the past in Palestine proper. A rapid survey of the rise and decline of the Great Empires leads him naturally to describe the Holy Land in the time of Jesus, and then to follow Paul, the traveller, into the Western world. After an account of the discovery of papyri and early manuscripts, the volume ends with a fascinating study of the catacombs, and of the Christian sarcophagi and sanctuaries. References to primary sources are clearly indicated in the footnotes, and more than two hundred illustrations of excellent quality enhance considerably the usefulness and attractiveness of the volume.

Biblical students will regret that several topics have received too succinct a treatment. Although the author rightly attributes to the discovery of the Ras Shamra inscriptions a "revolutionary importance," the whole question is presented in no more than three pages. Similarly, quotations from the literary

documents which constitute an important part of the biblical background do not seem to have been made with consistent regularity. The poem of Gilgamesh, for instance, appears in a number of well-selected excerpts (pp. 28 ff.), but the Accadian hymns and psalms of lamentations are dismissed in a few lines, and the extensive literature of Egypt, with the exception of Akhnaton's Prayer (pp. 96 f.) and the Wisdom of Amenemope (pp. 110 f.), receives little attention.

In spite of these limitations, which the vastness of the undertaking may have rendered unavoidable, this volume constitutes a highly useful introduction to the study of Hebrew-Christian antiquities.

SAMUEL L. TERRIEN

The Religious Basis of the Forms of Indian Society. Indian Culture and English Influence. East and West. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. New York: Orientalia, 1946. 51 pp.

The general theme underlying these three essays is the same, and in each the method is to use Western civilization as a foil for the explanation of the Indian social system. While the author disclaims any intention of defending caste, he quotes, almost at once, two Western writers who point to its superiority over the Western social system, one of whom says, "hereditary service has been painted in such dark colors *only* because it is incompatible with the existing industrial systems."

In comparison with the Indian, the author seems not to like our social order, with its "Kept press"; its idealization of mob rule by count of noses, or mob rule by majorities; and its arithmetical equality characterized as "an industrial system of production for profit where 'the law of the sharks' prevails." When he says that the West is a great war monger, the author should not forget that the East was war ridden long before there was a West, and has used all the barbarous means at her disposal in her warfare. But he reserves all his sarcasm and innuendo for the West.

Posed against this, is his picture of "the idea of a society of all men all earning their living by doing what each would rather be doing than anything else in the world." The religious basis of the forms of Indian society is explained in terms of *sva-dharma,* which means one's own duty or vocation contingent upon one's birth, and the doctrine of "action" as set forth, for example, in the *Bhagaved Gītā,* which means carrying out that duty with detachment toward the fruits thereof, and with devotion to that same "native" occupation. This way of life distributes to every man a vocation for which his own nature fits him.

> In a vocational hierarchy it is never a question of "doing what one likes," but of liking what one does, "for all must be accounted pleasure that it is in a man's power to put into practice according to his own nature." . . . I say that any civilization stands self condemned in which men have to earn their living in any other way than by doing what they would rather be doing than anything else in the world.

Dr. Coomaraswamy's discussion of the casteless is simple:

> In the first place, the problem exists at all only from the standpoint of the "ordinary" norm; "men of true learning look alike upon Brahmans perfected in science and conduct, oxen, elephants, dogs and foul-feeders." . . . The best answer to the problem was made by Swami Vivekananda: if the casteless or outcastes want to improve their position, "let them learn Sanskrit," which means, adopt the higher and colder standards of thinking and living that have only been preserved for millennia because those who practised them would not mix.

In his second essay, the author says: "What we are really, then, discussing is the effect of modern and self-styled 'progressive' cultures on the ancient and once worldwide type of civilization that has survived in India." He quotes the Marquis of Zetland to the effect that only in externals has British rule affected India.

It may be that, viewed abstractly, the Indian social system can be regarded with enthusiasm. The author is favorably disposed toward

> a feudal society where concepts of mutual responsibility and proportionate equality obtain; *aristocracy*, which simply means the *power of equality*, is available to everyone. . . . In a vocational order it is assumed that every grade is appropriate to someone and consonant with human dignity. . . . Under such conditions one does not meet with discontented or frustrated personalities.

But, here, it must be said that such a society does not exist in India. Caste, as a social order in operation, presents quite different aspects. Jawaharlal Nehru's discovery of India is primarily the discovery of wretched rural India. Dr. Coomaraswamy's exposition of the idea of the relation of individuals to their life-work, as exemplified in *sva-dharma*, is excellent, but there still remain the millions who never have the opportunity to escape drudgery by rising to intellectual or spiritual heights.

The author has some wise words to say about the improvement of communication between East and West, insisting upon broader and truer insights on both sides.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Self-Knowledge (Atmabodha). By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1946. xviii, 228 pp. $2.50.

The work under review consists of a translation of the *Atmabodha* and (in the Appendix) fourteen other hymns of Śankarāchārya. To the *Atmabodha* are attached notes supplying traditional interpretations of the verses, and the author's Introduction of 114 pages is based principally upon the *Vedāntasāra*. A paragraph from the Preface may be quoted as containing several points of interest:

Vedānta is the foundation of the spiritual culture of India. It has kept Hindu society alive for the past seven thousand years. It is the philosophy of all the important religious sects and groups. In its various phases Vedānta represents the progressive thought of man, beginning with Dualism, passing through Qualified Non-dualism, and ending in absolute Non-dualism, the doctrine of the total identity of the subject and object, beyond which reason, thought and experience cannot go.

The greatest disservice in the presentation of Indian thought to the West has always been the use of approximately equivalent Western terms in the translation of Sanskrit philosophical terms, and the present translator is no exception. Would it not be better to develop the meaning of *Atma* and use the term itself, rather than the equivocal word "Self"? The same principle applies to other words, such as "Knowledge." Consistency in translation of terms is also important, for example, in Verse 7 of the *Atmabodha* the word rendered "non-dual" is *avyayam*. Is not the problem of the *advaita* philosophy *avidyā*, or *māyā*? As regards the title, also, is there not a distinction between "Self-Knowledge" and "Knowledge of the Self," the correct rendering?

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The Golden Words of Moses. By MAYNARD D. FOLLIN. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1946. 668 pp. $2.00.

This bulky book may attract the Bible lover for at least two reasons. One is that Mr. Follin writes in the conviction that the Bible is God's Word. Another is that he seeks "spiritual values" in the Bible, and promises a mode of interpretation which yields such values. Add to this his repeated assurance that the mode of interpretation is from the Bible itself, and a Bible lover who is not too discerning may go along expectantly and even eagerly in this almost word-for-word interpretation of the Book of Genesis.

The Scriptural basis for Mr. Follin's methodology is this. The commonest word, like "feed" or "eat," a word such as "brimstone," proper names, too, like "Babylon," are used somewhere in Scripture in a figurative sense. That sense, says Mr. Follin, is the word's real meaning *wherever* the word occurs. So he contrives an allegorical interpretation, which he himself speaks of as a deciphering (p. 189), dealing meatily, he thinks, with jejune passages, illuminatingly with what he calls "blind" passages. To force plain Scripture uniformly into figurative language, however, is not to interpret the Bible but to do it violence. Because "Egypt" is a figure of speech in Revelation, is it in Genesis? Occasionally Mr. Follin confesses to inability in making out the meaning: "we cannot follow this up as yet" (p. 190). Genealogies are given up, which means at times whole chapters of Genesis (pp. 79, 137, 474).

This reviewer has looked hard for the "spiritual values" heralded by the author. The interpretation only turns up the same thing time and again, namely

a scheme of religious history, which he calls "The Great Plan of the Lord for the spiritual perfecting of man." It is a plan of four dispensations, each about two thousand years in length: the "patriarchal" up to Abram, the Old Testament period, the Christian centuries, and the "Day of the Lord" now to dawn and to be followed by no night. One hears nothing of the attainment of spiritual life, beyond the assertion that such life was achieved by successive "groups" (in the main unidentified) each time at the instance of a teaching given them (also rarely specified). Does all this become spiritual by calling the groups "spiritual" and "cultural" or the teachings "spiritual?" (Incidentally, "light" means teachings; so also do "bread," "voice," "Abram" and his posterity, "Babel," and even "the land," and many other "key" words. "Slay" means "teach thoroughly" [p. 456].) No matter where you step into Scripture, you come out with the plan of four dispensations. The river in Eden parted into four symbolizes the plan, also the cherubim at the Garden, and the years in Pharaoh's dreams; you have three of the dispensations in the three men who were entertained by Abram (those three men were Moses, Elias, and the Christ [pp. 220, 228] by some strange telescoping of chronology). Mr. Follin professes to get beyond the historical to the spiritual and enduring, and yet the one great "spiritual" value he keeps putting forward is an historical scheme.

Mr. Follin has a poor opinion of Bible commentaries, which he is under the impression ought to be expositions, and especially of "the Teutonic critics" (what of the spiritual value of overcoming racial feeling?). His is "a new and radical departure from the usual interpretations" (p. 15). Novel interpretation always intrigues some persons, and a key, a turn of which unlocks unguessed treasures, obviates drudgery over groundwork. That kind of key so often gives one only other words for the words one has. Mention is made of "spirituality," but what does this consist in? Mention is made of "a doctrine rich in spiritual truths," but what is this doctrine, and what are these truths? The spiritual substance and sustenance which the key supposedly unlocks, turn out to be verbalism.

WILLIAM F. WUNCH

The First Epistle of St. Peter. The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Essays, by EDWARD GORDON SELWYN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. xvi, 517 pp. $6.00.

Dean Selwyn's huge commentary is the best possible statement of the case for the conservative position, viz., for apostolic authorship of the Epistle. It is not a work which has been turned off in a few months, or even in a year or two, but is quite obviously the fruit of many years of research and a careful pondering of the problems. The thesis is not an out-and-out defense of the conservative view, but a modified, mediating one: St. Peter is the author of the book, but he had the collaboration of Silvanus, and he evidently turned over a good

deal of the responsibility for the writing to his collaborator. We can trace similarities in style between the parts of I Peter for which Silvanus was specially responsible and the two letters of Paul to the Thessalonians: clearly, Silvanus was something more than an amanuensis. At the same time, the author recognizes the use of apostolic tradition and a kind of catechism of morals, based on the use of Old Testament passages which were already staples of Jewish elementary moral education. Hence the likenesses between the epistles, especially in the *Haustafeln*. Here the author has made good use of Abp. Philip Carrington's important book, *The Primitive Christian Catechism* (Cambridge, 1940), with its tables showing the use of technical terms in the epistles, order of use, etc. The longest essay in the volume (103 pp.) is on the inter-relation of I Peter and other N. T. Epistles, and carries Abp. Carrington's theory and method still farther. Not so convincing is the correlation of the epistle with the speeches of Peter in the first half of Acts; here much of the "evidence" turns out to be the terminology of primitive Christianity, esp. in the Gentile mission.

The date preferred by Dr. Selwyn is A.D. 63, i.e., after the death of St. James in 62, and before the Neronian persecution of 64, and it is assumed that Peter, who now had Mark and Silvanus as his assistants, was urged to compose (with large help from Silvanus) an Easter epistle to be sent encyclically to the churches of northern Asia Minor, where the apostle had labored before going to Rome. Silvanus was a man of extraordinary culture, and contributed the numerous echoes of classical literature and philosophy which fill the book.[1]

Dr. Selwyn does not state his position dogmatically, and there is little in the commentary that cannot be used by one who holds the view that the book was written a generation after the death of St. Peter; in fact, the evidence is so fairly stated that some of us will read the work only to be the more convinced by it that we are right! Instead of Paulinism, what lies behind the epistle is common gentile Christianity, influenced to some extent by Paul but not made in his image. With this we heartily agree, although we date the book around 95. The persecution is not that of Nero (here we disagree)—nor yet of Domitian; but the latter is in the offing, and that of Nero was local and long ago. And so on: our views are in disagreement with Selwyn's, but we have profited by every page of the commentary.

The fine summary of the Epistle's Theology and Ethics (pp. 64-115) is most valuable, especially in that it takes account of the theological and moral problems of today, and the epistle's bearing upon them: e.g., the place of women in industry, the duty of the citizen to oppose the State when the State is outside its proper sphere, and so on.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

1. There is not a word of any importance in the epistle that does not receive a full historical exegesis; this is a commentary after the grand old-fashioned manner, and it is worthy of its place in the Lightfoot succession! Incidentally, the author tells us (p. 166) that the Patristic Lexicon is "forthcoming"; it was delayed by the War, and we have not heard anything of it since.

The Incarnation of the Word of God. By St. Athanasius, translated by a religious of C.S.M.V. S.Th., with an introduction by C .S. Lewis. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. 96 pp. $1.50.

An anonymous member of the Community of St. Mary the Virgin has given us a new translation of one of the classics of Christian theology and has, thereby, placed us greatly in her debt. The "us" is intended to include not so much the specialist or the writer of a dissertation as the ordinary reader, clerical or lay, who has discovered or ought to discover, in the words of the Introduction, that "first-hand knowledge is not only more worth acquiring than second-hand knowledge, but is usually much easier and more delightful to acquire."

To such a reader, Newman's porridge-like prose in the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* is likely to be his only road into those imperial centuries of thought. Luminous as that translation often is, its rather labored accuracy—to say nothing of the dreadful size and dinginess and general incivility of that monumental series—is not such as to invite the people who would most profit from the invitation. This new translation, bound in a light-weight and well-presented volume, is certainly, on these grounds alone, a welcome newcomer.

One or two comparisons may be in order. "But others," writes Newman (Sec. 2), "including Plato, who is in such repute among the Greeks, argue that God has made the world out of matter previously existing and without beginning. For God could have made nothing had not the material existed already; just as the wood must exist ready at hand for the carpenter, to enable him to work at all." Our unknown translator has it thus: "Others take the view expressed by Plato, that giant among the Greeks. He said that God had made all things out of pre-existent and uncreated matter, just as the carpenter makes things only out of wood that already exists."

Or again, (Sec. 42), Newman's version of the opening of the argument from human personality runs, "For just as, while the whole body is quickened and illumined by man, supposing one said it were absurd that man's power should also be in the toe, he would be thought foolish: because, while granting that he pervades and works in the whole, he demurs to his being in the part also." In all except the writers of government directives, college catalogues, and railroad tariffs, such prose as this is likely to inspire little if any enthusiasm. "It parses," as was remarked once about an unfortunately dull if monumental sermon, but its communicating power leaves something to be desired. The present version does a good deal better—"Take a parallel case. A man's personality actuates and quickens his whole body. If anyone said it was unsuitable for the man's power to be in the toe, he would be thought silly, because, while granting that a man penetrates and actuates the whole of his body, he denied his presence in the part."

These comparisons may suggest the reviewer's enthusiasm for the relatively simple and straightforward English of this translation. The translator has also felt free to condense slightly, where such condensation was possible without injury to the development of Athanasius' thesis. Even more condensation might have been profitable, and the translator might well have carried her

simplification of sentence structure and her freedom in the selection of current word-values even further. But it is an admirable affair as it is, and we will be fortunate if the promise of other translations ("if this one succeeds," according to Mr. Lewis) is fulfilled.

Mr. Lewis, incidentally, has written an excellent little introduction quite in his best vein, in which he manages to pay his respects all around and very satisfactorily too. Altogether, the book will make a good Christmas present to a good friend. It would be pleasant to have one of these each Christmas, as a matter of fact.

STEPHEN F. BAYNE, JR.

Kulturelle Ziele im Werk Gustav Frenssens. By FRANK X. BRAUN, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1946. 317 pp.

This scholarly study, printed in typescript form in German, was completed in 1940 under the direction of Professor Nordmeyer of the University of Michigan. Its publication was delayed by the author's participation in war work. In this interval, Gustav Frenssen, influential German novelist, has died, and with the downfall of the Third Reich much of the interest in his cultural goals has without question evaporated. Frenssen, who many times declared that the purpose of his life work was a unified, simple, and beautiful education for his German people, regarded the National Socialist state as the culmination and fruit of his ideals. He was one of the few notable German novelists who became, even before Hitler's accession to power, one of the ardent champions of this philosophy. Dr. Braun has attempted to explore Frenssen's educational goals under the general headings of religion, ethics, politics, and social reform, and to trace from one novel to another the development of the author's point of view from 1896 to 1938.

Perhaps it is impossible to evaluate justly the cultural ideals of a man like Frenssen at this juncture of German and world history. It is frankly difficult for this reviewer to feel symyathy for the novelist's views. Had Germany won the war, their importance and relevance would have appeared inevitably in a far different light. To understand the psychological and philosophical basis of National Socialism is probably no less important today. Though Dr. Braun has done a competent job of exposition, this book suffers from inadequate commentary and criticism.

Though Frenssen is not well known in this country, it would be a mistake to undervalue his influence in twentieth century Germany. Upon him and other popularizers lies a heavy responsibility for Germany's catastrophe. For his acceptance of such disastrous doctrines was no passive acquiescence in accomplished fact and no inexplicable aboutface; it was the logical next step in his thinking over a quarter of a century. Not that he originated any of the medley of National Socialist ideas, as Dr. Braun and his other critics have pointed out, but he popularized and extended them consciously and skilfully. His aim was

to be, not an artist, but a reformer, an educator, a propagandist, and his novels were written to win readers to his views. To those unacquainted with German literature, it is not difficult to become convinced that Frenssen was a continuer of the cultural goals of Goethe, Storm, Keller, Hebbel, and other distinguished figures of the German past. Frenssen and his kind were convinced of it. All of German literature has thus been rendered dubious today, which is a great misfortune. The truth is that Frenssen's spirit is as far from his illustrious predecessors as can well be imagined. A truly critical study of this novelist might well take stock of these differences and make them explicit and obvious.

The development of Frenssen's religious convictions over the years seems to have been notable. It is a far cry from his early manhood as an orthodox Lutheran pastor, where belief in the divine person of Jesus was the one thing necessary, to his culmination as one of the leading spirits of the German Faith Movement, founded to combat Christianity, and especially the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount. The key to this radical, though gradual, change is probably to be found in his ethical views. From the beginning he championed Romantic, evolutionary ethics, free love, unrestrained play of all "natural" impulses, etc., and in general equated ethics and biology. Later he managed to bridge the gulf between complete individual liberty in sexual ethics and the trans-individual race hygiene theories of the Nazis without becoming aware of the contradiction. In politics an ultra-conservative nationalism appears to have dominated his thought, though the influence of Friedrich Naumann and other radical social thinkers led him to press for economic reform, social justice, redistribution of land, and in general betterment of the workers' lot. The strong leaning toward socialism persisted throughout his career, but never carried him beyond the confines of nationalism. His cry for a fully armed Germany, a soldier-like, hard, healthy, pure, and conscienceless citizenry, to which was later added the idea of a German mission, merged with other clamorous voices in the 1920's to bring about the present chaos.

J. Glenn Gray

The United States Moves across the Pacific: The A.B.C.'s of the American Problem in the Western Pacific and the Far East. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946. ix, 174 pp. $2.00.

An illuminating survey of our situation in relation to the Far East by an historian thoroughly conversant with his subject, the eminent D. Willis James Professor of Missions and Oriental History at Yale University, and author of the seven volume *History of the Expansion of Christianity*. Professor Latourette regards the missionary movement as one of the important factors in drawing the United States into the Far East, the number of American missionaries being far greater than those of other countries. The Christian missions have weakened the inherited cultures and strengthened revolutionary movements, and, through native leaders educated in Christian schools, have had a powerful,

though indirect, influence on the course of history. And, Professor Latourette finds in the Christian fellowship, which transcends national boundaries, "an element which is making for constructive peace."

M. B.

In Him Is Life. By ROBERT H. BEAVEN. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1946. 188 pp. $1.50.

Robert Beaven has given us what has been called a fresh approach to the ancient truths of Christianity. In a book which is deceptively simple, he states that the aim and goal of the Christian religion is community of fellowship—"a living fellowship of man and God," based on the cauterization of self-love and the achievement of what the older mystics would have called "pure love." For Mr. Beaven the highest level of life is fellowship (p. 151), and salvation is "man living in response to God's abiding fellowship." So, too, the idea of sin would naturally be man living in fellowship with himself alone, or man isolated and an abstraction to God.

The author begins by repeating in modified forms the argument for the Trinitarian character of God based upon an analogy between the being of the deity and the known processes of human knowledge. The Father is the hidden, mysterious being; the Son is knowable being; and the Spirit is active being. But this is too simple, and the author's assertion that his position interprets the relationship between man and God as caused by a divine act, is open to question. For there is metaphysics as well as epistemology in the argument for the Trinity.

He next approaches the problem raised by the unity of life and the individuality of living beings, and looks with a deep longing for that "something which can fulfill the individual and preserve his society at one and the same time and by one and the same process." And the author's conclusion is that God is beyond man (the old theologians called this transcendence) and yet available to man, and that man's fellowship with this God allows him to transcend the anxiety of self-concern and the restrictive character of his individualistic sin.

Love, says Mr. Beaven, is God's will for man, and sin is rebellion against the will of God, or, as John Calvin would have said, disobedience. But Mr. Beaven's opposition to the modernist view of sin makes him fall into the trap of faulty analysis when he says that there are two major theories of sin: those which accept the Fall, and those which deny the Fall. God's life with man is the life of Christ within man's being, the indwelling Christ, and here Mr. Beaven offers us the choice between the liberalized Jesus and the conservative "Lamb that was slain" for us, but this choice leads us to a life that is marked by the transcendence of self in the higher objectivity of the spirit, a disinterestedness which produces the depth dimension—the spiritual stature which is man's empirical relationship to God in Christ Jesus. This is that level of life "where the self

transcends its isolated finality." And man, the author says, can be saved without contradicting his selfhood. This is simply the assertion that *nirvana* is not necessary for life in and with God.

This life in Jesus Christ is man's goal, and such life is within the fellowship of Christ, or the Christian Church: "It is to experience a corporate fellowship with God which, at one and the same time, brings release and fulfillment to those who experience it and which sends them out with creative concern and love towards those outside of the fellowship" (p. 171). And the core of Christian fellowship is the corporate experience of God. Thus the Church becomes the end, the goal and aim of Mr. Beaven's "Life in Him."

Mr. Beaven's first book thus ends just where Albrecht Ritschl began. Instead of being an advance beyond liberalism, it ends—as all liberalism must end—with its primary assumption, namely, with the idea that there is neither knowledge of nor fellowship with God outside of the corporate organism of the Church. But for some of us this is putting the cart before the horse.

JOHN JOSEPH STOUDT

Experience Worketh Hope. By ARTHUR JOHN GOSSIP. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1945. 200 pp. $2.00.

Experience Worketh Hope is a volume of sermons—"Some Thoughts for a Troubled Day" is the subtitle. It is commonly somewhat difficult to "take in" the written sermons of a preacher one has never heard; these, however, have more than the usual interest. They reflect a preacher with the highest regard for his office, who has read astonishingly widely and must have a remarkable memory, who has a gift of language almost too rich for the written word, and who must preach with a surge of hortatory zeal. Assuming the fire, these sermons are deft and compelling exhortation. Occasionally there must be a little too much urging to a way not well defined; but this is a reader's reaction.

The quieter, more thoughtful of the sermons have a peculiar charm in comparison with the others. Such are number eight, "On the Cry of Dereliction," with a fine passage on vicarious suffering as "the primary law of human life and progress" (p. 79); number thirteen, "On the Imitation of Christ: A Warning" —"Where we go wrong is thinking of Christ as giving us a railway time-table for our own journeys through life. That is precisely what he would not do, what he despised the Pharisees for attempting to do. He gave not rules, but principles, which we must work out and apply under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, in differing ways in differing circumstances, as He did Himself" (p. 127); number eleven, "On the Spiritual Danger of Being Unimportant"—

> They that wait on the Lord he (Isaiah) says, shall mount up on wings like eagles; and we, chained to the ground, watch them admiringly; and shall run and not be weary; that seems much less impressive; and shall walk and not faint; so it all dies away to that prosaic ending! But to Isaiah that seems far the greatest achievement of the three, that simple folk with nothing to encourage them, and seeing small

outcome of anything they do, should hold on loyally and zealously, still doing it eagerly, with all their heart and soul, that is the sacrifice most difficult to give to God (p. 111).

There are many fine passages throughout, too many to cite. On the other hand, there is little specific or detailed analysis of the human states alluded to; there is the frequent appeal to the witness of multitudes to the power of Christ —which is doubtless true, but also vague—; and perhaps there is a plethora of superlatives. But, again, these are defects apparent in print which the preaching might obviate.

HOLT GRAHAM

Christianity Rightly So Called. By SAMUEL G. CRAIG. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1946. 270 pp. $2.00.

This book defines Christianity rightly so called! Nothing less than this is completely Christian. Everything more than this is non-essential.

To the author—a veteran editor of religious periodicals who describes himself as a Fundamentalist Protestant Evangelical—Christianity is a system of doctrines rooted in specific historical data. It is a closed system, created by Jesus Christ and presented once and for all to the world in the New Testament by His Apostles, of whom St. Paul is chief. This same Christianity has been carried down through the centuries by the Christian Church—Catholic *(sic)* and Protestant—essentially undefiled (p. 40). All new knowledge which might discount this claim to simple continuity is either dismissed or ignored.

Today, therefore, anyone with "the New Testament in one hand and an adequate history of the Christian Church in the other" will find Christianity to be "that ethical religion that had its origin and that has its continuance in Jesus Christ conceived as a God-man; more particularly it is that redemptive religion that offers salvation from the guilt and corruption of sin through the atoning death of Jesus Christ and the regenerating and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit" (p. 87). This is the only passage in the book that is printed in bold type; the rest of the work is commentary on this definition. The key ideas in the definition (Incarnation, Atonement, Regeneration, and Sanctification) are elaborated in largely Calvinistic terms.

To be Christian the Incarnation must mean that Christ is regarded as the Second Person of the Trinity, the One whose "divine nature remains the same yesterday, today and forever" (p. 61). The view of the Atonement has to be "expiatory," preferably Anselmic, although St. Anselm's name is not mentioned (pp. 70 ff.). The correct concept of Regeneration is solely supernatural, allowing no place for man's effort (p. 83). Sanctification is rightly understood when it embraces absolute moral perfectionism not as "something to be striven after but never reached" (p. 167) but as something that will actually be realized through supernatural Power. These are the views to which the vast majority of Christians in all ages have given allegiance, declares the author; this is Chris-

tianity rightly so called. All divergence is some sort of "naturalism" that is "Christianity falsely so called" (p. 13).

This book will appeal to those whose sympathy for pious expression is greater than their desire for intelligibility. It will pique those who appreciate historical accuracy (the author's proclivity for absolutizing his own theological views is symbolized in the book-title and exemplified in his "satisfaction" theory of the atonement and his hyper-Calvinistic interpretation of Regeneration). The book will please "exclusive" Christians and sadden "inclusive" ones by its "test questions" which determine how Christian a given person is (p. 244). It contributes nothing at all to the reformulation of Christianity in ways that have meaning for moderns. As an expression of ancient Christianity, it may do—but for that I would recommend the New Testament.

ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

Those of the Way. By WILLARD L. SPERRY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. 146 pp. $1.50.

This book was originally meant for Lenten reading, and contains thirteen essays on religion in our time and in all times. The biblical idea of the Way provides the form and many of the ideas for Dean Sperry's reflections on Christianity as a way of life, a path for the pilgrimage through time. He discusses time and God's plan in the life of our Lord and in ours, "the seduction of the wayside," the witness of conscience to "the two ways," the role of convention and habit, the demands of the narrow way and the challenge of the heights, the justice and the guidance of God, and the works of repentance our times demand.

The writer's office in these pages renders the title twice appropriate. There are not many ideas and convictions here that will be new to the Jew or the Christian who reads, but he will find the current emphases of religious thinkers examined a little more carefully than usual, with wider learning brought to bear and a more mature judgment. There is a combination of precision in thought with tolerance and grace that is remarkable and somewhat rare. The Dean's reflections are throughout a little more careful, a little wiser, than one is accustomed to.

A few examples may serve to illustrate this. Tolerance is bidden to mark the duty of seriousness. Reflection upon the eternal is reminded that time and the things of time are essential to God's plan, in the Bible and now. The critic who is spectator—"merely sensitive plates upon which the time may record itself"—is warned against "a secondhand life off the experience of others" (p. 46). He who would explain conscience is shown he does not explain it away. The critic of "ordinary" religion is reminded that, in the long run, the choice is simply between one set of conventions or another, and that the real test of life and of religion is not the spectacular peril but the burden of the humdrum. To advocates of expediency, it is suggested that it is precisely at the top, at the

thought of God, that the real common denominator of life in one world may be found.

The book is brief and simple for all its thoughtfulness, and repays rereading, especially the chapter on the Unknown Way and the concluding specifications for today and tomorrow. The following characteristic passage may serve as conclusion:

> Religion, when it is true to itself, is always orthodox, while theology is, and ought always to be, in process of becoming heretical. The basic constant experience of the religious life—the awareness of mystery, an instinctive desire to worship, a sense of personal inadequacy, a feeling of dependence—these are constant century after century. The superficial changes which go on in society, in what we call "civilization," affect them little or not at all. The saints, as St. Louis said, not merely "come from the same country and speak the same language," they are contemporaries; centuries do not separate them. On the other hand, the rational interpretation of their experiences, their sober, reflective, second thoughts, change with our changing understanding of the world of nature around us and of our own human nature. The initial facts are uniform, our analysis of the facts varies and progresses with our better understanding of our world and of ourselves. Religion cannot ignore the changes at the surface of our life, but at the same time it may never neglect the constant subsoil of human life in which our most intimate experiences are rooted and by which they are nourished (pp. 124-25).

HOLT GRAHAM

How You Can Help Other People. By SAMUEL M. SHOEMAKER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1946. 189 pp. $1.75.

Although the author does not make it clear whom he addresses in the title, the Religious Book Club evidently took the appeal to be very general. That at least matches the contents. Here we have one more product of the prolific marriage of ecclesiastical religion and clinical psychology. This arrival is neither superior nor inferior to most of the other offspring born since the parents switched from planned parenthood to mass production. At that time the children's popularity began to increase remarkably, so much so that perhaps the psychological parent is beginning to regard the popularity as more interesting than the very ordinary children who achieve it. There are indeed some grounds for concern.

Since the contents are the usual contents, distinctive comment might proceed more fittingly from the flavor. This time the flavor is a sort of red-blooded optimism, reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt, mingled with Emerson, and containing a soupçon of cheer-leader. The book takes the reader through a few of the outer layers of the spiritual crisis, into church and club life, hospitals, and dim-lighted shrines of self-pity. The Alcoholics Anonymous support the flavor like boon companions of the way.

The documentation is vague, and a not untypical sample of rhetoric is: "Nobody can get on with the New Life by themselves."

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

Church, College, and Nation. By G. Roy Elliott. Louisville, Ky.: The Cloister Press, 1945. 162 pp.; $2.00.

This little book by the professor of English at Amherst College is the challenge of an Anglo-Catholic to secular American culture and education which he, along with many others, considered bankrupt. Professor Elliott sees college youth as the growing edge of society, the source of its leadership, and the hope of its future. It is among them that he sees the battleground of civilization. His work is a battle cry for the Church and churches to recover the leadership that was theirs in higher education; the alternative is doom. He builds a logical argument from the conviction that religion is basic to culture; that we are now living in a culture cut off from the soil that originally nurtured it; that disintegration is inevitable unless something is done about it.

One thing that he would do is strengthen the denominational colleges which are now lacking in both money and intellectual vitality, but which are the proper place for Christian culture to flourish. From these he would have "missionaries" go out to the frankly secular institutions. He would also have the "liberal" and, to some extent, semi-religious colleges establish chairs of Christian orthodoxy. With the Christian Community awakened and strengthened for its task of unifying and sanctifying the efforts of man, the nation and the world might be saved from otherwise certain disaster.

Professor Elliott writes in a provocative style, with a keen analysis of modern culture and an intimate knowledge of the secular academic mind. Having started life as an Episcopalian, he was an agnostic in his twenties, later became a Congregationalist, and now has returned to the Church of his youth. As a result, he reveals the fervor often found in a good mind reconverted.

Robert G. Andrus

The Nature and Unity of Metaphysics. By George M. Buckley. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1946. (Philosophical Studies, Vol. xcv.) xv, 261 pp. $3.00.

A study of Thomistic metaphysics which aims "to give an exposition of the inner structure of that historic natural wisdom or metaphysics by showing how it is a science and how its existence as a science depends on the preservation of its unity."

The Height of Life: Meditations on the Seven Last Words. By Frederick Ward Kates. Louisville, Ky.: The Cloister Press, 1946. 59 pp. 40¢.

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MAN—THOMISTIC AND CARTESIAN

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Qu'est-ce donc que i'ay creu estre cy-deuant? Sans difficulté, i'ay pensé que i'estois vn homme. Mais qu'est-ce qu'vn homme?

Descartes, *Méditations,* M. II, Adam et Tannéry, IX, 20.

I

MAN, THOMISTIC AND CARTESIAN—how do they differ? It may be conceded that the two doctrines concerning the nature of man have traditionally been regarded as, to say the least, different. The difference has often been appraised as radical. In some quarters, it appears, the doctrines are viewed as opposed, the Cartesian doctrine of man being summarily described as dualistic, the Thomistic doctrine as non-dualistic. Is this characterization adequate? If so, how explain an opposition of doctrine so radical? If not, just how do the doctrines differ? What, in sum, is the root of the difference?[1]

The reader may forgive a few words of reminiscence by way of an introduction to this essay, and as an indication of its intent. The questions posed have interested me ever since those far-off days when I was driven, by a dissertation and the austere counsels of one John Dewey, (who expressed the distressing opinion that I should know something about the matter on which I proposed to write a dissertation), to read Thomas' *Treatise on Man.* The results were meager. I was confused and perplexed. The Cartesian and Thomistic doctrines tended to converge when, as I gathered from the books, they really diverged. I abandoned the *Treatise,* assured of nothing save that Plato and the Platonists, as I understood St. Thomas, had fathered a considerable number of disturbingly erroneous ideas concerning the nature of man. But some twenty years later I re-read the *Treatise* and also again studied the doctrine concerning the angels. I succeeded in re-discovering my

1. In this essay I am not interested in determining the value of the Thomistic or Cartesian conceptions of man for the pursuit of psychological science. In view of the history of psychology, however, and of the influence of Cartesian conceptions upon that history, it is my hope that the study will not be regarded as of abstruse philosophical interest only.

perplexities. I wondered why St. Thomas had thought that Plato and the Platonists had erred. I wondered still more why St. Thomas had thought—as surely he must have thought—that his own doctrine avoided these errors. In any case, however, such conjectures were unbecoming. Recognizing defeat, I made no further efforts.

Later, however, I read Gilson's account of Thomistic man. It is extraordinarily persuasive. I came to the following conclusion: either Gilson's Thomistic man is truly St. Thomas' own Thomistic man; or else the former accurately represents what St. Thomas should have maintained, in view of the total conditions that presumably his doctrine was intended to fulfill. In sum, I was content to assume that what a Gilson declares St. Thomas to have meant is just what St. Thomas did intend. This was helpful. Thomistic man differs profoundly from Cartesian man. But my uncertainties concerning the basis of the difference increased. Now quite recently, I happened upon Brennan's *Thomistic Psychology*.[2] At last, thought I, with the aid of Gilson and Brennan all obscurity will be removed—and without the need of rereading St. Thomas. My objective was to arrive at a neat formula wherein the precise differences between the nature of man according to St. Thomas and his nature according to Descartes can be definitively summarized. This expectation seemed all the more reasonable in that both authorities have much to say concerning Descartes' account of man. This essay is an account of adventures in search for the formula. The search was not successful.

Gilson makes clear the historical conditions and theoretical issues defining the problem confronting St. Thomas. These may be summarized as follows:[3]

(1) A satisfactory doctrine concerning man must fall under the general principle of accord between philosophical (and scientific) truth,

2. *Thomistic Psychology, A Philosophic Analysis of the Nature of Man*, by Robert Edward Brennan (New York, 1944). References will be indicated as follows: Brennan's book by *B*; Gilson's *Le Thomisme* (Paris, 1922) by *T*, and his *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, English version (New York, 1936) by *S*, the French (Paris, 1932) by *E*; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, Eng. Dominican trans., by *ST*. (Where the *Basic Writings* of Pégis is referred to, the symbol *P* will be used.) In this paper I am relying upon materials used and conclusions advanced concerning the concept of matter in St. Thomas in my essay, "Matter and Scientific Efficiency," *Journal of Philosophy*, XLI (1944), nos. 24 and 25. The symbol *MSE* indicates reference to this essay.

3. I am following ch. IX of *T*, but still more ch. IX of *S* and *E*. The summary, however, is my own, not Gilson's.

on the one hand, and theological truth, on the other hand. This does not mean that independent thought can demonstrate all of the truths concerning man known to theology. It does mean that lack of accord is symptomatic of error somewhere. The requirement indicated may be called the met-empirical accord. In general, it implies the necessary harmony between philosophical and scientific findings with Christian theology. More specifically, of course, St. Thomas' doctrine concerning the nature of man must accord with Christian theology as interpreted and formulated by St. Thomas. It is understood, of course, that the met-empirical accord might equally govern a theologian whose Christian theology differs from that of St. Thomas. As the theologies might differ, so might differ the doctrines concerning the nature of man required by the theologies, if the principle of the accord is to govern all reflection and to be made manifest. But for present purposes, the met-empirical accord concerns only the Thomistic science, metaphysics, and theology.

(2) The doctrine concerning human constitution must accord with empirical data. This we may call the empirical accord. It implies that a sound conception of man's constitution will provide a fund of ideas effective in guiding scientific inquiries concerning men. It will be sufficiently flexible to permit assimilation of detailed discoveries and to be modifiable in view of them. In general, of course, the sciences concerning man must be internally consistent and consistent with other bodies of scientific knowledge. (Any discord, met-empirical or empirical, is a sign of error somewhere.)

(3) The doctrine must represent the unity of man. This condition may be called the metaphysical requirement. A man is a singular thing, an individual thing, a one thing. He is a unitary being, whatever the complexities of his nature. Distinctions found within the constitution of man, whose recognition is necessary for the intelligibility of man as an object of inquiry, must not be construed so as to negate or imperil this basic unity. If man is composite, he must be conceived as composite in a sense that is reconcilable with his unity. His compositeness must indeed be expressive of that unity. Man is no accidental combination of parts, natures, or functions. Factors discriminable in his constitution, determining that constitution, are wrongly conceived when the factors are represented as if extrinsically related. It is to be noted that this metaphysical requirement governs the use of

analogies. These may be employed to facilitate our understanding of the nature of man. But some historical analogies may be highly misleading, in relation to the conditions and issues to be met by St. Thomas' doctrine. Thus it may be necessary to distinguish soul from body, in one way or another. But to liken the relation of soul to body to the relation between pilot and ship may be deemed unsatisfactory, in view of the accords and the metaphysical requirement. St. Thomas, it seems safe to assert, insists upon the reality of the singular, a reality proportioned to its status in being. His doctrine concerning man must satisfy the requirement without impairing the complexity and unity of the individual man. It must make these intelligible. Satisfaction of the metaphysical requirement, however, must not contravene the met-empirical and empirical accords.

It is not unreasonable to contend that Descartes had in mind these accords and this requirement. He says, in effect, that he has demonstrated the immateriality and indestructibility of the soul, and that this should be all that the theologian should expect from the philosopher. The union of body and soul is very intimate. The analogy of the pilot and the ship is judged to be inadequate. He assuredly anticipates that a philosophical conception of man's constitution must be in accord with empirical findings. Now, of course, a preliminary concession must be made: it may be that Cartesian man fails to meet these three specifications, and that Thomistic man does meet them. Then certainly Cartesian man and Thomistic man must differ in some fundamental way. Provided that I understand Gilson's and Brennan's discussions and interpretations, it is a fair conclusion that these authorities would declare: St. Thomas met the conditions and achieved a conception of man, sound in principle if not exhaustive in detail, manifesting the accords and satisfying the metaphysical requirement; moreover, the Thomistic doctrine is radically unlike the unfortunate doctrine of Descartes. Perhaps Descartes conserves the errors of the Platonic tradition. However this may be, we may assume that Gilson's Thomistic man and Brennan's Thomistic man are, at least, close approximations to St. Thomas' own Thomistic man. What, then, is Thomistic man?

II

Let us proceed by an examination of Gilson's Thomistic man. Later on, Brennan's Thomistic man will be considered. On the authority of

Gilson, Thomistic man is certainly not Platonic man—nor Cartesian man. Gilson's chapter, "*Christian Anthropology,*" sets the stage for the exposition of Thomas' view by an historical survey.

> At first sight no philosophy could seem to hold out better promise for the future of Christian anthropology than that of Plato and his disciple Plotinus. . . . In the human composite the soul represents the permanent element, changeless and divine, while the body is transitory, changeable, perishable. . . . There is no doctrine in which the independence of the soul with respect to the body is so strongly marked as it is in Platonism, and that explains why the Fathers, as soon as they awoke to the importance of the immortality of the soul, so readily turned to Plato as a natural ally (*S*, p. 173).

But, asks Gilson, what becomes of man? He must be defined as a soul using its body, a formula which Augustine had to accept. Accepting it, however, he could not meet what we have called the metaphysical requirement. "In the end, then, the man is only his soul, or, if you prefer it, it is the soul itself that is the man" (*S*, p. 174). In spite of the advantages of Platonism, Gilson continues, it carried a latent but insurmountable difficulty into the very heart of Christian philosophy (*S*, p. 175). But the Christian, he affirms, must admit that the union of soul and body is natural, is willed by God, and no natural state can possibly be the result of a fall (*S*, pp. 174 f.). Christian thought turned to Aristotle.

> The soul, according to Aristotle, is the act or form of an organized body having life potentially. Thus the relation of soul to body is a particular case of the general relationship between form and matter. There is a sense in which the form and the matter may be said to be separable, since no particular form is of necessity destined by its nature to inform any particular portion of matter, but in another sense we must consider them as inseparable, at least in concrete substances, because forms of this kind could not exist apart from any matter whatsoever. Since the human soul is precisely a form of this kind, the advantages and disadvantages of the definition become at once apparent (*S*, pp. 175 f.).

Gilson summarizes: if we follow Plato, we put the unity of man in jeopardy; if we follow Aristotle, we risk the substantiality of the soul and its immortality (*S*, p. 176).

It is unnecessary to follow Gilson's account of the problem as treated by Avicenna and others. It is to be noted, however, that Avicenna is said to have anticipated Descartes: "if the soul is a substance essentially

separable from the body then, whenever I say 'I think,' it is of my soul alone that I speak; and it is the existence of my soul alone that I affirm when I conclude 'therefore I am' " (*S*, p. 182).[4] Thomistic man must be neither Platonic nor Cartesian man. Thomas had to effect a complete reconciliation of the issues. Proper study of Thomas' texts will reveal that his "reconciliation" is not an eclecticism (*S*, p. 182). With this we arrive at Gilson's critical statement:

> the Thomist soul is neither a substance playing the part of a form, nor yet a form which could not possibly be a substance, but *a form which possesses and confers substantiality*. Nothing could be simpler; and yet we should look in vain for any philosopher before St. Thomas who conceived the idea (*S*, pp. 182 f.).[5]

Alas, Gilson adds to this a depressing sentence—"There are few enough even today who are capable of setting out its meaning correctly." If Gilson should be in need of an instance of incapacity it will shortly be supplied.

Thomistic man, then, must be conceived as resulting from a form which possesses and confers substantiality. The formality of the soul lies at the basis of its substantiality (*S*, p. 183). For Augustine, the question had been whether we can conceive of a non-corporeal substance. For St. Thomas, if the soul exists, its incorporeal nature admits of no doubt. But what of its substantiality? St. Thomas demonstrates this, and the demonstration is said, by Gilson, to have been based on an insufficiently noticed principle, i.e., that every distinct operation supposes a distinct substance (*S*, p. 184). Substances are known by their operations. If there are acts of thought, then there are thinking substances. In Thomistic terminology, there are then intellects, i.e., things that think, *choses qui pensent* (*S*, p. 184; *E*, p. 190). The human intellect is an incorporeal substance, in its being and in its operations *(dans son être que dans ses opérations)*.[6] But man and the intellect are

4. Candor compels me to take the risk of saying that I cannot accept Gilson's interpretation of many points in Cartesian philosophy, as later stages of this essay may well suggest.

5. Italics mine: . . . *l'âme thomiste n'est ni une substance qui jouerait le rôle de forme, ni une forme qui ne saurait être une substance, mais une forme qui possède et confère la substantialité* (*E*, p. 188).

6. A paragraph from Gilson is indispensable. "The operations of which intellects are the principle are cognitive operations. By the intellect we are capable of knowing the nature of all corporeal things. Now the power of knowing all things demands as a first condition that we ourselves shall be no one of those things in

not to be identified, for men have other operations besides the intellectual.

Now the unity of man cannot be disassociated into two accidentally united halves—(against the metaphysical requirement, as it was called above). The substantial form described, Gilson says, is only a part of man.

> Everything therefore goes to show that man is a being composed of a corporeal matter organized by a form, and of an intellectual substance which informs and organizes this matter . . . it is the intellect itself, an incorporeal substance, that is the form of the human body (*S*, pp. 185 f.).[7]

Acknowledging that the internal difficulties of Thomism begin to look formidable, it is asked: "Grant that the intellect is an incorporeal substance; how, at the same time, could it form part of another substance, and form with it a whole that would be no mere accidental com-

particular, for if the intellect had a determinate corporeal nature, it would be but a body among bodies, limited to its own proper mode of being and incapable of apprehending natures different from its own. In other words, a thinking substance that knows bodies could not itself be a body. From this it results that if there are so many beings incapable of knowledge, it is precisely because they are nothing other than bodies, and that if there are corporeal beings that think, the principle of their cognitive activity is not to be found in their corporeity. That is why the human intellect, on account of the very fact that it is an intellect, must be considered as an incorporeal substance, and this, too, in its being as well as in its operations" (*S*, pp. 184 f.; *E*, p. 190).

7. This sentence is somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, there is the intellectual substance, the intellect, an incorporeal substance; on the other hand, a corporeal matter and the human body. Now just what is the "corporeal matter" which is organized by a form? Just what is the matter informed and organized by the intellectual substance? Is there first a corporeal matter organized by a form, this form being other than the intellectual substance, so that the latter informs and further organizes a corporeal matter which is itself already organized at a lower level? Or is it rather the case that the intellectual substance informs and organizes *prime* matter? If the corporeal matter results from prime matter organized by a form prior to its further organization by the intellectual substance, we surely have something closely akin to the composite Cartesian man. If the Thomistic doctrine insists upon the unicity of form, I presume the components of Thomistic man are prime matter, and the intellectual substance that informs and organizes, and, consequently, everything in the man that is not assignable to prime matter is to be attributed to the informing and organizing principle. This appears to be the teaching of the quotations immediately following in the text above. Souls obtain the co-operation of sensorial organs by actualizing "a matter" and it is due wholly to them that this matter is a body. But to remove all ambiguity, should we not replace "*a* matter" with prime matter?

posite?" (*S*, p. 186). St. Thomas' position, we are assured, is very different from that of his predecessors, and a great deal more favorable. He means that it is man, not a sensibility, that feels, and man, not a mere intellect, that thinks. "Like all facts, this does not need to be deduced, but simply apprehended (*S*, p. 186)." Substances like the human intellect

> would be unable to get into touch with the world of bodies save by the intermediation of a body. In order to apprehend sensible forms and thence elaborate intelligibles, they must themselves become the forms of sensible bodies. . . . They would have to do this—and here is the essential point—precisely because they are the kind of substances they are (*S*, pp. 186 f.).

The apparent difficulty here is said by Gilson to be due to an illusion of the imagination.

> To say that man is a concrete substance and complete in himself is in no way to contradict the thesis of the substantiality of the soul. The error of interpretation . . . is due to imagining body and soul as two substances and attempting out of these two to construct a third which would be the man.

The man alone fully deserves the name of substance, Gilson continues, but he owes all of his substantiality to that of the soul.

> For the human soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substance; the body . . . although without it the soul cannot develop the fullness of its actuality, has neither actuality nor subsistence, save those received from its form, that is to say from the soul. That, moreover, is why the corruption of the body cannot involve that of the soul. . . . Thus the substance 'man' is not a combination of two substances but a complex substance which owes its substantiality to one only of its two constitutive principles. Souls are immortal substances, which cannot develop their activity without the co-operation of sensorial organs; in order to obtain this co-operation they actualize a matter; it is due wholly to them that this matter is a body, and yet they are not themselves save in a body; the man, therefore, is neither his body, since the body subsists only by the soul, nor his soul, since this would remain destitute without the body; he is the unity of a soul which substantializes his body and of the body in which this soul subsists[8] (*S*, pp. 187 f.).

This, then, is Thomistic man, according to the magistral authority of Gilson. It is a fair inference to conclude that Thomistic man is thought by Gilson—and doubtless by many—to be exceedingly different from Cartesian man.

8. See also Gilson's Note 19, pp. 463 f. 7, which is indispensable.

III

But now to Brennan.[9] Brennan's Thomistic man is said to be a thing remarkably unlike Cartesian man, as Brennan appears to understand Cartesian man. Indeed, one gathers from Brennan's book that there are but two ways open to psychology. On the one hand it could continue along the path defined by Cartesian man; on the other hand it could be guided by the Thomistic conception of man, which Brennan calls hylomorphism.

In the history of philosophic thought, there have been many attempts to solve the body-soul problem in a manner quite different from that of Aristotle and Aquinas; yet, in the last analysis, we find but one alternative to the hylomorphic solution. For, if the body and soul of man are not substantially conjoined, then the union between them must be a merely accidental one. Two types of explication have been advanced, under which all nonhylomorphic accounts may be grouped: first, theories of interactionism, which began with Plato and were repeated by Descartes and the later Cartesians; second, theories of parallelism, which were first expounded in scientific language by Fechner and Wundt and afterwards developed with incidental variations by succeeding psychologists. To see that all these accounts are ultimately the same, one need but reflect that, historically, parallelism stems from the teaching of Descartes, through Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony and Geulincx's occasionalism; while, philosophically, parallelism is simply an attempt to show how body and soul can operate side by side without being causally related. It makes little difference that the Platonists were less concerned about the body and more about the soul and its spiritual integrity; and that the parallelists are less concerned about the soul and more about the body and the law of physical conservation. Fundamentally, the two positions come to the same

9. I have not observed a single reference to Gilson in Brennan's book. His name is not in the index, which seems a bit strange. But Brennan's book appears under impressive auspices. It has its *Nihil Obstat* and its *Imprimatur*. Moreover, it contains an introduction by Professor Mortimer J. Adler. After referring to his "first enthusiasm for the knowledge and wisdom about man which Aristotle and St. Thomas have taught me," Professor Adler says that he went to the opposite extreme and rejected all modern developments (p. x). In the course of time, he says, he recognized the importance of the modern contribution. He envisaged "an orderly exposition of all the truths we now know about human nature, both philosophical and scientific. The dream I had has come to life in this book; and though Father Brennan would be the first to insist that his work is only a first approximation to the ideal of which we both have been dreaming, he cannot deny that he has completed the pioneer's work. He has not merely seen the promised land: he has surveyed it, marked its boundaries, laid out its thoroughfares, developed its building-sites . . . the edifice of psychology will not be moved from these foundations" (pp. xi-xii).

thing: that body and soul have only incidental relationships with each other (*B*, pp. 75 f.).

Brennan says later that, for Descartes and his disciples,

> man is not one substance, but two different and widely opposed substances: mind, something that thinks, whose very essence, in fact, is thought; and matter, something that mechanizes, whose very essence is extension. In the Cartesian picture of man, therefore, the dichotomy of soul and body, or of mind and matter, is complete and absolute, since Descartes' unextended mind cannot communicate with his extended body—except, of course, in a purely mechanical or accidental way (*B*, pp. 76 f.).[10]

In sum, then, Thomistic man as described by Brennan is not what Brennan understands Platonic and Cartesian man to be. Let us assume the validity of the metaphysical requirement: no account of man that jeopardizes his essential unity can be accepted. It is fair to say, one hopes, that Brennan judges that Cartesian man does not, and Thomistic man does, meet the requirement. The Thomistic account makes intelligible the unity of man in virtue of the substantial conjunction of body and soul. Let us assume that the metaphysical requirement would be regarded as valid in the sciences of man. Let us further assume that any distinctions, such as that between "body" and "soul," the "psychical" and the "physical," and the like, found necessary for the understanding of the facts, must be so interpreted as not to conflict with the metaphysical requirement. Finally, let it be granted that man as defined by Descartes is such that "body and soul have only incidental relationships with one another," that the "dichotomy of soul and body, or of mind and matter, is complete and absolute," with the understanding that Cartesian man accordingly does not satisfy the metaphysical requirement. Given these conditions, it is evident that Cartesian man, if dominating psychology, will produce a pseudo-science. Again given these conditions, we should conclude: the Thomistic doctrine satisfies the metaphysical requirement; it renders intelligible the unity of man, providing a foundation for the interpretation of distinctions, while avoiding the difficulties arising from the notion of "two different and widely opposed substances." Thomistic man, then, is *man*. Anticipatorily, the Thomistic doctrine serves to guide the processes of psycho-

10. *Cf.* p. 178: "Descartes . . . revived the exaggerated Platonic dualism of mind and matter. . . . After the entrenchment of Descartes's philosophy, mind and matter were no longer regarded as conjoined in a substantial union."

logical inquiry. Consummatorily, it provides the pattern within which its findings must fall and by means of which they can be organized coherently. In the conditions cited, Cartesian man is not man at all—but rather a monster. Because of the similarities between Platonic and Cartesian man, St. Thomas was well advised to view Platonism with a critical eye. With this, it could be urged, the difference between Thomistic man and Cartesian man has been made sufficiently clear.

Prudence—and Gilson's remark to the effect that even now few are capable of setting forth correctly the meaning of St. Thomas' principle —would suggest an immediate end to this adventure. To continue would be folly. But then there would be no essay.

Thomistic man is man: Cartesian man is a monster. It would be comforting to dismiss all perplexities with this conclusion. We could exclaim, with Professor Adler—what man has made of man![11] The psychologists could be left to stew in their own—and Cartesian—juice. But, somehow, it seems improbable (i.e., to me) that Plato and Descartes described a monster and then thought they had described man. At any rate, Descartes knew quite a bit about St. Thomas and presumably about Thomistic man, and should have been able to recognize a (or his) monster for what it is. The truly perplexing thing, however, is a matter of words. Thomistic man and Cartesian monster are described, partly by means of the same words, and partly by means of similar terms. Perhaps this may be dismissed—but perhaps not. It awakens curiosity. Descartes declares that man is a unity, not indeed of nature, but of composition. The union is said to be very intimate. The pilot-and-the-ship analogy is expressly repudiated. On the other hand, Brennan refers to "the view of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas that man is a composite substance, made up of matter and mind, the one without physical dimensions, the other possessing all the characters of extended matter" (*B*, p. 56).[12] Strangely, this seems to put Descartes in a company from which one had thought him to be excluded.

11. *What Man Has Made of Man: A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism in Psychology* (New York, 1937).

12. The text continues: "if, further, we hold that no single intellectual operation is to be found without its material correlate, no thought without an image, no volition without feeling of some sort—at once the concrete phenomena of man's mental life are seen in their true context, which is both psychological and physiological." To which I can but add: perhaps—but just how different from the Cartesian monster?

Verbal identities and similarities, of course, demonstrate nothing. Occurring in different philosophical and scientific contexts, presumably the same and similar words are intended to convey meanings reflecting differences of contexts. Make what allowances you will—the question is re-evoked: what *is* the difference that makes the difference?

IV

Recklessly, let us resume the adventure, veering first towards Descartes' monster and then towards St. Thomas' man.

The monster is a unity of composition, not of nature. What is meant by the denial? By the unity? By composition?[18] Is man composed of two substances? How could Descartes possibly have said this without reservations of the utmost gravity? In the first place, Descartes is emphatic in asserting that the term substance, in the strict and proper sense, can be applied to God alone. The term cannot be used univocally of God and other beings. For the sake of brevity, let us use the term "Nature" as signifying *all* existents other than God or Substance. In this sense, man is a natural thing, and in so far as "substance" can be used, equivocally, in relation to natural things, man's relation to nature's substantiality or substantialities can be indicated. Is man, then, composed of *two* substances? Certainly not. Granting that Cartesian man has a substantial soul, that his soul is a substance, it certainly is not the case that his body is a substance. His body may be described as of a substance, as a part or portion of a substance, but not as a substance. It is an organized set or system of modes of a substance whose essential attribute is extension. It is then highly misleading to describe Cartesian man (or monster) as composed of two substances.

But why use "substance" of Nature at all? What could be meant by saying that Nature is substantial, is composed of substances? Distinguishing between God and the world, reality and appearance, Nature is quasi-substantial. Nature's substantiality as a whole can be described by saying that it depends upon the concurrence of God, and upon that alone, for its existence and for its being what it is. With reference to

13. In what follows I must make many unsupported statements. I do not accept many traditional interpretations of Descartes, and hope to defend my own, extensively, on another occasion. Perhaps the reader will graciously accept my statement as hypothetical, in the sense of saying to himself—*if* Descartes did mean this, then this comparative study of Descartes and St. Thomas on man has plausibility.

Nature alone, a natural substance has independence in existence in the sense that it is of the very nature of substances reciprocally to exclude one another. It is possible to take the position, without undue violence to Descartes' thought, that Nature, in relation to the divine concurrence, has a single conditional substantiality. In this sense, Nature can be described as an internally diversified substantiality.

But disregarding theological references, Nature can be viewed as that which the sciences in their similarities and differences seek to render intelligible. With this, in Cartesian doctrine, Nature's internally diversified substantiality appears as a plurality of (finite) "substances." This plurality is functional in the pursuit of the sciences. There are several existential sciences. Each science, let us say, views existential matter-of-fact in a perspective determined by a fund of assumptions and basic ideas, the fund of course being cumulative and revisional. Reflecting similarities in matters-of-fact, several perspectives may be in part defined by one and the same idea. All sciences have Nature's substantiality as the final referent for *sciences*. The problem is whether, this side of the final referent, there is a more limited referent, or referents, functionally necessary for the sciences. Descartes, seemingly, was led to a plurality of referents. It was necessary to define a plurality of natural substances. To one he applied the term matter. Since "substance" cannot either exist or be understood without an internal essential and constitutive character or attribute, the attributes of the substances into which Nature's substantiality proliferates must be defined. Thus we have, as referents for the sciences, matter with its essential attribute of extension, and soul-substances with the essential attribute of thought. For the purposes of scientific inquiry, then, that derivative, dependent substantiality or quasi-substantiality which is called Nature can be regarded *as if* it were unconditionally substantial or as composed of spiritual substances and a matter-substance.

It was disclosed to Descartes that man must be viewed in two perspectives, with the consequence that there must be two sciences or sets of sciences about man. One science (or set of sciences) refers its findings to Nature's substantiality by way of matter, the other by way of "soul." Let us say that the word "man" signifies an existent thing consisting of a set of matters-of-fact. In the total set of matters-of-fact signified by the word, many, many items are basically extensities, *what-*

ever they may be in addition. But many items are not basically extensities at all. This may be expressed crudely as follows: in this world, if you look for a tree, a flower, a butterfly, a stone, you must look for something that in every case, however different these things may be, is an extensity. They are things that can neither be without extension nor be understood without reference to "matter" and its essential attribute. Now, in the case of the total matter-of-fact signified by "man," this is not wholly the case. In this world, such items as arms, legs, intestines, cortical neurones, can neither be nor be understood without using the same referent as in the case of the former things. In this world, "rose," "stone," "arms," and "intestines," refer to existential sets that are extended, whatever they may be in addition. But there are other items in "man"—so finds Descartes—conditioned neither as to their existence nor as to their intelligibility solely by participation in and reference to matter and its essential attribute. For sciences dealing with man (at least), Nature's diversified substantiality must be interpreted by defining two referents, which may be called, in view of their role in inquiries, "substances," the nature of which is to be reciprocally exclusive and relatively independent.

If we think, not in terms of common sense and common-sense absorptions of (alleged) knowledge and scientific findings, but in terms of the sciences themselves, the real bearing of Descartes' view of man can be re-stated. It is not the case that man "has" or "is" a body, and *therefore* must be viewed in a perspective defined by "matter." Rather, because some of the matter-of-fact signified by the term "man" cannot be rendered intelligible save by reference to matter, it must be concluded that "man" is in so far a corporeal thing. His corporeality, then, is a name for an intricate set of scientific findings, many of which seem to be warranted. Because of certain similarities of scientific findings in the case of "dogs," "stones," "stars," it must be concluded that man is like these things in some measure. But it is equally true that other bits of this matter-of-fact identified by the word "man"—so thinks Descartes—cannot be rendered intelligible by reference exclusively to matter, (or, if you will, by reference to "matter" as defined by him). So to speak: look at man in the perspective of what we call "physics" or "chemistry" or "anatomy" or "neurology," and according to Descartes, you will not even see anything identifiable as "envy," "longing for immortality," or "thought." This being the case, if these items are to be

seen, you must look at "man" in a different perspective. Whereupon you will see that "man" is or has a soul.

Scientific probing comes to an end by referring these facts to a diversification of Nature's substantiality, of which diversification it cannot be said that extension is universally constitutive. The knowability of man, then, depends upon two different referents. Describe this, if you will, by saying that man is a dual being. Of course, he is a single thing; he is what Aristotle would call a unity of matter-and-form. Possibly he could be seen in some perspective (a metaphysical one?), in which his unity would be manifest and a duality of referents be unapparent. The union of body and mind is said to be very intimate. But if reflection is to begin *after* the perspectival findings of the several sciences are at hand to be reckoned with, then perforce the unity must appear as one of composition. Then "composition," if it is to be made specifically intelligible, and in view of different findings because of duality of referents, must take the form of a correlation of items, or by some form of systematic interaction between substantial factors. If the behavior of the pineal gland won't suffice, then some other way must be sought. Perchance—one might imagine Descartes saying—the day may arrive when Nature's concurrent substantiality may be reflected in a dominant idea providing a similar perspective for all of the sciences. Then, perchance, man's unity of "composition" will be resolved into a unity of "nature." If Descartes ever had such conjectures, he probably thought of their realization as distant.[14]

V

Whether or not this discussion leaves Cartesian man a monster may be left to one side. The question is how divergent are Thomistic and

14. It will be understood, I trust, that this essay is not concerned with a critical evaluation of Descartes' conceptions. It might be urged that, if Descartes' conception of matter were radically revised and the new conception were sufficiently absorptive of today's findings in the many sciences, there would be no need for two referents ("substances") for knowledge of the nature of man. Perhaps this is possible. But the new conception must be proportioned to the concrete diversification of Nature. It must function so as to embrace all the facts, and facilitate arriving at the intelligibility of the total set of matters-of-fact. Whether the word "matter" would be appropriate for this new conception would be a question of taste and expediency. Or it might be urged that the term "substance" should be abandoned—or that it has been abandoned, on the ground that it is of no use or cannot be made useful. I do not care to urge the retention of a term, or of any historical idea signified by the word,

Cartesian views concerning this thing, whether man or monster. Let us further examine Thomistic man under the tutorship of Gilson and Brennan. Identities and differences of terminology have been noted. Why should Thomistic man and Cartesian monster be described in words so strangely alike? Let us take samples from Brennan:

Applied to man, the hylomorphic doctrine states that between the first matter and the first form of every human being there is a bond of perfect substantial union. This means, more concretely, that the body of man, as first matter, is an incomplete substance; that the soul of man, as first form, is likewise an incomplete substance; that body and soul together, in a bond of mutual complementation, make one complete substance which is man (*B*, p. 68).[15]

Brennan supplies a "clarification" for this chapter, as follows:

I should like to make it clear from the outset that when the term "body" is used in conjunction with the term "soul" as in the phrases "the body-soul relationship," "man is a creature composed of body and soul," "the soul requires a body for its perfection," and so on, "body" always refers to first matter. Actually, the human soul confers on first matter all the perfections that we witness in the human body. In other words, the soul is united directly and immediately to first matter, as to its co-principle in the constitution of man. Strictly speaking, a body or corporeal substance is something that has already been perfected by union with a substantial form. To be precise, therefore, one should always say that the constitutive principles of man's essence are first matter and rational soul. This is the way in which the "body-soul" phraseology is to be understood in the text (*B*, p. 81).

But later Brennan states:

Now, it is quite manifest that a power which is capable of grasping the universal nature of its objects and of reflecting upon itself must be rooted in a substance that is completely devoid of matter; and further, that its proper stimulus, to be able to set it in motion, must be immaterial also (*B*, p. 171).[16]

provided the concrete and incredibily rich diversification of Nature be not "impoverished." I adopt the phrase from the paper, "The Postulate of an Impoverished Reality," by Iredell Jenkins, (*Journal of Philosophy* XXXIX, no. 20). Finally, the "subjectification" of sense-experience does not resolve the issue, since there must be a diversification of Nature-other-than-man in correlation with Nature-as-manifest-in-man.

15. How can the *body* of man be *first* matter? Is the body an incomplete substance? Or is first matter? But see the next quotation.

16. Cf. "It is proper to say, then, that the human mind exhibits an objective dependency on sense, since the data of sense furnish it with the objects of intellection. But in the subjective order, that is, in the act of abstracting and understanding, the intellect of man is completely devoid of matter and the appendages of matter. But

The incomplete substance, the soul, seemingly is completely immaterial. Let us admit, indeed, urge, that we have no right, at least so far, to identify the meaning of Brennan's terms with Cartesian meanings. Presumably, the meanings are Thomistic, or revisionally Thomistic. This is indicated by other statements. Distinguishing natural from intentional modes of being, Brennan says (referring to the "ability to give intentional existence to objects" as "precisely the thing that distinguishes cognitive being from nutritive being"):

> This is the gap that separates the sensitive from the vegetative acts of man. This, in a measure, is the dividing line between material and immaterial functions, because even sensitive knowledge, though common to body and soul, is yet immaterial in its way. In the hierarchy of man's acts, therefore, the operations of his senses are placed midway between the operations of his vegetative powers, which are purely material, though immanent and vital; and the operations of his rational powers, which are purely immaterial (*B*, p. 114).

Now it seems obvious that the notion of something midway between the material and the immaterial could not be reconciled with the Cartesian meanings. There would be absurdity in referring to the Cartesian soul substance, or "faculties" residing within it, as only somewhat, or slightly, or negligibly material. In Cartesian doctrine, if immateriality be defined by reference to the essential attribute of matter, the notion of "degree of immateriality" seems impossible. Assuredly the immateriality of the soul, of thought, cannot mean occupancy of relatively little space! Now evidently Brennan finds no difficulty in the notion of something midway, and presumably finds it integral to the Thomistic conception of man.[17]

> The effect produced in the sense when an object impinges on it is neither

if it is immaterial in its intellectual operations, it must be immaterial in its intellectual nature" (p. 309). Again: "An intelligible form . . . is a universalized form, that is, a form which has been denuded of all its concrete characters and thereby removed from the dimensions of space and time. A sensible form, then, is something material. An intelligible form is something immaterial. But, knowledge by sensible species is proper to the animal, just as knowledge by intelligible species is proper to man. Unless, therefore, material and immaterial mean one and the same thing, it is impossible to identify the cognitions proper to man with those proper to the animal" (p. 196).

17. See text cited in note 16. *Cf. B*, pp. 115 f., where the expressions, "the higher the degree of immateriality" and "a certain degree of immateriality" are found (although it should be noted that the expressions occur here in connection with discussion of the nature of knowing).

wholly material nor wholly immaterial. It is not wholly material because . . . it is a removal or disengagement of form from matter; yet it is not wholly immaterial because the modification is wrought in a material organ (*B*, p. 120).

The epistemological abstractive doctrine is at least intimately associated with the notion of degree of immateriality, although it is somewhat uncertain as to whether the epistemological doctrine determines the notion or the notion facilitates the former. In any case, it is evident that the unassimilability of the notion in the Cartesian doctrine, and its (apparent) assimilability (if not its necessity) in the Thomistic conception of man as reported by Brennan, is due at least in large measure to a difference in the notion of "matter." This suggests the question: is the difference between the Cartesian and Thomistic conceptions of matter so great as to render intelligible the difference represented by the impossibility of the notion, "degree of immateriality," in the former and its congeniality or necessity for the latter?

Postponing this question for the moment, it should be remarked that the notion seemingly collides with the dual notion expressed by Brennan.

The vegetative and sensitive functions of man are bounded by the limitations of time and space, though we discern varying degrees of immanence and remotion from matter in the activities of our psychosomatic powers. But now, with the advent of thinking processes, a completely new world is opened up to us: a universe of ideas and volitions, a region liberated from the palpabilities of sense. The human mind uses no organ in its actual elaboration of thought, however much it may be extrinsically limited by cortical substance, nerve centers . . . and all the material paraphernalia that form the necessary preliminary to its intellectual achievements (*B*, p. 169).

Distinguishing between the proper objects of sense and of the intellect, Brennan continues:

The restriction of the sensitive power to the apprehension of singulars is due, of course, to its psychosomatic nature. It is inherently dependent on matter for all its operations. By contrast, the extension of the intellectual power to the apprehension of universals is due to its purely psychic nature. It is inherently independent of matter in all its operations. This does not signify that intellect is free of the administrations of sense. Quite the opposite! (*B*, pp. 191 f.).[18]

18. Again on p. 192 it is stated: "To understand the true nature of the dependency on sense, . . . it is necessary to distinguish intellect's proper operations, which are immaterial, from the conditions of its exercise, which are material."

Brennan divides human powers into two classes: those that belong to the soul and body together, and those belonging to the soul alone. The first are psychosomatic; the second "purely psychic." Continuing, he says:

> Moreover, psychic powers are identical with mind; and mind, by extension, is identical with soul. To ask, then: is the mind of man a substance? is really to ask: is the soul of man a substance?

Brennan's summarizing reply is this:

> man is a hylomorphic creature. He is made up of two basic principles: matter and form. Each is a necessary part of his essence. As parts, each is incomplete without the other. Each belongs to the category of substance, though neither, alone, is a complete substance, because neither, alone, is a complete species. The point is that, entitatively speaking, the soul of man, like all souls, is a substantial form of matter. This means that it demands a material substrate as a coefficient of its very being, in conjunction with which it establishes the complete corporeal substance that we call man (*B*, pp. 303 f.).

These passages, together with others previously cited, verbally if not really suggest an unresolved collision of ideas.

VI

What tentative conclusions can now be projected? What is suggested by the expositions of Gilson and Brennan concerning Thomistic man? It seems clear that the Thomistic and Cartesian doctrines were formulated under an approximately identical tension between two sets of considerations. The nucleus of one set is assuredly represented by the metaphysical requirement: man is a unitary being; if in any sense he is compounded, the composition is an organizational conjoining that interprets his composite nature without destroying his unity. The nucleus of the other set is found in this, that inquiry seeking to render intelligible the constellation of apparent facts identified as a man appears to be driven towards the definition of a bi-polarity within the constellation itself. It is contended that the identity of the tension explains the similarity in verbal descriptions together with the Cartesian adaptations of terms found in the Thomistic tradition.[19] Substance,

19. It seems unnecessary to provide a list of identical and similar terms and phrases, in view of the abundance of materials quoted in the text and footnotes. It will be understood that I do not claim Brennan's interpretations of Thomistic man to be identical with Gilson's, nor, for that matter, to assert that either or both give

composition, matter—these seem to be the terms reflecting the tension in the highest degree.

Cartesian man and the Thomistic man of Gilson and Brennan seem to be identical—verbally at least—to the extent that the soul is incorporeal. Gilson, in the sources cited, appears to use the term "immaterial" more sparingly than does Brennan. It seems that the soul is distinct from the body: thus the incorporeal is distinguished from and presumably is radically different from the corporeal. Indubitably, analysis of "corporeality" will disclose a factor, "matter," without which corporeality cannot be understood. Presumably, in one direction at least, the soul can be understood without reference to the factor, matter. But the error of interpretation must be avoided—we must not imagine that body and soul are two substances and attempt out of these to construct a third which would be the man. Man is not to be identified with his soul. *"En disant que l'homme est une substance concrète et complète en soi, on ne contredit aucunement la thèse qui affirme la substantialité de l'âme"* (*E*, pp. 192 f.). Accepting this brave assurance, let us assume that Gilson's formula authentically expresses the central point of Thomistic doctrine concerning man—the Thomistic soul *(âme)* is not a substance playing the role of a form, nor yet a form which could not be a substance, but a form which possesses and confers substantiality.

Let us postpone the question of matter, to consider "substance," "intellect," and "soul." The intellect is said to be an incorporeal substance. Intellects are things that think. The Thomistic *intellectus* is a thinking thing.[20] But the intellect cannot be identified with the man. The body is some part of man, and this is also the case with the intellect by which he understands.[21] But the intellectual principle is the form of the man.[22] An incorporeal substance, it appears, is the form of the body. There are before us a number of terms whose relations must be determined: soul, intellect, intellectual soul, incorporeal substance,

impeccable accounts of Thomistic doctrine. For the purposes of this essay, it appears sufficient to regard Brennan and Gilson as genuinely representative of the Thomistic tradition. In what follows, to avoid over-burdening the essay with footnotes, I omit referring terms and phrases to the quotations from Brennan and Gilson from which they are drawn.

20. *Cf. E*, p. 199; *S*, p. 184.

21. *ST*, Q. LXXVI, art. 1, *I answer that . . .* (*P*, I, 697).

22. *Ibid.*, (*P*, I, 698).

the man (the concrete and complete substance), the form that possesses and confers substantiality, the form of the body, the body. It is not astonishing that the Thomistic doctrine is intricate—or that few are competent to understand its fundamental principle. However, one can but try.

As a first step, it appears safe to make several statements. According to Thomistic doctrine, the man cannot be identified with the intellect. Again, in some sense the soul cannot be identified with the intellect. It is evident that, were there a soul lacking the intellectual principle and not describable as an intellectual soul, then that soul could not be called human. That soul could not confer substantiality with the result that there is a man, the concrete and complete substance. The man, then, is not a composite whose components are (1) an intellect, this intellect being exactly equivalent to the soul, being the whole of the soul, and the whole of the incorporeal substance, and (2) everything else belonging to the man. The soul, then, is something more than the intellect. It comprises the intellectual principle. The soul comprising the intellectual principle is an incorporeal substance. Gilson states that:

> For St. Thomas, if the soul exists its incorporeal nature admits of no doubt, but it is not altogether the same as regards its substantiality, and it is on this precise point that he brings all his forces to bear. [The principle underlying the demonstration is said to be this]: that every distinct operation supposes a distinct substance. It is only in fact by their operations that substances are known, and conversely, operations are not to be explained except by substances (*S*, p. 184; *E*, p. 189).

The soul or form that confers substantiality cannot be identified with the intellect precisely because, as Gilson says, men have other operations in addition to the intellectual (*S*, p. 185; *E*, p. 191). The man, Socrates, exists, and being is the act of existence.[23] The man, Socrates, has operations other than the intellectual. What are the operations of Socrates? what are the relations of the operations other than the intellectual to the concrete and complete substance, the man, and to the form that possesses and confers substantiality? Now, in Thomistic man there is at least a distinct substance rightly described as an intellectual substance. "The operations of which intellects are the principle are

23. See Gilson's indispensable footnote, no. 19, *S*, pp. 465 f., referred to hereafter as Note 19.

cognitive operations" (*S*, p. 184; *E*, p. 190). Gilson immediately adds: "Even if we wanted to identify the man with his soul we should be faced with a difficulty of the same kind. Such an identification would be possible in the doctrine of Plato or in that of St. Augustine, because, for these philosophers, sensation is an operation proper to the soul and one in which the body plays no part" (*S*, p. 185; *E*, p. 191).[24] Clearly, there is man; there is the intellect, either an incorporeal substance or sharing in the incorporeality of the substance; and there is the soul. It is declared, however, that "the human soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substance" (*S*, p. 187; *E*, p. 198). If distinct operations imply distinct substances; if "intellect" must be distinguished from "soul"; if the intellectual soul is a substance, then just how many substances are there? From cognitive operations we are led to posit an intellectual substance. The man, Socrates, is not an intellect or an intellectual substance, but he has one. It is somewhat bewildering, because the man, Socrates, is said to be a concrete and complete substance, is said to be not a combination of two substances but a complex substance which owes its substantiality to one only of its two constitutive principles.

Let us indulge for a moment in free conjecture. Let us say that, in one sense, the soul is a substance, as the principle of all human operations. That is to say, some operations of the human being, the man, are vegetative-*like*, others animal-*like*, but even these operations are not just vegetative and animal but *human*, since all human operations are operations of the being called the man. In this sense, it is difficult to see how the identification of the man (in so far as incorporeal) with the soul can be evaded. We are told that St. Thomas "never loses sight of the fact that just as it is the man, and no mere sensibility, that feels, so it is the man, and no mere intellect, that thinks" (*S*, p. 186; *E*, pp. 191 f.). That Thomas never loses sight of the fact must be conceded. It is his way of effecting the empirical accord. As for the met-empirical accord, that, as we may perhaps find out, is another matter.

It is monstrous to regard man as made up of a soul capable of intellectual operations alone, and of a body which performs all other operations ascribable to man. Gilson's Thomistic man and St. Thomas' Thomistic man are, apparently, not that. Yet there must be something

24. Is it really the case that, for these philosophers, in sensation body plays no part?

more to be said for Platonic man than has been conceded so far. In some manner, all of the operations must be referable to the man, for they are operations of the man. In some manner, some of the non-intellectual operations, if not all, must be referred to the informing soul or incorporeal substance. Moreover, the man is not made by a combination of two substances, and the incorporeal substance is somehow a unity, not a random collection of souls accidentally conjoined. The soul possesses the intellectual principle, but the soul is not equivalent to the intellect. Yet a man would not be a man without this principle and a soul possessing the principle.

Let us consider the soul and its operations. We may first establish that ". . . the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent."[25] ". . . the intellectual principle, which we call the mind or the intellect, has essentially an operation in which the body does not share (*P*, I, 685). Revert now to the principle stated by Gilson: *"toute opération distincte suppose une substance distincte"* (*E*, p. 189; *S*, p. 184). It is evident that the principle cannot be applied loosely. There are operations other than the intellectual. Assume that some of these operations are such that the body has no share in them. A literal application of the principle suggests that there are as many souls, provided these operations are distinct. But the soul of Socrates is no collection of substances. Nor is the man, Socrates, a collection. The principle must be interpreted in a more recondite way. Adopting Dionysius' position that there are three things to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation, St. Thomas treats the problem of man accordingly.[26] Now, the power of the soul is not its essence.[27] Yet several powers must be placed in the soul.[28] There are operations of the soul performed without a corporeal organ, such as understanding and will. The powers of these operations are in the soul as in their subject. Some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs.[29] But all powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite,

25. *ST*, Q. LXXV, art. 2, *I answer that . . . P* reads: " . . . the principle of intellectual operation, which we call the soul of man . . ." (I, 685).

26. *ST*, Q. LXXV, intro.; *P*, I, 682.

27. *ST*, Q. LXXVII, art. 1, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 720.

28. *Ibid.*, art. 2, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 722.

29. *Ibid.*, art. 5, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 727.

flow from the essence of the soul as from their principle.[30] Plurality of powers and operations does not, then, imply a plurality of souls. Now, St. Thomas rules out several possible identifications. First, to equate "man" with "soul," but a particular man, Socrates, with the composite of soul and body. Second, to equate this man and this soul. (It is in this context that St. Thomas declares that Plato, supposing that feeling was proper to the soul, maintained that man was a soul making use of a body. But feeling is not an operation of the soul alone.)[31] Third, the man cannot be equated with the intellect, for if man is the intellect itself, and Socrates and Plato have one intellect, then Socrates and Plato are one man.[32] In man, the sensitive, the intellectual, and nutritive souls are numerically one.[33] "Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible that there be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul."[34] The intellectual soul contains virtually the sensitive and nutritive souls.[35]

We may now return to the powers of the soul. It seems clear that this conclusion must be maintained: once the essence of the soul shall have been established, then the powers must be such that they are in accord with that essence. They are all resident within one soul. If, for example, it is of the essence of the soul, if it is integral to the nature of the substantial form of man, to be incorporeal and immaterial, then assuredly all the powers, even if their exercise involves a corporeal organ, are rightly described as incorporeal and immaterial. Despite the desperate ingenuity of St. Thomas, does not Platonic man arise before us? Man is a soul using the body. Perhaps the expression is figurative —even for Plato. But in the end, does it not express something indispensable for the Thomistic doctrine concerning man? To this we may revert later.

30. *Ibid.*, art. 6, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 729.

31. *ST*, Q. LXXV, art. 4, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 688. Would not Descartes grant this?

32. *ST*, Q. LXXVI, art. 2, *I answer that . . . P*, I, 701.

33. *Ibid.*, art. 3, *I answer that . . . P*, pp. 705 f.

34. *Ibid.*, art. 4, *On the contrary . . . P*, I, 708. Here, as in many other places, Pégis is far more guarded in his use of the terms "being" and "existence" than the original *ST* translation, with resulting great improvement.

35. *Ibid.*, *I answer that . . . P*, p. 708.

VII

If Thomistic man—either that of Thomas, of Gilson, or of Brennan —is to fit the requirements of both the empirical and met-empirical accords, there are some interpretations of terms, of isolated texts, which must be utterly unacceptable. But it may be clarifying to entertain one of these interpretations. The proposed interpretation, it should be emphasized, would be utterly condemned (I believe) by St. Thomas, Gilson, and Brennan. It is *suggested* by certain texts, terminological usages, and doctrinal needs—but only by some. It may not be intended even by these. For the sake of brevity, the basis of the interpretation may be defined as the notion of degrees of immateriality and the doctrine to which it leads may be called the organismic (or naturalistic?) view of man. The latter is not what Brennan intends as the hylomorphic doctrine. It is contended, however, that Brennan's hylomorphism reduces to the organismic view *unless* distinctions of a Cartesian type are introduced. The same will be true of St. Thomas' and Gilson's Thomistic man, in so far as Brennan's Thomistic man is in accord with the former. Once more, the interpretation is offered purely for the sake of clarification.

Let it be assumed that the soul is the substantial form of man; that the man (say Socrates) is the concrete and complete substance; that the man is not constructed out of two substances; that with St. Thomas we shall never lose sight of the fact that it is the man, and not a mere sensibility or intellect, that feels and thinks. It is further assumed that this being, the man, for example, Socrates, is to be understood, and that the distinction between matter and form is indespensable for the purpose.[36] In the conditions hypothetically established, a man is composite in the sense that the analysis of his being,—logically conditioning any further investigation of his nature and being—moves in two directions, signified by "form" and "matter." The distinction is one of discourse, but it is relevant to and is referable to the thing, the man. The form of this thing can be identified as an intellectual soul in this sense, that

36. "Being is the act of existence. Posited by this act, the being is posited in and for itself. Since it is, it is by definition itself and no other . . . the being conceived in its undivided unity is called precisely *substance*, and its property of existing as substance, that is to say, for itself and without substantial dependence on any other, is called *subsistence*. Thus the act of being causes the substance and its subsistence." Gilson, Note 19.

the phrase and others like it describe the nature of the form constituting the intelligibility of this thing when the bi-polarity of analysis is expressed in terms of the distinction between matter and form. Were the thing a stone, an oak tree, a dog, no such description would be appropriate, for no one of these things is a man, albeit the distinction of matter and form conditions the intelligibility of each of them. The form conferring substantiality may be called the soul.

Now this form or the soul is evidently to be regarded as immaterial. It is immaterial in the sense that, form being distinguished from matter, form is not matter. Some substantial forms "are subsisting principles of operations proper to themselves as forms, and these are *rational souls;* others are bound up with matter both as to their being and as to their operation, and these are *material forms.*"[37] But the expression, material form, assuredly cannot *negate* the distinction between matter and form; rather it describes something about the nature of the form. Perhaps this may be conveyed by saying that immaterial stones are not: posited by an act of existence, the stone is matter-and-form. This states something pertinent to the essential nature of a stone. The soul, then, is immaterial, in the sense that every form is immaterial. If the soul now be described as incorporeal, the question arises: is this term to be regarded as equivalent to immaterial? If the corporeal signifies a being that is a unity of matter-and-form, the equivalence cannot obtain.

"Soul," "intellectual soul," and similar expressions, furnish content with respect to the form of this thing; the "body" or the "human body" effects something corresponding in view of the fact that the thing is matter and form. In the case of a stone or a dog, appropriate values must be supplied, for these, too, are unities of matter and form. It may possibly be reasonable to use "body" and "soul" with respect to a dog, but quite inappropriate in the case of a stone. The formula, possessing and conferring substantiality, on this interpretation, could be stripped of all suggestions that man is arrived at by taking two substances and adding them together. It could be made to mean something like this: here is a thing said to be a man; if inquiry does not disclose, as pertaining to its nature, a certain degree and type of organization, then this thing is not correctly called a man. It is the or-

37. *Ibid.*

ganization that, so to speak, makes the thing a man. In a similar sense, it could be asserted that it is the organization that makes a dog a dog, a reptile a reptile, and so on.

Continuing this plan of interpretation, the notion of degrees of immateriality seems requisite. The matter and form analysis points in one direction toward a terminus which is designated prime matter. Prime matter does not exist. Forms do not exist. Prime matter is what is never "a this." Matter acquires actual being as it acquires form.[38] The potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.[39] Now the degree of remotion from bare prime matter, the degree of actualization of its possiblities, could reasonably be described as a degree of immateriality. The more matter acquires form, or the higher the form acquired, the more actual being it comes to have. *De*-materialization, or *im*-materialization, is *organization*. In this sense, the higher the actual being, the more immaterial or organized it is. The higher the being subject to investigation under the analytical bi-polarity of matter and form, the more there would intervene for inquiry between this being, say a man, and the raw nudity of prime matter. Let us call a thing, composite of matter and form, a body, and reserve the term "matter" for prime matter. Agreeing upon this terminology, immaterialization or immateriality could not be identified with incorporeality. On the contrary, corporeality must signify some degree of removal from matter. The notion of a maximal degree of immateriality does not seem to be impossible. It could be urged that the set of finite existents called the world is somehow limited, in that nothing can have a degree of immateriality beyond a certain degree, whatever that is. In these conditions, maximal immateriality is maximal remotion from bare (prime) matter. But equally, maximal immateriality is maximal *corporeality!* Maximal actualization of the potentialities of matter is maximal corporealization! If prime matter is somehow restricted as to the nature and range of its potentialties, then actualization, organization, corporeality, immateriality are relative to that restriction.

If the preceding seems to be a strange use of words, the underlying ideas are familiar enough. It is equivalent to saying: all existing things are organized; organization may differ in degree. Do not biologists sometimes express their findings in such a manner? It might be con-

38. *ST*, Q. LXXV, *I answer that . . . P*, 1, 692.
39. *ST*, Q. LXXVII, *Reply obj. 2*, *P*, 1, 721.

tended that the most highly organized things are men. Their organization is such that the thing must be described as capable of rational operations and, therefore, as rationally be-souled. The maximally immaterial function, power, or aspect of organization is the intellect. This being is also the maximally *corporeal* thing, i.e., the maximal realization of matter's potentialities. A man is a concrete and complete substance. Let us assume that he is the highest being of that set of beings for the study of which the distinction between matter and form is necessary. This distinction controls investigation. As organization comes to be understood in the various sciences, the "form" of the thing itself comes to be understood. It is understood as an actualization of the potentialties of matter. Inquiry will vibrate between "form" and "matter." But the thing is there with its unity un-impaired, for distinctions are being made as demanded by its organization. Given this pattern "pre-investigatively" (to adapt Brennan's felicitous expression), (*B*, p. 336), then science may proceed to supply details, adjusting "post-investigatively" their findings to this pattern. This, then, is the organismic pattern.

VIII

It would be preposterous to attribute this interpretation to Gilson or Brennan. (Frankly, I am not wholly convinced that it would be preposterous to attribute it to St. Thomas!) The question, however, is this: why is it preposterous? Under what conditions can Thomistic man escape identification with organismic or naturalistic man? How can we follow the good counsel never to lose sight of the fact that it is the man who feels and thinks and, nevertheless, avoid the conclusion that all the historic distinctions summed up in the distinction between body and soul are nothing more than a distinction between organization and that which, in relation to the purposes of an inquiry, may be regarded as the raw materials of the organization? In great perplexity, I can but suggest this answer: Thomistic man is not organismic man because the former is astonishingly like Cartesian man! On the one hand, it must be said of Thomistic man, that the concrete and complete substance, the man, feels and thinks. This seemingly expresses the empirical accord. But, with Gilson, we must be able to say:

> Man . . . is a concrete substance, that is to say a substance in which there are parts which may legitimately be considered separately; but his being is

one, first because the substantial elements of his being, that is to say body and soul, cannot subsist apart, and secondly because it is due to the subsistence of one only of these, that is to say the soul, that the substance, man, subsists. The different *rôle* played by the two parts is quite clear, inasmuch as *the soul, once it has obtained the necessary aid from the body, can subsist without the body,* as in fact it does after the death of the man, while on the other hand the body can in no case subsist without the soul, to which latter it owes all its actuality; as the very dissolution of the corpse is enough to prove.[40]

The met-empirical accord is hereby satisfied. We must avoid the identification of the man with the intellect or even with the soul; yet the man must in some sense be identified with the soul; we must maintain the unity of man; we must understand "souls" as "immortal substances which cannot develop their activity without the cooperation of sensorial organs" and yet persist after having obtained the aid needed. Thomistic man must have a Platonic soul! The soul is substantial. It obtains necessary aid from the body. I am willing to concede that this represents faithfully the thought of St. Thomas. What aid does the soul receive because it confers substantiality and the man subsists? How does it use corporeal organs? Are its powers evoked, its operations made specific, by an extrinsic excitation on the part of the body? How are the parts of man to be considered separately? Granting that there are "parts" which can be considered separately, then, when they are so considered, how are their several functions to be conceived, and how the relation between them? Now it must be true, if the met-empirical accord obtains, that the immortal part of the man is genuinely the man.

To make this clear, let us consider that Socrates might have died in early youth. This Socrates would never have become the tutor of Plato. But this youth Socrates, since his soul is an immortal substance, would have immortality and the immortal soul would be that of the youth Socrates. But Socrates is reported to have died full of years. His soul obtained aid from the body for decades more than would have been the case had he died in youth. Surely this lengthened career implies that much accrued to the soul of Socrates which would not have so accrued had he died in youth. It was the man, Socrates, who thought and felt, who suffered and loved and sought the truth. But are the fruits of all this somehow gathered up into the soul substance which

40. Note 19; italics mine.

alone is immortal? And if so gathered up, must these fruits not be in and of the soul, participating in its nature, and escaping the dissolution of the body? The difficulty is obvious: the parts of man must be distinguished; they must be systematically interrelated in such a manner that the unity of the man can be maintained and the metaphysical requirement be met; but the immortal part must be separable, and in some way must be identifiable with the man—Socrates' soul with Socrates, Aristotle's with Aristotle—for otherwise there could be little meaning to the notion of necessary aid from their several bodies. But how can all of the conditions be fulfilled unless St. Thomas admits, as an abiding truth, *that man is a soul using a body*? I must confess my inability to see how Thomistic man can meet all the conditions for which it was devised, escape reduction to the organismic or naturalistic pattern, and provide a program for scientific inquiries, unless that program be based upon a radically "dualistic" conception of man's constitution.

IX

Let us return to Brennan's Thomistic man. Does he evade Plato, or Plato and Descartes? We may be assured that his hylomorphism is not intended to be the organismic conception. The vegetative and sensitive functions, he says, are bounded by the limitations of time and space. They are inherently dependent on matter for their operations. Strictly, one assumes, they are dependent on corporeal organs, but corporeality comports prime matter. This does not necessarily imply, of course, a simple identification of the functions with activities of corporeal organs. It implies some form of dependence. This might be construed to mean that the activity of the corporeal organ occasions or somehow elicits a corresponding vegetative or sensitive functioning. Whether Brennan means this, or whether he must accept it, remains to be seen. In any case, he continues: "By contrast, the extension of the intellectual power to the apprehension of universals is due to its *purely psychic nature*. It is *inherently independent of matter* in all its operations. This does not signify that intellect is free of the administrations of sense. Quite the opposite!" (*B*, pp. 191 f.)[41] Again, we read: "To understand the true nature of its dependency on sense, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish intellect's proper operations,

41. Italics mine.

which are immaterial, from the conditions of its exercise, which are material" (*B*, p. 192). Passions are said to be complexes of psychic and somatic elements (*B*, p. 155). According to Aquinas, Brennan says, "both the somatic and psychic features of a passion constitute one affective phenomenon. . . . Body and soul, in such a case, are acting as a single principle of operation" (*B*, p. 160). The operations of sense, he declares, are "*midway* between the operations of his vegetative powers, which are *purely material*, though immanent and vital; and the operations of his rational powers, which are *purely immaterial*" (*B*, p. 114).[42] Immateriality can be understood as signifying form, in the sense that "To understand is to free form completely from matter" (*B*, p. 190). "A sensible form, then, is something material. An intelligible form is something immaterial" (*B*, p. 196). Matter and form are parts of man's essence. Each is incomplete without the other. Each belongs to the category of substance. The soul is a substantial form of matter.

Brennan's terminology, so far as I can see, is incontestably two-fold. In part, it is the matter-form terminology. In part, it is what may be called psychophysical. Is the form-matter distinction intended to be identical with the distinction between the psychical and the physical? If form as form is immaterial, in view of texts previously instanced, it is difficult to believe that this equivalence is intended. If form is not matter, no form, whether sensible or intelligible, can be something material. If to understand is to free form completely from matter, then, presumably, if a sensible thing composite of matter and form came to be understood, its form would be divested of matter. It might be the form *of* a thing which could not exist save by being a unity of matter and form, and in this sense be material as the form of a material thing.

Are we to understand that, if a stone comes to be understood, its form being freed of matter (which presumably would involve the operations of purely immaterial powers), then that form becomes purely psychic? To man, said to be a complete substance, the distinction between matter and form is pertinent. We have been told that each of the parts of man's essence, matter and form, belong to the category of substance. The statements seem obscure. Accepting them, could the

42. Italics mine.

following be urged? If form be distinct from matter, or can be distinguished from it and from the thing as a unity of matter and form, and can be regarded by itself in its distinction from matter, then form is certainly immaterial. If, then, it belong under the category of substance, form emerges as an immaterial substance or as something in and of an immaterial substance. Accordingly, the substance, the man, in so far as form alone is regarded, becomes a non-matter or other-than-matter substance. But so it would be in the case of a stone, if a stone be a thing of matter and form, and if each factor in the case of the stone belong to the category of substance. Doubtless this is absurd. But to add that the substantial form in the case of man is psychical, while in the case of the stone the term "psychical" has no relevance, involves importing additional considerations. If it be urged that the form of a stone is the form of a material thing, while the form of man is an immaterial psychical something, then two radically different distinctions are employed and the systematic relations between them remain in obscurity.

Consider this text of Brennan:

> . . . the soul of man is the immediate subject of his rational powers. As a subject, it does not require to be possessed by anything else. It exists, in short, by its own rightful title, which means that it is a substance. For, obviously, acts suspended in a vacuum are inadmissible. Thinking demands, not only a power that thinks, but also a substance in which the power to think is rooted. Similarly, willing demands, not only a power that wills, but also a substance in which the power to will is embedded. Now, thinking and willing are acts proper to the soul alone, since the soul alone is the ultimate principle of such operations. As a basis of rational processes, then, the soul of man must be a substance (*B*, p. 304).[43]

If such a statement (and others cited in the footnote) cannot fairly be described as closely approximating the traditional description of Cartesian man (or monster), then I must admit utter incompetence. If

43. "And just as we cannot deny the substantiality of man's body, so we cannot deny the substantiality of his soul" (pp. 305 f.). "What kind of substance is this mind or soul of man? . . . Aquinas replies that the human soul is essentially immaterial. To say that it is immaterial is to say that it is *incorporeal*; that it is not a body. Further, to say that it is immaterial is to say that it is *subsistent*; that it is not intrinsically dependent on a body" (p. 306). On page 311, Brennan assures us that the soul is not made up of quantitative parts. It is a form of matter, which, on conjunction with matter, makes "the composite substance of man."

Brennan's doctrine does not comprise factors that cannot be derived from matter-form analysis, how does it escape reduction to the organismic position?

It may be instructive to imagine a scientist adopting the matter-form distinction. This living thing, (he says) is an organized functioning thing, a unity of matter and form. I must find meanings for matter and form relevant to my particular type of inquiry. I shall distinguish as "form" the organization of the living thing, while what does not concern me in my inquiries I shall designate "matter." By "matter," then, I shall mean that which, in view of the objectives of my inquiry, may be regarded as given, as the "stuff" receiving organization. It designates a terminus of my inquiries. But that which is the matter-terminus for *my* inquiries, may well be *the* or *a* concrete thing (a unity of matter and form) for *other* inquiries. Thus I may be assured by my colleague, the chemist, that he discerns a high degree of molecular organization below the level, as it were, of the terminus of my inquiries. At some point, needless to say, this reductive process must terminate. In some science, whatever it may be, there will occur a final gesture of acceptance of the bare fact of existence, a recognition that existence involves prime matter. Whatever may be added to this must be the responsibility of metaphysics, not of scientists and their sciences.

Now this imaginary discourse could be given specific illustration by taking man as an instance of existence. It could represent what is meant by saying that man is a composite, a complex, substance. It could interpret what is meant by saying that the intellectual soul is the form of man. It would be a translation of the form-matter distinction into a doctrine concerning the hierarchical organization of the stuff of existence, with the soul at one extreme and prime matter at the other. On this interpretation, it is difficult to see just why it would not be acceptable to a naturalistic philosophy. Now it may be absurd to think that this represents the doctrine intended by St. Thomas. I cannot believe that it would be acceptable to Gilson or Brennan, nor that either would accept it as an interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine. But *why* would it be absurd to attribute the interpretation to St. Thomas? What factors are involved in the real doctrine of St. Thomas which make the interpretation unrepresentative? I can see but one general answer—there remain, in Thomistic doctrine, elements of the Platonic tradition which, in the final analysis, make that

doctrine as "dualistic" as is the doctrine of Descartes! Making due allowance for terminological differences, making due allowance for differences of historical epoch, I can not avoid the conviction that a dilemma obtains: either Thomistic man is the naturalistic philosopher's man, is organismic man, or else the notion of the soul is so weighted that Cartesian man is basically a revised version of Thomistic man.

X

The contention may be tested in several ways. It was said that matter and form are parts of man's essence. Let us assume that something parallel could be said of a stone. In some sense, the corporeality of the stone is comprised within its essence, and presumably, in reference to prime matter, so comprised in virtue of its form. That is, incorporeal stones do not exist. There may exist incorporeal things, but they are not stones and do not possess at least some of the characteristics pertaining to stones. If the expression be allowed, we could say that stones have natures, and possibly may share something of their natures with other things. But some part of their natures could not be shared with incorporeal things.[44] If the essence of man be such that a man is, in part, incorporeal, he differs from a stone in two ways. First, the stone isn't incorporeal, even in part. The form of the stone, qua form, is, of course, immaterial, although the form is the form of a corporeal thing. Again, man, even if corporeal in part, differs in his corporeality from the stone's corporeality. That is, man's body is not a stone. Now, if it be of the essence of man to be form and matter, but if man is, in part, incorporeal (comprising an intellectual, a "psychic," substance, a soul devoid of matter, an immaterial incorporeal form *possessing* substantiality, etc., etc.), and yet man is in part corporeal, and we "cannot deny the substantiality of man's body," must we not, in reckoning with all this, use the notion of form and matter twice over? Or, if not this, must we not provide an additional distinction, other than the form-matter, but corresponding to it? If the soul only *conferred* substantiality, if it were only a form conferring but *not possessing* substantiality, the situation might be otherwise.

Let us accept the statement—the soul is not instrinsically dependent on a body. (Just how this is to be reconciled with the contention that

44. *Cf. MSE.*

body and soul are substantially conjoined, and with other related expressions, are aspects of the total problem). Now, in so far as the body is a substance, however incomplete; in so far as it is a something, an existent, and something other than the soul; and in so far as it is not *prime* matter (and certainly it is not that, although it could not exist without it), then the body is a unity of matter and form. The form, we know, is from the soul, the form that possesses and confers substantiality; indeed, it *is* the soul. The soul, too, is an incomplete substance, at least in some respect, or as understood in some perspective. It needs a body, an organized body, not prime matter, although it could not have what it needs if there were not prime matter. The soul achieves the organization of a body, and is the form of the body (an incomplete substance in some respect and in some perspective). Yet it is an immortal substance (incomplete or complete?). Now, the soul cannot be conceived, in the conditions stated, as becoming the form of the body in *this* sense, that it abandons its (semi-) independent status, its prerogative of *possessing* substantiality, so that it suffers the fate of the corruptible body. Yet the soul *is* the form of the body. The distinction between possessing and conferring substantiality cannot be overlooked.

Let us indulge in conjectures, but refrain from asserting that any of them represent Thomistic man. Suppose the form (the soul) is, as it were, internally fissioned, so that one "portion" informs matter with the consequence that there arises a body, while the other "portion" does not inform matter, but remains aloof. Or, alternatively, suppose that the form (the soul) is not one, but two, one form informing matter, being of such a nature that to inform matter and give rise to the human body is just what it is fitted to do, the other form being responsible for the possession of substantiality by the soul. In some sense, of course, the form of *man* can be regarded as not one, but two, because he is body (a formed thing) and soul (possessing substantiality, a form-possessing-substantiality). But let us indulge in another conjecture. The incorporeal, immaterial form, identified as substantial, as a thing in itself, which both possesses and confers substantiality, let us suppose, stands aloof from prime matter not immersing itself within it at all, but *elicits* by a sort of catalytic action the emergence of the organized body from the potentialities of prime matter. The supposition implies that the soul, with respect to prime

matter, might be described as an *occasioning* cause, or a *releasing* cause, provoking prime matter to actualize some of its pent-up possibilities. Of course, somewhat mysteriously, it must elicit an organized body appropriate to itself. In a sense, on this supposition, the soul is the form of the body. In another sense it is not, for it incites the actualization of the body from the resources of prime matter and, in some measure, both the matter and form of the body are evoked from prime matter. On the supposition, we could add that the body so evoked is organized in accord with the needs of this intrinsically independent substantial soul, and in view of this proportionality, the composite thing, the man, could be *figuratively* described as a one thing, a substance. Accordingly, in one sense, this being is to be identified with the soul and its catalytic power, in another sense with the body, and, in still another sense, with the thing as a composite being.

These are all conjectures, illuminating one or another aspect of Thomistic man. I do *not* claim that any of these suppositions represent Thomistic man satisfactorily. One or another supposition interprets, or is suggested by, sentences or clauses in passages cited from Gilson or Brennan. It is *not* claimed that any one of the conjectures rightly interprets Gilson or Brennan or Thomistic man. The conjectures show how the problem is haunted by Platonic-Cartesian man![45]

In *some* sense, the relation of Socrates' soul to Socrates' body *is* accidental, and, I contend, no less accidental on the Thomistic formula than in Cartesian doctrine. The relation is intimate. It is, however, temporary. Let us keep in mind that we are not concerned with embryological questions, but with metaphysical analysis. Say what you will, intimate union, the unity of the man Socrates, the composite nature of Socrates, must mean for St. Thomas something approximating that which Descartes called a unity of composition. Doubtless, to assert that the soul is the form of the body is a way of insisting upon

45. It is to be noted that according to St. Thomas, intellectual substances also are composites—composites, not of matter and form, but of actuality and potentiality, of form and participated existence. Thus the soul is composite; the man is composite; and presumably, the body, in so far as considered independently, is composite (*ST*, Q. LXXV, art. 5, *Reply Obj.* 4). Now the intellectual soul is endowed not only with the power of understanding but also with the power of feeling (*Ibid.*, art. 5, *I answer that* . . .). When all of this is put together, the intricacy of St. Thomas' doctrine, its ingenuity, and its failure to escape the "Platonic" view of man becomes apparent.

the intimacy of the union. The pilot-and-the-ship analogy is unacceptable—but unacceptable also for Descartes. But the soul, functioning as substantial form of the body, must not vanish in corporeality. The Gilsonian doctrine, as represented in the formula, indicates that a man as a composite substance involves a certain proportionment, adjustment, functional reciprocity between that which is a substance and confers substantiality and that to which substantiality accrues in that it has had substantiality conferred upon it. (Even this phrase is misleading, in that it suggests that there is a *something*, a substance, upon which further substantiality is conferred.) But assuredly, neither St. Thomas nor Descartes intended obvious absurdities. The independence of the soul substance, for Descartes, surely did not mean that it was merely a matter of sheer accident that Socrates' soul somehow got attached to the historical corruptible body that Plato would have identified as that of Socrates, and that—for all we know—it might as well have become attached to the bodies of Smith, Jones, or Brown, or to each one in succession.

If one abandon form-matter terminology, or revise its meanings, due allowance must be made in the comparison of doctrines. But surely St. Thomas and Descartes are in agreement as to this, that Socrates, the man, is one thing, but that he is also an incorruptible soul and a corruptible body, an immortal soul substance and a corporeal thing that is not immortal. Would not Descartes—who was not unacquainted with the Angelic Doctor's thought—say something as follows? Whatever be the unresolved mysteries concerning the nature and coming-into-being of a man, Socrates the soul is largely responsible for this, that Socrates the man has, not *a* body, but *Socrates'* body. Since we must make a distinction between a man's body and his soul, as St. Thomas insists, then we must interpret the empirical facts while maintaining the distinction. Would St. Thomas, Descartes might ask, deny the multitude of facts summed up in saying: the soul uses the body; it suffers and is sometimes constrained by the body; there is sometimes hostility between soul and body, and sometimes co-operative peace; that profiting by the body means, on occasion and in some measure, adjusting the soul to the body, etc., etc.? When human beings become objects of scientific investigation, and provided that "soul" is to mean something more than the way in which matter-modes are organized, then some hypothesis, conceived in terms of the distinction

between soul and body, must be provided for achieving the empirical accord.

This seems to be a reasonable representation of Descartes' thinking. The pineal gland hypothesis works in two ways: it represents a measure of dependence of Socrates' soul upon Socrates' very own body, and indicates the possibilities of his soul's profiting by intimacy of union; it also represents a measure of independence, for the will can cause the gland to deflect the animal spirits, to the profit, perhaps, both of Socrates' soul and Socrates' body, and in sum to the profit of Socrates. Moreover, this hypothesis is intended to interpret empirically the truth that it requires just that form possessing and conferring substantiality which is Socrates' soul to "inform" prime matter to the end that Socrates the man shall have a body. The form possessing and conferring substantiality identified as Plato, Aristotle, Smith, Jones, could not achieve Socrates' body.

Now, the pineal gland story may not today be regarded as a very likely one. There may be philosophers and scientists today who would insist that Socrates is simply an organized body, just as a stone is an organized body, and that to understand the differences of organization is to appreciate the complexities of matter's manifestations. This is as it may be. But such thinkers are discarding, not the thought and language of Descartes alone, but the thought and language of St. Thomas as well. If the demand for a met-empirical accord be valid, and if this requires that the soul be an immortal substance; if the empirical accord must be realized: then, say what you will, qualify the figurative language as may be necessary, but the Thomistic and Cartesian men are Platonic souls using the body! If, then, the metaphysical requirement also is to be sustained, scientific myths must interpret the intimacy of union between the form possessing and conferring substantiality and the body, which would not be what it is and have the temporary career that it does have, without its union with that form. The career of the man, Socrates, is cumulative. Socrates, the man who drank the hemlock, was something other than and more than the Socrates of the days of his youth. But the cumulative Socrates is not just the cumulative bodily Socrates; he is also the cumulative immortal substance called Socrates.

Now, in so far as the body is body, or can be scientifically investigated independently of the soul, there may be a perspective in which

the soul can be neglected as if it were not. Since according to Thomistic doctrine the soul is the *form of the body,* and the body in its organization is the soul-as-informing-prime-matter, presumably such a perspective is in principle definable. Since the soul is a form *possessing substantiality,* there may be definable a perspective in which it can be investigated independently. Nevertheless, for both St. Thomas and Descartes, there must be a perspective in which science may see that the soul uses the body and the body uses the soul, with the result that the immortal soul of Socrates may become enriched with the fruits of the career of Socrates, the man. The sciences must strive to accomplish all this, if they begin with the Thomistic-Cartesian notion of man. Or the sciences may abandon that notion, adopting the organismic notion. Perhaps, thereby, the empirical accord and the metaphysical requirement may be realized. Perhaps not. But the met-empirical accord, as vital to Descartes as to St. Thomas, would then, presumably, be denied.

XI

Having said "it is the intellect itself, an incorporeal substance, that is the form of the human body," Gilson continues: "It is just here perhaps that the internal difficulties of Thomism begin to look most formidable" (*S,* p. 186). I submit that they do not merely look most formidable; they *are* most formidable. They are more. They are insuperable, *if* the doctrine is to be internally consistent and *if,* at the same time, a fundamental and fundamentally meaningful difference between Thomistic man and Cartesian man is to be sustained. If Thomistic doctrine concerning the nature of man, not in its details but in its essentials, is simply false, one might as well, without more ado, pass a similar judgment upon Cartesian doctrine concerning man.

But a final test may be necessary. It may be urged that Thomistic doctrine has in view *prime* matter, but that Cartesian matter is something else. Let us agree to abandon particular Cartesian scientific hypothesis, such as animal spirits, pineal gland, and other more or less likely stories. Perhaps, then, the irreconcilable difference between Thomistic and Cartesian man, for which we seek, can be found in the direction for which the word "matter" is a signpost.

Now, surely, by no form entering prime matter could something be actualized which surpasses the potentialities of prime matter. Prime

matter could not receive any form, if such there be, that is not proportioned to prime matter and its potentialities. But for St. Thomas prime matter is not nothing. It is not bare *privation* of being, sheer emptiness, unrelieved lack of internal resources.[46] It has an internal, intrinsic, constitutive nature that defines its not-illimitable range of potentialities. Prime matter *is* this restricted range of potentialities. It contributes something of itself, however indefinite in character, its contribution, to the diversification of existence, to the multiciplicty of finite existents, in so far as the existence of these existents is referable to prime matter and they are corporeal.

Following excellent authority, St. Thomas' prime matter may be defined as *materia quantitate signata (Mqs).*[47] If it be the very nature of quantity to have parts exterior to one another, which St. Thomas seems to maintain, and if prime matter is *Mqs,* then *Mqs,* by its very own intrinsic character, must set restrictions upon the reception of forms. A form hostile, so to speak, to quantity could not directly enter into *Mqs.* Suppose there are such forms, and that such forms, moreover, *possess* substantiality. Suppose these forms, possessing substantiality, are such that they cannot tolerate having parts exterior to one another. It is difficult to understand how such forms could inform prime matter, if prime matter is *Mqs,* in the sense that these forms are in consequence the forms of corporeal things. On the other hand, if such forms were endowed with an eliciting catalytic power, so that, while remaining aloof from prime matter, *Mqs,* they could evoke from *Mqs* the actualization of a thing having parts exterior to one another, the thing so emerging would have a form. It would be a corporeal thing. The form of this thing, however, could not be identified with, but only *correlated* with, the form which had the inciting power. Thus, the soul substance—to return to a previous conjecture—might in this manner possess and *also* confer substantiality. Provided it had the catalytic power, it could occasion the emergence of a body fitted to its needs, from the resources of *Mqs.* If it did elicit anything from

46. Here, as elsewhere, the argument is based upon conclusions concerning the Thomistic doctrine of matter that were established (I hope!) in *MSE,* (see note 2 above).

47. *Cf. MSE,* pp. 654 ff. The authority referred to is Forest. I use the symbol, Mqs., not only for the sake of brevity, but because the formula appears open to many interpretations, a consideration of which does not seem necessary for present purposes.

Mqs, it would have to be content with eliciting a body, having parts exterior to one another, a material corporeal thing, because it could get nothing else out of prime matter.

It is as if Descartes were to say: if a soul substance can participate catalytically in getting something out of the resources of matter substance, then the thing so arising, as sure as fate, will be an extended thing, a body to be understood as basically a set of modes of the attribute of extension. No soul can evoke from matter a satellite for itself that is not extended, because the resources of matter are restricted in the sense that, whatever a material thing or body may be in addition to being extended, it is basically extended. In relation to St. Thomas' *Mqs* or Descartes' matter-substance, the catalytic action of a form possessing substantiality must be proportioned to the intrinsic endowment of the one or the other. If the form evoked a body from *Mqs* in the fashion indicated, it could remain serene in the possession of its own substantiality. It could be called the form of the body in an indirect sense, in that it is assumed that the catalytic power of each form is its own, and the body arising is adjusted to its individual power. Socrates' body, then, would be such that Socrates' soul could use it.

Man, viewed in terms of this effort to understand Thomistic man, is, indeed, a soul possessing and conferring substantiality, plus an organized body. The latter would owe its organization, in one sense, to the soul; in another sense, to matter. The soul would possess serenely its incorruptible substantiality. The met-empirical accord would be satisfied in principle. Presumably, in view of the history of modern psychology, the demand for the empirical accord could be satisfied. Further and prolonged examination would, perhaps, be necessary to determine whether the metaphysical requirement had been measurably satisfied.

Alas! the search has failed. I have not discovered a difference, *the* difference, a really fundamental difference, that opposes Thomistic man and Cartesian man. I believe that I have discerned a vast alternative—it is that between Platonic-Thomistic-Cartesian man, on the one hand, and hylomorphic organismic man, on the other. There is either dualistic man, in one or another variant of historical doctrine, or in still others yet to be formulated; or else, there is man as perhaps matter's highest manifestation of its own inherent unassisted resources. If

Thomistic man is to satisfy the conditions enumerated at the beginning of this essay, that man is formed upon a plan as essentially dualistic as the plan of Cartesian man, however the plans may differ as to detail. Not even St. Thomas, I submit, can eat his cake and have it too—but no, I retract that statement. Perhaps St. Thomas can. But I must confess that I do not see how he achieves this, and I submit, with deferential apologies and with gratitude, that neither Gilson nor Brennan has shown us either that or how St. Thomas can accomplish the feat.

A new perplexity besets me. How does it come about that those having mastery of Thomistic doctrine, nevertheless, believe that Thomistic man is so very different from Cartesian man? John Dewey's opinion was evidently sound. I should not have embarked upon an adventure whose record must end with a confession of failure.

RELIGION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

H. Heath Bawden

From the way in which many of its adherents speak of it, one would suppose that religion was a kind of short-circuit to the real by way of instinct and feeling. In theology, to be sure, religion persistently seeks rational grounds for the more immediate attitude of faith, but the characteristic fact of this mode of human experience in the past has been its alleged pre-rational or supra-rational sanctions. Theology at best has been what Bradley said of metaphysics, a finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, however firmly established may be the instinct to seek for those reasons. The common plea of the religionist is that you must first "experience" religion before you can understand it. There are those, of course, who insist that religious belief is grounded in reasons as valid as those of science, but so far they have not succeeded in expounding those reasons in such a way as to convince the disinterested thinker. Religion for such a person still rests on alogical premises.

This mode of experiencing is not unique in its nonrational hold on man. Many, if not most, of the best things in human life are rooted in instinct, which, perhaps, is just another way of saying that we are still ignorant of their precise conditions and causes. Love and art, to mention but two important phases, are still so *at*tuitive or *in*tuitive that attempts which have been made to explain them seem but a travesty on what the Germans call their inwardness *(Innigkeit)*.

The fundamental fact of religious experience which any philosophy must face, is its relatively immediate and elemental character. Like other modes of experience which are dominated by instinct and emotion, it is strongly impulsive and propulsive. The avidity with which religious thought has seized upon the concept of the "will-to-believe" and has sought to turn it to account in rationalizing the deep currents of religious striving, illustrates the vividly emotional and aggressively urgent character of the impulses which are here seeking expression.

The mental unrest and emotional ferment which characterize all instinctive life when brought under the scrutiny of reflective analysis are widespread today. The unremitting impact of the rapid-fire guns

of science on the bulwarks of dogma which have been supposed to embosom the essence of religion, has startled the placid customs and habits of a former period into wakeful desire and unclear impulses to know and to do. Hence the random chaotic clutchings at any thought that calls itself new, at any science that bears the adjective "Christian," at any psychology that makes much of the sub-conscious, at any philosophy which admits a place for feeling and faith.

If a naturalistic philosophy has any special message for religion, it will be found in its ability to offer some aid in ordering this chaos of warring impulses while, at the same time, providing for their proper functioning in relation to the worthwhile ends of experience at large. Without question the great philosophical systems of the past have rendered great service in just this direction. Not only the ecclesiastical theologians, but the greatest of the philosophers, from Plato to Spinoza and Hegel, have sought to do justice to this deep need of man's nature. The climax of the struggle between naturalism and supernaturalism in religion has probably passed, but the underlying opposition of feeling and intellect, of faith and reason, is still with us. It has, indeed, become crucial by the very application of the categories of a new scientific theology. Biological and psychological science, with their concepts of evolution and psychophysical unity, have only served to render the problem more acute and, indeed, at times distressing. Whether a naturalistic philosophy will be able to meet the demands of this widest and deepest of human problems, remains to be seen; but this much, at least, is apparent, that certain of the leaders of this movement have shown a disposition to meet the issue, and are exhibiting an evident sympathy with the attitudes involved. Assuming, then, that a naturalistic philosophy seeks to clarify and fortify here as elsewhere, what has this new philosophy to offer as meeting the religious need?

I

In the first place, we find explicit recognition of a fundamental truth for which religion has always stood: the fundamental unity and solidarity of all phases of human experience. It must be admitted that, in the light of our present knowledge of the unity of man and nature and of the so-called material and spiritual realms, much of the religious theology and metaphysics of the past seems to have been wilfully perverse in the intellectual lines of cleavage by which it separated na-

ture and man. We have to go back to the attitude of primitive culture to find that practical integrity of thought to which, at last, we have reflectively returned. The intermediate centuries show a continual pulling apart and opposition of aspects which, no doubt, were latent or implicit in the naïve consciousness of our forebears, but which, nevertheless, were there subordinated to the needs of the total life-process in an unconscious pre-reflective way as, once more, with us, they are coming to be similarly subordinated with conscious and reflective deliberation.

Any schism of reality or experience which leaves the aspects unreconciled and permanently opposed, is not only a practically inconvenient state of affairs but an intellectually unsafe procedure. In logic it is called the fallacy of abstraction, taking a part for the whole. Whereever the natural and the supernatural, the mental and the material, the finite and the infinite, subject and object, truth and error, good and evil, faith and reason, self and society, the individual and the institution, are turned into mutually exclusive concepts, we have become suicidal victims of the machinery of our own ratiocination. It is the belief of liberal-minded culture today, in the spheres of both theology and philosophy, that at bottom the search of religion and of science is for the same goal—to understand and establish a friendly relation with the universe in which we live by a recognition of the essential unity and continuity of its life with ours.

Whether it be the vague cosmological gropings of a primitive animism, with its anthropomorphizing of deity and its personification of inanimate objects; the passionate searching out of concepts or essences by Socrates, Plato, and the Scholastics, with their confident assurance of the existence of an archetypal reality; the combined love and fear with which the intense and mystical Semite worshipped Jehovah and dared finally, in the greatest of the Hebrew sages, to claim even divinity itself; the masterful executive ability with which the medieval ecclesiastics sought to embody a spiritual world in a temporal and even a political hierarchy; the refreshing directness with which the Protestants sought to re-establish an immediate relation of the believer with his God; or the pathetic attempt of the modern thinker to reconcile Genesis and Darwinism, while denying that he could find God with his instruments of precision—whether it be one or all of these honest and earnest efforts of men to understand their own experience and

their own world, we recognize throughout one pervading, inclusive, and dominant tendency—the search for unity and continuity of life and the distrust of absolute oppositions with their ologies and isms.

The instinct is a sound one, for it expresses the fundamental conviction that reality and experience, nature and man, form a unitary and coherent whole. If matter is inherently evil, and man's body somehow at war with his soul, then something is radically wrong with the universe. If faith shuts out science and science shuts out God, then either there is no such God as faith postulates, or there is a fundamental fallacy in this bifurcation of the emotional and the intellectual parts of man. If the infinite shuts out the finite and there is some radical hostility between the temporal and the eternal, so that the former comes to be stigmatized as mere illusion, this strikes at the vitals of religion as truly as at the heart of metaphysics. No thinking person today believes that man somehow started it all wrong, and that our lives, that all science, and history, and evolution are an attempt to set it right again. If there ever was a "fall," as Hegel said, it was on the part of God himself, and evolution is his dramatic climb back to divinity. Pain and evil and error must possess some positive significance to gain the respect of the human intellect, and to give dignity to the age-long struggle of man's mind to think, to feel, by sheer force of faith to push itself through to some vital hold on the reality of things.

II

This unrest in religion, in science, in theology, and in philosophy, is the inevitable accompaniment of psycho-physical evolution. Such emotional and impulsive upheaval is found at the crises of all growth. An impulse, so our psychologists tell us, is a thwarted instinct, a hindered habit; the emotional unrest is the pain which comes from such thwarting or hindering. The restlessness leads to an experimental attitude of inquiry and investigation. On the lower plane of animal and child life, we have an accidental stumbling upon the truth by a kind of trial and error method. On the higher plane of adult human experience, this process takes the form of an ideal experimentation, a more conscious trial and success among the ideas or images or symbols which stand for the external situation. The child must perform the muscular co-ordination in order to learn how to do; the adult has learned to do by proxy—by the use of what we call a mental picture which is also the

product of muscular adjustments, but of those sub-vocal speech reactions we call thought. Thinking, in other words, whether in the simple common sense adjustments of everyday life or in the science and philosophy of reflective thought, is the use of ideas as vicarious substitutes for objects and acts, and develops out of the clash of instincts and habits in that psycho-physiological turmoil we call impulse and emotion. That thinking is ultimately a mere matter of the balancing of motor tendencies, the mutual attrition and adjustment of delicate muscle-systems, whereby initial or partial acts—nascent acts—come to stand for and mediate overt acts: this is all involved in what is here recapitulated all too briefly from the behavior psychology of today.

If we can see that our ideas and our ideals spring from the conflict of instincts and habits, customs and traditions, dogmas and creeds, institutions and codes of the past, which are coming into opposition because they are proving ineffectual in the present situation; if we once grasp what may be called the social psychology of thinking, and see that all our rational activities, the whole process of reason in the life of society that we call science and philosophy and theology, are the products of psychophysical and psychosocial tension and disadaptation, we have in our grasp the key at once to the significance of these departments of knowledge and to an understanding of the function of ideas in relation to that impulsive and emotional demand we call religion.

The goal of philosophy as well as of religion is unity and harmony, poise and peace and rest from the harassing and everlasting warfare and struggle of ideas. Whether there is any rest or peace in the sense in which it is sometimes sought, which implies the surcease of thought, is a problem worth considering, but in the sense of poise and control and the mastery and serenity that come through knowledge, both science and philosophy seek something that sounds much like the peace that passeth understanding of which the religionist speaks. The little old lady tried to be cheerful and, as she said, to take things philosophically, when her well-meaning but stupid relatives insisted on finding a place for her in an Old Ladies' Home. To make the best of things when they are unpleasant; despite adverse conditions, to try to feel at home in the universe, this, indeed, is a happy characterization of that branch of knowledge which began among the Greeks as the love of wisdom. And it is a most hopeful sign of the return to a certain natural-

ness in our thinking, even in academic circles, that philosophy, the grandmother of the sciences, is again seeking vital connections with the everyday life of the doer and his deeds.

Few of us, perhaps, are gifted with the little old lady's sense of humor—the only known substitute for prolonged reflection. We are driven by our needs to the invention of an imposing array of technical terms and distinctions indispensable, as we think, for coping with the problems of life which we take so seriously. Hence the verbal impedimenta and the enormous dialectical baggage-train of some very simple and commonplace ideas. But, after all, as we ourselves are the first to insist, all this indirectness in our thinking and circumlocution in our speaking is to the end of final simplification and peace, so that the goal in the end would seem to be the same. This, at its root, is the aim of religion and art, of industry and of science, when they are frank—their lack of frankness being one occasion for the existence of the philosopher. Many seem to get along very well without any reflective thought, and appear to find considerable joy in living, nor would one hastily deny that that is a very good way, but if one does have this hankering after the Whys and Wherefores, the Whences and Whithers, that, as Henry James said, is another way. Whether it adds to one's enjoyment of life or merely increases one's susceptibility to pain is a moot point. For some, reflection leads naturally to an increased capacity to enjoy, and probably in religion as well as elsewhere in life.

Everyone at times feels desolate and very much alone in the midst of the muchness of things—caught up into the world-agony until he feels that his poor mind must somewhere find rest lest it destroy itself. The tension, the pain, the passion of life become too violent to be developmental. The soul and the body cry out for refuge, and where else should refuge be found if not in the very bosom of reality? Because the pain and tragedy of life have passed beyond the help of the consolations of any instituted religion, beyond the charm of any art, beyond the stimulus of the scientific technologies, it does not follow that there is no help for the lost soul. Salvation lies where it has always been found, in spite of the mummeries that have mystified alike the sinner and the saint—in the honest confrontation of the fact.

Back to the essence of things! Socrates and the Scholastics were right in their fearless facing of fundamentals. The essential, the quintessential, the core and marrow of the real, the summum bonum, *ens realis-*

simum, perfectissimum, Deity himself. Nothing less would satisfy the God-intoxicated saint centuries ago. Today we have a different language of energy and evolution, change and acceleration, the good-for-nothing-infinite and the mad-absolute, to use Bakewell's half-serious jest, but it is the same old story of the human quest for the familiar touch of the real. Religion, like philosophy, is a kind of homesickness.

III

The religionist very rightly insists that his peculiar experience is a much wider and deeper fact than any intellectual attempt to explain it. Love is ever affirming the infinity of its riches in contrast with the poverty of its expression. And so of art, or any vital experience. Nor do philosophy and science, at their best, ever seek to substitute a logical formula for the living faith. But what the philosophic scientist and the scientific philosopher do seek to do is to understand, as far as possible, the content of such an experience in terms of its conditions and consequences, just as the lover and the artist never tire of trying to comprehend the beautiful objects of their devotion. Reason, thought, philosophy, science, are but the effort of the religious experience to comprehend itself in a more diversified as well as in a more unified way.

The only alternative to this is that nebulous mysticism which purchases peace by withdrawing from the actual world of change and growth. Mysticism may be defined as the effort of experience to transcend the time category, an attempt to evade the difficult problems of adjustment that are continually arising to vex the progress of a growing mind. This is the menace to our spiritual life of the various forms of occultism which have grown to such astounding proportions—their tendency to revert to type, refusing to face the issues of an evolving religion, and falling back into some more primitive ancestral attitude.

The meaning of the impulses which are here striving for expression has not been brought clearly to consciousness. Christian Science, for example, and the various forms of New Thought, whose literature has bulked so large in recent years, are random reactions, judged from the point of view of reflective thought. They illustrate the recoil of a knowledge, culture, and sensibility back upon itself when they encounter the harsh outer surface of our political, economic, and social life. Not finding the natural outlet of a healthy and honest activity in

our industry and commerce, this sensibility and culture retroacts with the bizarre effects we observe. The intense idealism and fantastic subjectivism of these semi-religious, semi-philosophic movements are but the logical rebound from the objectively real corruption of our politics, the insincerity of our social conventions, and the brutality of our industrial institutions.

There is, of course, a positive aspect also. Mysticism throughout the ages has had this in common with science—its empiricism. The mystic insists that experience is the test. His failure consists in falling back upon a pre-scientific and often a rather childish kind of test: his own feeling in the matter, unchecked and uncorrected by subsequent reflection or social confirmation. As far as it goes his method is sound, when he judges the reality of religion by the values found in the immediate personal experience of that religion. The dominant note of Protestant Christianity has been this emphasis on the priority of the empirical sanction. Not historical validation nor institutional authority, but personal experience is the evidence of its truth and value. The evidences of Christianity are sought intrinsically in what it does for the individual life, not extrinsically in an alleged supernatural revelation, apostolic succession, or specially inspired record of alleged miracles in the past. Practical religion, religion as a way of living, as a fact of everyday practice, is empirical throughout. Perhaps it is not as accurate and scientific in its application of the test as it should be, but that will come with the advance of scientific technique in its application to the complex phenomena of human behavior.

A naturalistic philosophy insists that in religion, as in practical life, the test of the value of an experience is to be found in the results. If, as William James said, a given interpretation of the infinite and the eternal and the ultimate makes no difference in practice, that is, in living, it is in no way preferable to any other religious tenet or belief. If a man remains religious in spite of his formal pantheism or atheism, it would appear that the essence of the religious spirit is not bound up with what is called theism. This idea is, indeed, receiving recognition even among ecclesiastical religionists, as is manifest in the general movement toward tolerance, unity, and interdenominational co-operation. But a still deeper implication has not become commonly recognized, namely, that a man may have what is practically a godless religion judged by ordinary standards. That is, he may frankly face the

ultimate mystery of being and reverently eschew every shred of what historically has been called religious. Many men of science and many men of the world belong in this category. They are too honest, too sincere, too religious, to be religious in any of the traditional ways. And yet their spirit is essentially the same, so far as psychological analysis reveals, as that of the so-called religious man of the better sort. Such a man has the same deep-seated wonder and awe in the presence of the majesty of the sea and the starry heavens, in the presence of human emotion and man's inwardness, that the believer in a special revelation has. He has the same dynamogenic and ideomotor urgency toward any hint of explanation of the present miracle of existence that any orthodox believer has toward the supernatural. He sits with Tyndall before the humblest fact of nature and says, "I do not know," and "I dare not affirm," as reverently as any high-priest swings his censer before the symbol of the Incarnation. The grim challenge of the overpowering mystery about us, that keeps so many virile men out of the church, may be as religious as that pathetic running to cover and clamor for peace, that lures so many into it.

Religion, in other words, is not bound up with the belief in God; it is found in many kinds of impulsive hunger for and rapport with the unknown. A religious philosophy has the primary problem, therefore, not of defending the existence of the deity, but simply of bringing to consciousness in a clearer image, the meaning of this instinctive, impulsive yearning. It may be that this image will define itself in terms of the "sub-conscious self" of William James, in terms of some concept born of the present travail of occultism, or in terms of some modified orthodox notion. That is as it shall be. The important issue for the present is a clear consciousness on the part of every human being of the fact and, as far as possible, of the nature of the impulse that is actuating him. The religious impulse has been exploited by all kinds of superstition and ignorance because its conditions and laws have been so little understood. But the application of historical research and literary criticism to its alleged sanctions and records, and especially the subjection of the phenomena of the religious consciousness to careful psychological investigation, are rapidly lifting a half-conscious, semi-instinctive need into a conscious and rational demand. The impulse is being defined in terms of its conditions and its results, and the outcome promises to be a more articulate ideal.

IV

In the progressive definition of this ideal we must use the best science and philosophy of the day and, indeed, of all the past. These bear the same relation to religion that they do to other parts of experience: they undertake to understand and interpret it in relation to the whole of life; they aim here, as elsewhere, to make man feel at home in the universe. The fact that before certain tragic events of human experience we stand dumb, pathetically toying with pebbles on the shore of the illimitable, is not in itself warrant for substituting feeling for thinking or impulse for reason. The facts of pain and death and injustice, crushing as they are at times to the emotions, are not met by a resignation begotten of autosuggestion. Rather is the attitude of the man of science the reverent one, which bows before the baffling phenomenon, not to mumble a prayer, but more rigidly to interrogate the recalcitrant fact. Our faith in a supreme intelligence at the core of things is best shown by our persistent refusal to be put off by mere nerve-quieting rituals and thought-calming creeds, and perpetually flinging down the gauntlet of our struggling intellects in the presence of the ultimate mystery. If to act reflectively is not nobler than to act impulsively, if to mediate emotion and conduct by the highest knowledge of which we are capable is not more worthy than to act on instinct, how are we better than the brutes? Religions differ just to the degree that the immediate experience which constitutes their central essence and substance has been organized and enlightened by common sense and by that more highly organized and systematic use of the reason which we call science and philosophy.

If religion is essentially an expression of the unity and continuity of our living with the universe which is around us and within us, then anything that makes for a more organic synthesis of the parts of experience tends to deepen the religious consciousness. This is the distinctively religious note in a naturalistic philosophy. Man acts and feels and thinks. First and foremost, from the cradle to the grave, he acts: his body is the center of a transformation of energies which never ceases, an unbroken continuum of activities which we call the conduct of life. Under certain conditions of stress or favorable stimulation, this psychophysical process flashes forth in pain or pleasure, and under still other conditions of tension in adjustment, images or ideas appear, and what we call thinking develops. Philosophy and science are the crown-

ing effort of this thinking process in its effort to solve the problems which the active and emotional side of our nature presents. It is the theory of the practice of living, the theory developing at the point where the practice breaks down. The searchlight of science ferrets out the finest details of fact and then, by the path of its widest laws and generalizations, scales the highest peaks of speculation for that world view which we call philosophy.

But this science and this philosophy are ever in the service of the active and emotional needs of man; they seek the reality of things as truly and as faithfully as do art and religion. What the former lack in immediacy they make up in validity and universality; what the latter lack in validity they make up in immediate and concrete appreciation of values. There is a sense, of course, in which science and philosophy are not life, but theory about living. A philosophy of religion need not be itself religious, just as we might conceive of a very unhappy student of happiness, or a very optimistic expositor of pessimism. Our unhappy student of happiness might exclaim: "Don't suppose that I, the writer of this treatise on happiness, am happy. I am not. No happy man has any philosophy of happiness. He needs none. It is because I am not happy that I must investigate and write about happiness." So of religion. It is the failure somewhere in our adjustment to the social and cosmic environment that drives us to an ethical and religious philosophy. Every writing, every speaking, aye, every thinking, is a search for what we have not.

It may be that someone will quote Lessing at this point and say that the joy is in the search. This already quite ancient modernism is rather out at the elbows, however, and after the first flush of adolescence fails to be the solace it doubtless was intended to be. The Occidental man and woman as a rule do not need to be urged to strenuosity. That virtue has assumed the proportions of a vice. What we need is to be inoculated with a dose of Oriental repose. The typical American is a man of means, not merely in the sense of possessing wealth, but in the sense of being dominated by the conditions of getting a living rather than by the process of living itself. We are all striving for an end, but most of us finally flounder about in the paths that lead thither without ever reaching the goal. We are caught in the machinery of the very civilization and culture that was designed to give us peace and understanding.

Thanks to a certain power of recoil, we are, at last, growing a little weary of this perpetual straining for something we never get, and directing attention to the ends themselves. The very generalizations of scientific law from the vast array of accumulated facts, have inevitably led to the projection of ideals, and the passion for ideals has at last demanded that they be made practical in terms of human life and action. The law of the process of events and facts in nature is being read off in terms of use and function and utility for human nature. And philosophy, the general theory of experience, is taking on the character of a technique of interpretation and appreciation of these ends. Thus philosophy itself is coming to be a part of the conduct of life, a kind of connoisseurship in the fine art of living.

V

This enhanced susceptibility is manifest in the new issue which is the subject of controversy at the present time. We are passing from an age of emphasis on facts and laws to one of emphasis on values and ideals. The old antitheses of mind and matter, subject and object, finite and infinite, God and man, man and nature, are being taken up into a new polarization of means and ends, instrumentalities and goals. In this renewed emphasis on value we observe a return to the recognition of the age-old priority and pre-eminence of feeling and impulse. Reason is powerless without the passion which it informs; ideas, images, flower out of effortful striving. The ideal is simply the need stated in terms of its possible fulfillment under more favorable conditions.

But just this recognition of the organic relation of our rational cognitive life to our affective and conative impulses, furnishes us with a key to the true interpretation of the new duality of fact and value. Is the religious consciousness self-generating or self-maintaining, or is it dependent on the evolution of fact and law? Is it sui generis, or dependent upon scientific description and philosophic reflection for the development of the ideals which are the bearers of religious values? Can the religious experience find its standards within itself, or must it constantly turn to life in its other aspects—to industry and science, to philosophy and art—for the transvaluation of its own values? Is not the history of asceticism and monasticism the best evidence one could demand that the moment a religion secludes itself from the other parts

of life it begins to lose its own distinctive qualities as an expression of the value consciousness?

A fundamental fallacy found among those on both sides in the present controversy over the nature of value, is the idea that, because religion is an expression of the value consciousness it, therefore, must develop and be judged by canons of its own, totally distinct from those of philosophy and science. When it is remarked that "any system of religion which is small enough for our intellectual capacity is not large enough for our spiritual needs," two things are opposed as abstractions which in concrete experience require each other for mutual support. Reason, it is true, by its very nature delimits the subject-matter with which it deals, while the religious consciousness seems to be an unlimited motor and emotional expanse of the soul to the infinite and the eternal. But so is love, so is art, so is any vital experience. Yet we do not extoll love that overrides reason, nor art that debauches sense. Here again we abutt upon the fundamental problem of the relation of thinking to feeling and action. What is the function of ideas in experience? What is the relation of the descriptive technique and explanations of science and philosophy, with their emphasis on fact and law, to the immediate appreciations of religion, with their emphasis on values?

VI

Science and philosophy are as organically related to life as religion or art, the aim and function of the former being inseparable from that of the latter in the search for unity and harmony of experience. Religion, with its impulsive effort to relate an act or situation to the widest context, calls upon philosophy and science to give content and significance to the ideals born of this effort. The fallacy of both religion and science in the past has been to suppose that either of these could supplant the other. The significance of the discussion of value categories is the recognition, at last, of the importance of this problem of the organic synthesis of the affective-volitional and the logical or cognitional sides of experience.

The apparent opposition of these two aspects of life arises from the discrepancies of theory and practice. The fundamental difficulty, when life presents a problem, lies in this, that our thinking on the one side

and our feelings and actions on the other, do not mutually support each other. We find ourselves, on the one hand, acting unreflectively and feeling blindly while, on the other hand, our thoughts and theories about things are ridiculously academic and abstract. A true philosophy is a comprehensive statement of the effort to make our thinking more organic with our feeling and our acting. What men *do* often does not tally with what they *think they do*. If thought or reflection is to be anything more than a kind of mental calisthenics, if it is to be what it professes to be, an efficient method of managing experience, then we need to know more about the biology, the psychology, and the sociology of knowledge. This need the recent development of behavior psychology has begun to meet. Perhaps the most significant contribution to our present problem has been the insight that the ideals, and thus the progress, of experience grow out of the very antagonisms and illusions that seem to mark its defeat.

Our boasted civilization is full of contradictions due to the dislocation of theory and practice. We are all familiar with the conscious self-illusions of art. But they pervade the whole of life. It seems as if our culture were but the funded fallacies and iniquities of the race. Man is economically in chains, while he pretends in his ethics and his politics that he is free. His industry and commerce are predatory, yet he extols the golden rule. He is a creature of race prejudice and imperialist nationalism, yet he prates about international peace. The laws of nature and of morals are really only convenient makeshifts for the given case, but he speaks of them as if they were self-evident, universally and necessarily valid. Democracy seems to be an ideal born of such illusions. Equality is a chimera under existing conditions; freedom a word only; fraternity a dream, until co-operative competition supplants special privilege in our economic life. Even God, freedom, and immortality appear to be but useful fictions in the education of the race, more significant as folklore than as dogma. It would seem that the ideal is necessarily ambiguous, that it is just the failure in the immediacy of the actual that throws experience out of focus and projects one of its blurred images into this seductive world of illusions. We clutch the impossible in despair of the actual.

It is idle to deny that this astigmatism, this double vision, is indispensable to the evolution of the race. That is the way our culture has evolved. But a naturalistic philosophy helps us to see the true function

of this illusionism in relation to the reconstruction and revitalization of experience. If, as Dewey says, a thing *is* what it is *experienced as,* then illusions are as real as anything else—that is, developmentally real. Schiller went so far as to say that we are not truly civilized until we come to value the semblance above the reality. We, at least, may say that we have not grasped the true significance of life until we have come to see that all the illusions and so-called error and evil must be organized into the real as part of its very nature. Every negation, as the greatest of the idealists put it, must figure constructively in the result.

The positive import of these illusions is to be found in the fresh ideals to which they give birth in the effort at readjustment and the struggle for revaluation. It is the merit of a naturalistic philosophy to have aided in transforming these apparent negations into a positive method for controlling the transitions of experience. In place of the distortions and refractions of an alien religion borrowed from the Orient, it exalts the ideal of a religion of our own, the product of our own vital relationship with a cosmic and social environment continuous with, but in important respects also different from, any previous culture, a religion born of the wonderful spiritual riches latent in our marvelous industrial, scientific, and social techniques. When the day comes that we develop an indigenous religion, the ideal of other-worldliness attached to custom, tradition, dogma, creed, superstition and ignorance, will give place to an ideal of mutual esteem and social progress implicit in the best science and reflective thinking of our age.

For, after all, the test which religion in the last analysis always imposes upon itself is the pragmatic one: Does it enlarge and enrich experience, or does it negate and hamper and deplete? Is it a religion of self-realization or a religion of self-denial and inhibition? What may be called the distinctively Christian superstition of self-sacrifice even now is undergoing transformation as the concept of personality has become enlarged to include the social implications of selfhood. We are coming to see that a true altruism is not the negation of egoism but its necessary fulfillment. I must identify my selfhood with your selfhood in order to attain even my own egoistic ends. The self cannot live apart from "the generalized other."

A fresh impulse such as this, born in the very heart of the religious experience, makes for a more vital unification of our common life. The attempt to meet the unprecedented conditions of our material exist-

ence, in this age of electronics, radionics, and the splitting atom, has given a new impulse to industry and science. A new art and a new religion lie there in germ. The novel methods and complicated techniques of our multiplied contacts with a submicroscopic world are engendering new culture types native to our age and race and clime. The need of reinterpreting life in terms of this new material and in terms of these freshly budding ideals puts a tremendous demand upon the religion and the philosophy of today. Science is unlocking the unfathomed mysteries of the unknown and giving us a spiritual content undreamed of in the past. If religion be defined, with George B. Foster, as the ideal-achieving capacity, the progressive glimpsing of a better scheme of things, then science and philosophy are the organization and systematization of that ideal. There need be no fear of the lapsing of religion with the advance of science, for as fast as knowledge controls and defines actual living in terms of present ideals, this growing-point of appreciation moves on to new spheres, feeling out still finer issues and potentialities. Religion sounds the deepest note and has the widest emotional sweep of any conscious experience, and when it fills up our greatest philosophic and scientific concepts with its impulsive earnestness and its subliminal uprush, it becomes almost artistic in its grasp of the infinite and eternal and the ultimate mystery of things.

BOOK REVIEWS

Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation. By GUSTAVE E. VON GRUNEBAUM. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. vii, 365 pp. $4.00.

At a time when the headlines of our newspapers tell daily of events in the Muslim world from Egypt to India, when Islamic countries participate in world events as active partners, and when their delegates have a seat and say in the deliberations of the United Nations, a book which aims at giving a comprehensive exposition of the ideas and ideologies of Islam is very welcome, indeed. Modern Islam has its roots in the concepts developed in the Middle Ages; it is, therefore, almost mandatory to understand the fundamental religious doctrines and philosophic trends underlying them. This is what Professor von Grunebaum's book endeavors to do.

Islam, almost from its beginning, has been a religious, as well as a political, force; in the history of the Islamic empire political aspirations almost invariably made use of religious and philosophical ideologies and philosophies. Dr. von Grunebaum's book is concerned primarily with the cultural strains in the pattern of medieval Islam; he endeavors to show both the influence at work in forming Muslim thought and the result in Islamic literature. As a basis for his work, the author has accumulated and analyzed rich material. His sources are Arabic poetry, religious, philosophical, polemical, and apologetic works in the Arabic language, from which he tries to derive a comprehensive picture of medieval Islamic society and its culture. The political history of the Islamic empire does not attract the author's attention; indeed, historical events and the personalities involved in them are rarely mentioned and, if so, only to indicate the historical background of the cultural process he is analyzing. Therefore, Dr. von Grunebaum's book cannot rightly be described as a sociology of Islam, though it results incidentally, but not intentionally, in providing an insight into the social life of medieval Muslim society.

The author's real intention in writing the book is expressed in its subtitle, "A Study in Cultural Orientation," which sets the theme and indicates the scope of the investigation. Since Islam is a late-comer in the religious development of the world—or even in the Oriental world

—it took over and adapted to its own needs many elements of the earlier religions, notably Judaism and Christianity, and of the philosophic thought prevalent in the countries in which it gained its maturity. Throughout the book, the indebtedness of Islam to the cultures with which it came into contact is stressed, and great pains are taken to show their influence in detail.

Dr. von Grunebaum begins his book with a chapter, "The Mood of the Times," in which he confronts the "upstart" Islam with Rome and Constantinople, the heirs of age-old cultures. In spite of intermittent war between the Byzantine and Muslim empires, they share the central conception of their empires as a theocracy. In the same way, the polemics ensuing between the apologists of the Christian and the Muslim religions revealed the similarity of their basic conception that the history of mankind is "leading from Creation to Judgement Day" and is a "final revelation of God's will and God's truth." This thought leads to the all-pervading awareness of the inevitability and imminence of death in the minds of Muslims and Christians. The similarity of outlook between "Byzantium and Baghdad" is also apparent in the conduct of their respective rulers. Though evident to the historian of our time, these similarities were not perceived by either the Muslim or the Christian of that epoch, who fought each other being aware mostly of the differences. As throughout the book, the author supports his interpretations by full quotations from both Muslim and Christian contemporary writers.

The following chapter is called "Islam in the Medieval World: Christendom and Islam." The Arab's feeling of superiority, based on his consciousness of the fact that Islam, the final religion, was revealed amongst his people and in the Arabic language, leads him to view his achievements in indigenous Arab scholarship, poetry, philology, history, and theology, as superior to the sciences, especially the natural sciences, which he considered as foreign. The greater part of this chapter deals with the appraisal of Islam and its founder, Muhammed, by Christian writers. The extracts quoted confirm the well-known fact that not until comparatively recent times were they given a fair treatment in the writings of Christian theologians. Not until he has reached the third and fourth chapters is the reader acquainted with "The Religious Foundations," the third chapter being subtitled "Revelation,"

the fourth "Piety." The former is a masterly representation of the growth of Islam in its native setting, which was a mixture of pagan Arab traditions and Judeo-Christian theological ideas. In broad strokes, Dr. von Grunebaum gives only the salient features in Muhammed's development, probing, at the same time, into their origins and tracing the growth of the legend of Muhammed in the belief of the later Muslim community. "Piety," the topic of the following chapter, is understood to include the whole development of Islam after the Prophet's death, and the formation of its theological and philosophic doctrines. The emergence of *Ḥadith* and of *Sunnah* is reviewed briefly; the main emphasis in this chapter is laid on the analysis of the moods which led to the growth of personal religion and mysticism. One of the most interesting features of this chapter is the poems, which show how religious feeling gradually penetrated into poetry, which formerly seemed to be lacking in it, until it culminated in the religious poetry of the mystics.

But Islam was not just a religion which exhausted itself in religious dogmas and philosophic discussion. It had enough vitality to create a state and a body politic founded on its doctrines. The fifth and sixth chapters of the book deal with Islamic political theory, and the state and its laws created out of this force. In theory, Allâh was at the head of the Muslim state and the caliph was his vicegerent on earth. Though religious legal theory held fast to this conception, the actuality of communal life required adjustments in the practical execution. This necessitated the creation of authoritative sources for the interpretation and administration of law; thus, *sunnah,* roughly equivalent to tradition, *qiyâs,* analogical deduction, and *ijmāc',* consensus, were admitted as such valid sources, besides the Koran. Various schools of religious thought rose as a result of more rigorous or more lenient interpretation of the law. Besides the legal theorists, the actual administration of the law, i.e., the government, entailed a hierarchy of legal officers, civil servants of the state. While the fifth chapter, entitled "The Body Politic: Law and the State," deals with the discussion of the theoretical aspects of canon law, the sixth chapter, subtitled "The Social Order," investigates the situation of the people living under the sway of Muslim law: the position of the *dhimmîs,* non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state, the ideology of the unorthodox Shi'ites, the parti-

sans of 'Alî, the antagonism between Muslims of Arab and those of non-Arab origin, and the social status of the various classes of Muslim society, its professions and activities, are among the topics discussed.

One of the most fascinating and rewarding chapters of the book is the seventh, which aims at giving an exhaustive characterization of the human ideal of the Muslim. It has many facets, generosity, saintliness of spirit, courage in the fight for Allâh, scholarship, refined education, and *savoir vivre,* go into the making of the perfect Muslim gentleman. The last two chapters are concerned with Arabic literature, the eighth giving an evaluation of its main aspects as evidenced in Arabic poetry and prose and of the essential tenets of Arabic historiography. In the last chapter, entitled "Creative Borrowing: Greece in the *Arabian Nights,*" the author analyzes the best-known literary example of Muslim culture, the *alf laila wa laila.* As is apparent throughout the book, Dr. von Grunebaum is convinced of the decisive influence on Islam of Greek literature and philosophy; in this chapter he investigates one segment of Islamic "self-expression" in detail and shows, as he maintains, convincingly, that Greek literary forms were instrumental in the shaping of many of the elements contained in the tales of the *Arabian Nights.* A final chapter, "Conclusion," sums up the main streams of thought in the East, and its wide, though somewhat shallow, influence upon the West.

It is impossible, in a short review, to give an adequate impression of the wide range of reading, both in Arabic and non-Arabic sources, the skilful arrangement of the abundant material, and the penetrating judgment and interpretation to which it is subjected, in short, of the amount of patient research and deep scholarship that have gone into the making of this work. Every reader will be deeply impressed by the book, which is an informative and thought-provoking representation of the main trends of the medieval Islamic world. That one would differ in the interpretation of some detail, or in the translation of a passage or a phrase or a verse, is unavoidable, almost self-evident, with the mass of quotations contained in the book—such differences in detail are hardly worth mentioning. Throughout the book, however, in spite of its mosaic-like structure, a central idea is apparent, the implications of which a reviewer has to discuss.

The most striking aspect of the book is that Islam emerges from it not as a living organism, a vital, dynamic, and life-giving power, but

as a literature, a culture composed of books influenced by books. The Muslim himself, the individual who lives his life as a Muslim, expressing his deep-rooted emotions in Islamic forms, vitally affected by theological problems, fearing Allâh and, at the same time, feeling near to him, doubting and affirming his faith, does not come to life within the book. It moves in the rarified air of the literati, in the society of the learned and their patrons; even al-Ghazâlî's very personal religious struggle and the eventual solution of his problems do not emerge as the spiritual upheaval that they must have meant to the man, but are treated as a system of philosophy and theology. Just as "the individual is depersonalized" in his sources, the author himself deprives Islam of its dynamics and vitality; since he is preoccupied with the literary expression, even his "Human Ideal" remains literature. For this reason, the reader will not gain a picture of life in medieval Islam, of the conditions under which the teeming masses of Muslims lived, nor of the social forces that moved them, sometimes even leading to revolts. For the most part, only the categories evolved by theoretical thought and speculative deduction are shown.

For this reason, the formal construction of his sources claim a major part of the author's attention. This analysis of the "form elements" extends throughout the book and culminates in the chapter on the *Arabian Nights,* a topic to which he has previously devoted a separate study. His classical studies enable Professor von Grunebaum to show the parallels between classic and Hellenistic Greek and Islamic literatures; they also lead him to a predilection for the former, and to assuming for it decisive influence on the development of the latter. Under the impact of this thought, the indigenous Oriental and Semitic factors in the formation of Islam, not only as a religion, but as a mode of life, and in its literary expressions, are pushed into the background, in this reviewer's opinion, to an excessive degree. For the stream of Oriental blood in the Muslim is clearly recognizable, in his religious ideas as well as in his poetry and, perhaps most of all, in his heresies and heterodoxies.

However, these remarks do not detract, in the least, from the value of the book, nor do they prevent the reviewer from praising the work without reservation. This is an excellent book, one to be studied thoroughly. It will be widely used as a textbook, and ought to be read by any one who is looking for an authoritative interpretation of Mus-

lim thought and an inclusive exposition of the formative ideas of medieval Islam. The publishers have matched the author's scholarship with a praiseworthy example of bookcraft.

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Man and Society in the New Testament. By ERNEST F. SCOTT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. IX, 299 pp. $2.75.

Dr. Scott is convinced that, despite Browning's cheery optimism, God may be in his heaven but there is plenty wrong with the world—at least, there is a host of urgent problems crying for solution. And he is sure that in the New Testament, rightly understood (as it rarely is today), their solution is to be found. The trouble is that in modern thinking the "social interest is placed at the centre, and the religious interest is considered in the light of it." This, he is convinced, is all wrong. Actually, in the New Testament there is no social teaching at all, at least "as we commonly understand the term"; the all-important concern of Jesus and of his early followers was for the "individual soul," for the "fact of human personality." This thesis he sets forth in his two-page preface; the rest of the volume is simply commentary.

It would be pleasant to say nothing but nice things about this book, for the author has made frequent important contributions in the course of his many years of work in this field, and, in this latest book, there is much that is wholesome and important; but to me such an appraisal would be quite unwarranted. All the time I was reading it—and it was a surprisingly long chore—I was aware that the author was an entirely different man from the one who wrote such earlier and important volumes as *The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology.* That was a scholar and free interpreter; the present writer is an ecclesiastic, or at least a churchman, set for the defense of the gospel which he no longer views as it really was, but in a completely idealized light. Thus statement after statement of the most reckless sort occurs: Jesus was the first who held faith in the beneficence of God, was the first to discover that every man is a person, was the first to see the true meaning of the fight for liberty. In the Old Testament there is no sign of

recognition that God is a god of all mankind; in fact, there is no personal religion in the Old Testament at all. Paul was the only man in that age who saw quite clearly what was wrong with the world. These pleasant statements occur on nearly every page, but with nothing that approximates proof.

With the contention that a good society is impossible unless made up of good men I have no slightest quarrel. In recent years, perhaps, this wholesome insight has been pushed so far into the background that its restatement is needed. And I quite agree that much of the so-called "social gospel," which a few years ago was read into the teaching of the gospel and then read out as the peculiar contribution of Jesus, would have appeared strange in first-century Palestine; and with Dr. Scott I am far from sure that many of its related modern panaceas are calculated to solve our stubborn problems. But, while I quite agree with Dr. Scott that the historical Jesus was concerned with individual men and women and that the amelioration of society was farthest from his thoughts, I find the figure which he paints of him as untrue as the one he criticizes. Actually, as I read, I found myself frequently in essential agreement with his negative statements, that is, of what Jesus *did not* do; it was his statements of what he *did* and *was* which seemed to me so fuzzy and unreal—a belated restatement of the type of New Testament criticism which flourished forty years ago, and which read back into the gospel pages precisely the values which it wanted to find there. Thus the essential difference between Dr. Scott and the advocates of the so-called "social gospel" is that he stresses the individual, they the social. Both are equally uncritical in their pulling the desired rabbit out of the silk hat of the distant past, and in their comfortable generalizations: "The New Testament teaching is ——"

Perhaps an even more severe criticism of the book would be its needless repetition and its fuzzy use of terms. Just what Dr. Scott means by "soul," "religion," "morality," "personality," "Kingdom of God," is to me far from clear. He talks about them, makes slogans of them, and repeats these observations and slogans again and again. But what do they really mean? To me, at least, they remain very vague. The book is divided into ten chapters and a conclusion. The titles of these chapters are attractive: "The Twofold Gospel," "The Individual in Ancient Religion," "The Principles of Jesus' Teaching," "Jesus and the Individual," "The Christian Community," "Per-

sonality in the New Testament," "Social Obligations in the New Testament," "The Community and the Inward Life," "Liberty," and "Progress." But, as I read them, I found myself constantly turning back to the table of contents to see what I was reading —the chapter titles are not used as running heads—for the constant repetition of the same emphases and statements clog—at least it did for me—the argument and its development sorely.

Another perplexing quality—at any rate it is an annoying one—is the tendency to contradiction. After the reader has been assured that there is no social teaching in the New Testament, he is surprised—until he becomes hardened to it—to find that it is all "social,"—or at least that this is "no mere secondary" interest—and he is left to figure it out for himself that in the use of "social" and "individual" the author is engaged in a sort of dialectic logomachy. Similarly, the reader is left to figure out why, if before the advent of Jesus there was nothing which could be called "personal" religion, it had "in all times . . . been the function of religion to bring home to men that they are individuals."

The book could have been condensed into an essay of the length of any one of the chapters with great profit. To me at least, the impression is of another book hastily produced and marketed in the hope of its becoming another "Religious Book Club Selection." The hope was realized, but the book, nevertheless, is far from revealing Dr. Scott at his best, or at least what used to be his best.

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The Jewish Home. By IGNAZ MAYBAUM. London: James Clarke Ltd., [1946]. 177 pps. 7/6.

The disintegration of the family pattern is one of the most deplorable commentaries on the disruption of our society in this period of crisis and conflict. This once sturdy link in the chain binding the individual to the community has been shattered. The representatives of our time are the man in uniform, the refugee, the evacuee, the bombed out. Our heritage is a new generation of men and women estranged from the normalness of community life. This strangeness arises out of

the ferment of great conflicts among the major powers, the substitution of new philosophies and systems for old, the confusing rise and fall of governments and institutions. How can the ties between the individual and the community be reconstructed? This is the subject Dr. Ignaz Maybaum discusses in his new volume *The Jewish Home.* He has as his objective the re-establishment of the family unit as the basis of modern society through the utilization of the resources and the historic ideals of Judaism:

> The revolutionary tendencies of our age and the war have estranged the young people from peaceful life. . . . Homelessness has become the fate of masses. In this age a new generation has grown up. I wish to show them how to be happy in a community from which they have been absent for so long that it has become strange to them. This community is the family.

Dr. Maybaum has the difficult task of analyzing the problem of family disintegration, seeking causes, pointing new directions. He has attempted to blend the traditional wisdom of Judaism with the most modern expressions of thought. But this work is meant to be more than a call to the ways of the past, to idealized family forms. It is rather a challenging juxtaposition of conflicting ideas—the biblico-prophetic tradition and the science of Freud, the rabbinic-talmudic system of ethics and the insights of Ibsen, chassidic folklore and the thought of a Marx and Nietzsche. It is the statement of a religious leader who balances the traditional teachings of Judaism with modern ideologies in a spirit of fine intellectual honesty. Questions are posed, challenges accepted, as the reader is drawn into this meeting of potent and relevant issues as set forth by a Marx, a Freud, an Ibsen or a Nietzsche and evaluated by a traditional Jew.

> Marx, Nietzsche and Freud protested against the liberal and idealistic thesis: Man is good. They maintained that justice, truth, love, society, and civilization are only superstructures which hypocritically conceal man as he really is. . . .
> But it hardly matters whether one calls man good or evil. Man is neither one nor the other, he is capable of being either. Man must not be described as a static being. There is no ontology of man, but there is a theology of man. . . .

After having analyzed the source and cause for the disintegration of the family as being rooted in such modern ideologies, the most important subject matter of the volume unfolds, the discussion of "The

Jewish Home." It would seem that Maybaum, unable to fully meet the challenge of the philosophers in the realm of theoretic ideas as to the form of society most desired, turns to a description of traditional family life practiced by the Jew. In this, he follows the pattern of the great, wise men in Israel. The Jewish scholar, from earliest times, did not merely limit his discussion to abstract principles of ethics or concepts of the ideal. He was more concerned with what could be created out of the raw materials of human life; he was concerned with men and women seeking the motif through which to mold a rich and meaningful life. To argue the values and disadvantages of the traditional forms of family life solves no problem. Our author advances his solution to this problem of the disrupted family by pointing to the actuality of the traditional Jewish home, its sacred values, its spiritual framework, the hallowed attitude between parents and children, the honored place of the father in the home, the holiness of marriage, the Jewish view of love with the "Song of Songs" as its highest expression, the revered position of the woman in the household, the rich observance of the Sabbath as a family festival, the home as a milieu for the practice and study of Judaism.

Every family experience is touched upon, and the means by which everyday human experiences are transformed into an expression of the divine is powerfully portrayed. The description of the father as the lay priest in the inner sanctuary of the home, transforming the humblest abode into a place of holiness and love in the varied and colorful customs and ceremonies of Judaism, is the richest and most inspiring aspect of the volume. Here it is that one finds the secret of Jewish survival through the difficult centuries of homeless wandering and intermittent intolerance. The home stood as a fortress of strength against all challenges from the outer world, shielding the individual from the overwhelming misery of man's eternal struggle for security and fulfillment.

> What we value in our symbols, rituals and traditional forms is that they speak to us with the impressiveness, with the precision of practical activity, with the brevity of a formula. . . . It is true that the rabbis have fenced and hedged in the Biblical Sabbath law. But are there only fences consisting of iron railings? There are also living hedges which are part of the tender plants entrusted to their keeping. . . . It is a flowering hedge. . . .

The primary task for the religious leader of this generation, both

Christian and Jew, has been to ally his strength with the struggle to retain the moral values inherent in the "family." Disruptive philosophies and new theories of human value have done much to destroy this inner bulwark of our society. With every economic, political, social, and religious change it has become more apparent that positive community living must be buttressed to meet the problems of our complex, urban, industrialized society which has weakened the basis of wholesome family living. These new ideas are pertinent and challenging for the honest mind, and men of the caliber of Dr. Maybaum are attempting to cope with them. This is a pioneer work and, as such, should serve as a valuable guide to further study in this controversial field.

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Discerning the Signs of the Times: Sermons for Today and Tomorrow. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. x, 194 pp. $2.50.

The author calls his chapters "sermonic essays." Ten sermons preached in colleges and universities are here written out, with elaboration of their themes and more articulation of their intellectual backbones. They may be looked at, therefore, both as examples of the art of preaching and as theological essays. But one cannot altogether separate one way of looking at them from the other, because the preaching is theological preaching, and the theologizing is, as we have learned to expect from Niebuhr, "existential" theologizing. That is to say, at risk of a misleading simplification, the theologizing aims at communication of attitudes rather than "theoretical" concepts.

The kind of preaching met here is reflective rather than evangelical. It appeals to the understanding rather than to the will, which is, perhaps, both appropriate to his congregations and characteristic of most sermons by religious liberals. It aims at giving more scope and depth to religious vision, and at connecting this kind of vision with historical realities. Several of the sermons are tracts for the times, dealing explicitly with such topics as war guilt, treatment of conquered nations, and the hope for world peace. What lifts Niebuhr head and

shoulders above the rest of contemporary preachers is intensity and depth of feeling joined with boldness of thought and maturity of judgment on social and political issues. His characteristic style, in which the resolutions of his paradoxes are given more often by suggestion than by explicit statement, is reminiscent of the dialectical passages in the writings of Augustine.

One of the major themes of the book is the relation between the "historical" and the "trans-historical" elements in the Christian faith. Here we come upon the problem of what Niebuhr means by the trans-historical, for which "supernatural," "other-worldly," and "eternal" are equivalent terms. I venture the suggestion that there has been a good deal of misunderstanding on this crucial point, and I am strongly inclined to think that part of the blame belongs to the author.

What is meant by terms like "beyond history," "supernatural," and so on, as nearly as I can determine, is as follows: every act and event contains a reference to the future beyond itself. In this respect it is incomplete, and awaits completion in its historical consequences. Thus we seek more freedom and brotherhood in human history than we now have. The Christian commitment to the Kingdom of God, has, in this respect, a this-worldly dimension.

While there are partial fulfillments of our acts in their historical consequences, historical existence is and always will be incomplete. That is, the conditions of historical existence are such that there never can be a future state of mankind in which all human frustrations will be overcome. Utopias are illusions.

Every act and event also has, in addition to its reference to the future, an aspect of its existence "which does not wait upon some future development for its meaning [its fulfillment?], but has that meaning not within itself [as being self-sufficient], but within itself in relation to what is felt to be the ultimate source of the meaning of our life" (p. 97). It is in *this* sense that God "completes the drama of history." And, in this respect, the Christian faith is "other-worldly." There is a "transection of every moment by the eternal." The fulfillment occurs *now*. What is "eternal" about the fulfillment is that the act is done, not only with a reference to its historical consequences, but also with a reference to "what is felt to be the ultimate source of the meaning of our life."

The view of time Niebuhr adopts sounds much like Bergson's and

even more like Whitehead's theory, according to which the process of supersession of one event by another is distinguished from the internal process in which the event finds fulfillment of the aim derived from God. The resemblance to Whitehead is strengthened by the following sentence: "If we live and act in faith, the imperfections of our momentary achievements are transmuted and become a part of God's perfection" (p. 103). The first clause of the sentence, of course, is less Whiteheadian than the second.

The "supernatural," Niebuhr says, is not "a separate and distinct realm of existence." It is "the final ground and ultimate dimension of the unity of existence" (p. 159). There is an important sense, then, in which there is only one world. Now one is not sure what "ground" and "dimension" mean. As one reflects on what, from an existential point of view they *may* mean, the following question arises: Is the gap between Niebuhr's "supernaturalistic" conception of God and Wieman's "naturalistic" conception of God (as expressed in *The Source of Human Good*) really so wide as many of us have supposed?

Certainly there is a difference in the kinds of language used, but Wieman in recent years has been more willing to talk in the language of faith, and there is some indication in this book that Niebuhr is more willing to explicate his faith in public language. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the central religious affirmations of each may be found to be more alike than is commonly supposed. This is, I know, a somewhat venturesome suggestion. It is put forward in the hope that it may lead naturalists and supernaturalists to define more clearly the points at which they find themselves opposed.

WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN

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Faith and Reason. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1946. XII, 247 pp. $2.50.

Professor Ferré's thought is subtle, sensitive, eager, agile, many-sided. His writing is often eloquent, sometimes highly picturesque. My doubt is as to whether it is equally clear and consistent. Certainly there is much that is worth while in this book. The discussion of the strength and limitation of science is penetrating, and many of the

comments on philosophy and religion are enlightening. There is a large-minded appreciation of the rightful claims of various disciplines; also a sound sense of the difficulty of religious and philosophical issues, and of the fallibility of all of us, including the author, in dealing with them. Religion is defined as whole-response to what is most important and most real, ideally, to what is most important as coincident or "completely combined" with the most real in the divine perfection. Knowledge or reason is the world viewed from the here and now and the actual. Only faith can survey the future in its entirety and evaluate the perfection or imperfection of God in terms of all His work, past and to come. It does this by means of whole-response which brings something besides intellect and factual observation into play, brings love and trust toward God. This is to be made more clear in later volumes; so it is risky to criticize it as it stands. But I wish to express certain misgivings.

I agree that in the whole-response of religion more is believed than reason can establish, but I do not believe that this "more" is expressible in any such proposition, in general abstract terms, as that God is perfect, or that in him "most important" and "most real" coincide. I believe, rather, that what escapes reason is the concrete personal aspects of religious life, *my* duty, *my* destiny and meaning to God, or my neighbor's, as unique indefinable individuals, and God's equally indefinable relations to us, in particular. Nor do I believe it tenable that the perfection of God stands or falls with any character of the future that is beyond the reach of human reason. The author argues that unless God's work is at least destined to be made perfect (he agrees it is not so now) He cannot be perfect as worker. This is a rationalistic, not a religious, contention, by which I mean that it is not required (perhaps not even adapted) to make God appear completely worthy of ideal whole-response or worship. For the religious view may be the following. God is not an artisan manipulating passive material or merely instrumental value. The value of his work lies solely in one thing, experience, his own and that of the creatures. There is no "cathedral" to be built, no "ripe fruit" to be grown, but only lives to be lived. Now no life can be wholly molded by the life of another. God's perfection cannot be tested by the perfection or lack of it of our lives, for it cannot be that the quality of the response should be a mere echo of, or wholly determined by, the quality of that which is

responded to. No one is responsible for what he does not control so far as he does not control it, and the idea, strongly hinted at if not affirmed, that, after all, God absolutely and wholly controls us is the denial that we have any freedom whatever or, indeed, that we are living individuals at all.

Ferré urges that evil may be overcome entirely in the future. This would mean that all free acts will eventually cease, for every free act involves risk of evil, through failure to harmonize with the free acts of others. It also means that all past suffering will either simply be forgotten or will be remembered as completely indifferent, or as entirely fortunate, in its effects upon the future total state of things. But if faith in God is faith that this shall happen, on pain of God's not being God, then it is faith that nothing depends upon what we do with our freedom, since the very essence of God as perfect makes even the slightest ultimate ill effects of our actions impossible. The author virtually says that it matters only in short-run terms how we decide. Then let us take the long-run view and achieve indifference as to our responsibilities. Is such a God the object of any genuinely whole response?

The author says process must have a direction and a goal. He forgets, perhaps, as so many do, that direction does not require a goal, if that means a state of absolute value to which process is to come closer and closer. The direction toward ever-more value is a direction, even though there be no most-value to be reached, or even approached as a limit. (No doubt there must be a standard or measure of value, but this can be an abstract principle, not itself an achieved value.) Ferré feels we cannot believe God to be wholly loving and, in that sense, perfect, if the present world, with all its suffering, including animal suffering, is typical of the total process, is anything better than a green fruit not yet ripened. But what could anything happening in the future do to cancel out the sufferings of animals? If he means that the animals will all endure and finally become utterly happy, as seems rather to be his notion, I think he exaggerates the notion of self-identity. Could it mean anything to the animal now suffering that "it" will one day be happy? Nor is it clear to me that present happiness makes past suffering not to have been an evil. If present feeling does not matter, but only future feeling, then we ought not to care in the least how we suffer, or others suffer, now, and only at some future time will it begin to matter, will feeling have intrinsic value as contrasted to

merely instrumental value as preparing us for that future time, which is *bound* to come anyway. This projecting of all intrinsic value into the inevitable future seems both absurd and harmful to me.

In all this I have been attacking the author more fiercely than he has attacked those (including myself) who hold views somewhat different from his. While I do not think his arguments are always fair in the logical sense, they are admirably courteous in tone, and it is obvious that he is trying to be fair and accurate.

The notion that whole-response carries us beyond reason has two quite different meanings, generally not distinguished. It might mean that reason cannot reach a conception of the essential or eternal character of God, that which He will be regardless of what we do or anyone does. Or it might mean that we cannot reach a conception of the non-eternal and accidental aspect of God which is his relation to the non-eternal and accidental in the world. For the first interpretation I see no good ground. Reason is limited to the present in contrast to the future *only so far as the future is contingent,* and that by definition means, "so far as the essence of God fails to determine the future." So our ignorance of the future is irrelevant to the question, what is the essence of God? But it is highly relevant to the question, how shall we think of our own personal destiny and plans, which depend in all details upon contingencies? Here, indeed, we can only walk by faith and trust and love. Nor by reason can we know even the present and the past, so far as it is true that all self-observation and interpretation of the personalities of others is, in man, limited by all sorts of more or less incurable prejudices, fears, vanities, and other more innocent defects.

Since we are through and through contingent beings, and therefore God, *so far as related to us,* is contingently thus related, and since religion concretely is precisely our relation to God and His to us, obviously religion transcends what philosophical reason can know. The one thing, however, that does *not* transcend such knowledge is precisely whatever it is that is essential or necessary or eternal in God, for such necessity can only consist in this, that every thought whatever implies this something in God, so that its non-being is unthinkable and impossible. Now what every thought implies is not beyond the scope of reason.

One advantage in admitting the distinction of essence and accidents

in God, a distinction required by reason itself, as I claim to have proved, is that, by this rational distinction, it becomes at last clear in what sense religion is supra-rational. It is supra-rational because in religion we, who are particular persons, confront God, not merely qua eternal and necessary, but as loving and judging us in particular, as we concretely happen to be, and, therefore, as Himself a concrete person in particular states and relationships. Religion is suprarational because it is personal, on both sides of the relation.

I deeply fear that our author, for all his gifts, is tending to take us back to the old confusions and equivocations concerning freedom and necessity, abstract and concrete, real risk and responsibility but complete inevitability of unlimited success. However, perhaps I shall be pleasantly surprised by later works. Perhaps his promised treament of the problem of evil will open a hitherto neglected alternative. This assumes that we have failed to exhaust the views logically possible. I suspect that, except on some fine points of secondary significance, the possibilities have been exhausted. We shall see. Meantime it is a fine exercise to read this book. And those of decidedly orthodox inclination may find it satisfying.

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

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A Critique of the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy. By LEO A. FOLEY. (Philosophical Studies, XCIV.) Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946. xii, 169 pp. $2.00.

In this series of studies, most of which are devoted to Thomism, Whitehead joins Herbert Spencer, Orestes Brownson, Irving Babbitt, and George Santayana as a modern non-scholastic whom, for one reason or another, it is worthwhile to examine. The study is divided into two parts, an exposition and a critique, and each section is subdivided into four topics: knowledge, being and becoming, causality, and God. The critique consists in an evaluation of Whitehead vis-à-vis Thomas, and Whitehead fails to make the grade, although he is complimented for having tried.

The first part of the book is sprinkled liberally with quotations from

Whitehead and seems to promise a painstaking study. Soon, however, the reader experiences a slightly nightmarish feeling—everything is vaguely familiar and yet somehow all wrong. The Reverend Foley's fidelity to his topic is regrettably more apparent than real. Strange errors creep in. For example (p. 52), he quotes Whitehead as saying: "It is better to say that they (feelings) *are aimed at* their subject." What Whitehead actually says is: "It is better to say that the feelings *aim at* their subject, than to say that they *are aimed at* their subject." Again, he finds inconsistency in Whitehead (p. 42) for saying: "The order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature," and so on. He fails to note that Whitehead is not asserting this position but rather denying it. A check with the original shows that this view is a consequence of the seventeenth century picture of the world, which Whitehead finds still the prevalent view but, nonetheless, "quite unbelievable." Examples of this sort shake one's faith in the author's exposition.

More serious, however, is his failure to come to grips with the basic notions in Whitehead's philosophy. In spite of his assertion that "the theory of knowledge is the measure of a philosophy" (p. 102), in his exposition of Whitehead's theory of knowledge, he fails even to mention either conceptual prehensions or eternal objects—an almost unbelievable feat. The subsequent discussion of prehensions ignores the epistemological aspect altogether, in spite of Whitehead's introduction of the term in *Science and the Modern World:* "I will use the word *prehension* for *uncognitive apprehension:* by this I mean *apprehension* which may or may not be cognitive." The later reference to Whitehead's "love for 'feeling' in Knowledge" (p. 103) indicates that the definition of "feeling" as "positive prehension" has been forgotten or not understood. There is a similar uncertainty about the way in which Fr. Foley handles all of the leading ideas. On page 48 he quotes the passages affirming the causal independence of occasions, but on page 35 he describes the mutual prehension of two occasions. "Symbolism" always seems to suggest mathematical symbols, for he seems unaware of the use of "pure sense-perceptions" as symbols. In short, the words are present, but devoid of their meaning.

So far as the critique is concerned, the principle of criticism is stated quite frankly:

> We may say that it is of primary importance, in criticizing the philosophy of

organism, to thereby justify the system of Thomism. Thomism has been tried and found true. If it be objected that Thomism has been tried and found wanting, we may answer, as would Chesterton, that for those who have found it wanting, they have never tried it (p. 87).

The frankness is no doubt praiseworthy, but the conclusion is begged and therefore insignificant.

It seems clear that the only profit that a student of philosophy not already committed to Thomism could derive from a book of this sort would be from the examination of the key-points around which a Thomistic criticism of a non-Thomistic philosopher revolves. Let us take the problem of knowledge. On the first page of the critique we find Fr. Foley saying: "In order to guarantee the truth of knowledge, we must hold that (I) things are, in their very natures, knowable, and that (II) the mind can know them" (p. 87). This point is made relevant to the criticism of Whitehead as follows:

Here is the difference: *Thomism has a sufficient reason whereby we can explain the attaining of the idea from the image,* namely, that in the thing is a principle, a metaphysical principle, of identity, which is in its very nature knowable, and that the mind has power to know and understand that principle and use it in judgments. To deny that is to commit intellectual suicide, for it is to deny the knowing process, which denial ends up in an entirely repugnant solipsism. Whitehead has no such sufficient reason (p. 105).

This becomes more explicit when it is affirmed that Whitehead "agrees that we have specialized organs, the senses, for the purpose of perceiving stimuli from the things known. These things exist actually, and emit (so to speak) stimuli to which our senses react" (p. 101). What Fr. Foley fails to see is that it is precisely the "emit (so to speak)" which has excited and bothered philosophers and scientists from Aristotle to the present day, and that it is just that vagueness, dissatisfacton with which is what we consider the scientific spirit. "Emit (so to speak)" simply is not good enough, and a whole tradition of physics, physiology and experimental psychology is launched.

Consider a simple example: I wake up suddenly in the night with the definite feeling that something unusual is taking place in my bedroom. Something unidentified has aroused me—but what? I hear a noise, and my vague feelings of apprehension focus on that noise as being connected with the original cause of my alarm. I summon memory to my aid and run over various possibilities, and finally I guess that

there is a mouse behind the bureau. With my alarm giving way to a grin, I heave a slipper at the bureau, and a small dark object goes scuttling away along the floor board. The situation is resolved.

A Whiteheadian analysis of this would point to the unidentified "it" felt as a causal factor, the emotional factors, the propositional feeling of the "it" as a mouse, and the final satisfaction as the datum bears the interpretation. (Of course, the "true" explanation might still be that it was a large cockroach—this would have been more probable in a house I once lived in.) Now, at this point, Thomism can step in and explain the knowledge on the ground that it is the very essence of a mouse to be knowable and of my mind to know a mouse when it emits (so to speak). But before I get around to figuring that out, I have tucked myself back into bed again. In other words, a scientific or a Whiteheadian explanation of knowledge concentrates on coming to know something (in one sense of knowledge) or on using one's knowledge in order to interpret a datum (in another sense of knowledge). The Thomistic concentrates on the "act" of knowing and contributes, quite correctly, the dictum that to be known a thing must be knowable. The chief point of difference is that, whereas every detail of the Whiteheadian explanation may well be wrong, the Thomistic explanation is irrefutable. On the other hand, it is precisely investigations of the Whiteheadian sort which constitute the basis of our wealth of scientific knowledge, while the Thomistic solution contributes nothing except the satisfaction that with the aid of an "able" word, another interesting problem has been laid to rest.

One quite fascinating element in this book is Fr. Foley's attitude towards mathematics and what he calls mathematical philosophy. Whitehead's theory of knowledge is introduced as "an attempt to explain and defend the validity of sense experience in theories of higher mathematics" (p. 13). Mathematicians, it appears, achieve the second degree of abstraction, which "is based upon relations both within entities and between entities, and hence is more remote from the principles within the related entities. Since, thus, mathematics is based upon relations, mathematical philosophers will logically tend towards relativistic philosophies" (p. 93). Finally we learn:

> Whitehead's philosophy is one of becoming. His theory of judgment is in the second degree of abstraction, mathematical. He sums it up in symbolism, that is, applying symbols to reality and to ideas. Mathematical symbols are pat-

terns of relation. Whitehead's philosophy is relativistic. Hence, he ends in dynamic monism wherein all is process that is ordered by mathematical forms. . . . From his mathematical symbolism he makes the ultimate principle "creativity." This latter is a relativistic process with mathematical symbols as the principle of order (p. 106).

Now there is so much apparent gibberish here that it is almost impossible to figure out what Fr. Foley is trying to say. Apparently it is the same point that Russell made so well in his book on Leibniz. Fr. Foley would say that, in the last analysis, reality can only be expressed in propositions of a simple subject-predicate form, never relationally. In other words, the truth is "John is taller-than-Henry," not that "John is-taller-than Henry." Again, the truth is that "that tree is (actually or potentially) an-oak-tree," not that "that seems-to-be-an-oak-tree-to me." Russell's point is that if one's logic accords priority to propositions of the subject-predicate form, one is led to a substance-attribute metaphysics. Fr. Foley is trying to maintain that there is a radical dichotomy between a subject-predicate logic and a relational logic, while for Russell and Whitehead there is no dichotomy, the former being simply a limiting case of the latter. The Thomistic logic is subject-predicate in form, and the whole fuss and bother over "mathematical philosophies" seems to turn on this point.

Fr. Foley can here follow either of two lines of argument. He can try to show that relational logic is somehow inferior to subject-predicate logic, but here the whole evidence from Boole to the present day will suggest overwhelmingly that his argument is nonsensical. Or he can try to show that a relational cosmology must be inferior to a substance-attribute cosmology, as being less adequate to interpret experience. Here he would join issue with Whitehead who maintains that *(pace* that great speculative philosopher Chesterton), substance cosmology has been tried and found wanting. The line of argument closed to Fr. Foley (which, unfortunately, appears to be the line he has chosen for this book) is the justification of his cosmology by his logic and of his logic by his cosmology, whichever justification happens to be needed at the moment.

I have stated here what I believe to be the fundamental point at issue in this book. It is always a temptation to try to smoke a Thomist out of his calm assurance that Thomism is, of course, true. When the Thomistic argument employs such absurdities as the above-quoted re-

marks on mathematics, it is nothing but obscurantism. When it rests on its logic, its poverty is apparent to the merest tyro. When it rests on its anti-relational cosmology, it is not so much false as pre-Copernican and useless. In any case, whatever satisfaction it may give to "refute" a non-scholastic in the manner in which a refutation of Whitehead is attempted in this book, the method here employed can in no way contribute to human understanding or to the liberation of the human intellect.

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Conversations with an Unrepentant Liberal. By JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946. x, 113 pp. $2.00.

The "unrepentant liberal" of these genial and enlightening "conversations" is Dr. Bixler himself, entertainingly if rather thinly disguised as a contemporary incarnation of the Cebes of the Platonic dialogues. The case against his liberalism is put by a Simmias who has borrowed his ideas from a number of contemporary sources, and is in some measure a disciple of John Dewey. Their discussions take place in a Boston subway, a railway coach en route from Boston to Providence, and the plane in which their journey to New Haven is completed. The outcome of this curious temporal, spatial, and ideological juxtaposition is the twenty-second volume of Terry Lectures on religion, an attractive addition to this formidable series, and one which the reviewer is tempted to describe as wise and witty since, in spite of the alliterative cliché, it well merits that description.

Dr. Bixler has located with precision the central issue in the current controversy over "liberalism" in morals and religion:

> To me the essence of liberalism is the view that the reasonable standards, qualities, and relations with which the mind deals in its capacity as judge can be abstracted from the imperious driving desires which make up so much of the stream of experience, and that the judgments made by temporarily abstracting ideas in this way can be used to control conduct and improve it. Ideas do exist apart in a special sense as Socrates himself used to teach (p. 12).

The autonomy of reason, its final authority for our moral and religious commitments and the absoluteness of the values or ideals which

are its norms—these are the central tenets of the liberal faith of which these lectures are a reasoned re-affirmation.

Dr. Bixler recognizes that the essential current task for such a liberalism, however, is not so much a restatement of general ideas as such an application of those ideas to the hard and stubborn facts of contemporary existence as will demonstrate their continuing pertinence and reality. Hence, after a preliminary presentation of the liberal "at bay" but still well able to defend himself against a variety of critical attacks, he proceeds to a positive statement of the case for the primacy of reason in religion and in liberal education. What he has to say on the former point seems to me in its substance unanswerable, and while it has been said before, it is well that it should be said again, especially when it is said as forcefully as this. "Religion is active, devoted, and loyal commitment to the best that we can discover, and the best can be discovered only by using our reason for all that it is worth" (p. 51). If the critics of "liberalism" in religion have in fact been denying this contention, as they have very often seemed to be, then they are the enemies and not the friends of any religion that is rationally defensible and humanly worth having.

The "liberalism" of a "liberal education" is similarly defined:

> We start, as liberals, with a truth about reason. We discover that this implies moral goals. We find that these determine our view of the nature of the divine as the rational good, that is, the reasonable object of our complete devotion, and we go on to try to express the same truths in education by calling that type liberal which sets up the truths of reason as ends in themselves and refuses to be diverted from following them (p. 86).
>
> After all, how can we better prepare for good citizenship through a liberal arts education than by arousing a passion for reason which means also for justice? (p. 92).

It is heartening to realize that the "unrepentant liberal" who writes in this vein is also a college president. If only there were more of them!

There are two criticisms to be made, I think, of this timely and constructive book. One is that, in telescoping all the main types of critic of the liberalism he defends into a single character in his "conversations," Dr. Bixler has made his Simmias seem even more confused than an anti-liberal could reasonably be expected to be. Sometimes this composite character speaks with the voice of Niebuhr, sometimes with that of Dewey. And there are echoes of logical positivism, and of Nietzsche as

well. This makes Simmias something of a push-over dialectically. And that is, on the whole, a pity, since the philosophy of Cebes could have withstood a more impressive and searching attack.

A more serious difficulty centers in the claim that the values which reason discerns and honors are absolute as "existing apart," and as the appropriate objects of "a devotion we can only call religious in its absolutistic quality" (p. 66). That the claim of such ideals upon a moral will is of a different order from the urgency of competing desires and is thus unconditional in its rational cogency, is implied in the liberalism that Dr. Bixler rightly defends. To add that such ideals are absolute in their existential status or as "representatives of another world than that of the give and take of daily life" (p. 66) may be merely a metaphorical way of saying this over again in a high metaphysical tone. But if it is more than this, it needs clarification and justification of a sort that the "conversations" do not provide. Cebes observes (p. 57) that the word "absolute" has "unfortunate connotations." I suspect that some of these have been retained in his own use of it, but look hopefully to Dr. Bixler to show us in a further and more detailed discussion that this suspicion is without foundation.

Sanity is seldom spectacular, and as judicious a book as this is likely, for that reason, to receive less attention than it deserves. And that is to be regretted, since it is a very readable book on moral, religious, and educational philosophy that is also well worth reading. The rarity of such a book in contemporary discussion may lend it also something of the charm of novelty.

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The Gospel of Peace. By FR. JOHN J. HUGO. Easton, Pa.: Catholic Worker Penny Press, xxii, 134 pp. 25¢.

This book is an important—indeed an indispensable—contribution to the discussion of Christianity in relation to modern war. It is well written and documented, logically coherent, and noteworthy for its candor in facing difficult issues. Of these the most obvious, for a Catholic, is the Thomistic doctrine of the just war. Fr. Hugo goes straight at it. Most people, he remarks, know more about St. Thomas' doctrine

of war than they do about his doctrine of peace. They regard the sphere of collective conduct, especially in its dominant military aspect, as falling entirely within natural ethics, to which, so they say, the Gospel teaching is neither relevant nor necessary. Neither St. Thomas nor anyone else gives the slightest countenance to this notion. "We must discuss and settle the problem of war, not by the principles of Aristotle alone, however commendable these may be in their own order. We must speak and think and act in Christ Jesus."

The Catholic Church, following Thomas and Augustine, admits, at least tacitly, the possibility of just war, though it has never formally defined this teaching (the historical background that Fr. Hugo gives is particularly useful). The admission is a necessary consequence of the recognition of inviolable human rights. But actually we do not find that the vast extension and intensification of modern war has made those rights more secure or more inviolate—quite the contrary. That is the difference between theory and practice; between war *as such* and the specific nature of war *as is*. "Due to the actual condition of human nature, the full and simultaneous realization of all the conditions required for a just war is a moral impossibility." Even the recent wars of intervention against injustice and oppression do not fulfill those conditions, either in their conduct, their actual aims, or their consequences. And further, true peace is not simply the work of justice; it is the work of charity, for which even perfect natural justice can only clear the way.

That brings us to the Gospel of peace. Here Fr. Hugo—still in line with St. Thomas—takes the familiar Christian platitudes and puts an uncompromizing punch into them. True peace is the peace that our Lord and His ministers offer us, and there is no other kind.

> The false peace that we obtain from the possession of material things is not stable or lasting because of the things we do not possess. True peace requires that the appetites be wholly stilled. . . . The peaceful man is in repose; he has ended his search. . . . The unpeaceful man is restless, discontented, ever in search of new satisfactions. This at once brings him into conflict with his neighbours.

Yes, we admit it, we have heard it all before, we all agree; but is it not asking too much of ordinary people, beset with original sin, who have to make a living and support their families? What about the difference—the theological difference—between the counsels and the precepts? Into which category do the beatitudes fall (we hope they fall only in the

former!)? Hugo will not let us out of it so cheaply. Christians must surrender unconditionally, not to Stalin, but to God.

> Not the avoidance of gross sin, which is also demanded of the heathen, but the imitation of divine holiness, is the message of the Gospel. Therefore, the final question to which the Christian must address himself is not, Can war be ethically justified? The main question is still before him; it is this: Does war have a place in the way of life described by the Gospel? Above all, does the total war of today conform to the evangelic law of love?

But are we really expected to translate that way of life into political as well as personal conduct? Hugo says bluntly Yes: what do you think the Church is there for? "If the world is not Christian, so much the worse for the world. It has not the right to ignore Christ; nor have Christians the right to pardon or acquiesce in its denial." Even in secular reasoning war can be justified only as a last resort; Christians are called so to live that neither their own nor anyone else's good intentions can drive them to that doomed and desperate remedy.

The book is the soundest and solidest manifesto of Catholic pacificism with which I am acquainted. But it is, on reflection, more than that. In its implications it is revolutionary, as is all pacificism. It harks back to the early Church and is full of the memories of martyrdom. It affirms the possibility that the dreary circle of economic rivalry, political expediency, nationalism, imperialism, power politics and war, can be smashed open by a dynamic breakthrough of Christian will. And by nothing else. Christian people cannot afford to dismiss that possibility on the plea of perfectionism. Fr. Hugo positively courts that charge: has he not good precedent?

WILLIAM AYLOTT ORTON

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Walt Whitman Handbook. By GAY WILSON ALLEN. Chicago: Packard and Company, 1946. xviii, 560 pp. $3.00.

The first handbook to be produced on Walt Whitman and the studies concerning him raises more forcefully than usual in such cases the question what the genius might himself think of the scholarly work, could it be placed in his hands. Probably two main thoughts would come to his

mind. He would be flattered and astonished at the vast literature about him. It seems doubtful if, even in his most sanguine hours, he imagined that, a century after he commenced to write, he would be the most provocative and widely discussed American author. He might also be mildly shocked at the impersonality of a modern handbook, and at what this type of writing signifies when considered philosophically. With his beloved doctrine of "personalism," Whitman believed that no matter what human problem were considered, discussion should bear the mark of self. Though he raised paeans to science, its impersonality held small charms for him, and of the principles of social science he knew little or nothing. Of all men, he most readily dispensed with accumulative learning. Though producing the most appalling compilations of his own, he never countenanced works of compilation by critics. Whatever he may have blabbed in favor of subject matter and against art, he was at heart an artist. Whitman believed in literature, not in digests of literature. So he would probably say of Professor Allen's book that he was deeply gratified yet would also have certain cooling qualifications.

By so thinking, Whitman would, in the opinion of the present reviewer, be in part right and in part wrong. The question how well Professor Allen has executed the details of his task—and I believe that in general it is done exceedingly well—may be postponed till the pros and cons of the task itself are weighed.

Whitman's importance, the vast literature about him, and the highly contradictory views frequently expressed on almost all aspects of his personality, mind and art, well warrant such a volume. It is of value to two types of readers. First are the Whitman scholars, and probably none is so well informed as to fail at some points to profit from the handbook or to value it for convenient reference. Second are the more general readers, and the growing importance of Whitman should in a sense make every intelligent American a Whitman scholar, by which is meant not a critical writer in the field but a thoughtful and critical reader. The chief contribution which the book offers to both types of readers is its comprehensive and well balanced view. No other book treats the same subject from so many angles. Almost of necessity, the reader ends with a more sober and a wiser view than he possessed at the beginning. Indeed, this encyclopedic experience is almost too sobering, almost depressingly erudite. The volume is useful for any interested person to

consult on special points, as well as thoroughly readable and worth reading consecutively, even though its author almost deliberately eschews a warm or imaginative style. Especially the chapters on the life, literary sources, and reputation at home and abroad, and the successive editions of *Leaves of Grass,* make valuable contributions. The sections on Whitman's general ideas and political opinions are almost certain to be suggestive. No one who knows Whitman scholarship is likely to agree entirely with Allen's references, but no one is likely to dissent violently. One of the chief objections is that he is prone to follow books and articles specifically on Whitman at the expense of books in which the poet is treated only incidentally. George Santayana and John Dewey have said more about Whitman in passing references than several score of of authors of periodical articles.

The commentary on the poet's religion affords a fair example of the worth of the book. Here, more successfully than anywhere else, can we find a summary of Whitman's relation to American transcendentalism, German idealism, and Oriental mysticism. His relation to Emerson and Alcott, and his interest in ideas associated with "personalism," together with his gradual change from belief in an indwelling God to faith in an objectified divinity, merit special attention. That Whitman is highly significant for a study of religious life and thought should always have been apparent. The handbook illustrates some of the specific angles of this problem.

Yet the limitations of a handbook appear with peculiar irony where a poet such as Whitman provides the subject. The measure of Whitman's greatness as a poet is precisely in his ability so to fuse and synthesize all his ideas that they simply refuse to yield their full value when viewed in seriatim manner. Much of the handbook consists of severe condensations, statements in sentences of ideas which scholars have elsewhere developed in chapters. Even where the compiler leans least on the work of others and, as in pages on Whitman's ideas and style, virtually writes his own essay, the somewhat prosaic and over-methodical manner of the handbook summary inevitably prevails. In short, an atom has been sadly broken. The principle of the book is fragmentation or, at best, mosaic work instead of synthesis. The scholarship is good, but much that is stupid is summarized along with much that is sound. Parts of books and parts of Whitman pass before us in too rapid succes-

sion. We yearn for at least the illusion of some integrated whole. This may be illustrated by a return to the field of Whitman's religion. The only chapter specifically dealing with this subject discusses Whitman only as a religious thinker. But he was also a religious man and a religious poet. The arrangement of the book, providing for discussion of all aspects, nowhere provides for that more imaginative treatment which would unite the three. The same principle may be observed in what is for Whitman a still more important field. Whitman is above all the poet of democracy. From this seed, in a similar fashion, may be derived his various attitudes toward art, manners, philosophy, psychology, history and religion. Even his views of science are concerned. It is very embarrassing to deal with a man who has so much imagination as Whitman. Every poet, the romantics say, is a god in little. A handbook on a poet conveniently gives us the telephone number to all the ideas inhabiting the city of his mind. But it no more supplies us with the poet's own number than the New York telephone book supplies us with the number of God. Handbooks of poets, in short, are very useful, but literary criticism still remains very much more an art than a science.

The conclusion of this review is therefore in general agreement with the earlier conclusion hypothetically assigned to Whitman himself. Here is a helpful book, almost the best of its sort that could be imagined. The author-compiler has done his work remarkably well. Nevertheless, it is always timely to remind ourselves of the limitations of this species of writing. Imaginative authors yield their deeper secrets only to those critics who exercise not only industry but imagination. And there is no short road to imagination. Summaries will not cut the gordian knot. This our semi-mechanized American scholarship is in need of remembering. Originality in art can be sharply illuminated only by a parallel originality in criticism. The very words of the vital critic become, in their own way, as lively, precious, and untranslatable as those of the poet. A handbook is good, and may make a good beginning, but it would be a serious error to rest content even with the best, for it is never enough.

HENRY W. WELLS

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BOOK NOTES

Enki and Ninhursag: A Sumerian "Paradise" Myth. By SAMUEL N. KRAMER. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Supplementary Studies, No. 1. New Haven, 1945. 40 pp. 75 cents.

This remarkable Sumerian poem, inscribed on a clay tablet dating ca. the seventeenth century B.C., has a long and very exciting history behind it. It was first published with text and translation in 1915 by the late Stephen Langdon, under the sensational title, "Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood, and the Fall of Man." Cuneiformists severely criticized Langdon's translation of this difficult text and convincingly pointed out that the poem had nothing to do with any of the three mentioned events. Fifteen years later Langdon offered a revised translation of the poem in his *Semitic Mythology* (*The Mythology of All Races*, vol. 5, 1931), where he admitted his error in including the Deluge story in his interpretation of the poem. He continued to insist, however, that "It presents . . . an almost complete parallel to the Hebrew legend of Adam and the Garden of Eden." Dr. Kramer, one of the foremost Sumerologists in this country, has now presented us with a new edition of this strange poem, and although there still remain many obscure passages, the soundness of the translation is beyond any serious doubt. The content of the poem, consisting of 275 lines, is briefly as follows:

Enki, the god of civilization, made Dilmun a land outstanding for its fruitfulness and health. It is a pure, clean, and bright place, and its inhabitants know neither sickness, old age, nor death. Upon the completion of this veritable paradise, Enki impregnates the goddess Ninhursag, who gives birth, without pain, to the goddess Ninmu. Enki impregnates Ninmu and, later, also her daughter Ninkurra. But when he proceeds to do the same to Uttu, Ninkurra's offspring, the great-grandmother Ninhursag intervenes and uses the seed of Enki to produce eight different plants. Enki eats up the plants and thus consumes his own seed. Ninhursag, angry at this act, curses him soundly saying, that until he dies she will not look upon him with the "eye of life." Thereupon Enki begins to pine away without the gods being able to help him. Finally, Ninhursag consents to restore his health. This she accomplishes by creating eight deities who cure the eight sick organs of Enki's body.

What is the meaning of this mythological poem? Dr. Kramer finds many traits in this poem reminiscent of the biblical stories in Genesis, chapters 1-3. He points out that the Sumerians regarded Dilmun as a divine paradise and that the Babylonians considered the place as a "land of the living"; the birth of the goddesses Ninmu, Ninkurra, and Uttu, who were born without pain, illuminates the background of the curse against Eve, who is to conceive and bear children in sorrow; and Enki's eating of the plants and the subsequent curse pronounced against him by Ninhursag recalls the story of the eating of the forbidden fruit by Adam and Eve. These points are well taken, and it is quite possible that a version of this Sumerian poem was known to the ancient

myth-makers of Israel. I am, however, unable to follow Dr. Kramer in his interpretation that this poem affords an answer to the puzzling story of the fashioning of Eve from the rib of Adam. That the creation of the obscure goddess Nin-ti (*ti* meaning in Sumerian both "rib" and "life") by Ninhursag to cure the ailing rib of Enki should have served as the pattern for the biblical story of the fashioning of the first woman (*Hawwah,* meaning "she who gives life"), is highly improbable.

I. M.

The Great Religions of the Modern World. Edited by E. J. Jurji. Princeton University Press, 1946. 387 pp. $3.75.

The religions considered here are Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and the religions of China. Zoroastrianism is omitted entirely, and Jainism and Sikhism, which are often treated as separate religions, get only incidental treatment in the chapter on Hinduism. There is merit in this arrangement. China is treated as a unit, with Confucianism and Taoism distinguished as separate faiths, yet, as closely intertwined, and each expressive of an important element in Chinese character.

Each unit is written by a different scholar. All are well-known and highly respected authorities in their special fields. Lewis Hodous, longtime resident in China and intimately acquainted with not only the literature, but also the life and practices of the Chinese people, writes on Chinese religion; J. C. Archer, of Yale University, on India; A. J. Reischauer, on Buddhism; E. J. Jurji, of Princeton University, on Islam; D. C. Holtom, on Shinto; and Abraham A. Newman, President of Dropsie College, on Judaism. An excellent feature of the book is the division of Christianity into three chapters, with Professor Hromádka, formerly of the University of Prague, writing on Eastern Orthodoxy, Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., of Fordham University, on Roman Catholicism, and President John A. Mackay, of Princeton Theological Seminary, on Protestantism. This, to be sure, throws the book somewhat out of balance, giving to Christianity a great deal more space than the others, but since, probably, the vast majority of those who use the book will be persons of the Christian tradition, and since few books give any adequate treatment of any one of the three great branches of the Church, this may be all to the good. Where will one find, for example, any brief but authoritative treatment of Eastern Orthodoxy, or for that matter of the other two? Large volumes, yes—of these there are many, but not brief accounts. If a criticism were to be made of these chapters, it would be that they are too theological in nature. One can, of course, hardly avoid theology in discussing religions, but religion is distinctly more than theology, and it is that "more" which is chiefly lacking, particularly in the chapters on Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.

In a book of this sort, one naturally expects to find an unevenness of style and treatment. Some chapters are very clearly written and easy to read, yet

present the salient features of the religions under discussion. But some are obscure and difficult to read, presupposing a degree of knowledge concerning the religions which the average reader is not likely to have. This latter fact is true especially of the chapter on Islam.

On the whole, it is an excellent book and will prove to be helpful supplementary reading in courses on the world's religions. An especially valuable feature is the attention given to major recent trends in the religions discussed. It will also be good reading for mature persons who wish a rapid survey of the religions of the modern world.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

Essence of Hinduism. By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1946. 91 pp. $1.25.

Two essays, "Immortality" and "Faith for Today," serve here to expound the "essence" of Hinduism, and both may justly meet with praise and blame. A good deal of sound sense appears, especially on pages 74-85, where variations among religions are assumed, but no sound faith for today is actually devised therefrom—we do *not* say extracted from them—beyond advocacy of "democracy" in religion, e.g., "Be steadfast to your own ideal and show respect to the ideals of others." There is sense, too, in the observation that man's soul "is not a bundle of sensations," and that "God is not a projection of the human mind," but there is in the monograph too much casual comment, intentional interpretation, speculative adventure, and, if it be examined closely, contradiction. The essence of Hinduism is not to be conclusively exhibited within one hundred English pages, and only by a careless use of the term "Vedas" can the author bring so much within a tiny circle. Nor should he identify Yoga and Vedanta.

What is exhibited is not the "essence" of Hinduism, but only an abstraction —and a vague theory of things, at that, but how else could the author reconcile Vedanta and Yoga? He makes too much of his assertion that "one soul alone exists in all beings"—and, even so, what of all *things?*

This booklet does not represent the modern India, nor the India that will itself harken to its gospel. The swami says that "the soul . . . is most blissful when it is totally dissociated from the body"—an ancient mystic speculation on the bliss of dreamless sleep, individualism to the nth degree, a state which Hinduism, nowadays at least, must defer until a multitude of pressing affairs of state are taken care of. There is no need, we'll say, to minimize the spiritual—rather, great need of cultivating it—for God himself is Spirit, but man's task is more than ever worldly. Even Hinduism must reckon on its essence in a real, immediate India. The claim the author makes for the originality, the consistence, and the finality of the Vedic faith *for today* is very largely hypothetical—and this may properly be said with due regard for the age and worth of Hindu wisdom, and for that within it which is, after all, essential to the

survival, if not to the very creation of an Indian nation. At any rate, Hinduism *is* the essence of India. How it will fare in political contingencies, is a matter for current demonstration.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Woven Cadences of Early Buddhists. Translated by E. M. HARE. (Vol. XV in *The Sacred Books of the Buddhists.*) London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. 229 pp. $4.00.

The Buddhist canon, the Tipiṭaka, consists of three sections, of which the second is the Sutta-piṭaka. This is subdivided into five parts, the last of which is the Khuddaka-Nikāya; under the latter the fifth division is the Sutta-Nipāta, which has been translated from Pāli into English by E. M. Hare of Colombo, Ceylon, under the title "Woven Cadences of Early Buddhists." The series known as *The Sacred Books of the Buddhists* was begun in 1895 under the editorship of F. Max Müller, and continued by Rhys Davids and latterly by Mrs. Rhys Davids until her death a few years ago. This series is impressive for the ecumenicity of its scholarship; the translators of the several books represent England, Denmark, India, Ceylon, Tasmania, and the United States of America.

An English translation of the Sutta-Nipāta by Fausböll appeared in Volume X of *The Sacred Books of the East* (1880); that was in prose and rather literal in its rendering. A second translation into English was published by Lord Chalmers in the *Harvard Oriental Series,* Volume 37 (1932); here the Pāli text is on the left page and the English faces it on the opposite page. The poetry was rendered into verse, and, in consequence, it is quite free. In Hare's work, the poetic form has been retained in English, but, on the whole, his rendering is not so free as that of Lord Chalmers.

The Sutta-Nipāta is important for studies in primitive Buddhism, since it contains an ancient, if not the oldest, part of the Sutta-piṭaka. Even though we have two earlier translations of the Sutta-Nipāta, it was fitting to include a new rendering in the series of *The Sacred Books of the Buddhists* and, thus, make this ancient work accessible to a wider circle of students and readers. One wonders, however, why Pāli *Sutta-Nipāta* does not appear on the title page. The Buddhist canonical works are best known by their Pāli designations, and something is lost in dropping the euphonious name of the original. The extremely free translation, "Woven Cadences," seems so far removed from the better-known title Sutta-Nipāta.

This volume, however, is not intended only for the English reader who does not know Pāli. The indexes of proper names, words and subjects, Pāli words, word-play, alliteration and assonance, as well as the Concordance, are useful for the student of the original language. The book is attractive in form, and the translator is to be congratulated on the completion of his task.

HENRY S. GEHMAN

Studies in the Middle Way. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS. London: Luzac & Co., 1946. 136 pp. 6*s*.

The Flowing Stream: Reflections of the Middle Way. By CLARE CAMERON. London: The Buddhist Society, 1946. 48 pp. 1/6.

The first book is the second edition of a volume of essays by Mr. Christmas Humphreys, former editor of *The Middle Way*, the journal of the Buddhist Society, London, first published in 1940. They were, in the author's words, "written for the West rather than for the East," and, therefore, stress the Inner Life in its relation to the extravert life of action in the world. They do not claim to be orthodox Buddhist teaching, nor yet Theosophy, but are the author's own interpretation of Oriental religious thought. Essay No. XI, "The Religion of China," is of especial interest, for its clear analysis of the mutual interpenetration of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, with Buddhism serving as the middle term which reconciles the opposites represented by the other two.

The Flowing Stream is a collection of short editorials by Miss Clare Cameron, present editor of *The Middle Way*. They reflect the strain of the war years, and reveal the age-old dilemma of a religion of detachment faced with the unavoidable involvements in human life characteristic of a *Blitzkrieg*. But, in the last analysis, Buddhist serenity and British phlegmatic stoicism do have a peculiar sort of family resemblance!

M. B.

Tibetan Voices. By ROBERT B. EKVALL. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946. 63 pp. $1.50.

This slim volume of poems, with its attractive format, and charming line drawings by Jean Hammond, is of interest to the student of religion for its deep and sympathetic insight into the Buddhism of the simple folk of Tibet. As a Christian missionary, the author has only horror for the devil-ridden degenerate teachings of Lamaism, but he finds among the people themselves a remarkably sensitive receptiveness to the new Gospel of Hope which he brings them.

M. B.

Heirs of The Prophets. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER. Chicago: Moody Press, 1946. 137 pp. $2.00.

Using the tradition attributed to Muhammad that the Ulema are the heirs of the Prophets as the title of a study of those who may be termed clergy in Islam, Dr. Zwemer enumerates and describes different types of religious leadership and various institutions in Islam. In the introduction, Dr. Zaki Ali, an

Egyptian Muslim, is quoted as having written, "Islam has no clergy nor church organization, and the office of priesthood is rejected altogether. Any Muslim may suffice to conduct the ritual, and none is invested with sacred character." The statement of Professor William Thomson is also cited, "A class of religious officials arose, indeed as the result of a felt need, preaching sheikhs, Koran reciters, imams or leaders in prayer, and muezzins. But these officials do not form a closed profession. They have no special obligations." While admitting that Islam has no priests who have authority to administer sacraments or pronounce absolution, the author maintains that Islam has three religious classes quite comparable to "priests" and "clergy," those who are appointed to public worship and preaching, those who are theologians and masters in canon law, and those who are hereditary saints and holy men.

After discussing the pre-Islamic priesthood in Arabia, and the religious prerogatives of Muhammad and the early Caliphs, the mosque and its pulpit and personnel are described at length. Then follow chapters on such diverse subjects as the Sheikh al-Islam and the Mufti, the Azhar as the oldest theological seminary, religious funds and endowments, sacrifices and blood-covenants. The leaders who have influenced Islam through mysticism, the widely diffused Darwish orders, the Sharifs and Seyyids who claim distinction through family relationship with the Prophet Muhammad, and the Mahdis and New Messiahs who have appeared from time to time, are treated in this order. The book concludes with a chapter on the power and influence of the clergy today, and another on converts from the clergy to Christianity.

The very fact that so many various types of religious leaders can be cited might be used as an argument for the thesis which the author disputes, namely, that there is no clergy in Islam. So many of these are comparable in Western lands to teachers, scholars, lawyers, government employees, and officers in benevolent secret societies, that a real case for "a clergy" in Islam may be questioned. Should not the role of the parent in religious instruction be given great emphasis in the light of Islamic practice and the well-known tradition from Muhammad? "Order your children to perform worship when they reach the age of seven, and beat them [if they fail to do so] when they are ten" (Ahmad b. Hanbal, *Musnad* II, 180 etc.).

For some readers there will be confusion because the transliteration of Arabic words is not uniform: as, for example, "darwish" (pp. 97 ff.) is written "dervish" on page 128, and "sharifs" (pp. 110 ff.) as "sherifs" on page 24. Those who read with interest Dr. Zwemer's article on the clergy and the priesthood of Islam in the *Moslem World* (XXXIV, 17 ff.) will appreciate this fuller discussion of those who lead in the ceremonies and religious life of Muslim lands.

E. E. Elder

The Tomb of Jesus. By Sufi M. R. Bengalee. Chicago: Moslem Sunrise Press, 1946, 55 pp. 60 cents.

Some years ago Mr. Bengalee published a small pamphlet under this title which has had a wide circulation. This new edition is perhaps three times the length of the earlier one. The author, like all Ahmadiyya Moslems, believes that Jesus did not die on the cross but only swooned, was resuscitated, escaped from the tomb, went to India, spent some forty years preaching and teaching there, died and was buried in a tomb in Srinagar, Kashmir. Thither go many Ahmadiyyas on pilgrimage every year to do him honor.

He supports this contention with a variety of arguments. Relying largely upon western scholars for proof that Jesus was not dead when taken down from the cross, he asserts that he went to the Lost Tribes of the House of Israel, which the author identifies with the people of Afghanistan, Kashmir and surrounding regions. Anyone who is appealed to by the kind of evidence that supports the claims of the British Israelites will undoubtedly be impressed by his piling up of evidence. His use of scripture passages in support of his ideas resembles that of conservative Bible students, though they will hardly accept his conclusions. His argument for the identification of the Lost Tribes is not likely to appeal to the modern ethnologist or anthropologist.

Nevertheless, the book is very interesting, well written, and is so obviously the sincere belief of the writer that one must respect, even when he cannot accept, the author's conclusions. Reading such a booklet might be a salutary experience for those who have never come in contact with persons of another faith, and do not know how Jesus appears in their eyes. This is a thoroughly reverent study of one phase of the career of Jesus, by one who, while rejecting orthodox theological views of the person of Christ, does nevertheless hold him in highest esteem.

Charles S. Braden

In Time and Eternity. A Jewish Reader. Edited by Nahum N. Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 1946. 255 pp. $2.75.

This is a beautiful little book. It is beautifully printed and beautifully bound. It is a joy to handle. It is a pleasure to read. It is a treasure to contemplate. Its beauty is more than skin—or binding—deep. Nahum Glatzer, the editor, who, in 1932-33, held the unique chair in Jewish theology in the philosophy department of the University of Frankfort, succeeding Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, has ranged far and wide through many types of post-biblical and pre-emancipation Jewish literature, and has compiled a rich collection of brief selections on varied themes. The words of the learned and those of the pious, the sayings of the famous and those of the humble, come together in these pages.

What a mine of inspiration every page provides! There is the speech of Eleazar, the leader of the host at Masada after the fall of Jerusalem, exhorting

his men to face death nobly. "I regard it as a special grace of God that he has put us in a position to die honorably—as free people—a death not vouchsafed to those others who were taken unawares . . . we still have the free choice of dying a noble death together with our loved ones. Our enemies cannot prevent us from doing this" (p. 177). Again, the saneness and balance of such a passage as this (from Joseph Karo's *Shulhan Aruk*) commands our attention. "It is the duty of man to turn his eyes and his heart to his path, and to weigh all his doing in the balance of reason. If he sees something that will lead to serving the Creator, blessed be he, let him do it; if not, let him not do it. Whoever keeps to this will be constant in the service of his Creator" (p. 74). Or again, Nahman of Bratzlav's profoundly human comment: "There are men who suffer terrible distress and are unable to tell what they feel in their hearts, and they go their way and suffer and suffer. But if they meet one with a laughing face, he can revive them with his joy. And to revive a man is no slight thing" (p. 142).

These are random selections; they can be matched on every page. Each of the authors has considered deeply and earnestly the meaning of life and the significance of the human spirit. From such serious reflections we cannot fail to gain spiritual insight. Our debt to the editor and publisher of this beautiful volumes is a great one.

J. L. B.

Paganism to Christianity in the Roman Empire. By WALTER WOODBURN HYDE. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946. 296 pp. $4.00.

This work, which is the fruit of a lifetime's study, surveys the history of religion from the period of the Roman Republic to the final triumph of Christianity in the fifth century. In successive chapters, the author treats of the native Roman religion, the mystery cults, Judaism, and the origins and progress of Christianity. There is an Epilogue of some twenty pages, giving a summary treatment of the later developments in Judaism and Christianity, and an Appendix, containing three excursuses on "The Origins of Christmas," "Sunday Observance," and "Was St. Peter in Rome?"

The book is well arranged and clearly written, and contains a good deal of factual material well presented. Reference is frequently made, especially in the Christian sections, to different understandings of miraculous stories and events, the author's own tendencies lying in the direction of the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule.* The volume is excellently documented, and the writer reveals his wide acquaintance both with the sources and with modern critical studies.

While the work contains nothing particularly new, it has brought together, into convenient compass, much inaccessible material. Thus it is a useful survey of the field, and although one may take issue with many aspects of the presentation, it is a ready and competent source of information. It has a careful index, but, unfortunately, no bibliography.

Though the author attempts to describe the course of Roman and Christian religion with objectivity, he falls into the error of supposing that historical criticism has decisively disposed of many ancient beliefs. And, again and again, his canons of criticism reflect his own presuppositions about the way history happens. He fails to take into account the historical work of more conservative scholars, and, therefore, many of his own conclusions concerning the historicity of the Gospel story, etc., reveal his own faith (or lack of it), rather than an effort to wrestle with the problem of historicity as such. Had he paid more atention to opposing assessments of the evidence, he would have become aware that, on the purely historical level, his judgments are often too facile, and raise more difficulties than they solve.

C. C. R.

Religion on the American Frontier, 1783-1840: The Methodists. By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago Press, 1946. ix, 800 pp. $10.00.

This is the fourth in a series of volumes upon religion on the American frontier, the earlier ones having been devoted to Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. The plan of each volume is to present introductory chapter, giving the basic facts of the history of the denomination. Then follows a much longer section composed of documents such as minutes of Associations, Presbyteries, Councils, and Conferences, together with a great number of letters and autobiographical accounts. Many of these papers are here published for the first time.

Dr. Sweet collected far more material than could be included in his limited space. Therefore his problem was to select a few from among many papers, all of them authentic and informing, and to excerpt passages from more voluminous accounts, which would present accurately the experiences of the men who wrote them.

One hundred and fifty years ago European social and political conceptions brought to this country by the colonists were giving way to the democracy of everyday human relations, in a physical environment which encouraged, if it did not compel equality. Plenty of cheap land for everyone who desired a farm, free public schools, universal manhood suffrage, were characteristic of the developments of the period.

The life of the Churches in the same time shows the transition from Calvinism to Arminianism—from "predestination" to "salvation available for all." All our Churches during the Colonial period were more or less strongly Calvinistic; today, representative American denominations are equally Arminian. This book is not an argument in theology; instead it simply tells, in their own words, the experiences of the men who lived through the period in which this distinctive American conception of religion and life was being formed.

Students of our national life, for a long time to come, will stand in debt to

Dr. Sweet for perserving and making available these first-hand records of religious and social experience.

ROBERT W. GOODLOE

The Idea of Christ in the Gospels. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 266 pp. $2.75.

"My object," says Mr. Santayana early in this book, "is not to pass judgment on the validity of Gospel truths, either historical or metaphysical. I wish only to analyse and detach, as far as possible, one original element in the inspiration of the Gospels, namely the dramatic presentation of the person of Christ." The reader may wonder whether judgment can actually be passed on the drama in the Gospels, in any way that is religiously significant, without bringing up questions of historical or metaphysical validity. But, whether it be taken as poetry or as philosophy, what Mr. Santayana has to say is always interesting and important. This, like his other books, is one to read slowly and to ponder, as well as to enjoy for the sheer beauty of its language.

Toward the end, it becomes clear that what chiefly concerns Mr. Santayana about the Gospel story is the light it throws on the question of self-transcendence. The idea that existence is constantly transcending itself is, of course, a familiar one to his readers. Everything ideal has a natural basis; everything natural an ideal fulfillment. As he puts it here, everything "wastes itself in the service of something eventual, unknown and of uncertain value." Animal faith itself implies its own kind of expectation and action. Life, matter, knowledge, perpetually leap the chasm "from now to then, from here to there, from me to thee, from the given to the assumed, and from all times into eternity."

In the life of reason, transcendence is continually going on. Knowledge, since it has an object, is intrinsically self-transcending. In logic, each term moves from itself into its implications. And, just as vital feeling reaches out toward images and these, in turn, toward independent objects external to themselves, so spirit may transcend factual knowledge in order to move in the realm of ideas. "For what profit is there in discovering the order of nature or the history of mankind except that we may thereby protect and sweeten the transit of the soul through the world, and choose eternal objects of study and love?" Also, since experience is constantly offering itself in surrender to such ends as fame, insight, Nirvana, or the glory of God, why, asks Mr. Santayana, should it not be the normal life of the soul to transform itself in repentance and to fix its sights on the Kingdom of Heaven? With its theory of a supernatural soul in man, he continues, the idea of Christ shows us what the vocation of spirit in its essence is. It is to be incarnate, to suffer and do what is appointed, and to return at times to perfect union with God. True as it may be that materially life is characterized by constant flux, it is also true that in spirit sometimes it transcends itself and realizes the eternal.

"Moralism" in religion, as one would expect, comes out badly in this book. If God conformed to human morality, asks Mr. Santayana, could he be a god

at all? Nor does the appeal to history fare better. "As in poetry, so in religion, the question whether the events described have actually occurred is trivial and irrelevant. Anything may occur in infinite time. The question is what light it would kindle within us if it happened to happen." It is hard to resist the feeling that, in offering us a religion which sidesteps at least some of the issues raised by "moralism" and refuses to ask the question of historical fact, Mr. Santayana has gone only half way. But it is true that no one has described the half-way house with greater richness of insight, and it would also appear to be true that a religion of poetry and imagination such as this one is not prevented by anything in its own nature from going further.

J. S. Bixler

Preaching Values in the Bible. By Corwin Carlyle Roach. Louisville, Ky.: The Cloister Press, 1946. vii, 299 pp. $2.50.

Dean Roach has placed preachers very considerably in his debt with the publication of these thoughtful notes and comments on the use of the English Bible in homiletics. The substance of the book has been given in lectures to seminarians, and has clearly been refined by those minor fires. Perhaps too much time is taken reminding readers of the elementary steps in biblical interpretation—the clergy, for example, who will and should use this book widely, hardly need to be advised of the complexity of biblical literature, or that "it is hard to tell sometimes where myth and legend leave off and where true history begins" (p. 17). And the author makes astonishing private ventures, as when the J document is accused of degrading man to the level of the beast (p. 99).

But it is a straightforward, suggestive, helpful book and will be of great value to teachers and preachers.

S. F. B. Jr.

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